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FOREWORD 
 
 
Today, western Balkans states are a long way from where they were at the beginning of the 
decade. The Stabilization and Association process, which has just started in 2000, is almost 
completed as all the states have negotiated and signed the Stabilization and Association 
Agreements with the EU, the EU is negotiating visa liberalization agreements and all states are 
entitled to the new pre-accession financial assistance IPA, designed to address the strategic 
needs of the region. This progress, apart from the persistent efforts of the national governments 
and the EU administration, is also partly due to the visionary policy reports and 
recommendations of people and organizations working on the Balkans. We are convinced that 
their commitment to the region and the ability to look beyond the limitations of the immediate 
political context for lasting solutions makes them an irreplaceable item on every reading-list of 
both those who wish to study the Balkan region and those who aim to produce similar such 
reports addressing the present dilemmas and challenges for the western Balkan states.        
  
“The Enlargement of the EU to Balkans” is a compilation of four reports on the Balkans 
published since 2000. They all concern the Balkan region and its prospects for the future – 
away from violent legacies towards peace, stability and European integration. As such, they are 
a valuable source for all those interested in and studying the recent political developments in 
this region, for these reports give an overview of the challenges that Balkans states faced on the 
start of their journey to European integration. We hope this collection of reports will become 
part of the curricula of schools and departments where Balkan politics, history and EU 
integration are taught.    
 
From the multitude of reports, books and other works written on the Balkans, the reports that 
follow were not chosen accidentally. Rather, we aimed to include the most influential reports, 
those which had the greatest impact on the EU and international community’s approach 
towards the Balkans, those with the most valuable recommendations concerning the features of 
EU’s policy towards the Balkans. The results of in-depth field research and analysis of 
diplomatic relations in the region, these reports provided the most credible assistance to the 
European and other policy-makers when faced with the dilemma ‘how to deal with post-
conflict post-Milosevic Balkans?’ By publishing their reports again, we also like to pay tribute 
to those people and organizations that made their most for Balkans to be found in EU 
integration map.   
 
 
 
In this collection we feature: “After Milosevic: a Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace” 
by the International Crisis Group, “The European Union and the Balkans: From Stabilization 
Process to Southeastern Enlargement” by ELIAMEP and CAP, “The Road to Thessaloniki: 
Cohesion and the Western Balkans” by the European Stability Initiative and  “The Balkans in 
Europe’s Future” by International Commission on the Balkans.  
 
“After Milosevic: a Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace” published by the 
International Crisis Group is a comprehensive analysis of the challenges and prospects faced 
by each of the Western Balkans states and the region as a whole after the fall of Milosevic 
regime in Serbia, as well as the international dimensions of the Balkan problems. Among the 
other recommendations, the report stands strongly in favour of increased commitment of 
Europe to the Balkans through focused technical and financial assistance aimed at maintaining 
the reform momentum and institution-building.  
 
“The European Union and the Balkans: From Stabilization Process to Southeastern 
Enlargement”, a joint effort of ELIAMEP and CAP, calls for a consistent and transparent 
overall strategy with more coherent sets of policies and instruments providing concrete 
“stepping stones” - distinct intermediate incentives with immediate benefits. Published in 2002, 
when none of the western Balkans states had a candidate status awarded, the reports call for a 
‘paradigm shift’ – looking at Balkan issues through the lens of EU integration rather then 
international intervention, a shift that is likely to produce better results and lead the region 
towards stability and prosperity.  
 
“The Road to Thessaloniki: Cohesion and the Western Balkans” published in 2003 by the 
European Stability Initiative argues for cohesion as the guiding principle of European policy 
towards the Western Balkans, so that the widening gap between western Balkan and the other 
East and South East European states is covered through increased aid and assistance from the 
EU.  
 
Finally, International Commission on the Balkans in 2005 published “The Balkans in Europe’s 
Future” analyzes the best way to draw the western Balkan states closer to the European 
mainstream. The report reiterates the fact that EU integration for these states is not a question 
of ‘if’ they will join the EU, but rather ‘how’ to better realize goal through policy tools and 
practices adequate to the specific political and economic legacies of the region. This report 
calls for an active role of the EU in assisting the western Balkan states in their state-building 
efforts thus helping their transformation from nation states to EU member-states.        
 
 
 
We hope you find our selection of reports a useful, interesting and enjoyable read. Analytica 
will continue to prepare Collection of Policy Reports on topics relevant to western Balkans 
politics, societies and development. 
 
 
 
Analytica Team      
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FOREWORD
The October 2000 democratic uprising in Serbia gave the world new hope
that the horror, chaos and misery that devastated the Balkans - through a
decade of four wars, and of murder, atrocity and economic destruction on a
massive scale - were finally at an end.
But the problems of security and stability in the region have not suddenly
been solved by Slobodan Milosevic’s defeat - or by his incarceration as this
report goes to press. Nationalist sentiment remains pervasive; sovereignty
issues remain unsettled; tens of thousands of refugees cannot return home;
and war criminals remain unpunished. Political and other institutions
throughout the region are fragile. Corruption is endemic,and the evidence
of economic failure is everywhere. Unless these issues are addressed quickly
and decisively, the potential for renewed conflict remains grave.
Serbia’s political transformation has unleashed high expectations, but the
peoples of the Balkans and the international community must take a
comprehensive and forward-looking approach to the current situation if
those expectations are not to remain dangerously unfulfilled. Fundamental
institutional change is crucial, and final status issues have to be addressed
sooner rather than later.
In this re p o rt , the International Crisis Group (ICG) makes many
recommendations as to how best to move forward,some of them going well
beyond the present cautious international consensus. The test for us in each
case has not been what is currently acceptable in the diplomatic marketplace
- though many of our recommendations should be - but what will contribute
to lasting peace, bearing always in mind the need to apply consistent
principles and to consider the wider consequences of every action. Some of
our key recommendations are:
o For Montenegro, that it no longer be actively discouraged from seeking
i n d e p e n d e n c e , and that the international community focus more
c o n s t ru c t i ve ly on helping Po d go rica and Belgrade to find a mu t u a l ly
satisfactory basis for a new relationship.
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o For Kosovo, that the reality, legitimacy and permanence of the split from
Serbia be acknowledged; that early Kosovo-wide elections be held to
establish a democratic leadership; that the final political settlement
p rocess then be commenced; and that the option of “ c o n d i t i o n a l
independence”be closely explored.
o For Serbia,that the embrace by the international community of the new
government be less uncritical, with it being held to the same high
standards demanded of other Balkans countries, notably Croatia, in
particular on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal.
o For Bosnia, that a tough policy be maintained toward all extremist
nationalists;that the secession of Republika Srpska not be contemplated;
and that Dayton be vigorously enforced to create the conditions for
ultimate acceptance of a more viable post-Dayton governance structure.
o For Macedonia, that the international community assist in every way
necessary to maintain the territorial integrity of the country, but at the
same time treat the basic problem as political rather than military, insisting
on a serious and sustained effort to address the political and cultural
concerns of ethnic Albanians.
This re p o rt is built on the ex p e rience of fi ve ye a rs of field-based analysis by the
I C G. Since our fi rst project commenced in Sara j evo in 1996, we have pro d u c e d
on the Balkans three book-length re p o rts and over 140 other re p o rts and
b ri e fing papers . This is the fi rst time we have tried to look at the re gion as a
w h o l e , a d d ressing all the outstanding issues, a p p lying ex p e rience learn e d
e l s ew h e re , and identifying wherever possible common policy themes and
a p p ro a ch e s . It is an appro a ch we have long been urging upon gove rn m e n t s
t h e m s e l ve s , who have too often responded in an ad hoc and piecemeal fa s h i o n
to pro blems crying out for a compre h e n s i ve appro a ch .
Our endeavour is ambitious: to analyse the sources of possible further confl i c t
and offer practical policy measures - including on the critical and sensitive
constitutional issues - to prevent that happening. We have sought to identify
roles and responsibilities for both local actors and key playe rs in the
i n t e rnational commu n i t y, i n cluding the European Union, United States and
R u s s i a .
Our focus in this report is not on the entire area that has historically or
geographically been described as “the Balkans” but on the seven entities
where the remaining problems - and potential for conflict - in the Balkans are
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most concentrated, and where policy makers most need to focus their
attention: Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo (together making up the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia),Bosnia,Macedonia,Croatia and Albania.
Many friends,supporters and staff of ICG helped to shape this report, and I
thank them all warmly for their contributions. They cannot all be named,but
the members of the ICG team who contributed most directly to the writing
and editing process over many gruelling months were Bob Churcher, Michael
Doyle, James Lyon, Peter Palmer, Brenda Pearson, Louis Sell and Miranda
Vickers of our Balkans field staff;Theodora Adekunle,Mark Pierce and,more
recently, Mark Thompson from ICG’s Brussels headquarters;and John Norris,
who worked with me as coordinating editor.
Much remains to be done before the Balkans can shed the burden of the
region’s own divisions,and before peace and stability once and for all make
the threat of violent conflict just an unhappy memory. It is our hope that this
report will be seen as a timely and useful guide as to how policy makers can
take major and lasting steps in that direction.
Gareth Evans 
President
Brussels, 2 April 2001
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Challenge of Achieving Lasting Peace
Slobodan Milosevic has go n e , but he has left behind him in the Balkans a
bitter legacy of death, d e s t ruction and distru s t . His democra t i c
ove rt h row was a wa t e rs h e d , but the potential for re n ewed conflict in the
re gion remains dange ro u s ly high, and it is vital that there be fo r wa rd -
looking and compre h e n s i ve action by the international community to
a d d ress the continuing sources of underlying tension.
A c ross the Balkans, s e c u rity and stability continue to be undercut by
l i n ge ring nationalism, f ragile and unre s p o n s i ve gove rnment institutions,
u n d e r p e r fo rming economies, u n d e l i ve red justice and the issue of
u n re t u rned re f u ge e s . B reaking the cycle of violence in the re gion will
re q u i re shattering the hold on power of narrow and often anti-
d e m o c ratic political elites, and accelerating difficult transitions to lasting
political and economic re fo rm .
As recent outbreaks of violence in southern Serbia and Macedonia
u n d e rs c o re , events in the seven countries and entities cove red by this
re p o rt - Serbia, M o n t e n e gro , Ko s ovo , B o s n i a , C ro a t i a , Macedonia and
Albania - will move dy n a m i c a l ly and unpre d i c t ably in the immediate
t e rm . Anticipating to the extent possibl e , and responding to, these eve n t s
will be a continuing test of the transatlantic commu n i t y ’s bro a d e r
political aspira t i o n : to socially and economically integrate the re gion into
a democratic and peaceful Euro p e .
The international commu n i t y ’s response to events in the Balkans has too
often been re a c t i ve and ad hoc. The overwhelming need now is to set
clear goals and pursue them consistently. And the fo remost goal now
must be to peacefully and enduri n g ly settle unre s o l ved political status
and minority rights issues in all the are a s , b e ginning with the Fe d e ra l
R e p u blic of Yu go s l avia and its component entities, w h e re they re m a i n
most contentious.
Settling and moving past these difficult issues - not just hoping they will go
away - will  allow for mu ch more rapid improvements in securi t y, e c o n o m i c
grow t h , re gional integration and human rights across the entire we s t e rn
B a l k a n s , as well as in a number of neighbouring states. Until the
fundamental gove rning stru c t u res of these societies are cl a ri fi e d , all their
institutions will remain built upon a foundation of sand.
The Future of the FRY
The stakes invo l ved in resolving the final and future political status of the
F RY are high, c rucial in determining whether the re gion emerges into a new
e ra of stability and re l a t i ve pro s p e rity or continues to be plagued by
divisions capable of escalating into wa r. Until clear directions are set, t h e
F RY ’s current constituent parts (Serbia,M o n t e n e gro and Ko s ovo) and mu ch
of the Balkans, will remain in an uneasy limbo. Fo reign inve s t o rs will be
d e t e rred by the continuing uncert a i n t y, issues of ow n e rship and other
basic legal rights will remain clouded by mu d dy constitutional stru c t u re s
and politics will remain plagued by nationalism.
The constitutional and legal stru c t u res of the FRY we re neither intended
nor designed to meet the needs of any modern ,d e m o c ratic state. The time
has come for the international community to assist in an ord e r ly and
d e m o c ratic process to re s o l ve future and final status issues. The task,
p a rt i c u l a r ly for Ko s ovo is huge : to confront the reality that the status quo is
not sustainabl e ; to identify processes that will move things fo r wa rd
c o n s t ru c t i ve ly ; and to find ultimate solutions that are principled and
c o n s i s t e n t , and don’t make things wo rs e ,i n cluding within the wider re gi o n .
Hopes that the FRY can be reconstituted - on a transitional or perm a n e n t
basis - as a loose fe d e ration or confe d e ration with little or no power ve s t e d
in central authorities - appear  painfully detached from political re a l i t y. B o t h
M o n t e n e gro and Serbia remain reluctant to enter into a revised fe d e ra l
a rra n gement as co-equals; Ko s ovo wants nothing to do with Serbia or the
F RY at all.
M o n t e n e g ro should no longer be discourage d , as it has been by the
i n t e rnational commu n i t y, f rom seeking independence. C o n c e rns about this
t ri g ge ring internal confl i c t , n e g a t i ve impacts on Serbia and in Ko s ovo , a n d
domino effects in Bosnia and elsew h e re , h ave all been ove rs t a t e d . T h e
d e p a rt u re of Montenegro from the FRY would not mean its automatic
dissolution as a legal entity, nor effect the operation of United Nations
S e c u rity Council Resolution 1244 in Ko s ovo .
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T h e re are a number of constitutional models ava i l able through which
M o n t e n e gro and Serbia can retain some of their traditional ties and
a d vance common intere s t s . As Montenegro navigates its way thro u g h
fo rthcoming elections and a possible independence re fe re n d u m ,
discussions should be held with Serbia on a wide ra n ge of issues that mu s t
be re s o l ved whatever stru c t u re fo rm a l ly binds them or not in the future ,
s u ch as monetary policy, t a x a t i o n , e nv i ronmental regulation and
c o o p e ration over pensions, education and healthcare .
For its part , the international community - perhaps through mediating
assistance from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Euro p e
(OSCE) or Group of Eight (G-8) - should help Montenegro and Serbia to
find a mu t u a l ly satisfa c t o ry basis for this new re l a t i o n s h i p . The appro a ch
until now of seeking to pre s s u re Montenegro into drawing back fro m
independence has been both unconstru c t i ve and ineffe c t i ve , and has
d i s c o u raged Belgrade from engaging in meaningful dialogue.
In K o s o v o, the pro found gulf between Belgrade and Pristina has led many
in the international community to assume that Ko s ovo ’s final status
remains too ex p l o s i ve a subject to tackle in the near term . H oweve r
substantial pro gress towa rd building a viable economy, d e radicalising the
p rov i n c e , and stabilising the neighbourhood (part i c u l a r ly in southern
Serbia and we s t e rn Macedonia) will be virt u a l ly impossible unless gre a t e r
cl a rity is brought to the fundamental legal and constitutional fra m ewo rk in
Ko s ovo .
The fi rst step is to establish with no further delay a full system of
d e m o c ratic and autonomous self-gove rnment within Ko s ovo - the full set
of “ p rovisional institutions”, l e gi s l a t i ve , exe c u t i ve and judicial, re fe rred to
in Resolution 1244 and described in more detail in the Rambouillet
a c c o rd s .
The second step should be to establish a focal point for Resolution 1244’s
“political process designed to determine Ko s ovo ’s future status”. The most
o bvious candidate for that role is the “ i n t e rnational meeting” ( a n t i c i p a t e d
as occurring three ye a rs out by the Rambouillet nego t i a t o rs in 1999) held
under the aegis of the G-8 or the OSCE.
The third step would be for consultations to occur - pre fe rably, but not
n e c e s s a ri ly, in the context of an anticipated international meeting of the
kind just described - on the principles that might constitute the
foundations for a final political settlement. In keeping with Helsinki Fi n a l
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Act principles, a peacefully agreed adjustment of Kosovo’s border (possibly
involving both northern Kosovo and the Presevo valley) should not be ruled
out as part of such a settlement. This would not be rewarding ethnic
cleansing, and there are no relevant parallels with demands for partition in
Bosnia.
The most appropriate status for Kosovo to emerge from such consultations
may be “conditional independence”,which could involve preconditions (e.g.
minority rights protection) having to be satisfied for a period before all the
benefits of recognition (e.g. UN membership) are granted; the permanent
renunciation of some forms of action (e.g. territorial expansion);and a form
of a period of international trusteeship,in which certain veto powers would
qualify Kosovo’s capacity to exercise complete sovereignty.
Serbia Internally
Even after Milosevic’s departure,Serbia faces enormous challenges - resolving
the constitutional relationship with Montenegro and Ko s ovo , re s t o ri n g
accountability and the rule of law, addressing an insurgency in the Presevo
valley and bringing new life into an economy decimated by mismanagement
and debt.
Reformers and hard-liners are struggling with each other to define Serbia’s
place in the world in a battle with high stakes, and the struggle between
liberal European-style policies and holdover nationalist policies continues.
The new leadership in Serbia will not necessarily embrace policies aimed at
creating regional stability, and the embrace of the new government by the
international community should be less uncritical: it should be held to the
same high standards demanded of other Balkans countries,notably Croatia.
The international community must certainly continue to insist that Milosevic
be tried not in a local court but under international law, in an international
court, for the war crimes for which he has been indicted. A range of policies
still supported by Belgrade are unacceptable, including its policies toward
ethnic minori t i e s , s u p p o rt for ex t remist elements in both Bosnia and
northern Kosovo,and the continuing detainment of large numbers of ethnic
Albanian “political prisoners”.
The international community should closely condition financial assistance on
Serbia’s ability to meet clear benchmarks with regard to economic and
democratic reforms and cooperation with the Hague tribunal. If the
standards are met,both the European Union (EU) and U.S. should initiate a
c o m p re h e n s i ve economic assistance stra t e gy for providing the FRY
desperately needed technical assistance to rapidly reform the old socialist
economic laws and carry out privatisation.
The FRY gove rn m e n t ’s reaction to insurgency in southern Serbia by ethnic
Albanian guerrillas has been re a s o n ably re s t ra i n e d . While that re s t raint and better
We s t e rn policing and imagi n a t i ve diplomacy may hold down the fi g h t i n g , t h e
situation in southern Serbia will remain dange ro u s ly unstable as long as Ko s ovo ’s
status is unre s o l ve d .
M o n t e n e g ro Intern a l l y
Over the past three years,Montenegro has increasingly come to operate as a
separate state, and it continues to focus its energies on resolving its
constitutional status within the FRY or outside it. Opinion polls persistently
show that none of the various options for the republic’s future status enjoys
overwhelming support. Opposition to independence is strong,especially in
parts of the north, but it does not appear severe enough to trigger violence
or a counter separatist movement.
In order for the process by which Montenegro decides on its future status to
have credibility, strict adherence to the Montenegrin constitution - which
ultimately requires a two-thirds majority in parliament - is advisable, if the
appearance is to be avoided of rules being manipulated at will in much the
same way that Milosevic abused the federal constitution.
Beyond its status, Montenegro also needs to make progress in key areas of
reform such as public administration and the judiciary. The United States and
the EU will need to move from their earlier priority of direct budget support
to supporting sustainable reform, including thorough overhaul of the party-
state apparatus,and the networks of cronyism,nepotism and corruption that
go with it.
Kosovo Internally
Kosovo is adrift,and real stability will continue to elude it and the adjoining
areas in Serbia and Macedonia until substantial self-government is put in place
and a process for resolving the province’s political status is resolved.
Renewed rioting in Mitrovica, violence in Serbia’s Presevo valley, clashes on
the Macedonia border and attacks on bus convoys escorted by the NATO-led
Kosovo Force (KFOR) all served to drive home this point that while Kosovo
is not out of control,violence is lurking near the surface.
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Issues surrounding Kosovo’s final status remain central to virtually all the
challenges facing the province, from security to economic growth to basic
governance. The lack of any foreseeable resolution of the status of Kosovo
and the resulting continued insecurity for the people of Kosovo complicates
almost every one of Kosovo’s other problems,especially ef forts to encourage
reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs. As long as Albanians fear and
Serbs hope that Belgrade’s rule might return,each side will be preparing both
psychologically and practically for the next war, deflecting attention from
other pressing political,economic,and social problems.
KFOR and United Nations Interim A d m i n i s t ration in Ko s ovo (UNMIK) can
both take important steps to help destroy the illegal armed groups that
o p e rate among both the Albanian and the Serb commu n i t i e s . This will
re q u i re a more focused and ag gre s s i ve posture against both ethnic and
political violence. A critical element in dealing with the Serbs of Ko s ovo ,
and indeed in pre s e rving Ko s ovo as a single entity, is regaining control of
M i t rov i c a .
The municipal elections of October 2000 we re an important symbolic step
in demonstrating Ko s ovo ’s commitment to democra c y. By and large ,
Albanian political part i e s , c a n d i d a t e s , and media behaved in a re s p o n s i bl e
fa s h i o n . UNMIK should have then moved quick ly to begin the complicated
and potentially dange rous process of creating the provisional democra t i c
institutions specified in Resolution 1244. U n fo rt u n a t e ly the reasons fo r
inactivity and caution are cl e a r. Without strong international support , t h e
UN administration is afraid any pro gress or decision may be seen as
p rejudicing the question of final status, and disturb the new gove rnment in
B e l gra d e . Again new cl a rity of thought, and a new direction are re q u i re d
f rom the major international actors .
B o s n i a
Bosnia is still burdened by the legacy of war and trapped by the
c o n t radictions of the Dayton Peace A gre e m e n t . B o s n i a ’s nationalist
politicians have pre s e rved considerable populist appeal, often paying little
m o re than lip service to Dayton and have devoted their energies over the
last fi ve and a half ye a rs thwa rting re fo rm , with the most recent ch a l l e n ge
coming from the Croat hard l i n e rs . A ny move now towa rd intern a t i o n a l
d i s e n g agement or outright partition of the country would be disastrous -
risking undoing all the gains to date and potentially tri g ge ring re n ewe d
c o n fl i c t .
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Since 2000, the international administration has been more active in
b reaking down the influence of nationalist ex t re m i s t s , and building up
B o s n i a ’s state institutions. But if the international community wa l ked away
t o m o rrow those institutions would cru m bl e . E ven with more coopera t i ve
gove rnments now at state and Fe d e ration leve l s , m o re vigo ro u s
e n fo rcement measures remain necessary for Bosnia to ach i eve stab i l i t y.
The enfo rcement mechanisms granted by the Dayton A greement must be
used to further strengthen Bosnia’s central institutions while eroding the
p ower base of factions that oppose the development of a functioning,
d e m o c ratic state and the re i n t e gration of Bosnia’s ethnic commu n i t i e s .
E ffe c t i ve ly implementing, a landmark Constitutional Court ruling ag a i n s t
ethnic discrimination may be the key to ach i eving a smoother transition to
a more viable post-Dayton gove rnance stru c t u re . While building Bosnia’s
c e n t ral institutions, the High Repre s e n t a t i ve must use his authority to
eliminate political party control over pension funds, p u bl i cly - ow n e d
e n t e r p ri s e s , the judiciary, the civil service and police; t race the funding
m e chanisms and patro n age netwo rks of political part i e s ; and enable the
local judiciary to prosecute corrupt offi c i a l s . The OSCE, O H R , UN and all
other international agencies in Bosnia, under the direction of OHR, mu s t
d evelop a detailed plan for pushing the full implementation of the
Constitutional Court decision on the constituent peoples of Bosnia. I n
p a rt i c u l a r, the OSCE should investigate voting rules and gove rn i n g
s t ru c t u res that violate the decision.
Sooner or later the representatives of these communities will have to replace
the Dayton governing structures with something more viable, but this will
only be productive after Bosnia’s numerous constitutions and laws have been
amended in line with the Constitutional Court’s ruling. The logical end-point
for reform of the Dayton structure would appear to be a strengthened central
gove rn m e n t , with reduced or no roles for the two present “ e n t i t i e s ”
(Republika Srpska and the Federation), replacement structures for the
cantons (re s e m bling the pre - war “ o k ru z i ” , with reduced fiscal and
administrative powers),and enhanced powers for the municipalities.
Croatia
Croatia continues to make impressive strides in distancing itself from its
nationalist past. Its restraint in dealing with Bosnian Croat hard-liners and
continued willingness to move toward international standards are welcome.
However, it still has to tackle difficult issues of economic reform,and to make
further progress with regard to the return of refugees and its treatment of the
Serb minority:the Tudjman legacy dies hard.
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Since parliamentary and presidential elections in Croatia in early 2000,
C roatia has taken major strides in strengthening democracy and the ru l e
of law. It has also played an incre a s i n g ly constru c t i ve role in the re gi o n ,
p a rt i c u l a r ly by its refusal to support or encourage Croat nationalist
ex t remists in Bosnia. This pro gress has been wa rm ly re c e i ved by the
i n t e rnational commu n i t y, as re flected in the country ’s admission to
NATO ’s Pa rt n e rship for Peace pro gra m , the ending of the Council of
E u ro p e ’s monitoring re gime and the November 2000 initiation of
n e gotiations for a Stability and Association A greement with the Euro p e a n
U n i o n .
M a c e d o n i a
Recent violence has made clear the need not only to contain conflict in
the short - t e rm but to bring greater energy to the underlying political task
of improving civil rights and relations between the country ’s Macedonian-
speaking and Albanian-speaking commu n i t i e s . It has also re i n fo rced the
need to speed pro gress in Ko s ovo towa rd self-gove rnment and re s o l u t i o n
of its final status. M u ch remains to be done in Macedonia to re d u c e
c o rru p t i o n , re m ove other impediments to economic growth and improve
the quality of gove rn a n c e .
In late Fe b ru a ry 2001, violence fl a red in villages in nort h e rn Macedonia
close to the border with Ko s ovo and in mid-March , the fighting spread to
M a c e d o n i a ’s second largest city,Te t ovo . W h a t ever the re b e l s ’ i n t e n t i o n s ,
t h ey cl e a r ly tapped into the fru s t rated local demands for basic minori t y
ri g h t s : c i t i z e n s h i p , ow n e rs h i p , e d u c a t i o n , l a n g u age and re p re s e n t a t i ve
gove rn m e n t . The Macedonian gove rnment should accept, and the
i n t e rnational community continue to insist, that the pri m a ry focus in
resolving Macedonia’s internal security pro blems must be political ra t h e r
than military. A serious effo rt must be made by Macedonian-speake rs to
a d d ress the re a s o n able political, c u l t u ral and economic concerns of the
Albanian-speaking commu n i t y. The international community should help
to bro ker talks on minority rights and hold the gove rnment to higher
d e m o c ratic standards over elections and human ri g h t s .
NATO ’s role in containing guerilla activity from the Ko s ovo side of the
b o rder is cru c i a l . Within Macedonia it should continue its ex i s t i n g
t raining and support pro gra m s , and be pre p a red to consider an active ro l e
in support of the Macedonian security fo rces against further rebel activity
if the country ’s gove rnment so re q u e s t s . But the NATO allies mu s t
recognize the need to maintain primacy for a political rather than military
s o l u t i o n .
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Albania
Albania’s preoccupations are internal, as it struggles to establish the rule of
law, battle   endemic corruption, restructure its economy and build the basic
institutions of governance. Western efforts in support of strategies to stem
the flow of illegal weapons and other forms of trafficking are essential.
While Albania has made important strides in re s t o ring essential ord e r, t h e
c e n t ral ch a l l e n ges facing Albania include re s t ru c t u ring an economy
s eve re ly hampered by outdated and obsolete industry ; filling the social
vacuum left by the collapse of a ri gid authori t a rian state; combating cri m e
and corruption and disarming the civilian population; and balancing the
n ew ly enhanced sense of Albanian national consciousness throughout the
s o u t h e rn Balkans with respect for the multi-ethnic nature of the re gion and
the integrity of surrounding states.
A l b a n i a ’s neighbours - Gre e c e , B u l g a ri a , Tu rkey, Macedonia and Italy - and
the administra t o rs of Ko s ovo , should take urgent steps to strengthen their
c o o p e ra t i o n , in particular in closer border monitori n g , over the pro blem of
illegal tra ffi cking of people, d rugs and weapons through A l b a n i a . T h e
p rovision of logistical and communications equipment for use ag a i n s t
illegal tra ffi ck i n g , and help in establishing a re gional centre against illegal
t ra ffi cking in A l b a n i a , would be part i c u l a r ly va l u abl e .
Regional Cooperation and the Stability Pact
For the fo re s e e able future ,re gional cooperation in the Balkans is more like ly
to develop incre m e n t a l ly, f rom the ground up rather than arch i t e c t u ra l ly,
f rom the top dow n . T h e re is an ingrained suspicion of grander re gi o n a l
o rganisations - but plenty of scope for bilateral and small group mu l t i l a t e ra l
c o o p e ration in a va riety of economic areas (especially infra s t ru c t u re ,b o rd e r
c o n t rols and trade agre e m e n t s ) , while security arra n gements and cro s s -
b o rder cultural ties are also fe rtile areas for such pro gra m s .
The Stability Pact for South Eastern Euro p e , welcomed in 1999 by some as
a latter day Marshall Plan, was meant to improve coordination of
i n t e rnational assistance while emphasising re gional coopera t i o n . B u t ,
without significant re s o u rces or mu ch planning or implementation capacity
of its ow n , the Pact has so far failed to live up to ex p e c t a t i o n s . For the
S t ability Pact to play a more effe c t i ve role in building re gional growth and
c o o p e ration it will need to focus its effo rts better and determine where it
o ffe rs a compara t i ve adva n t age .
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E u ro p e
E u rope is well positioned to take a coordinated and fo r wa rd-looking appro a ch
to the Balkans,but it cannot simply hope that a “common European home” w i l l
c u re all the re gi o n ’s ills. Both the EU and the Balkan countries face mu ch steeper
ch a l l e n ges than they have publ i cly ack n ow l e d ged in wo rking towa rd eve n t u a l
a c c e s s i o n , and the EU will need to cl o s e ly focus its immediate assistance to
ge n e rate tangi ble benefits and maintain the momentum for re fo rm .
Wa s h i n g t o n ’s incre a s i n g ly distant appro a ch to Balkans diplomacy gi ves the
E u ropeans new opportunities to set the necessary conflict prevention age n d a ,
but it is hard to break old habits of doing too little too late.
The major European countries and institutions, l i ke other key intern a t i o n a l
a c t o rs , should adopt a less negative appro a ch towa rd the holding of final and
f u t u re status discussions in the re gi o n ,and be more open-minded about possibl e
o u t c o m e s . By continuing to insist upon the retention of the FRY in some fo rm
and to oppose the creation of any new s t a t e s , the major European actors are
j e o p a rdising their role as honest bro ke rs in such discussions.
If the U. S . seeks to continue to limit its military engagement in the re gi o n ,
E u rope will need to establish just how mu ch it is pre p a red to do in the re gi o n ,
either by assuming a larger role in the NATO operation or considering an
o p e ration that is not stri c t ly NATO-led - a dange rous path. NATO, the OSCE and
the EU need to wo rk collab o ra t i ve ly to help militaries in the re gion re d u c e
t roops stre n g t h ,i m p rove equipment, p ro fe s s i o n a l i s e ,m ove towa rd part n e rs h i p
with We s t e rn military stru c t u res and become part n e rs with a stake in re gi o n a l
s e c u ri t y.
In terms of membership of the EU,t h e re needs to be a cl e a rer and more re a l i s t i c
a ck n owledgment on both sides of the enormous difficulties invo l ved for the
Balkans countries in meeting EU accession cri t e ri a . The EU should focus on
e ffo rts that have the best prospects for ge n e rating job creation and short - t e rm
economic growth in the re gion to maintain the momentum for re fo rm ,i n cl u d i n g
cl a ri fication of pro p e rty ri g h t s , a decision to relax the rules on inve s t m e n t
g u a rantees for new investments in the Balkans and organising standard rules on
dispute settlement.
The United States
The U. S . has been a peri o d i c a l ly re l u c t a n t , but often indispensabl e , fo rce in the
B a l k a n s . M o re vigo rous U. S . diplomatic and military leadership proved essential
in tra n s fo rming the disastrous international community policies of the early- and
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mid-1990s into the far more effe c t i ve appro a ches of the last seve ral ye a rs .
The current U. S . a p p ro a ch to the Balkans - seemingly designed with limiting
diplomatic and military engagement in the re gion as a central goal - risks both
alienating allies and creating a more dange rous situation on the gro u n d .
Washington should not become so obsessed with avoiding “mission cre e p ”t h a t
it compromises the ability of its fo rces in the re gion to effe c t i ve ly preve n t
re n ewed confl i c t . G i ven its immediate interests in the re gi o n , and the scope of
A m e rican military capab i l i t i e s , the continuing deployment of U. S . fo rces in the
Balkans is a modest inve s t m e n t .
The next round of NATO expansion will carry great political import in the
re gi o n , and U. S . v i ews towa rd expanding the alliance will be viewed as a
b a rometer of Wa s h i n g t o n ’s willingness to re a ch out to South Eastern Euro p e .
The U. S . should maintain pre s s u re on Belgrade to reject unacceptable policies
s u ch as its support for ex t remist elements in Bosnia and a continuing pattern of
d i s c rimination against minori t i e s ,while developing a compre h e n s i ve economic
assistance stra t e gy for providing the FRY technical assistance to carry out
p ri vatisation and other re fo rm effo rt s . The U. S . should also reconsider its
bl a n ket rejection of potential joint KFOR-FRY patrols in southern Serbia.
Russia 
R u s s i a ’s engagement in the Balkans during the last decade has proved a
d e c i d e d ly mixed blessing for all parties invo l ve d , often deeply complicated by
R u s s i a ’s own social and economic tra n s fo rm a t i o n . While Russia’s re s o u rces are
m o re limited at this juncture than that of the EU and the United States, it can still
p l ay an enduring and positive role in the re gi o n .
Russia should take an active role in encouraging Montenegro ,Serbia and Ko s ovo
to re s o l ve their final and future status issues peacefully, with protection fo r
m i n o rity rights and a shared understanding by parties to a settlement that the
t e rri t o rial integrity of new states must be re s p e c t e d . Russia should also maintain
its peacekeeping presence in the re gi o n , and take great care to ensure that its
assistance to Macedonia, w h a t ever fo rm it take s , does not inadve rt e n t ly
exacerbate tensions between Macedonia’s Slav and Albanian commu n i t i e s .
The United Nations
The Balkans have been a difficult crucible for the United Nations. In many
ways,the events over the last decade have cut to the very core of the role the
international community wants the UN to play in the modern world.
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The UN’s relative effectiveness in carrying out its civil administrative duties
in Kosovo,and its more limited role in Bosnia,will have a positive impact on
the future of these societies. While these tasks rarely draw the s a m e
i n t e rnational attention as the use of military fo rc e , t h ey are eve ry bit as
i m p o rtant in establishing the underlying conditions for re gional stab i l i t y.
The UN still has a considerable way to go in developing effe c t i ve and
s t reamlined methods for getting such important operations quick ly up to
s p e e d , and developing more important systems along these lines will be
vital to the success of future opera t i o n s .
N ATO 
While NATO only entered the Balkans militari ly with re l u c t a n c e , since the
war in Bosnia it has become a corn e rstone for maintaining stability in the
re gi o n . NATO ’s military mu s cle made peace possible on the ground in
Bosnia and Ko s ovo , and has been essential in keeping Macedonia fro m
descending into wider conf l i c t . One can also make the argument that the
successful NATO military intervention in Ko s ovo during 1999, for all the
c o n t rove rsy it ge n e ra t e d , helped speed the demise of fo rmer Yu go s l av
P resident Milosev i c , and put Serbia on a mu ch faster tra ck to
n o rm a l i s a t i o n .
T h e re is increasing European concern that the Bush A d m i n i s t ration is
e ager to distance U. S . fo rces from the Balkans, while ex p re s s i n g
reluctance to see NATO ro b u s t ly exe rcise its re s p e c t i ve mandates in the
re gi o n . A ny NATO fo rce reductions in its peacekeeping commitments
should occur only within the context of regular NATO rev i ews as has
been the case with all previous fo rce re d u c t i o n s .
The U. S . should cl e a r ly understand that even re l a t i ve ly small deploy m e n t s
of its peaceke e p e rs send out a larger and more powerful message to
a c t o rs in the Balkans (and to NATO allies as we l l ) , re g a rding the U. S .
commitment to re gional stability and the ability to dominate any
escalation in the conf l i c t . It would be unfo rtunate if the Bush
A d m i n i s t ration desire to minimise fo reign “ e n t a n g l e m e n t s ” u l t i m a t e ly
helps create the conditions that lead to a need for greater U. S . m i l i t a ry
i nvo l vement on the ground to stem re n ewed confl i c t .
NATO ’s long-term effo rt to partner with militaries in the re gion is also a
vital part of re gional stab i l i t y. E ffo rts to help shape smaller, m o re
p ro fessional and civilian controlled militaries throughout South Eastern
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E u rope has been of great utility, and the effo rts should continue and
intensify effo rts to rid the re gion of the para m i l i t a ry fo rces that have been
a source of so mu ch destruction and violence over the last decade.
The International Financial Institutions
The international financial institutions, e s p e c i a l ly the World Bank, h ave
both the authority and capability to exe rcise critical leve rage over the
Balkan States’ e c o n o m i e s . Their actions could determine not only dire c t
access to concessional fi n a n c e , but also the success in mobilising
s u p p l e m e n t a ry financial re s o u rc e s , their ability to manage economic
re fo rm and their credibility in seeking to attract pri vate inve s t m e n t . W h i l e
EU association remains a re l a t i ve ly long-term pro j e c t , building a
c o n s t ru c t i ve relationship with the international financial institutions will
need to be an important short and medium term dimension of the
B a l k a n s ’ i n t e rnational engagement and their attempts to stabilise their
e c o n o m i e s . Without stab i l i s a t i o n ,t h e re will be no economic grow t h .
To w a rds a Lasting Balkans Peace
The international community has a vital role to play in assisting the fo rc e s
of peace, and must avoid the temptation to let its attention drift at a time
when the foundation for a more lasting peace is possible but far fro m
c o m p l e t e d . T h e re is a dange rous tendency in We s t e rn capitals to
m a rgi n a l i z e , postpone or just ignore those issues not curre n t ly dominating
the headlines.
Slobodan Milosevic was not the only source of instability in the Balkans
re gi o n . E ffo rts to deal with the underlying sources of tension are key to
keeping conflict from erupting and spre a d i n g . And no task is more centra l
or pro found for the international community than peacefully guiding the
p rocess to re s o l ve final status issues for the FRY, and putting Bosnia and
Macedonia on sounder constitutional fo o t i n g . While policymake rs often
wince at the intra c t ability and complexity of these issues, s u ch
fundamental stru c t u ral ch a l l e n ges are the great unfinished business that
Yu go s l av i a ’s dissolution set in motion.
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PART I.
MILOSEVIC’S BITTER LEGACY
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1.  The Challenge of Achieving Lasting Peace
Although Slobodan Milosevic has left the stage - with terrible devastation his
most lasting legacy - the potential for renewed conflict in the Balkans re m a i n s
c l e a r.  Comprehensive and forw a rd-looking action by the intern a t i o n a l
community to address the sources of underlying tensions in the re g i o n ,
including final status issues, is vital.
A. Milosevic’s Legacy
In 1989 Yugoslavia was one of the wealthiest and most open countries in the
communist world. But ten years of war, ethnic hatred and mismanagement
have left its economy devastated and its infrastructure in tatters. The price of
Yugoslavia’s destruction has been staggering:
o more than 200,000 dead;1
o some 3 million people forced to flee their homes;2
o material damage estimated at between $20 billion and $60 billion;3
o more than 1,000 United Nations (UN) peacekeepers killed or wounded;
o more than 3 million landmines scattered throughout the region;4
o real GDP in the region less than half its 1989 level;and
o more than 300 suspected mass grave sites in Bosnia and Kosovo yet to be
i nvestigated by the International Criminal Tribunal for the fo rm e r
Yugoslavia (ICTY)5 or relevant local authorities.
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The four Balkans wa rs since 1991 - in Slovenia (1991), C roatia (1991-1995),B o s n i a
(1992-1995) and Ko s ovo (1998-1999) - have re d rawn the political and social map
of the re gion and left searing ethnic divisions, bitter re c riminations and massive
re c o n s t ruction needs. Fa c t o ri e s , h o m e s , national monu m e n t s , and cultural sites
h ave been destroye d . The re gi o n ’s industrial base has badly decaye d , and wa r
capitalism and ra cke t e e ring have established themselves as fi x t u res of the
economic and political landscape.
As if the perils of war we re not enough, the people of the fo rmer Yu go s l avia have
also lost a precious ten ye a rs of opportunity for re fo rm , m o d e rnisation and
i n t e gration with the stru c t u res of Euro p e . As we have seen across Central and
E a s t e rn Euro p e ,overhauling state economic and political stru c t u res is a Herc u l e a n
task in its own ri g h t . In the Balkans, the lasting distrust and ruin of war have only
complicated this effo rt .
The culpability should not be ove r - s i m p l i fi e d . No political party or ethnic gro u p
had a monopoly on the violence,gre e d ,and short-sighted policies that have made
“ B a l k a n s ” s y n o nymous with division and unre s t . The crimes and atro c i t i e s ,
i n cluding widespread “ethnic cl e a n s i n g ” ,could not have been carried out without
b road organisation and high levels of local acceptance. No individual or institution
was the sole source for the calamities visited upon the re gi o n .
N eve rt h e l e s s , Slobodan Milosevic came to publ i cly embody the collective
l e a d e rship fa i l u re of the fo rmer Yu go s l av i a . M i l o s evic bears heavy pers o n a l
responsibility for having exacerbated ethnic hatreds and re l i gious tensions in the
old fe d e ra t i o n , stoking military confro n t a t i o n , w re cking his own country and
l a rge ly destroying the re gional economy.
All the more we l c o m e , t h e n , that in September and October 2000 the Serbian
people ri s ked their lives to ensure that the President for whom a majority had vo t e d
on 24 September,Vo j i s l av Ko s t u n i c a ,would be permitted to take powe r. No other
single event could have bro ken the logjam in Serbian politics and re gional affa i rs ,
or have provided such a needed sense of catharsis to people throughout the
B a l k a n s . P resident Milosev i c ’s defe a t , and his subsequent arrest on 1 Ap ril 2001,
h ave opened up dramatic opportunities for economic,political and social re n ewa l .
H oweve r, as events in Macedonia this year show, the international community still
faces substantial danger of re n ewed conflict in the Balkans. I n t e r - c o m mu n a l
t e n s i o n s , u n re s o l ved and conflicting issues of political legi t i m a c y, ex t re m e
economic dislocation and disputes over terri t o ry, individual rights and the
s t ru c t u res of power all have the potential to spark the fi rst Balkan war of a new
c e n t u ry.
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Milosevic’s departure means that events in the region will move dynamically
and unpredictably in the immediate term. Excepting Croatia,the countries of
the western Balkans all remain at an unstable threshold between what they
were and what they hope to become, faced with a variety of fundamental
structural issues.
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) consists of a more democratic but
still disconcertingly nationalist Serbia, linked with an independence-minded
M o n t e n e gro and a deeply hostile Ko s ovo whose population re m a i n s
overwhelmingly committed to independence. Serbia faces insurgency in
Albanian-majority areas adjoining Kosovo and Macedonia. All three entities
need to bring new clarity to their constitutional structures.
o Despite recent progress in cobbling together moderate political alliances
in Sarajevo,Bosnia remains largely paralysed by weak central institutions
and systematic obstructionism by ethnic political elites, exacerbated by
divided priorities among the international organisations implementing the
Dayton Peace Agreement.
o Macedonia’s two predominant nationalities (Macedonian and Albanian)
continue to wrangle over a wide range of issues that define their
coexistence in a state highly vulnerable to external and internal security
pressures. Macedonia’s future will depend very much on how sensitively
the government addresses the demands of its ethnic Albanians, how
measured is its response to Albanian guerrilla attacks, and how Kosovo’s
political status is settled.
o Albania is struggling to recover from economic collapse and curb the
pervasive lawlessness, corruption and organised criminality that keep it
from functioning as a normal state.
o Croatia has made commendable strides in moving beyond a nationalist
agenda, but still confronts the challenges of advancing broad economic
reform and overcoming the legacy of its late President Franjo Tudjman.
B. The Role of International Actors
The international community faces stern challenges in a region where it has
repeatedly struggled to prevent and mitigate conflict. Until very late in the
day,the collective effort of the transatlantic community to address strife in the
Balkans left much to be desired. From the hastily improvised recognition of
Slovenia and Croatia,through the blunders of the United Nations Protection
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Force (UNPROFOR) leading to the tragedy of Srebrenica,and the vain attempt
of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to
prevent full-scale combat in Kosovo,the West learned hard lesson after hard
lesson.
The first United Nations sanctions (an arms embargo) were imposed in
September 1991, more than nine years ago, and some specifically targeted
measures such as the “outer wall” of financial sanctions against Serbia and
Montenegro were later put in place. Another major international instrument,
the (ICTY), was established in February 1993. While these efforts were well
intentioned,they did little to stop the spread of state-sponsored chauvinism,
corruption and violence.
Western policy in the Balkans during the last ten years was for too long
reactive, cautious and improvised. Russian policy was usually intended to
maintain Moscow’s separate profile and prestige, rather than pursue just and
viable solutions. Responses were driven event-by-event,with little long-range
strategic planning and even less appetite for confronting military aggression
head on. Over time, the conscience of Western public opinion, as well as
increased understanding that Balkan instability threatened to undermine the
fundamental security order in Europe, forced a change.
Belatedly and tentatively, the international community came to take more
direct action in the Balkans. Robust North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) military action helped bring Bosnia’s conflicting parties to the
negotiating table, resulting in the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. The 1999
NATO air campaign eventually reversed a massive campaign of “ethnic
cleansing” in Kosovo. Discussions within the Group of Eight (G-8) were
crucial in forging the UN Security Council Resolution (1244)6 that constituted
the basis for a peace agreement in Kosovo and the subsequent wholesale
return of refugees. The debate about UN-NATO military intervention has
evolved from earlier arguments about minimising involvement to the current
position where over 60,000 NATO-led European and U.S. troops are deployed
with vigorous rules of engagement to keep the peace in Bosnia and maintain
a de facto international protectorate in Kosovo.
The international community has made great progress in the Balkans. Equally
important work still remains. It must address the underlying tensions that
could fuel new conflicts. This demands a comprehensive understanding of
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the challenges the region faces and the tools best utilised by the international
community to secure its goals. A key objective of this report is to outline the
basis for more sustainable policies in the Balkans that would be both credible
and creditable. The need, simply put, is for a more comprehensive and
coherent policy approach, more far-sighted in its assessment of impact and
more timely and targeted in its delivery.
The nineteen NATO countries and their allies on both sides of the Atlantic
have strong but sometimes divergent stakes in developments in the Balkans.
Whether or not the Balkans move forward must be seen as a fundamental test
of NATO’s credibility. The alliance has only launched direct military action
twice in its more than half-century existence - both times in the Balkans. A
failure to act to address concerns such as refugee returns, the apprehension
of war criminals or violence in northern Kosovo, southern Serbia and
Macedonia could be divisive within the NATO alliance and undercut its
effectiveness as an organisation. Further turmoil would diminish alliance
credibility throughout Central and Eastern Europe and place peacekeepers at
greater risk. Continued regional instability would also be tragic for the
frontline states - Romania, Bulgaria,Albania and above all Macedonia - that
provided NATO with stalwart support for its military objectives during the
Kosovo war of 1999.
The Balkans also re p resent a fundamental test of the tra n s a t l a n t i c
community’s broader political aspirations: to expand a Europe that is
d e m o c ra t i c , peaceful and committed to closer social and economic
integration. If the Balkans can eventually be brought into the mainstream of
Europe in such a fashion,it will send a powerful message that North American
and European dedication to this goal is more than simply rhetorical. By
contrast,if the Balkans again descend into renewed strife,the region will be
relegated to a new European “grey zone” - neither East nor West, neither
integrated nor self-sufficient. The region will continue to bleed lives and
resources and the international community will look dangerously ineffectual.
Other international actors also have vital interests in the region. Russia enjoys
close historic and cultural ties with Serbia and Montenegro, as well as
Bulgaria, and it has a vested interest in seeing a growing zone of peace and
prosperity develop near its southern flank. Stability in the Balkans would
promote broader regional security, a precious commodity for the Russian
Federation across Central Europe to the Caucasus. Further, the international
community as a whole has a tremendous stake - in terms of precedent - in
seeing the peoples of the Balkans resolve their territorial and constitutional
disputes peacefully and through the instruments of self-governance. Ethnic
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tensions and irredentism are by no means exclusive to the Balkans, and the
world has looked to the Balkans to see how basic issues of sovereignty,
human rights and self-determination will be resolved.
The international community should and must embrace clear goals for the
Balkans and help make them reality. First and foremost,international actors
should help to peacefully and enduringly resolve political status and minority
rights issues where they are most contentious: Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo,
Macedonia and Bosnia. Moving past these difficult issues would allow for
much more rapid improvements in security, economic growth, regional
integration and human rights across all of the seven entities covered in this
report, as well as in a number of other neighbouring states. Until the
fundamental legal mechanisms and governing structures of these societies are
clarified,all their institutions will remain built upon a foundation of sand.
In looking at the tools that the international community has for working with
the people of the Balkans - from troops,to assistance,to technical expertise,
to the panoply of regional and global organisations active in the region - none
is more important than its collective will. Although the task is extremely
difficult,the West must make it a priority to resolve final status issues. It must
also remain deeply engaged in the region. Many foreign ministries will prefer
to put such issues off for another day, and avoid the challenge of completing
as peacefully as possible the reordering set in motion by the dissolution of the
former Yugoslavia. To yield to such preferences would mean replicating the
international failures of the early 1990s.
The international community has important “sticks and carrots”to facilitate
this difficult process. Across the Balkans, one desire is near unanimous: to
participate in the European mainstream. Europe must make realisation of
that aspiration contingent on the peaceful resolution of final status issues
conducted through democratic dialogue under international oversight - and
Balkan residents will respond by supporting the process of resolution.
A number of other important ch a l l e n ges are intertwined with this
ove ra rching agenda - continuing pro gress in re c o n s t ruction effo rt s ,
fundamental institutional and economic reform, the return of refugees,
i m p roved securi t y, d evelopment of functioning systems of justice and
headway in forging the basic instruments of self-governance and civil society.
The international community needs to use its good offices, conditional
assistance,the promise of regional integration,a robust security presence,the
power of media and persistent advocacy. There is no substitute for a hands-
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on approach, and only a combination of tough-mindedness, resolve and
continuing commitment to the region will help it move beyond conditions
that are a prescription for chronic instability and underdevelopment. At the
end of the day, this is the only sound exit strategy.
C. This Report
The subject of this report is the area known in European Union parlance as
the “western Balkans”,comprising the former constituent parts of Yugoslavia
minus Slovenia,plus Albania. (Slovenia’s relative progress over the last decade
has removed that country from risk of conflict, while Albania’s many
challenges are inextricably linked to the other entities included in this
report.) Within this grouping,our focus is on Serbia,Montenegro and Kosovo
(all three comprising the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or FRY);Bosnia and
Herzegovina (henceforth Bosnia); Croatia; Macedonia (officially “the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”or FYROM);and Albania.
As the potential for disruption and conflict in the Balkans is concentrated in
these seven entities, this is where policy makers must focus attention. In
discussing each of these entities in turn in Parts II and III, we consider the key
issues as they now stand in each of the four critical areas of security,
governance, human rights and the economy. The report offers important
proposals relating to the final status of the FRY and Bosnia,and deals also with
issues of regional integration and the broad role of the key actors of the
international community.
We have attempted to provide a comprehensive framework for analysing the
sources of renewed Balkan conflict and offer realistic policy alternatives to
prevent it. We offer policy options for local actors, regional institutions and
the major international players - the Europeans,the United States and Russia.
The importance of fundamental institutional change in the region is central
to this work, and we have sought systematically to identify roles and
responsibilities for the prominent players currently operating in the Balkans.
This report is not designed as a detailed development blueprint, nor does it
offer cures for all Balkan ills. It is intended rather as a thorough and broad
analysis, grounded in extensive field research, of the complex interaction
currently driving tensions in the region,and of what is necessary to prevent
renewed deadly conflict 
In trying to bring a comprehensive perspective to bear on the Balkans,this
report draws heavily on scores of earlier, specific reports from the field
offices and analysts of the International Crisis Group produced since we
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opened our first project office in Sarajevo in early 1996. During that time,
ICG has published three book length reports and 140 other reports and
briefing papers. A good many of those earlier assessments, particularly the
more recent ones,provide the essential grounding for the conclusions in this
re p o rt ; t h ey are the product of detailed wo rk in the fi e l d , t h o ro u g h
knowledge of local languages and environments and intensive comparative
research.
In addition, much of our work builds on the labours of various government
and intergovernmental sources, including the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF),the European Union (EU), NATO, the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),the UN and its respective
age n c i e s , the OSCE, the Stability Pact secre t a ri a t , and the Swe d i s h
Government’s Kosovo Commission. We have also referred to reports from
c o l l e ague non-gove rnmental org a n i s a t i o n s , i n cluding Tra n s p a re n c y
International, the Institute of War and Peace Reporting, the European Policy
Centre, the Centre for European Policy Studies and the European Stability
Initiative.7
While many analysts have proposed that a comprehensive solution be found
to the problems of the Balkans, few have produced far-reaching reports on
regional problems.8 Two in particular do,however, serve as models for their
scope and completeness. The U.S. Centre for Preventive Action 1996 report,
“Towards Comprehensive Peace in Southeast Europe”, did an excellent job
detailing the importance of external engagement in the region. Another
report of general scope which remains pertinent and valuable is “Unfinished
Peace:The Report of the International Commission on the Balkans”(1996), a
joint product of the Aspen Institute and the Carnegie Endowment, chaired by
former Belgian Prime Minister, Leo Tindemans.
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2.  COMMON PROBLEMS
A c ross the Balkans, security and stability continue to be undercut by lingering
nationalism, fragile government institutions, underperf o rming economies,
u n d e l i v e red justice and the issue of unre t u rned refugees.  Breaking the cycle of
violence in the region will re q u i re shattering the hold of narrow political elites
on power and beginning the difficult transition to lasting economic and
democratic re f o rm .
This report deals in depth,in Parts II and III,with the particular problems of
S e r b i a , M o n t e n e gro , Ko s ovo , B o s n i a , M a c e d o n i a , C roatia and A l b a n i a .
However, a number of major problems and challenges are common to most,
or all, of these seven entities. Fi ve broad issues deserve part i c u l a r
c o n s i d e ration - unsatisfied nationalism, u n re s p o n s i ve gove rn m e n t
institutions,underperforming economies,undelivered justice and unreturned
refugees and displaced persons.
Dealing with these overarching concerns remains a fundamental key to
preventing conflict in the Balkans. Obviously these issues must be addressed
within a local context,as is done throughout this report. However, there is
also merit in analysing broader themes from a regional perspective to gain
more comprehensive insight into the situation in the Balkans today.
A. Unsatisfied Nationalism
Nationalist impulses are still fuelled by divisions over competing territorial
cl a i m s , final political status and minority ri g h t s , as well as wholesale
economic dislocation across the region. Seeing no hope of protection within
weak, poorly functioning states, and lacking confidence in the ability of
institutions and laws to provide security, many people continue to turn to
ethnic parties promising to defend their interests.
The fear and insecurity surrounding the breakdown of communist Yugoslavia
set the stage for rabid nationalism in the 1980s and 1990s. In a climate of
dissatisfaction and deep uncertainty brought on by economic crisis and the
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disintegration of communist rule, political leaders seized upon appeals to
nationalism as a powerful mobilising tool. This is not to say that nationalist
aspirations and grievances were not keenly felt. However, these sentiments
were whipped up and manipulated by political leaders. This served the
tactical purpose of generating popular support,but at the extraordinarily high
cost of precipitating a bloodbath.
C o m munist ideology claimed that equality among the Yu go s l av peoples had
been ach i eved through the liberation struggle of World War II. The reality wa s
d i ffe re n t . Yu go s l av President Josip Broz Tito maintained control thro u g h
a u t h o ri t a rian state stru c t u re s , an ag gre s s i ve police presence and cynical
re gional and ethnic powe r - s h a ring arra n ge m e n t s .
As the communist pro p aganda of “ b rotherhood and unity”became discre d i t e d
by the end of the 1980s, t h e re was no other basis for the accommodation of
competing national demands. The communists claimed to have settled the
national question,but in fact simply drove it undergro u n d ,w h e re it was left to
fe s t e r. This was especially the case after the communist party purges fo l l ow i n g
the suppression of the “ M a s p o k ” (Mass Movement) in Croatia at the begi n n i n g
of the 1970s. Fo l l owing this, attempts to accommodate legitimate national
a s p i rations over which the communists did not have full control we re
ab a n d o n e d , and nationalist sentiments we re suppre s s e d . In the climate of the
e a r ly 1990s, with little room for meaningful dialogue or compro m i s e , m a ny
Yu go s l av leaders focused on settling old scores and securing “ethnic terri t o ry ”
instead of uniting to tackle the pro blems facing their society.
The fi rst leader openly to break the communist taboo on nationalism wa s
Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, who came to power in 1987. T h roughout the
1 9 8 0 s , Serbian resentment had risen over the pri v i l e ges enjoyed by its two
autonomous prov i n c e s ,Vo j vodina and especially Ko s ovo , fuelled by re p o rts in
the Serbian press of harassment and pre s s u re by ethnic Albanians against Serbs
in Ko s ovo . In championing the Ko s ovo Serbs and the re i n t e gration of “ d i v i d e d
S e r b i a ” , M i l o s evic found a means of fomenting a nationalist frenzy and in
winning for himself, at the end of the 1980s, a unique level of popular support
in the fe d e ra t i o n ’s biggest re p u bl i c .
R e s u rgent Serbian nationalism at the end of the 1980s, and the fear it
e n ge n d e re d , also helps explain the fo rceful re s u rgence of Cro a t i a n
n a t i o n a l i s m . These sentiments we re exploited and manipulated by Fra n j o
Tu d j m a n ’s Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), w h i ch won power in Cro a t i a ’s
fi rst mu l t i - p a rty elections in Ap ril and May 1990. S u ch strident nationalism wa s
in its nature undemocra t i c , refusing to account for the desires and aspira t i o n s
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of others . This was notably the case with Serb nationalism, whose core aim
was the unification of all Serbs in one state. This effo rt wa s , at best, i n s e n s i t i ve
to the wishes of other peoples that lived in the same terri t o ries and, in its most
violent ex p re s s i o n , p u rsued the eradication of non-Serb populations. It wa s
also the case with Croat nationalism, whose insensitivity to the fe a rs and
i n s e c u rities of Cro a t i a ’s Serb population in 1990 gre a t ly assisted Belgra d e ’s
e ffo rts to whip up tension among Serbs across Yu go s l av i a .
A similarly undemocratic nationalism is evident in a lack of tolerance among
Ko s ovo Albanians towa rds non-Albanians - Serbs,M u s l i m s ,Roma - living in their
m i d s t . The elusive quest for national unification has preoccupied many ethnic
Albanian academics, intellectuals and, when playing the nationalist card ,
p o l i t i c i a n s . Despite being cut off from each other for almost a century, e t h n i c
Albanians from A l b a n i a ,Ko s ovo ,Macedonia and Montenegro never lost a sense
of shared national consciousness, underpinned by a perception of an unjust
allocation of bord e rs by the Great Powe rs in the declining ye a rs of the
Ottoman Empire . But the decades of separation produced three distinct
Balkan Albanian entities: A l b a n i a , Ko s ovo and we s t e rn Macedonia. D e s p i t e
re c u rring effo rts to stir “ G reater A l b a n i a ” o r, m o re re c e n t ly,“ G reater Ko s ovo ”
s e n t i m e n t , these centres of Albanian population have ex p e rienced such
d i ve rse development that any pan-Albanian nationalism will like ly re m a i n
re l a t i ve ly muted for the fo re s e e able future ,as these communities struggle with
m o re pressing social pro bl e m s . Whilst the top pri o rity for Ko s ovo Albanians is
to see an independent Ko s ovo , the main goal of Macedonia’s A l b a n i a n
population seems, on balance, l i ke ly to remain ach i eving a marke d
i m p rovement in their status within the Macedonian state, w h i ch would end
their perceptions of being second-class citizens.
M e a n w h i l e , A l b a n i a ’s own inhabitants remain deeply traumatised by the
events surrounding the 1997 uprising and the 1998 attempted coup d’état.
The “national question”was brought square ly to international attention by the
Ko s ovo war in 1998 and 1999. The sudden arri val in Albania of tens of
thousands of Ko s ovo Albanian re f u gees and guerrilla fi g h t e rs brought the
Ko s ovo issue into the home of eve ry A l b a n i a n . For that brief period from the
s p ring of 1998 to the end of the conflict in the summer of 1999, a true sense
of pan-Albanian solidarity preva i l e d , and the world was presented with a
united Albanian fro n t . H oweve r, as soon as the re f u gees and Ko s ovo Libera t i o n
A rmy (KLA) guerrillas left A l b a n i a , the grim realities of life in that impove ri s h e d
c o u n t ry pushed the “national question” to the perimeter of ge n e ral debate.9
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Ta ken as a whole, the world saw communist rule disintegrate in the late 1980s
and the full fo rce of nationalism - ex cl u s i ve ,i n t o l e rant and violent - explode on
to the scene with a vitriol greater than had been the case in the admittedly
h i g h ly tro u bled pre - World War II Yu go s l av i a . Yu go s l avia was ultimately torn
a p a rt at such cost because the use of fo rce as a means of ach i eving nationalist
goals was legi t i m i s e d . This was fi rst explicit in the case of Serb nationalism. I t
s t a rted with violence against the political and constitutional system, w h e n
B e l grade orch e s t rated political coups in Vo j vo d i n a ,Ko s ovo and Montenegro in
1988 and 1989. T h e n , with the connivance of the Yu go s l av Pe o p l e ’s A rmy
( J NA ) , it escalated as Serb para m i l i t a ries in Croatia and Bosnia accumu l a t e d
a rm s , using them fi rst to threaten and later to seize control of terri t o ry they
cl a i m e d .
Serb nationalists we re not the only ones to view fo rce as their pre fe rred means
of nego t i a t i o n s . The Slovene defence minister at the time of Slove n i a ’s brief wa r
in 1991 planned a violent confrontation with the JNA , b e l i eving that such a
s t ra t e gy would most quick ly secure international recognition of Slove n e
independence and the JNA’s withdrawal from Slove n i a .1 0 S i m i l a r ly the stra t e gy
of the KLA in the late 1990s was to provo ke ,t h rough attacks on Serb securi t y
fo rc e s ,Yu go s l av A rmy (VJ) retaliation and the internationalisation of their cause.
To d ay, e ffe c t i ve ly undermining destru c t i ve nationalism re q u i res addressing the
u n d e r lying causes of the fear and insecurity that have been exploited by
nationalist leaders . C roatia offe rs an interesting example in that re g a rd . H av i n g
won its independence, C roatia re - e s t ablished control over its terri t o ry thro u g h
the military campaigns against the Serb-controlled re gions in 1995 and thro u g h
the United Nations Transitional A d m i n i s t ration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTEAS),
w h i ch ended in 1998. While the right wing in Croatian politics, i n cl u d i n g
Tudjman himself, did not gi ve up its obsession with the lands inhabited by
ethnic Croats in Bosnia, t e rri t o rial claims against Bosnia never had widespre a d
popular support in Cro a t i a . After 1995 a more norm a l , h e a l t hy political
e nv i ronment evo l ve d , in which the nationalist right led by Tudjman and the
HDZ was pro gre s s i ve ly less able to mobilise the population ag a i n s t
i n t e rnational pre s s u re for democratic re fo rm as the price of Euro p e a n
i n t e gra t i o n . Fo l l owing Tu d j m a n ’s death in December 1999, the HDZ wa s
h e av i ly defeated in elections in 2000.
A number of major issues concerning terri t o rial claims and political status in
the re gion remain unre s o l ve d ,i n flamed by nationalism and economic hard s h i p ,
e a ch of them offe ring the clear potential for re n ewed confl i c t . M o n t e n e gro has
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yet to re s o l ve its constitutional relationship with the FRY, with a signifi c a n t
p ro p o rtion of Montenegrins eager for independence; Ko s ovo ’s ethnic A l b a n i a n
m a j o ri t y, residing in a province that is curre n t ly a de facto intern a t i o n a l
p ro t e c t o rate while de jure still part of the FRY, remains determined to seve r
Ko s ovo ’s ties with Serbia and gain control of their own affa i rs ; v i o l e n c e
c o n t i nues to roil the Pre s evo va l l ey in southern Serbia; d i s c o n t e n t ,a m o u n t i n g
p o t e n t i a l ly to separatist pre s s u re , c o n t i nues to be ri fe among the A l b a n i a n
l a n g u age speake rs of we s t e rn Macedonia; and Bosnia struggles to define the
n a t u re of its state beyond communalism at a time when the constitutional
s t ru c t u res created by the Dayton Peace A greement are under seve re stre s s .
All these issues will be daunting to re s o l ve . T h ey revo l ve around thorny issues
of history, s e l f - i n t e re s t ,b a re - k nu ckled politics,c u l t u re , ethnicity and economics.
In each case, t h e re is a clear need for a democratic dialogue to peacefully
re s o l ve outstanding issues of terri t o rial claims and political status. T h e
p rinciples on which that dialogue should proceed are summarised in the
recommendations at the end of Chapter 65, “ The Futur of the FRY ”.
B. Unresponsive Government Institutions 
A c ross the Balkans, p ro blem after pro blem can be traced back to publ i c
institutions that fail to provide for economic, legal and security needs of citizens.
Almost all state institutions in the Balkans are fragi l e ,a large number are corru p t
and a great many are discre d i t e d . T h roughout mu ch of the re gi o n , a n t i -
d e m o c ratic fo rces maintain a stranglehold over political, m i l i t a ry and economic
p ower in these societies. B reaking this legacy - one nu rt u red under Ti t o , a n d
f u rther exacerbated by the upheaval and violence of the last decade - is cru c i a l
to reducing tensions and preventing confl i c t .
While international assistance has produced a patch wo rk of projects to addre s s
a va riety of pro blems at diffe rent stages using diffe rent means, the essential
ch a l l e n ge is almost inva ri ably the same,that of institution building. For ex a m p l e ,
the continuing strength of stri d e n t ly nationalist parties in some parts of the
B a l k a n s ,s u ch as Bosnia, often re flects the weakness and lack credibility of the
state stru c t u res among the population,p a rt i c u l a r ly in providing basic securi t y.
T h roughout the re gi o n , a n a ch ronistic and authori t a rian commu n i s t
institutions did not make the transition to democracy and a free market that
o c c u rred in the rest of Central and Eastern Euro p e . I n s t e a d ,p u blic institutions
in the Balkans we re large ly dri ven back wa rds - dire c t i n g , and being consumed
by, four wa rs , m a s s i ve re f u gee fl ow s , d e s t ruction of infra s t ru c t u re , c o m mu n a l
h a t re d s , the collapse of established tra de and the demise of law and order.
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Political, economic and military power in the Balkans still remain largely
synonymous, dominated by the expectation that public office and state-
dominated assets should - and will - be exploited as a source of power and
patronage. Elites continue to use their positions to favour family and friends,
intimidate opponents,divert funds to consolidate their political bases,impose
corrupt conditions on new enterprises and treat investors as short-term hard-
currency cash-cows. Across the Balkans, already scarce public resources
continue to be directed to partisan advantage and personal gain.
The institutions of the most significance to the people of the Balkans are
those related to the security and stability of daily life. Those institutions are
of three broad kinds - those which ensure personal and communal security
(including a conscientious and impartial judiciary, backed up by a reliable
police force); those which give substance to the transition to democracy
(including parliament,political parties and electoral commissions);and those
which encourage and regulate economic activity. Later sections in this
chapter focus on frail economic and judicial institutions; the pre s e n t
emphasis is on the problem of institutional frailty as it affects security,
governance and public life.
More effective and integrated institutions are needed at the larger European
level,at the inter-entity level and within each of the seven entities covered in
this report. Unless progress is made in reshaping institutions, the goal of
broader integration both within the Balkans,and between the Balkans and the
rest of Europe,will remain daunting. This discussion is developed in Part IV.
Ultimately, not all countries in the Balkans need - or want - the same kind of
institutions. As the experience of the United Nations Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is demonstrating, particularly with regard to
dictating the pace of establishing democratic institutions, many sorts of
Western imposition will be resented and undermined. Assistance through
provision of models and mentors may be more effective, with one recent
example being the EU’s help to the Balkans in drafting a standard, regional
Investment Compact through the Stability Pact mechanisms.
To succeed,the process of institution building will have to be owned by local
communities. As institutions develop form and force,so will the commitment
of the Balkan communities to those institutions. Institution building must
t a ke account of peculiarities in constitutional as well as economic
circumstances in each location. In Bosnia, as the experience of developing
border police demonstrates,central state institutions need to be designed to
give the three major communities the habit of working together on practical
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projects where a sense of common interest and purpose can more easily be
identified. In Montenegro, the local government has built up parallel
institutions,as a function of tensions with Serbia and its exclusion from FRY
gove rning stru c t u re s . In Ko s ovo , the institutions of the intern a t i o n a l
protectorate need to be adjusted to encourage more participation and
ownership from the local communities, including the Serb population,
pending a decision on the final status of the area. In Macedonia, institution
building needs to broaden the basis for dealings between the Albanian and
Macedonian communities.
Regarding security institutions, a number of practical and common sense
steps can be purs u e d . Civilian control over the military must be
strengthened. Further, militaries in the region have to be encouraged to
engage in even modest confidence-building measures already underway,
including information-sharing on potential mobilisations. All the countries in
the region have participated in the work of the OSCE, including some
C o n fidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) providing for the
exchange and verification of information regarding the participating states’
armed forces and military activities. This includes an annual exchange of
military information and modest risk reduction measures. The aim of these
measures is to promote mutual trust and dispel concern about military
activities by encouraging openness and transparency. Furthermore the
OSCE’s politico-military code of conduct commits participating states to
maintain only such military capacities as are commensurate with individual
or collective legitimate security needs, although it also stresses the right of
each participating state to freely determine its security interests and to
choose its own security arrangements - including treaties and alliances.
It is clear that a considerable gulf still exists between rhetoric and practice
with regard to military matters in the region. Over time, force levels should
be reduced and the internal security and paramilitary forces that have been
so abusive over the last decade should be disbanded. Support for training and
professionalisation through NATO’s Partnership for Peace will augment the
OSCE efforts and help return these militaries to the role of national defence
and away from explicitly political agendas.
As justice and policing go hand in hand, the training of local police forces
should be a central goal in the security arena, and continued international
supervision of these police forces should be maintained.The European Union
has made improving its ability to support civilian police efforts a central goal
for improving its crisis management capabilities. By 2003,EU member states
hope to be able to volunteer up to 5,000 police officers in a regional crisis,
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with 1,000 of them to be deployable within 30 day s , for international missions
a c ross the full ra n ge of conflict prevention and crisis manage m e n t
o p e ra t i o n s .1 1 These are welcome steps, and come part i a l ly in response to the
s l owness with which effe c t i ve police presences have been developed in the
B a l k a n s . H oweve r, mu ch more still needs to be done in the Balkans - mu ch
sooner than 2003 - to develop pro fessional local police fo rc e s . G e n e ra l
p recepts need to be backed up with specifi c , p ractical help on institution
b u i l d i n g . In Bosnia, for instance, mu ch effo rt has been devoted to training and
equipping border police. This pro gram should pay dividends in incre a s i n g
state reve nu e s , in improving control over sove reign terri t o ry, in re d u c i n g
c rime and smu g g l i n g , and helping better relations between the Bosnian
c o m mu n i t i e s
M a n aging the process of democratisation poses its own pro bl e m s . The usual
place to start is with the calling of elections. H oweve r, successful elections in
the Balkans, as elsew h e re ,depend on prior institution building at a commu n i t y
l evel if the elections are not simply to consolidate the power of ethnically -
based groups and there fo re to confi rm social divisions. Pa rties have to be
c re a t e d , i n fo rmed and encourage d . Freedom of the press must become an
accepted norm , and civil society will have to develop stro n ger roots thro u g h
the development of more active interest groups and non-gove rn m e n t a l
o rg a n i s a t i o n s . Freedom of association needs to be established as a ro u t i n e ,a n d
the role of ex t reme nationalist parties will have to be margi n a l i s e d .
Nurturing a free, vibrant and independent media will be a vital part of this
effort throughout the region. In many of the countries covered in this report,
the media has made impressive strides over the last decade. However, in too
many cases state-run or state-dominated television stations and newspapers
offer ruling parties a distinct advantage.
Corruption continues to be a central problem cutting across the variety of
Balkan institutions. All the entities in this report suffer pervasive corruption
that discourages inve s t m e n t , s t i fles normal democratic ex p re s s i o n ,
discourages judicial impartiality, subverts security structures for political
purposes and erodes trust in government institutions and the administration
of laws. Indeed,the FRY finished ahead of only one country - Nigeria - in an
index of corruption in 90 states world-wide. The World Bank has also argued
that cor ruption remains the principal impediment to doing business in the
Balkans.12
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Table 1.  Corruption Indicators
Source: The 2000 Corruption Perceptions Index. Transparency International, www.transparency.de
Institutional changes to combat corruption will need to be reinforced by the
emergence of a free media able to expose corrupt of ficials, a firm message
from the international community and investors that corrupt practices will
not be countenanced and,the strengthening of anti-corruption norms in civil
society.
The starting point need not be new laws. The rule of law is discredited by the
Balkans habit of passing laws that are not fairly and honestly applied but often
designed just to impress donors. Ensuring that the law is applied fairly and
rigorously means making sure that officials are sufficiently well-paid that they
do not regard taking bribes as an essential livelihood. It also entails training
officials to ensure that they are aware of their obligations and responsibilities
- and of the penalties for corrupt practices. The international community,
where it has the power, and local governments should move to sack corrupt
or partial judges and vigorously prosecute corrupt firms and officials, not
least for the demonstration effect. This should be part of a larger effort to
remove bias toward friends and clients in the application of everything from
tax laws to customs duties.
Conclusions and recommendations on government institutions 
o A central goal of policy makers should be to break the stranglehold of small
elites over political and economic power in the re g i o n .
o I n t e rnational funding should heavily focus on institutional
s t rengthening, par ticularly measures that will allow democratic
g o v e rnments in the region to become increasingly self-supporting, with less
c o n t rol of revenues by political parties and more by professional civil
s e r vices.  
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Countries 2000 Corruption Country Rank 
Perception Index Score (Among 90
(Index ranges from 1-10, countries rated)
with 1 the worst score)
Nigeria 1.2 90
FRY 1.3 89
Bulgaria 3.5 52
Croatia 3.7 51
o E ffective, long-term institution building in Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo
and Bosnia depends on clarifying the underlying constitutional stru c t u re s
that provide the legal framework for these societies.
o Civilian control over the militar y should be strengthened, and
paramilitaries should be disbanded; the OSCE should intensify its eff o rt s
to engage in confidence building measures between militaries in the
region; and NATO should explore - through its Partnership for Peace
p rogram - how to augment these eff o r ts.  
o Ending state control over media outlets in line with Council of Euro p e
n o rms will help develop more robust regional democracies, and allow
c o rruption to be addressed more eff e c t i v e l y.  The European Union and
other donors should maintain pre s s u re and support for media re f o rm .
C. Underperforming Economies 
None of the Balkan economies has made an effective transition from state-
dominated economic control to market management. Indeed, many have
gone backwards. Unless the peoples of the Balkans themselves address these
issues,assisted by the international community, there is no realistic prospect
of attracting major investment or sustaining growth.
Broader Balkan integration within the European Union will remain a mirage
without major institutional reforms. Most of the people of the Balkans are
eager to take their place in Europe. However, such Europe-wide cooperation
will work only if those involved from the outside - funding agencies,
investors,lenders,consultants and government officials - know that they can
rely on the institutions being developed in the Balkans countries. Without a
solid foundation in institutions,law will remain unpredictable and capricious,
c rime and corruption will fl o u ri s h , legal judgements will be ignore d ,
cronyism will be the norm, and government administration will remain
skewed to the benefit of one ethnic group at the expense of others. Failure
to improve economic conditions or move forward with broader integration
into Europe will provide a recipe for continued tensions, extreme nationalist
politics and potential conflict.
In sharp contra s t , the majority of economies of central Europe have
modernised and diversified. They have largely abandoned the heavy-handed,
bureaucratic state control of their former communist regimes. They have
p u rsued ra d i c a l ly diffe rent economic policies, e n c o u raging inve s t m e n t ,
commencing privatisation, liberalising economic policies, and seeking to
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align standards and practices with those of the EU. This process is not yet
complete and there have been serious hardships and difficulties along the
way. Nonetheless,liberalisation is well under way.
Those options may not have been open to the Balkans in 1989,or at any time
since - but they are open now. To make the jump, the Balkans need much
more than they could possibly raise from their own resources alone, by way
of capital, skills, technology, distribution and marketing know-how, and
workforce training. The western Balkans need both to attract and to absorb
substantial amounts of foreign assistance,while avoiding the risk of becoming
aid-dependent, over-reliant on both donor funds and their advice. Similarly,
these countries have to find ways to encourage foreign investment. That
requirement,like any plans for affiliation with the EU, will necessitate facing
difficult and disruptive structural change. That change, in turn, will entail
confronting powerful vested interests, those opposed to any liberalisation
and determined to maintain control of their own corrupt, crony-ridden
economic sectors.
The solution to this problem does not lie in ever more assistance, but in
regenerating economic activity through internal reform,and expanding trade
with Europe and the rest of the world:as to trade,see further the discussion
in Part IV. Harmonising customs procedures and standardising technical
regulations would be logical areas for early regional cooperation. Internal
reform requires adherence to the rule of law and the elimination of
corruption, a commitment to liberalisation (including privatisation in ways
that ensure economic activities are not sold to the same corrupt hands now
in control), and a willingness to undergo even more economic hardship.
Foreign investment can only follow internal reform;it cannot precede it.
While the state control economic model has been utterly discredited, its
vestiges linger - including its mindset. The dead hand of intrusive, over-
regulated management impedes economic development. The region’s former
comparative advantages have been lost, and new market niches have not
been established. Only Croatia has so far demonstrated an unequivocal
political determination to open up its market, and not even Croatia has
shown the technical economic competence to do this. Credible economic
teams are nowhere in place.
Above all,the governments in the region need to recognise how serious their
problems are. That involves avoiding any temptation to convince themselves
that they can be completely bailed out,in the short-term by donor assistance,
in the medium-term by “quick fix” remedies (poorly designed privatisations,
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13  “Commission proposes increased market access for products from Western Balkans”,European Commission Press Release
IP/00/586,Brussels,7 June 2000. Duty free access was widened further in September 2000.
for ex a m p l e ) , and in the longer term by affiliation with the EU. E x t e rn a l
s u p p o rt and assistance will cert a i n ly be helpful - e.g. the EU’s decision in
June 2000 to further open markets to we s t e rn Balkan countri e s , b ri n gi n g
up to 95 per cent the pro p o rtion of imports from these countries gi ve n
duty free access.1 3 The necessary internal re fo rm momentum ultimately
has to come from within. G ove rnments need to set fi rm , cl e a r, p ro p e r ly
designed pro grams for economic liberalisation - and stick by them. T h a t
will be diffi c u l t , because economic re fo rm threatens strong ve s t e d
i n t e re s t s .
P ri va t i s a t i o n , while not a panacea, will be key to re fo rm effo rt s . T h e
p rocess of pri vatisation will reduce the scope for arbitra ry, c a p ricious and
c o rrupt gove rn m e n t - p a rty interventions in business manage m e n t . I n
a d d i t i o n , p ri vatisation stri kes dire c t ly at some of the entre n ched and
c o rrupt vested interests in the Balkans economic systems. If fo rmer state
assets are pri va t i s e d , n ew sources of capital will be injected into the
e c o n o my, gove rnment finances strengthened and new jobs will be cre a t e d .
But - and it is a crucial but - Balkan gove rnments need to make sure that
t h ey fix a fair price for their assets, p a rt i c u l a r ly in circumstances where
their value may have been understated and the assets themselves badly ru n
d ow n . T h ey need to care f u l ly manage the pace and scope of pri va t i s a t i o n ,
avoiding either a “ fi re sale” to cronies or a process so disru p t i ve ly slow it
will undercut the momentum for re fo rm .
Handling pri vatisation may be the biggest - and hardest - economic
decision that this ge n e ration of Balkans leaders has to addre s s . T h ey may
not be well placed to take that decision alone. Bad past hab i t s , c o m b i n e d
with current skills short age s ,m a ke it difficult for Balkans leaders to addre s s
s i mu l t a n e o u s ly all the economic pro blems they need to re s o l ve . I n
m a n aging pri va t i s a t i o n , t h e re is there fo re a case for taking more outside
advice than usual, in a more hands-on way than is customary (especially fo r
questions that relate so dire c t ly to state sove re i g n t y ) . Outside advisers
could help to stri ke fair market values for assets, evaluate independently
t e n d e rs and assist in rew riting pro p e rty law s .
The dilemma for Balkans gove rnments as they move fo r wa rd with re fo rm
will be to find ways to reduce ch ro n i c a l ly high levels of unemploy m e n t . I t
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will be easy for critics to argue that stru c t u ral ch a n ge entails unacceptabl e
l evels of dislocation, and there fo re an intolerable increase in
u n e m p l oy m e n t , but delaying ch a n ge is not a realistic option.
R e c o n s t ru c t i o n , t o o , will offer new job opport u n i t i e s , e s p e c i a l ly in the
c o n s t ruction sector itself. In addition, a number of local industries will
s u rv i ve , whether by making themselves competitive in ex p o rt marke t s ,o r
by using their adva n t ages of pri c e , location and customer base to maintain
their local markets against outside competition. Small business can serve
as the main economic motor, and source of employ m e n t , for the indefi n i t e
f u t u re . Free of oppre s s i ve re g u l a t i o n , small business can fl o u ri s h .
A ge nuine commitment to stru c t u ral re fo rm would also gi ve Balkan leaders
enough fl exibility to introduce some bolder economic policies. Some of
the most successful economic policies in the re gion have invo l ved leap-
f ro g ging over established practices and entre n ched obstacl e s . O n e
example is the creation of the Central Bank of Bosnia, and its success in
e s t ablishing a currency board ,c o n t rolling infl a t i o n , and introducing a new
c u rre n c y, the conve rt i ble Mark . Another is the UNMIK-inspire d
replacement of Yu go s l av currency in Ko s ovo with the German Mark , n ow
e mulated in Montenegro .
Conclusions and recommendations on internal economic re f o rm generally
o The solution to Balkans economic underperf o rmance is not ever more
financial assistance, but in regenerating activity through internal re f o rm
and external trade.
o F o reign and domestic investment in Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo and
M o n t e n e g ro will remain limited until basic legal stru c t u res, pro p e r ty rights
and constitutional arrangements are finalised.
o G o v e rnments need to set firm, clear programs for economic liberalisation -
and stick by them.
o Privatisation, guided by international assistance and norms, should move
ahead expeditiously, with donor guidance and conditionality important in
ensuring that these eff o rts don’t become a “fire sale” to the politically well
c o n n e c t e d .
o H a rmonising customs pro c e d u res and standardising regulations are logical
a reas for early regional cooperation.
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14  For an overview and discussion of the weaknesses in the judicial system in Bosnia see ICG Balkans Reports No. 72, Rule
over Law:Obstacles to the Development of an Independent Judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5 July 1999;For Albania,
see ICG Balkans Report No. 87, Albania:State of the Nation, 1 March 2000.
15  ICG Balkans Report No. 84, Rule of Law in Public Administration:Confusion and Discrimination in a Post-Communist
Bureaucracy, 15 December 1999;ICG Balkans Report No. 86,Denied Justice:Individuals Lost in a Legal Maze, 23 February
2000.
16  For the handling of the case against Slobodan Milosevic himself, see Chapter 3 on Serbia.
D . U n d e l i v e red Justice 
R e l i abl e ,i m p a rtial and timely delive ry of justice is a key to pro gress in the
B a l k a n s . The quality of justice, e s p e c i a l ly in settlement of pro p e rty cl a i m s
and dispute settlement pro c e d u re s , is one crucial va ri able in determ i n i n g
p rospects for fo reign inve s t m e n t . Pe rc e i ved ethnic or nationalist bias in
the judicial systems re i n fo rces the fe a rs and hatreds which fuel unsatisfi e d
n a t i o n a l i s m . Fa i l u re to establish cl a i m s , and to obtain and trust the
p rotection of the law, c ri t i c a l ly limits the fl ow of re f u gee re t u rn s .
The essential pro blem with the judicial systems lies not so mu ch in the
enactment of appro p riate law s , as in making sure those laws are applied
fa i r ly and with re a s o n able alacri t y.1 4 Balkans gove rnments introduce new
l aws as though this in itself would re fo rm their systems of gove rn m e n t . I n
too many cases, those laws are of notional effect only, c o n t radict other
pieces of legi s l a t i o n , a re undermined by administra t i ve discretion and are
not policed ri go ro u s ly.
A number of steps can be taken to strengthen the judicial system ge n e ra l ly,
i n cluding re m oval of corrupt judge s ; m o re objective processes for the
appointment and dismissal of judge s ; better training for judges and
a d vo c a t e s ; p o s s i ble establishment of separate commercial court s ;
i n t roduction of standard dispute settlement pro c e d u res for inve s t m e n t
c a s e s ; a n d , e a r ly simplification of the curre n t ly laby rinthine maze of
p ro p e rty law s .1 5
The issue of war criminals remains far more contentious and
c o m p l i c a t e d .1 6 B ri n ging war criminals to justice goes to the heart of
i n t e rnational law, m o rality and the ability to assign blame for Euro p e ’s
wo rst atrocities in the second half of the 20th century. O n ly by bri n gi n g
the perpetra t o rs of such acts to justice, and re m oving them fro m
i nvo l vement in the day - t o - d ay affa i rs of the Balkans, can the stigma of
c o l l e c t i ve guilt begin to be lifted from the peoples of the re gi o n , a l l ow i n g
them to embrace a larger and more lasting sense of re c o n c i l i a t i o n . The ro l e
of the ICTY is crucial in this re s p e c t , and a number of measures to
s t rengthen its effe c t i veness are spelt out in the recommendations below.
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17  Of the rest,twenty were acquitted or had all charges dropped;nine died;38 have proceedings still on foot;and 27 remain at
large. See ICTY website www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e.htm
18  For a comprehensive discussion see ICG Balkans Report No. 103,War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska:Who are the
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Other measures can and should be taken at country leve l , i n cl u d i n g
i nvestigation by police and tax officials of the possibility of seizing the
assets of publ i cly indicted war cri m i n a l s .
P u rsuing war criminals alone does not guarantee the wider objective of
e n t re n ching justice. Nor does any other single component in
s t rengthening the Balkans judicial systems. All the re fo rms proposed in
this re p o rt are designed to be cumu l a t i ve and complementary in their
e ffe c t , and must be supported by broader effo rts to educate the public and
reconcile commu n i t i e s .
H oweve r, without pursuit of war cri m i n a l s , re f u gee re t u rns will be
i n h i b i t e d , multi-ethnic confidence in the justice system will not deve l o p
and criminals will continue to flout the law with impunity. C riminals still
at large make a mocke ry of the justice system, c o n t i nue to pro p ag a t e
ex t remist political views and help control local militias and political
p a rt i e s . The international community should take great care not to let its
enthusiasm for recent democratic pro gress in Serbia lessen its commitment
to seeing Belgrade cooperate with the Tri b u n a l . C roatia in part i c u l a r,
w h i ch has cooperated to a considerable extent with ICTY,would be deeply
a n ge red if the international community instituted a double standard .
The War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague has publ i cly indicted 98 pers o n s
since its inception in 1993,of which only four have so far been conv i c t e d .1 7
A mu ch larger number of known or suspected war criminals remain as ye t
un-indicted by state courts or by the ICTY.1 8 The ICTY could make gre a t e r
p ro gress by using ava i l able pro c e d u res to try selected war crimes suspects
in the re gion itself, with proceedings fully translated and locally
t ra n s m i t t e d . With a substantial portion of its proceedings moved from T h e
H ague to local settings, the ICTY might develop mu ch greater legitimacy in
the eyes of the ge n e ral ex - Yu go s l av publ i c . These proceedings should be
t e l evised at prime time throughout the countries of the ex - Yu go s l avia in
the local language . T h rough such effo rts the people of the re gion are more
l i ke ly to come to grips with their history. Of cours e , p roviding adequate
s e c u rity for justices, witnesses and indictees would be a key element of
holding trials in the re gi o n , and the difficulties of doing so cannot be
u n d e re s t i m a t e d . Most if not all these pro blems could pro b ably be manage d
with appro p riate budge t a ry support .
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Conclusions and recommendations on justice generally
o Justice systems should be strengthened, including by improved pro c e d u re s
for the appointment and dismissal of judges, better training for judges
and advocates, and the removal of corrupt judges.
o The ICTY should be strengthened by:
- N ATO raising the priority given in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and
Stabilisation Force (SFOR) to apprehension of suspected war
criminals; 
- The international community being firm and consistent in imposing
penalties, either in terms of direct assistance or in access to
i n t e rnational financial institution support, for non-cooperation with
the ICTY; 
- The Tribunal expanding its numbers of judges, having more with
d i rect, practical experience in tr ying cases, and holding more trials
simultaneously; and
- The Tribunal using available pro c e d u res to the extent practically
possible to tr y selected war crimes suspects in the region itself, with
p roceedings broadcast locally in appropriate languages.  
o Police and tax officials should investigate the financial activities of
publicly indicted war criminals to determine if their assets and/or money
should be seized in accordance with existing laws.  
E . U n re t u rned Refugees and Displaced Persons
Of the three million Intern a l ly Displaced Peoples (IDPs) and re f u ge e s
c reated by war in the Balkans, o n ly 38 per cent have been able to re t u rn to
their pre - war homes.1 9 The 1,926,000 people remaining displaced
t h roughout the re gion and in third countri e s , u n able to re t u rn to pre - wa r
h o m e s , remain a serious impediment to broader stab i l i t y. The suffe ring and
l e gitimate security concerns of these civilians stand as stark testament
both to the horror of successive Balkan wa rs and the continu i n g
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d i fficulties of post-conflict transition in these societies. The prospect of
i m p roved relations among the successor states of the fo rmer Yu go s l avia has
opened up new opportunities for the remaining re f u gees and displaced
people who wish to re t u rn , but va rious administra t i ve and political
o b s t a cles re m a i n .
Table 2.  Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in the Western
Balkans
Source:UNHCR, Refugees and Others of Concern,1999 Statistical Overview;Update on Durable Solutions for Refugees and
Displaced Persons in the context of the Dayton Agreements,Humanitarian Issues Working Group,29 November 1999.
Table 3.  Returned Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons
Source: UNHCR,Refugees and others of Concern,1999 Statistical Overview.
The right of re t u rn for re f u gees and IDPs in the Balkans is entre n ched in
four major agreements that provide for freedom of movement and
settlement and spell out the legal basis for re f u gee re t u rn . These are the
Washington A gre e m e n t , w h i ch created the Bosniak-Croat Fe d e ration in
Bosnia in 1994; the Erdut A greement for eastern Slavonia in Cro a t i a ; t h e
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Country Total Population Internally Displaced Refugees
(millions) Persons
Bosnia 3.8 809,500 65,000
Croatia 4.5 52,400 28,400
Macedonia 2.0 21,200
Albania 3.4 3,900
FRY 10.6 234,900 500,700
Refugees outside
the region 210,000
Total: 24.3 1,096,800 829,200
Country Returned Internally Returned Refugees
Displaced Persons
Bosnia 73,000 161,000
Croatia 63,600 35,000
The FRY 168,000 755,000
Total: 304,600 951,000
20  ICG has published sixteen reports over the last five years on refugee return. See ICG Balkans Report No. 2 Security
Repatriation,Elections and Reconstruction, 1 April 1996;ICG Balkans Report No. 23. Going Nowhere Fast:Refugees and
Internally Displaced People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1 May 1997;ICG Balkans Report No. 24, House Burnings
Obstruction of the Right to Return to Drvar,9 June 1997;ICG Balkans Report No.29,A Hollow Promise? Return of Bosnian
Serb Displaced Persons to Drvar,19 January 1998;ICG Balkans Report No.30,Rebuilding a Multi-ethnic Sarajevo:The Need
for Minority Returns , 3 February 1998;ICG Balkans Report No. 33, Minority Returns or Mass Reallocation, 14 May 1998;
ICG Balkans Report No.34, A Tale of Two Cities:Return of Displaced Persons to Jajce and Travnik, 3 June 1998;ICG Balkans
Report No. 35, The Konjic Conundrum:Why Minorities have Failed to Return to a Model Open City, 19 June 1998;ICG
Balkans Report No. 37, The Western Gate of Central Bosnia: The Politics of Return in Bugojno and Prozor-Rama , 31 July
1998;ICG Balkans Report No. 40, Impunity in Dr var, 20 August 1998;ICG Balkans Report No. 49, Breaking the Logjam:
Refugee Returns to Croatia, 9 November 1998;ICG Balkans Report No. 68,Balkan Refugee Crisis, 1 June 1999;ICG Balkans
Report No. 73, Preventing Minority Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina:The Anatomy of Hate and Fear, 2 August 1999;
ICG Balkans Report No. 84,Rule of Law in Public Administration:Confusion and Discrimination in a Post-Communist
Bureaucracy, 15 December 1999;ICG Balkans Report No. 86,Denied Justice:Individuals Lost in a Legal Maze, 23 February
2000;ICG Balkans Report No. 94, Bosnia’s Refugee Logjam:Is the International Community Ready?, 30 May 2000;
21  See ICG Balkans Report No. 95, Bosnia’s Refugee Logjam:Is the International Community Ready?, 30 May 2000.
D ayton A greement for Bosnia in 1995; and UN Security Council Resolution
1244 for Ko s ovo in 1999. The fi ve basic barri e rs to wide-scale re p a t ri a t i o n
a re securi t y, p ro p e rty law s , d i s c ri m i n a t i o n , b u re a u c racy and limited
i n t e rnational support .2 0
Pe rsonal securi t y, as in almost all re f u gee situations, remains the large s t
impediment to large-scale re t u rn s . Despite the presence of peaceke e p i n g
fo rc e s ,m a ny individuals are ri g h t ly concerned that they may still be targe t s
of intimidation and violence. The pattern of re t u rns in some parts of the
re gion shows that many re f u gees are pre p a red to re t u rn to areas where
t h ey will be in a minori t y, so long as they can feel secure .2 1 Adding to the
sense of insecurity has been the re l a t i ve ly slow pro gress by local and
i n t e rnational officials in apprehending and bri n ging to justice accused wa r
c ri m i n a l s . F u rt h e r, c o n t i nuing official corruption and the presence of
p owerful criminal organisations spur fe a rs of re p risal attacks among
re f u ge e s .
The current state of pro p e rty law across mu ch of the Balkans has also
p revented higher rates of re f u gee and IDP re t u rn s . Attempts by re t u rn e e s
to use the courts to evict tempora ry occupants (often themselves re f u ge e s )
f rom their homes and regain rightful pro p e rty have often ended in
f ru s t ration rather than re - p o s s e s s i o n . In many cases, l aws either prov i d e
inadequate protection of pro p e rty rights or we re framed to deter potential
re t u rnees and disadva n t age those who do re t u rn , as for example under the
fo rmer Tudjman gove rnment in Cro a t i a . B a rri e rs include difficulties in
e s t ablishing tenancy rights over fo rm e r ly socially owned pro p e rt y, t h e
main fo rm of pro p e rty holding in fo rmer Yu go s l av i a ; the absence of legal
d o c u m e n t a t i o n ; and continued obstructionism by local authori t i e s . T h e
p ro blem of re f u gees and IDPs re claiming their pro p e rt y, u s u a l ly
a p a rt m e n t s , has been part i c u l a r ly acute in urban are a s . Political pre s s u re
to relocate other families in apartments has often obstructed re t u rns and
little pro gress has been made in revising the legal rights of urban tenants.
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In some are a s , re f u gee and IDP re t u rns have shown a promising upturn ,
even in some hard-line areas in Bosnia and Cro a t i a . U n fo rt u n a t e ly, t h e
UNHCR has often lacked funding to facilitate individuals. G i ven the
emphasis that the international community has placed on pre s e rving the
multi-ethnic ch a racter of communities in the Balkans, it would be a
t rage dy if it failed to deliver the re l a t i ve ly modest financial support
needed to assist displaced individuals willing to brave re t u rn s .
G e n e ral discrimination also continues to thwa rt re t u rn s . U n e q u a l
t reatment in the provision of basic serv i c e s , re p a t riation assistance and
e m p l oy m e n t , and the pro p e rty laws mentioned ab ove , a re all designed to
send a powerful signal that re t u rnees are not we l c o m e d . D i s c ri m i n a t i o n
in the provision of re c o n s t ruction assistance has been a major pro blem in
C ro a t i a , w h e re it was enshrined in law.
Local bure a u c racies throughout mu ch of the Balkans continue to obstru c t
re p a t ri a t i o n . Among the frequent tactics used to discourage re t u rns are
failing to implement court decisions establishing minority re t u rn e e s ’t i t l e
to their pro p e rt y ; dubious application of the law ; and systematic delays in
legal pro c e d u re s .
The goal of pre s e rving and re s t o ring multi-ethnic societies has been a
c o rn e rstone of We s t e rn policy in the Balkans. Except within Bosnia,
We s t e rn policy-make rs ri g h t ly refused to rewa rd “ethnic cl e a n s i n g ” by
re d rawing maps along ethnic lines. H oweve r, while some groups want to
re t u rn , and others cannot re t u rn ,o t h e rs still may opt to stay in their are a s
of displacement. Peace has come too late for some re f u gees who are we l l
i n t e grated into their new local communities and for a va riety of re a s o n s ,
i n cluding economic fa c t o rs , wish to remain there . T h i s , for ex a m p l e , is the
case for a significant pro p o rtion of Bosnian Croat re f u gees in Cro a t i a , a s
well as many of the 500,000 or more IDPs and re f u gees in the FRY. Fo r
those who fall into these catego ri e s ,n o rmalisation of citizenship laws will
need to be the principle motor in fo rmalising relations so as to integra t e
the population into the commu n i t y. In Cro a t i a , most Bosnian Croats have
been granted citizenship, and in the FRY recent amendments to the
citizenship law will impact on the legal status of this signifi c a n t
c a s e l o a d .2 2 It is important to stress that integration in the host country
cannot include long-term occupation of someone else’s home. L e a d
age n c i e s ,s u ch as the UNHCR, should continue to earm a rk donor funds to
s u p p o rt local integra t i o n .
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Facilitating re t u rns re q u i res the re m oval of the administra t i ve and
b u re a u c ratic   obstacles   to   re t u rn , ending   the   culture   of   impunity
vis-à-vis known or suspected war criminals and the adoption of non-
d i s c ri m i n a t o ry pro p e rty law s . In that re g a rd , the High Repre s e n t a t i ve ’s
n ew pro p e rty laws in Bosnia can serve as a re gional template to fa c i l i t a t e
and speed up eviction and re p o s s e s s i o n . The Pro p e rty Law
Implementation Pro gram has been effe c t i ve in Bosnia because it has
i d e n t i fied key points where international pre s s u re can be brought to bear
on  local  authorities  and  has  gi ven  international  officials  the latitude
to  enfo rce  implementation  -  two  integral  elements  for success.
H oweve r, evictions alone will not solve all the re t u rns issues; a sizeabl e
amount of new housing stock will need to be built throughout the
re gion and donor funded projects are critical in meeting these needs.
A d d i t i o n a l ly, the question of re t u rn sustainability - pivotal to ensuri n g
the long-term success of re p a t riation - will need to be pro p e r ly tre a t e d .
R e t u rn sustainability is about creating the right social and economic
conditions for re t u rn e e s . It also includes access to health, education and
basic serv i c e s , and is linked to re fo rm in other areas - era d i c a t i n g
c o rru p t i o n , p romoting good gove rn a n c e , and long-term economic
re ge n e ration of the re gi o n .
Conclusions and recommendations on refugee returns generally 
o Donors should increase support to the UNHCR for facilitating the return of
refugees and IDPs to formerly frontline areas.  
o Wherever indicted war criminals have been arrested, or surrendered, to the ICTY,
refugees have subsequently returned home.  More aggressive pursuit of indicted
war criminals, and efforts to disband paramilitary groups, would greatly improve
the prospects for refugee return.  
o The problem of refugee and IDP return to apartments in urban areas has been
particularly acute, and the international community needs to focus on making
progress in revising and enforcing the tenant rights of urban dwellers.  
o Bosnia’s new property laws, established by the High Representative, should serve
as a regional template to facilitate the eviction and repossession process.  
o Discrimination against returnees in the provision of basic services, repatriation
assistance and employment, reconstruction assistance, and in the administration
of the law generally, must be ended.
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PART II.
SERBIA, MONTENEGRO AND KOSOVO 
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3.  SERBIA
Deep strains of nationalism run through a Serbia facing enormous challenges
- resolving the constitutional relationship with Montenegro and Kosovo,
restoring accountability and the rule of law, addressing an insurgency in the
P resevo valley, and bringing new life into an economy decimated by
mismanagement and debt.  Reformers and hard-liners are struggling with each
other to define Serbia’s place in the world in a battle with high stakes.  The
embrace of the new government by the international community should be less
uncritical: it should be held to the same high standards demanded of other
Balkans countries, notably Cro a t i a .
A . I n t ro d u c t i o n
As of Ap ril 2001, the coalition of parties still called the Democra t i c
Opposition of Serbia (DOS) had secured its hold on the organs of both the
Fe d e ral Republic of Yu go s l avia (FRY) and its main constituent unit, t h e
R e p u blic of Serbia. The danger of the re t u rn of Slobodan Milosevic has
passed with his arrest on 1 Ap ri l , and Yu go s l av President Vo j i s l av Ko s t u n i c a
and Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic are attempting to help their
b a t t e red country emerge from its thirt e e n - year twilight of wa r, s a n c t i o n s ,
economic collapse and destru c t i ve ultra - n a t i o n a l i s m .
I n t e rnational sanctions - with the exception of travel bans and fi n a n c i a l
re s t rictions against certain Milosevic cronies - have been lifted, and the
world has ra p i d ly welcomed Ko s t u n i c a ’s FRY back into key intern a t i o n a l
o rganisations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organisation fo r
S e c u rity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the Council of Euro p e .2 3 The Serbian people have seen
fi rsthand the benefits of cooperating with the international commu n i t y
and committing themselves to meet intern a t i o n a l ly acceptable standard s
of behav i o u r.
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But many questions remain about the future of both Serbia and the FRY.
The most basic question centres on the FRY and its future . This is
discussed in this and the next two ch a p t e rs from the pers p e c t i ve of Serbia,
M o n t e n e gro and Ko s ovo . The elements of the argument are then bro u g h t
t o ge t h e r, and conclusions offe re d , in Chapter 6, The Future of the FRY.
Failing to set these re s p e c t i ve societies on a sound legal, constitutional and
institutional footing will be a recipe for a great deal more tro u bl e . T h e
i n t e rnational commu n i t y, wo rking with Serbia, M o n t e n e gro and Ko s ovo ,
must put in place an ord e r ly process for resolving final status questions
and do so in re l a t i ve ly short ord e r. With Serbia central to the re gi o n a l
e q u a t i o n , mu ch will hinge on Belgra d e ’s willingness to look to the future
and not to the past.
M a ny of Milosev i c ’s policies, w h i ch helped sow despair throughout the
1 9 9 0 s ,h ave yet to be signifi c a n t ly altered at the fe d e ral or re p u blican leve l .
Ending the FRY ’s international isolation may have been the easiest step in
re p a i ring a country whose economy is in ruin and where politicians, t h e
police and criminals have long been entwined in a Gordian knot of
l awlessness and corru p t i o n .
With the exception of a re l a t i ve ly small elite within the DOS coalition, t h e
great majority of Serbs have shown no signs yet of reassessing the
xenophobic philosophy of their previous leadership or the methods used
to pursue its war aims. I n d e e d , the DOS victory in the 24 September 2000
Fe d e ral election, and Milosev i c ’s ove rt h row on 5 October 2000, should not
be read as a rejection of strong nationalist sentiments. The DOS won not
because the Serbs had become libera l , but because the mainstre a m
opposition parties fi n a l ly united, p a rt ly due to international guidance and
p re s s u re , behind a single candidate, and because Milosevic lost the support
of the main strongholds of nationalism - the Yu go s l av A rmy (VJ), the Serbian
O rt h o d ox Church and the Serbian A c a d e my of A rts and Sciences. This loss
of support seems to have had mu ch more to do with Milosev i c ’s fa i l u re to
win his wa rs , than any revulsion at Serbia’s bellige rence as such .
Since assuming powe r, Kostunica and Djindjic have taken stri k i n g ly
d i ve rgent positions on re fo rm , with Djindjic appearing more pro gre s s i ve .
I n t e rnational policy make rs have begun to realise that new leadership in
Serbia will not necessari ly embrace policies aimed at creating re gi o n a l
s t ab i l i t y. The struggle between liberal European-style policies and holdove r
nationalist policies continu e s . But if the old policies are not rev i s i t e d ,t h ey
will cert a i n ly sustain, and possibly signifi c a n t ly incre a s e , the curre n t
i n s t ab i l i t y.
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M ovement towa rd economic and social re fo rm will entail considerabl e
d i s l o c a t i o n . The DOS could face a significant backlash from citizens fru s t ra t e d
with continued suffe ri n g , with some of the DOS’s fa i n t - h e a rted members
t u rning back to nationalism in an effo rt to curry favour with a disgru n t l e d
e l e c t o ra t e . The basic lesson for the international community is that it mu s t
channel policies and assistance towa rd those fo rces pulling towa rd
i n t e gra t i o n , and discard those carrying the bag g age of virulent nationalism.
Table 4.  Serbia at a glance 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
B. Security
There are four security issues generating concern both within Serbia and the
wider international community. First, there is the fundamental question of
Serbia’s relationship with Montenegro within the FRY and with Kosovo as
part of Serbia itself. Secondly, there is the ongoing conflict with ethnic
Albanians in southern Serbia. Thirdly, Serbia’s relationship with Bosnia, in
particular the Republika Srpska, remains crucial to both countries. Lastly,
there is the crucial internal issue of control of Serbia’s state security services.
Relations with Montenegro and Kosovo
The political gulf between Serbia and Montenegro has continued to widen
since Milosevic’s defeat,with even Montenegrins not enthusiastic about their
government seeing and resenting a persistent strain of condescension
emanating from Belgrade. The amendment of the Federal constitution by
Milosevic in 2000 to effectively abolish Montenegro’s equality with Serbia
within the FRY was the culmination of a series of events leading Montenegro
to argue,with some credibility, that the FRY has effectively ceased to exist.24
Without a transformation in Belgrade - and perhaps even with it - the
momentum towards independence is likely to continue in Montenegro.
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Population:9.8 million
Elections: Parliamentary elections held on
23 December 2000,presidential elections
due September 2002.
President:Milan Milutinovic
Prime Minister:Zoran Djindjic
25  The FRY Constitution states in Article 1 that “The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal state founded on the equality of
...member republics”and in Article 2 that it “consists of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro as republic
members”.There is no provision for secession,and nothing in the text as to the implications of a declaration of independence
by one or other of the constituent republics.
Would the FRY - a federation consisting of the two republics, Serbia and
Montenegro25 - continue to exist if Montenegro left it? As a practical,political
matter there is not much doubt that a FRY without Montenegro would be so
empty a shell that the continuation of federal institutions,including the office
of federal president now occupied byVojislav Kostunica,would be untenable.
There seems to be reasonably clear acceptance of this in Belgrade, and an
expectation that Kostunica would seek to continue his role by standing for
the post of president of the republic of Serbia in the election due by
September 2002.
But as a matter of law, it needs to be understood that there is nothing
automatic about the dissolution of the FRY in the event that Montenegro
should leave it. A FRY that continued to be described in its Constitution as a
federal state but consisted only of Serbia would certainly be an odd legal
beast. But it would be entirely a matter for Serbia itself, as the remaining
republic, to determine whether the FRY continued in existence or not. If
through some legislative, executive or judicial process Serbia decided not to
continue to recognise,or to participate in, federal institutions,that would be
a death-blow for the FRY, but in the absence of any such process those
institutions would continue, in parallel with Serbia’s own. No international
law principles would apply to the contrary.
It has also been suggested that there are some implications for Kosovo if
Montenegro were to become independent. UN Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1244 explicitly treats the FRY - not Serbia (of which Kosovo remains
part) - as the relevant Serbian stakeholder for the purposes of that resolution,
w h i ch establishes an interim administration (pending a final political
settlement) giving Kosovo“substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia”. One argument is that Montenegro’s independence would,
insofar as it dealt a deathblow to the FRY, add another element to the Kosovo
Albanians’arguments for recognition as an independent state. Insofar as the
FRY continues in legal existence, as we have just stated it could do, that
argument would have no weight. But even if Serbia chose to kill off the FRY,
as it could after a Montenegrin secession,that would have no impact on the
continuing applicability of Resolution 1244,which refers throughout to “the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” rather than Serbia. Just as it was well
understood that the 1991 Security Council arms embargo which originally
applied to the former Yugoslavia continued to apply to each of the states into
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26  The indication in UNSCR 1244 that the FRY is the holder of the sovereignty within which Kosovo is to have “substantial
autonomy”is in any event applicable only to the “interim”period:when it comes to the final political settlement phase,the
resolution is quite silent on the sovereignty question,and who has to agree to what. See further Chapter 6, The Future of
the FRY.
27  Since 1991,the Sandzak Muslims have lived in a tense coexistence with their Serb and,to a lesser degree,Montenegrin
neighbours. Beginning in 1992,the Serbian authorities began open discrimination against the Sandzak Muslims,dismissing
some from state-owned enterprises,“ethnically cleansing”villages along the border with Bosnia,and subjecting the population
to arbitrary arrests and discriminatory administrative measures. At the same time,the Serbian authorities attempted to settle
Serb refugees from Bosnia and Croatia in the region to dilute the Muslim population. As a result,many Muslims who made
up around 70 per cent of the 500,000 population in the Sandzak fled to Bosnia,both during and after the 1992-95 war, and
once again during the 1999 NATO bombing. Since 1998 the Montenegrin government has adopted a policy toward national
minorities that gives the Sandzak Muslims far greater rights than their co-nationals in Serbia.
28  This in turn might ha ve ramifications for neighbouring Bosnia’s Muslim population and its relations with Bosnia’s Serbs and
other Serb nationalists,who have for long speculated about the so-called “Green Transversal”,i.e. an imputed strategy to
connect Muslim-majority territories between the Adriatic and Black Seas.
which that country then fragmented, so too would it certainly be held that
Resolution 1244 resolution continues to have effect, and to create binding
obligations,notwithstanding that there may no longer be a FRY in existence.26
Should Montenegro secede, the nort h e rn pro-Serbian elements in
Montenegro - erstwhile pro-Milosevic and current Socialist People’s Party
(SNP) supporters - have threatened to retaliate by seceding from Montenegro.
Although this fear seems to have been overstated in Belgrade to discourage
independence,any radical resistance that Montenegrins might generate in the
north of the republic could have important ramifications in the Sandzak
region, a Muslim Slav enclave straddling the Serbia-Montenegro border.27 In
the face of Serbian nationalism,many of Sandzak’s residents have looked to
their co-religionists in Bosnia to provide a sense of identity, so much so that
the Sandzak Muslims have openly revived the traditional term “Bosniak” to
describe themselves. Should Montenegro secede, Serbian Sandzak could
present a potential for instability - particularly if the Muslim population
continues to suffer broad discrimination.28
Kosovo itself presents more formidable difficulties. President Kostunica -
backed by the nationalists, the Yugoslav Army (VJ), police, and Milosevic’s
Socialist People’s Party (SPS) - continues to demand that Kosovo remain a part
not just of the FRY but of Serbia. In contrast to Milosevic,he appears willing
to offer some sort of autonomy to the province’s ethnic Albanians,but as this
would be extremely limited, falling short even of that enjoyed under the 1974
Yugoslav constitution,it would be unacceptable to Kosovo Albanians.
Kostunica also appears to have continued Milosevic’s policy of aiding Serb
extremists in northern Mitrovica,from whom he received significant electoral
support. This includes working actively against Kosovo Serb moderates
seeking common ground with the United Nations Mission in Ko s ovo
(UNMIK). Kostunica is unwilling to cooperate meaningfully with UNMIK.
Belgrade’s support for anti-UNMIK elements in Mitrovica has not stopped,
and Kostunica has called publicly for the return of FRY police and soldiers.
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Although the return of “hundreds,not thousands”of FRY troops and police is
provided for in UNSCR 1244,the Kosovo Force (KFOR),the UN and Kosovo
Albanian representatives all agree that returning any Serbian forces would be
impossibly destabilising. The border demarcation with Macedonia was
negotiated without informing UNMIK or the Kosovo Albanians, let alone
consulting them. In sum, Belgrade’s approach unquestionably has made
progress on reconciliation,refugee returns and discussions of final status even
more difficult than they need be.
While privately a number of DOS politicians acknowledge that Kosovo has
been lost,and that the VJ and police will likely never return to ethnic Albanian
controlled areas, it remains politically impossible for a Serb politician to
mention publicly the possibility that Kosovo should gain broad autonomy or
independence. As a result, there is no real effort to move towards a
resolution,or even begin a dialogue.
Most Serbian politicians fail to grasp the depth of change in Kosovo since
June 1999, reflecting a broader unwillingness to face up to the reality of
systematic persecution and “ethnic cleansing” of Kosovo Albanians prior to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) arrival. Serbian politicians
seem unimpressed that Kosovo Albanians are unanimous in their refusal to
submit again to Serbian rule. Even should their authority somehow be
restored, these politicians have yet to think through the numerous and far-
reaching implications of Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo - not least the
voting impact of approximately one million ethnic Albanian voters on the
composition of the Serbian Parliament.
Should the international community push for an early resolution of Kosovo’s
status,as this report argues it should,there is some risk that nationalist forces
may again assume a more prominent role in domestic Serbian politics,where
they are currently nominally held in check by more liberal factions within
DOS. Belgrade might also encourage the authorities in Bosnia’s Republika
Srpska to press for partition of Bosnia to “compensate” Serbia for lost
territories. At best, given the continuing turbulence in Serbia, the liberal
elements inside DOS could well need considerable assistance to ride out the
political storm that would accompany such events.
Southern Serbia
A small-scale war has been raging for a year in the Presevo valley area of
southern Serbia,where ethnic Albanians make up an overwhelming majority
of the valley’s 100,000 people. The towns of Presevo and Bujanovac lie in the
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Morava river valley above the route of the main north-south road and rail
corridor joining Central Europe to the Aegean. The road through the valley
directly connects Belgrade with the Macedonian capital of Skopje and the
Greek port of Thessaloniki. Belgrade fears that loss of Bujanovac and Presevo
would virtually cut Serbia off from Macedonia and Greece and give Albanian
forces a possible wedge to use in any demands against the Serbian and
Macedonian governments.
But the question of southern Serbia goes beyond severing a strategically
important route. In a 15 January 2001 report on southern Serbia, the UN
Special Envoy for the Balkans,Carl Bildt warned that any escalation in fighting
could lead to renewed “ethnic cleansing”of non-Serbs from Kosovo,as well as
drag in the tense Albanian-majority regions of northern Macedonia. Given the
spread of armed rebellion in February and March, Bildt’s warning proved
prescient. The potential for escalating regional conflict is obvious.
The situation in southern Serbia is providing a rallying point for nationalist
passions on both sides of the ethnic divide. Over the past year fighting
between the approximately 700 to 1,000 Albanian guerrillas and Yugoslav
s e c u rity fo rces has been confined large ly to skirmishes with infa n t ry
weapons. Belgrade was unwilling to provoke a KFOR or other international
response by sending the VJ into the five kilometre-wide buffer zone created
by the June 1999 military-technical agreement with KFOR, which only
permitted police with small arms inside the buffer zone, forbidding all VJ
forces and heavy weapons. Given the reluctance of the police to incur losses
in frontal infantry assaults without artillery support, the ethnic Albanian
guerrillas in the region successfully seized large parts of the buffer zone. To
date there have been numerous casualties on both sides and several dozen
deaths.
Extremist factions within Serbia may be using the Presevo issue to discredit
the government. Serbian media have presented the clashes as part of an
irredentist movement intent on carving out sections of Serbia to form a
greater Albania or greater Kosovo, with the Albanian forces portrayed as
“terrorists”. For their part, the local Albanians who form the guerrilla
Liberation Army of Presevo,Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB),have been all
too willing to provoke the VJ and police and to respond in kind to
provocation,hoping to draw in KFOR and internationalise their struggle. The
UCPMB has been encouraged by the success of their fellow fighters in
Kosovo during 1999,particularly in achieving a NATO intervention, and they
have been funded and supported by former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
fighters and commanders and diaspora.
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UCPMB is by all accounts a rather loose confederation of groups - there are
two political parties and probably three armed groups under its umbrella title
- and it is not an organised united force in the generally accepted sense of an
army. While numbers are difficult to estimate, informed Western military
sources place the UCPMB troop strength at 600-700. However, it might be
fairly easy for them to get very strong reinforcements quite quickly from
former fighters in Kosovo. NATO is also keen that all three groups are
represented in any talks,in order that they should be fully committed to any
possible settlement or plan.
Yet Albanian success in Kosovo, and fantasies of expansion, are not the only
reasons for the uprising. As in Kosovo,the Albanians of southern Serbia - who
make up the majority in this specific area - have legitimate grievances. The
Serbian authorities have long subjected the ethnic Albanians to widespread
official discrimination and persecution. For much of the last decade,Serbia
ex cluded Albanians from the education and health care systems, a n d
dismissed them from jobs in state-owned companies, the police and other
public sector jobs, and limited access to Albanian-language media. Coupled
with the perceived Albanian victory across the administrative border in
Kosovo,it was only a matter of time before the situation boiled over.
The FRY gove rn m e n t ’s reaction to the situation has been re a s o n ably
restrained. It adopted a Presevo peace plan in February 2001 developed by
Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic. The three-part plan seeks to
address the situation by emancipating the Albanians and reintegrating them
into Serbian political, social and economic life. This plan would combine a
s e ries of confidence-building measure s , w h i ch include re i n t ro d u c i n g
Albanians into the local police force, combined with a gradual phased
disarmament plan,with economic aid for job creation. While the Covic plan
is the first serious step taken by a Serbian politician to address one of the
underlying sources of regional tension and instability, and a basis for further
discussion,a lasting settlement in the area is probably some way off.
Kostunica suggested that the ground safety zone be narrowed or eliminated,
and policed by joint Serbian and KFOR patrols on both sides of the
administrative border (the Kosovo - Serbia border). Following discussions
between the FRY and NATO, NATO agreed to allow the limited, but
expanding, reintroduction of Serb forces into the Ground Safety Zone. This
decision seems to have been driven both by a reluctance on NATO’s part to
have KFOR take a military role in southern Serbia, and growing frustration
within the alliance at ethnic Albanian violence in both southern Serbia and
Macedonia.
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As of March 2001, both the FRY and the respective UCPMB elements had
signed separate NATO - b ro ke red cease-fi re agre e m e n t s , and NATO had
facilitated the first talks between the two sides. However, accusations and
counter accusations of cease-fi re violations and hostage taking have
threatened to derail discussions even as they were initiated. In addition, a
European Union Monitor Mission Regional Office has been established in
southern Serbia. Some 25 monitors will be deployed under this plan, but
given that there were already reports as of March 2001 that these monitors
had been fired upon,security for these monitors will obviously be an ongoing
concern.
While Belgrade’s restraint,better Western policing and imaginative diplomacy
may hold down the fighting, the situation in southern Serbia will remain
dangerously unstable as long as Kosovo’s status is unresolved. This matter is
discussed in detail in Chapter 5,Kosovo and Chapter 6,The Future of the FRY.
But other measures are also needed:
o The international community should maintain pressure on both the FRY
and the UCPMB guerrillas to conduct face-to-face talks.
o KFOR should more robustly enforce the Kosovo-Serbia border to stem the
flow of weapons and personnel involved in the conflict.
o The EU should ensure that its monitors in southern Serbia have the proper
skill set and language skills for such a demanding task.
o KFOR should agree to serve as an extraction force for these monitors if
they are under threat.
o Concrete measures to be put forward in the peace negotiation should
include mutual demobilisation and the creation of a police force which
represents the local populations proportionately, and incorporates former
rebels to ensure their compliance.
More controversially, the question of a possible exchange of territory should
not be dismissed out of hand. The borders around Kosovo are relatively
recent creations, and Presevo, Medvedje and Bujanovac transferred out of
what is now Kosovo in 1947. Leposovic, to the north of Mitrovica, was
transferred into Kosovo in 1951. Since the first are largely Albanian inhabited,
and Leposavic is largely Serb29, an exchange of territory might well provide a
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more lasting solution. However, any possible land swap would also be deeply
intertwined with the issue of Kosovo’s final status: the issue is addressed in
that context in Chapter 6.
Bosnia
Although Kostunica has officially re-established diplomatic relations with
Bosnia and visited the country three times, in important regards his policy
toward the neighbouring country is no better than Milosevic’s and may be
worse. His first visit to Bosnia was to attend the reburial of a Serb poet in
Republika Srpska, prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations with
Sarajevo. A diplomatic fiasco was narrowly averted by the intervention of the
head of the UN Mission in Bosnia (UNMIBH), Jacques Klein, and High
Representative Wolfgang Petritsch.
Kostunica’s rise to power accompanied a significant increase in FRY support
for the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) the extremist Bosnian Serb party, in
blatant disregard for international community policies aimed at weakening
nationalist forces. In the campaign leading up to Bosnia’s November 2000
general elections, officials of Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)
openly campaigned for the SDS inside Bosnia.
Kostunica’s support for the SDS has encouraged that party, which continues
to represent a significant and serious obstacle to implementing Dayton. He
has refused to apologise for war crimes committed by FRY and the Serbs,
while reiterating his belief that the Serbs were primarily victims in the recent
wars. He has never spoken out openly against Republika Srpska joining
Serbia, as Croatian President Mesic has done over Bosnian Croat interest in
joining Croatia. Kostunica has also failed to sever the FRY’s financial support
of the Bosnian Serb army (VRS),intelligence services and police. In short,his
Bosnia policy will add to Western frustration over implementation of the
Dayton Agreement.
Serbia’s State Security Services
The VJ and police must be brought under civilian contro l . The Serbian
s e c u rity fo rc e s , p a rt i c u l a r ly the police (MUP) and state security (DB),
remain highly compromised by their criminal activities under Milosev i c ,
i n cluding political assassinations, s mu g g l i n g , car theft, p ro s t i t u t i o n , ex t ra -
legal actions against the opposition and media, as well as “ethnic cl e a n s i n g ”
and the actions of their special para m i l i t a ry fo rces in Cro a t i a , Bosnia and
Ko s ovo .
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The battle for control of the security services has become a litmus test within
the DOS movement. Kostunica and his sympathisers turned toward the old
guard for support,while Djindjic appears to wish to gradually weed out the
old elements in favour of newer, more compliant ones. Djindjic appears to
have succeeded in placing his candidate - Dusan Mihajlovic - as Republic
Minister of the Interior. The position,however,appears to be interim,perhaps
reflecting the lack of consensus in the DOS on the matter.
The extent to which the police have been comprised is seen in Interi o r
Minister Dusan Mihajlov i c ’s controve rsial appointment of police Genera l
S reten Lukic as head of all non-secret police units. Lukic - who re c e i ve d
s u p p o rt for this position from the VJ and DB - is re p o rted to have commanded
Serb police units in Ko s ovo from early 1998 until June 1999, d u ring which
time significant “ethnic cl e a n s i n g ” , expulsions and massacres occurre d ,
i n cluding the Racak massacre . In May 1999, just days befo re the Intern a t i o n a l
C riminal Tribunal for the Fo rmer Yu go s l avia (ICTY) indicted Milosevic and fo u r
of his closest associates, M i l o s evic presented a medal to Lukic and pro m o t e d
h i m . G i ven his position in the chain of command, Lukic may be a candidate
for ICTY indictment. His appointment demonstrates the difficulties of making
a clean break with the fo rmer re gi m e . H oweve r,until this happens,m i n o ri t i e s
a c ross the FRY will fear that little has ch a n ge d . This in turn will further subject
the entire society to a degree of lawlessness that will delay re fo rm ,d i s c o u rage
fo reign investment and heighten the alre a dy considerable social tensions. T h a t
s a i d , the willingness of police fo rces to arrest Milosevic on 1 Ap ril 2001,
despite some initial re s i s t a n c e , m ay signal an increased awa reness in the
s e c u rity services that power is shifting to democratic fo rc e s .
C. Governance
This section addresses political issues both in Serbia, and in the larger FRY
federation of which it is part: in Belgrade the two institutional systems are
inextricably connected. Today’s FRY is a relatively weak political entity,
possessing formal authority primarily over foreign affairs,the military and the
central currency. The federal government has essentially ceased to exist in
Montenegro, and has been suspended by UN Security Council Resolution
1244 in Kosovo. In Montenegro,the only federal institutions that continue to
function are the Yugoslav military and air traffic control. All other functions
have been usurped by Milo Djukanovic’s Montenegrin Republic government
or shut down. Even within Serbia,the Federal government operates largely at
the mercy of the Serbian Republic government. This is due to the nature of
the Serbian constitution,which gives Serbia the power to contravene federal
authority in certain instances.
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Table 5.  Main Political Parties in Serbia
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Political Pa rt y
D e m o c ra t i c
Opposition of Serbia
(DOS) 
D e m o c ratic Pa rt y
(DS) 
D e m o c ratic Pa rty of
Serbia (DSS) 
Socialist Pa rty of
Serbia (SPS)
Pa rty of Serbian
Unity (SSJ)
Serbian Renewa l
M ovement (SPO)
United Yu go s l av Left
(JUL) 
Serbian Radical Pa rt y
( S R S )
Political A l i g n m e n t
The loose gove rning coalition of eighteen part i e s ,f ro m
across Serbia’s political spectrum. Principally
d e m o c ra t i c a l ly ori e n t e d , a n t i - M i l o s evic part i e s . D O S
won a two - t h i rds majority in the 250 seat A s s e m bly with
65 per cent of the popular vote in the December 2000
Serbian elections.
The party of Serbian Premier Zoran Djindjic. The DS is
c o n s i d e red to be re l a t i ve ly liberal and re fo rmist in
o ri e n t a t i o n . It is curre n t ly not associated with stro n g
nationalist sentiments. One of the two leading part i e s
in the DOS coalition.
Led by FRY President Vo j i s l av Ko s t u n i c a , fo rm e r ly a
g a t h e ring point for ultra-nationalist intellectuals,the DSS
is curre n t ly the most popular party in Serbia thanks to
Ko s t u n i c a ’s personal pre s t i ge . Second influential part y
in the DOS coalition.
Slobodan Milosev i c ’s unre fo rmed fo rmer commu n i s t
p a rt y. The largest opposition part y, it holds - in coalition
with the JUL - 37 out of 250 seats in the Serbian
A s s e m bly, and 44 out of 138 seats in the fe d e ral lowe r
h o u s e .
A hard-line ultra-nationalist party founded by the late
war criminal Zeljko “A rk a n ”R a z n a t ov i c . The party wa s
founded on A rk a n ’s notorious para m i l i t a ry gro u p , t h e
Serbian Volunteer Guard also known as the “ Ti ge rs ” . I t
was a surprise winner of 14 seats in the December 2000
Serbian elections.
An ultra-nationalist party founded by the ch a ri s m a t i c
Vuk Dra s kov i c . It failed to re c e i ve significant votes in
either the September 2000 FRY or December 2000
Serbian elections, and now has only one upper house
fe d e ral seat.
The political part y / m ovement of Slobodan Milosev i c ’s
w i fe , Mirjana Markov i c . P rev i o u s ly a haven for die-hard
c o m munists and political opportunists looking to pro fi t
f rom the Milosevic re gi m e .
Led by Vo j i s l av Seselj, the SRS was the stro n gest ultra -
nationalist party for most of the 1990s. After a poor
s h owing in the December elections,its future is uncl e a r.
Table 6.  Party Representation by Seats in Serbian and FRY
Parliaments
Source:Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Ministry for Foreign Affairs, available at www.mfa.gov.yu;Centre for Free elections and
Democracy (Belgrade). Figures are those following the September 2000 FRY and December 2000 Serbian elections.
Much of the character of the federal government is currently dictated by
Vojislav Kostunica’s personality and nationalist ideology. Prior to taking
power, Kostunica was the leader of one of Serbia’s smallest opposition
political parties,the Democratic Party of Serbia. He was not known either for
his charisma or organisational skills, and his meteoric political rise did not
occur until the election campaign in the summer of 2000.As a candidate with
strong nationalist credentials but no association with Milosevic, Kostunica
was uniquely well positioned for success in that effort. He is the most
popular political figure in FRY at this time, with moral authority that far
outstrips the weak formal power of his of fice.
To all appearances, Kostunica is an ardent nationalist, very conservative and a
man of deep convictions. As a university teacher, he was removed for his
objection to clauses in Tito’s 1974 constitution giving increased rights and
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Political Party Serbian Parliament FRY Parliament
Unicameral Chamber of Chamber of 
Chamber Citizens (Lower Republics
House) (Upper House)
Democratic Opposition 
of Serbia (DOS) 176 58 10
Socialist Party of Serbia 
and United Yugoslav
Left (SPS/JUL) 37 44 7
Socialist People’s Party 
(SNP) (Montenegro) 28 19
Serbian Radical Party 
(SRS) 23 5 2
Party of Serbian Unity 
(SSJ) 14
Serbia People’s Party 
(SNS) 2 1
Serbian Renewal Party 
(SPO) 1
Alliance of Vojvodina 
Hungarians (SVM) 1
Total Seats 250 138 40
30  In 1994,Kostunica criticised “the old,irrational myth that...Serbia up to the [river] Drina...is a just and sufficient Serbia.Surely
from the moment that Yugoslavia disappeared,Serbia was one indivisible territory on both sides of the Drina.... Whatever
foreign and domestic ‘peace-lovers’think or say peace is only possible once this natural fact is acknowledged rather than
rejected.” Quoted in Rober t Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic . Politics in the 1990s, Hurst & Co.,London 1999,p.223. The
river Drina has marked the border between Serbia and Bosnia since Serbia’s emergence as an independent entity two
centuries ago.
autonomy to Yugoslavia’s national minorities. As a politician in the 1990s,he
refused to enter into coalition with Milosevic. On the political spectrum,
Kostunica’s views are far closer to those of ultra-nationalists such as Vojislav
Seselj and Dobrica Cosic than most Western officials are comfortable
admitting. He has gone on the record for the restoration of the Serbian
monarchy and the creation of a Greater Serbia,and has called for the West to
give war reparations for the NATO bombing.30 He continues to denounce the
ICTY as being “political”and practising selective justice,biased against Serbia.
He favours strengthening ties between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the
state,including religious instruction in public schools. He is frequently seen
in the company of Patriarch Pavle, and the Federal Minister of Religion
B o goljub Sijakovic suggested that all gove rnment ministers seek the
Patriarch’s blessing for their decision-making.
However, Kostunica has continued to live much as the Serbian “everyman” -
residing in his old apartment just down the street from the National Theatre,
eschewing the Presidential palace, dressing modestly and driving a battered
old Yugo automobile. His positions on public policy appear to mirror those
held by a significant majority of the population.
Both Kostunica and his circle appear to have little practical experience of
economic reform or international affairs, and Kostunica’s political skills
remain raw. His convictions served him well during his pre-election
campaign, but may ultimately prove a liability. The president’s lack of
pragmatism since taking office has created a political perception both at
home and abroad of a man struggling to reach beyond his ideology.
Nonetheless, he has begun to show some ability to compromise, but only
when pressured by members of the DOS and the international community, as
seen by his support for the Covic peace plan for southern Serbia, and his
willingness to incarcerate Milosevic.
While the DOS-controlled Serbian government did not officially come into
existence until 25 January 2001,it has (in various versions) been running the
country since the 5 October revolution in a tense cohabitation with
Milosevic’s SPS. It is the real source of power in today’s Yugoslavia, and
Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic holds a more substantial position than
President Kostunica in many respects. Djindjic has called many different
political alliances home over the years. He is a student veteran of the “Praxis”
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m ovement of re fo rm-minded socialists, and wrote art i cles and essay s
c riticising communism during the 1970s. After graduating from the
University of Belgrade,Djindjic lived for over ten years in Germany, where he
took a PhD at Konstanz University. He then went on to create a combined
business-academic career in Germany. Returning to Serbia in 1989, he
entered politics within the Democratic Party (DS).
Djindjic’s views can be characterised as pragmatic and pro-European. His
business experience gives him certain practical insights into the functioning
of the economy and the necessity for rapid and far-reaching reforms,but also
has left him vulnerable to charges of associating with criminal elements. He
does not appear to be saddled with the self-destructive philosophies of
Serbian nationalism; however during the war in Bosnia he had close ties to
the Serb side, including indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic. Although
c redited with being the stra t e gist and chief organiser behind the 24
September 2000 elections and the mastermind behind the events of 5
October, Djindjic falls far behind Kostunica in popularity, with his negative
ratings nearly equalling his popularity.
In Serbia,the DOS leadership has established a government that functions as
a corporate governing body. In order to form this system,the DOS pushed a
law through the Serbian Parliament that created the post of six Vice-
Presidents, who come from the largest parties in the DOS coalition. These
Vice-Presidents act as the Board of Directors of a corporation,in concert with
Djindjic acting as Chairman of the Board. In this system,the cabinet ministers
are weak in comparison to the Vice-Presidents. Within the new government
DOS has reduced the number of ministries to seventeen and abolished the
nu m e rous minister-without-port folio positions that existed during the
Milosevic regime.
The Serbian government has not yet begun to make substantive changes in
many policies from the Milosevic era, and such revisions will require
consensus among the members of the “Board of Directors”and the “Chairman
of the Board”. Nonetheless, the new government has started to work on a
number of serious issues,including pensions,economic reform,the judiciary,
media censorship,privatisation,education, financial reform,southern Serbia,
and taking control over the security forces which appear deeply intertwined
with criminal elements.
One basic dif ficulty is that deep rifts continue within the DOS on important
issues, particularly cooperation with the ICTY and control over the police
and military. Because of the federal government’s control over the VJ, foreign
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policy and a police force (albeit small and relatively weak in relation to the
Serbian police),the DOS coalition faces daily strains between the liberal and
nationalist members of the coalition. The nationalist faction, headed by
Kostunica himself, refuses to cooperate with the ICTY. This same faction
draws much of its support from the VJ and the Federal police, bodies that
appear to support Kostunica fully. The liberals - backed primarily by Djindjic
- have pushed for rapid reform of Milosevic era policies and a more European
orientation.
These disagreements could tear DOS apart. The threat by Federal Deputy
Prime Minister Miroljub Labus to resign over Kostunica’s opposition to
cooperating with the ICTY is one indication of the severity of these splits.
Other issues that could divide DOS are the pace and scope of economic and
social re fo rm , c riminal prosecutions and re t ribution against Milosev i c
cronies. These disagreements will continue for the foreseeable future and
may provide a major stumbling block to broader international cooperation
with the FRY. Relations with Ko s ovo A l b a n i a n s , B o s n i a , C roatia and
M o n t e n e gro are all strained by the abiding suspicion that Milosev i c ’s
opportunistic nationalism has been replaced by Kostunica’s heartfelt variety,
and that apart from the withdrawal of the direct military threat, little
fundamental change has occurred in Belgrade. Given the significant power
granted to the structures of the Serbian Republic, Djindjic’s pro-Western
re fo rm sentiments could gra d u a l ly prevail over some of the more
conservative ideas emanating from the Kostunica cabinet. But fundamental
change could well take some time as the people of the FRY adjust to the
challenge before them, and at this stage it is simply too early to predict
whether nationalism will continue to dominate,or reform will prevail.
One relatively minor security issue with a regional dimension that could be
resolved quickly, given sufficient will in Belgrade, is the Prevlaka peninsula.
This uninhabited spit of land, some four kilometres in length by half a
kilometre wide, forms the southern tip of Croatia,but it dominates the mouth
of the Bay of Kotor, which lies inside Montenegro. This bay houses most of
the FRY naval assets, including shipyards. Prevlaka has been occupied by a
dozen unarmed UN peacekeepers since the negotiated withdrawal of the VJ
in autumn 1992. Milosevic and his allies in Montenegro maintained a
territorial claim to the peninsula, arguing FRY’s overriding security need to
control access to the bay. Under Djukanovic, the Montenegrin government
has dropped this preposterous claim. However, as Croatia and FRY are the
parties to the UN deployment, only Belgrade can negotiate a settlement.
While no lives are at risk around Prevlaka, a peaceful solution would build
confidence in the region and set a positive example. Neither the UN
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Secretariat nor the Security Council has tried to push the parties to negotiate.
This should change. The international community should require the Federal
government to emulate Podgorica’s sensible position on Prevlaka, and then
p re s s u re Belgrade and Zagreb to settle the issue through bilatera l
demilitarisation,along the lines proposed by Croatia in 1998.
Western policy on the ground - and Western stamina in tackling apparently
intractable problems - will be crucial. The international community will need
to approach Kostunica’s policies with a sharper eye. Hoping for change and
achieving change are quite different things. The international community
should understand that a significant majority of the Serbian electorate
supports Kostunica’s approach, as do conservative elements in the VJ and
police. But it is clear that as long as Kostunica and the Serbian leadership
maintain these policies,the Balkans will continue to be unstable.
D.  Human Rights
Serbia’s human rights problems have not disappeared since October 2000.
The main issues are minority rights,media freedom,the independence of the
judiciary, and above all,the handling of Milosevic-era war crimes.
Minority Rights
President Kostunica has yet to institute serious reforms. The newly appointed
Federal Minister for National and Ethnic Communities is Rasim Ljajic, a
Muslim from Sandzak. His ministry has relatively circumscribed powers,and
the DOS’s political will to tackle ethnic issues has been limited. Some
members of Kostunica’s DSS party,such as Gordana Vukovic,a member of the
Federal Parliament,oppose the official use of the Latin alphabet even though
large numbers of FRY citizens,including many Serbs,speak languages that use
the Latin alphabet. Both the FRY and Serbian Republic still maintain policies
of discrimination against Albanians in southern Serbia,Vojvodina’s Hungarian
p o p u l a t i o n , Sandzak Muslims and smaller national groups such as
Macedonians,Bulgarians and Roma.
Further, Kostunica has pursued policies that contribute to continued ethnic
discomfort. He has discussed returning confiscated property to “Crown
Prince” Alexandar Karadjordjevic, stimulating fear in some quarters that
Serbian monarchism (currently marginal, but associated with nationalist
chauvinism) will be boosted. Kostunica’s strong support of the Serbian
Orthodox Church has fuelled concerns about reviving religious education in
the public schools and re-establishing the Church as the state church. Both
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measures would further alienate Serbia’s national minorities and exclude
them from full participation in state institutions. The constant emphasis on
defining Serbia as a state of Serbs has left precious little room for minority
groups within public life, and does nothing to persuade Montenegro and
Kosovo to seek their future within the FRY.
The Media
F u rther improving the media env i ronment in the FRY will also be crucial to
i m p roving the ove rall human rights env i ro n m e n t . M i l o s ev i c ’s abuses of the
media are well documented, but Serbia’s media are struggling to find a post-
a u t h o ri t a rian ro l e . Both Radio-Te l evision Serbia (RTS) and the Po l i t i k a
n ewspaper group reacted to the October ch a n ges by sw i t ching sides, l i t e ra l ly
ove rn i g h t . These and other state-controlled outlets cannot re fo rm themselve s
without material and political support for democra t i s a t i o n , neither of which
a re yet fo rt h c o m i n g . The politically independent pri vate outlets are ex h a u s t e d
after a decade of struggle against incre a s i n g ly dictatorial re p re s s i o n . Few of
them are objective about the new gove rn m e n t s . Some are lobbying for a
t h o rough investigation into a large number of dubious pro p e rty and licensing
decisions that favo u red pro - re gime outlets over the past decade. T h ey also
demand that their colleagues in the state media should be accountable fo r
their offences against the ethics of journ a l i s m : a process that neither their
c o l l e agues nor the DOS leaders seem interested in launch i n g .
In this embittered and also impoverished atmosphere, it is no surprise that
Serbia’s media have yet to show enthusiasm for exploring the difficult
questions that will help citizens to come to terms with the events of the last
decade and their role in Yugoslavia’s destruction. Although the faces have
changed much of the message remains the same,and the Serbian media has
yet to break decisively with the nationalist legacy of the past. More dynamic
and independent reporting will be essential to guiding a fragile democracy
through a very difficult transformation.
The new authorities in Serbia are unwilling,and perhaps unable,to encourage
a clear process of democratisation in the media. The international community
can best assist by coordinating strong support for the reform of state-
controlled broadcasting in line with Council of Europe norms, and the
adoption of liberal media laws and regulations. The OSCE mission in Serbia
may serve as a focal point for such dialogue and assistance,with active input
from the key embassies in Belgrade as well as the Council of Europe. At the
same time,international support to independent media of proven quality and
influence should be maintained.
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31  See ICG Balkans Report No. 85, Kosovo Albanians in Serbian Prisons: Kosovo’s Unfinished Business, 26 January 2000.
Judicial Reform
Addressing human rights concerns will require the overhaul of a judicial
system that was almost completely discredited and deprofessionalised under
Milosevic. Serbia’s police or judiciary did not respect basic human rights,and
many members of the senior judiciary were intimidated or simply became
compliant actors in a ruling criminal class.
Even today the danger to the judiciary continues. On 7 November 2000
I nve s t i g a t i ve Ju d ge Nebojsa Simeunovic disappeare d , and was fo u n d
murdered. Simeunovic had refused to move against the miners at the
Kolubara open pit mine for sabotage and striking illegally in the days leading
up to the 5 October revolution. These miners were vital in breaking the
Milosevic regime,and the judge’s murder was likely retribution for his role in
this,and several other, politically charged cases.
Serbia today needs a new law on the court system and to begin the creation
of a truly independent judiciary. The DOS government seems to be moving
in this direction, particularly with the removal of several key judges.
Nonetheless,this change was not structural in nature. Judges salaries remain
far below those of other functionaries,making them easy targets for bribery.
In December 2000 the government increased judges’salaries by 30 per cent
in an effort to alleviate the problem,but they are still too low.
Yet there are some encouraging signs. The Yugoslav Constitutional Court
recently ruled unconstitutional measures imposed under the Milosevic
regime that restricted civil rights and moved to limit current police powers
of detention in certain cases. The Court also overturned the powers of the
Serbian interior minister to restrict movement in public places under specific
circumstances, a measure that had been used to prevent demonstrations
under the Milosevic regime. And it ruled that the Serbian Supreme Court
does not have the authority to authorise checks on private correspondence,
declaring that such matters should be regulated under federal and not
Republic law.
Some progress has also been made on another vital issue. The Federal
a u t h o rities had been under international pre s s u re to amnesty the
approximately 630 Kosovo Albanians who had been detained in Kosovo in
1999, tried in a blatantly irregular manner, and sentenced to long prison
terms, some 200 of them for terrorism.31 On 26 February 2001,the Federal
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32  The law also exonerated some 28,000 young Serbs and Montenegrins who had refused to fight in Croatia,Bosnia or Kosovo.
33  “Yugoslav Chief Says Milosevic Shouldn’t Be Sent to Hague”,Interview with Steven Erlanger, New York Times, 3 April 2001.
Parliament adopted an amnesty law. However, as it excluded more than half
of the 630 from release,this law seems unlikely to have much positive impact
on Serbian-Albanian relations.32
Milosevic-Era War Crimes 
C o o p e ration with the ICTY is widely viewed as a litmus test for Belgra d e ’s
willingness to break with the past. It has now been half-heart e d ly pro m i s e d
for lesser fi g u res but not, so fa r, for the pri m a ry architect of the last decade’s
t rage dy, fo rmer president Milosevic himself. Wider cooperation with the
ICTY must be fo rt h c o m i n g . This is not an issue on which the intern a t i o n a l
c o m munity can gi ve up: it must insist that Milosevic be tried under
i n t e rnational law, in an international court , for the war crimes for which he
has been indicted. The issue was not pressed hard , even by the Tri b u n a l
i t s e l f, b e fo re the 23 December 2000 election in Serbia. But if the
i n t e rnational community is serious about putting the horro rs of the 1990s
behind it, the claims of justice cannot any longer be shelve d .
P resident Kostunica has been ducking and we aving on the issue, h i s
nationalist instincts at odds with international obligations and demands. H e
maintains that the Tribunal is politicised,biased and anti-Serb. He also cl a i m s
that it imposes collective guilt on the Serbs, s e e m i n g ly oblivious to the
a rgument that only through the ICTY process can the Serbs be re l i eved of
s u ch a burd e n . His meeting with Milosevic in early 2001 and fa i l u re to
i n fo rm his DOS coalition part n e rs and the public fully created an impre s s i o n
that he was protecting his pre d e c e s s o r. The Ja nu a ry 2001 visit to Belgra d e
by ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte also went badly, with Ko s t u n i c a
fi rst refusing to meet on the ground that she was too junior, then insisting he
was too busy,b e fo re acquiescing under fi e rce pre s s u re from members of his
own DOS coalition and fo reign diplomats. This behaviour signalled that
unwillingness to cooperate with ICTY was fe d e ral policy. In March 2001
Kostunica seemed to moderate his position slightly by indicating that it wa s
up to the “ c o u rts to decide” on the matter of tra n s fe rring Milosevic to T h e
H ag u e , but the next month he was still saying “It should never happen”.3 3
On the other hand, Fe d e ral Deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Lab u s , S e r b i a n
P rime Minister Djindjic, Serbian Minister of Justice Vladan Batic and Fe d e ra l
Minister of Justice Momcilo Grubac all appear to favour tra n s fe rri n g
M i l o s evic at some point. But these DOS politicians are a minori t y. D j i n d j i c
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34  The FRY is not currently a World Bank member, but had begun the negotiating process for membership as of March 2000.
The FRY will also likely need assistance from both the World Bank and the IMF in restructuring its current debt.
35  “As Expected,Belg rade Wins ‘Cooperative’Seal From U.S.”,New York Times, 3 April 2001.
36 106th Congress Report,House of Representatives 2nd Session,100 997,“Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations,Export
Financing,and Related Programs for the Fiscal year ending September 30,2001,and for other purposes”,Section 594.
is awa re that at present domestic political fo rces oppose tra n s fe rri n g
M i l o s evic to The Hag u e . Yet he also fe a rs that both the U. S . gove rnment and
the EU will continue to re s t rict Yu go s l av membership and participation in
key international org a n i s a t i o n s , s u ch as the IMF or the World Bank, s h o u l d
the FRY not coopera t e .3 4 On 14 Fe b ru a ry 2001 the Fe d e ral gove rn m e n t
adopted a platfo rm of official cooperation with the ICTY. H oweve r,
i m m e d i a t e ly prior to and fo l l owing this turn - a ro u n d , both Kostunica and
Fe d e ral Prime Minister Zoran Zizic announced that cooperation did not
mean ex t raditing indictees or turning over documents to the ICTY. T h i s
p e r fo rmance natura l ly aroused concern that the authorities wanted to re a p
the international benefit of cooperation without incurring its cost.
Notwithstanding these va rious re a s o n able grounds for concern ab o u t
B e l gra d e ’s perfo rm a n c e , the U. S . a d m i n i s t ration cert i fied on 2 Ap ril 2001
that Yu go s l avia was cooperating with the war crimes tribunal at The Hag u e
and the international commu n i t y ’s effo rts in Bosnia, thus allowing A m e ri c a n
economic assistance to continu e , although this was accompanied by
l a n g u age stating that Belgrade still needed to fulfil its intention to
“ c o o p e rate fully ” with the Tri b u n a l .3 5 The U. S . C o n gress appro p riated $100
million for Yu go s l avia last ye a r, ro u g h ly half of which would not have been
d i s b u rsed without this cert i fi c a t i o n .3 6
The fact that the FRY turned over Milomir Stakic, the fo rmer Bosnian Serb
m ayor of Pri j e d o r, to the ICTY and called for the vo l u n t a ry surrender of
other suspects we re ex c e e d i n g ly modest steps towa rd ge nu i n e
c o o p e ra t i o n , and cl e a r ly designed as tokens to allow cert i fication to move
fo r wa rd . S i m i l a r ly, the recent amnesty law that still leaves signifi c a n t
nu m b e rs of Ko s ovo Albanian political pri s o n e rs jailed in Serbia can only be
seen as ve ry partial step towa rd the respect for minority rights as called fo r
in the cert i fication legi s l a t i o n . H oweve r, visits by Grubac and Batic to T h e
H ag u e , and Milosev i c ’s arrest (albeit only on local ch a rges) short ly
t h e re a f t e r, m ay have been useful steps fo r wa rd . But Belgra d e ’s continu e d
sustenance of nationalist elements in Bosnia, and obvious reluctance to
c o o p e rate fully with the ICTY, m a ke clear how far the FRY still has to go
t owa rd meeting the spirit of cert i fi c a t i o n . P resident Ko s t u n i c a ’s ow n , a n d
often contra d i c t o ry, statements on eve rything from Milosev i c ’s ex t ra d i t i o n
to Serbian nationalism call into question the fundamental intentions of the
n ew gove rn m e n t .
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The overall political judgement in Washington appeared to be that cutting off
assistance was simply too draconian a response to the FRY’s mixed progress
at this juncture and would have been difficult to publicly justify given
Milosevic’s detainment. While the certification process sparked considerable
debate,two important facts linger:Serbia and the FRY still have a considerable
way to go in distancing themselves from their past behaviour and the
international community, particularly because of the FRY’s crushing debt
burden,still has considerable leverage. This leverage was clearly seen in last
minute political scrambling within the FRY, which resulted in Grubac and
Batic visiting The Hague,one individual voluntarily surrendering to the ICTY
under pressure from the Serbian government,one being arrested and forcibly
extradited,and finally the Milosevic arrest. This leverage should be exercised
and as the certification process makes clear,Western pressure can produce
results.
There is near unanimous agreement among Serbia’s politicians - Kostunica
included - that Milosevic be tried in Serbia for certain crimes committed
during his regime. Serbs wish to see Milosevic arraigned before the courts on
charges of corruption and abuse of power. Such a trial would be an
important,but far from sufficient,step forward for Belgrade. It could serve to
open a discussion on responsibility and recent history among the Serbs,and
would allow some of the political passions surrounding Milosevic’s fate to
cool over time. The international community should not discourage this
process, but it should continue to make absolutely clear that it does not
replace the obligation to make Milosevic face the ICTY charges.
The question then becomes how best to move forward with an ICTY trial of
Milosevic. A central goal of this process should be not only to deliver justice,
but also to create the opportunity for the Serbian public to come to terms
with the events of the last decade. A ny real attempt at truth and
reconciliation in the Balkans will require the Serbian public to be fully and
truthfully informed about the events of 1991-2000,and the ICTY proceedings
should serve as a kind of morality play to achieve this goal. The Tribunal’s
public education efforts throughout the Balkans have been sorely lacking,but
the need is greatest in Serbia.
To date, the only contact the average Serb has with the proceedings of the
ICTY are occasional short television news stories,which show video footage
of the accused wearing headphones,sitting in front of a panel of robed judges
in a foreign court setting. During the Milosevic era these news clips were
usually accompanied by heavily propagandised commentary. Today these
stories - although somewhat better than under Milosevic - are still quite
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37  Poll conducted by the Argument research agency,12-19 February 2001 on a sample of 910 Serbian voters in 26 municipalities.
38  Given the sensitivity of dealing with Milosevic,the FRY authorities might be well advised to start by transferring the three
JNA officers - Mrksic,Radic and Sljivancanin - indicted for crimes committed in Vukovar in 1991.
39  Statute of the International Tribunal,adopted 25 May 1993,amended 13 May 1998,Art.31,and Rules of Procedure and
Evidence (IT/32/REV.18),Rule 4. Available at www.un.org/icty
40  Ibid.,Rule 3.
41  Discussions by ICG with senior ICTY officers in October 2000 and March 2001.
critical of the ICTY and are often accompanied by a local politician attacking
the Tribunal. Kostunica’s own disdain for the ICTY is widely publicised.
However, a February 2001 poll showed encouragingly high levels of support
both for Milosevic’s arrest and extradition to The Hague. Sixty per cent of
respondents indicated that Slobodan Milosevic should stand trial for war
crimes, and more than half believed he should hand himself over to the
ICTY.37
Transferring Milosevic to The Hague has always been - and should remain - the
avenue of choice for bringing Milosevic and other indicted war criminals to
justice.38 But one alternative for dealing with him that may become worth
exploring would be to permit him to face the ICTY charges in Belgrade itself.
This would serve the goal of educating the Serbian public while meeting the
demands of justice. Although the ICTY’s Charter places the tribunal seat in
The Hague,its rules authorise it to “exercise its functions at a place other than
the seat of the tribunal if so authorised by the President in the interests of
justice”.39 The rules also provide for proceedings to be conducted in other
than the official working languages of English and French, and the ICTY
already maintains a battery of interpreters to translate all the proceedings into
Serbo-Croatian.40
There are obvious practical difficulties with the “Hague-on-the-Danube”
option, in particular the extensive security required for judges, prosecutors
and especially for witnesses. Given the lawlessness and criminality in Serbia,
as well as the powerful and prominent positions inside the VJ and police of
many of the indictees, the ICTY could experience significant difficulties
maintaining security for witnesses - many of whom would be war victims
from Croatia,Bosnia and Kosovo. These problems are not seen by the ICTY
i t s e l f4 1 as insurm o u n t able provided the Tribunal we re gi ven suffi c i e n t
additional budgetary support, and there were clear understandings with
Serbian officials regarding the high international costs that would be involved
in less than fully cooperative behaviour.
A further difficulty could be objections from Croatia and Bosnia,which have
taken pains to cooperate in different degrees with the ICTY, and which see
themselves as the first victims of Milosevic’s war-mongering. Governments in
these countries might seize the opportunity to demand that all future trials of
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their indicted citizens must take place on home soil. Unless the ICTY alters
its overall approach to extradition and trial location,it may be preferable - for
these and the other reasons mentioned - to treat the Belgrade trial possibility
as a fallback rather than front-line option.
C o n t i nuation of the FRY ’s limited cooperation with the ICTY will not only
c reate serious splits within DOS, but also encourage ex t remist fo rces in
C roatia and Bosnia. A l re a dy Cro a t i a ’s gove rnment is under pre s s u re fro m
the far right to halt war crimes trials and cooperation with the ICTY. S e t t i n g
a double standard for the FRY would undermine many of the intern a t i o n a l
c o m mu n i t y ’s hard - won gains elsew h e re , and sow the seeds of future
re gional instab i l i t y. Until those guilty of violations of international law are
b rought befo re a court of international justice, S e r b i a ’s neighbours will
remain deeply wa ry of Serbia, and relations with Bosnia, C roatia and Ko s ovo
will see little pro gre s s . F u rt h e r, as long as those indicted for war cri m e s
remain at large ,S e r b i a ’s political scene will remain unsettled and unstabl e ,
and the DOS will have difficulty consolidating its hold on power and
i n t roducing the re fo rms necessary to pull Serbia out of the Milosev i c -
induced ch a o s .
E . E c o n o m y
D u ring his thirteen ye a rs in powe r, Slobodan Milosevic destroyed an
e c o n o my which had been among South Eastern Euro p e ’s most pro m i s i n g .
Under cover of wa r, economic sanctions, s h o rt ages and hy p e ri n fl a t i o n ,
M i l o s evic and his henchmen looted mu ch of the country ’s hard curre n c y
re s e rve s ,p ri vate sav i n g s , and a good deal of the FRY ’s minera l , agri c u l t u ra l
and industrial we a l t h . Serbia today must ove rcome the triple ch a l l e n ges of
making the transition from a command economy to a market economy,
u n d e rtaking post-war re c o n s t ruction and dismantling a kleptocra c y.
B e ginning in Fe b ru a ry 1992, the FRY suffe red a pro t racted period of
ex t reme hy p e ri n flation - with monthly inflation re a ching tri p l e - d i git leve l s
after December 1992. By October 1993, i n flation was occasionally re a ch i n g
t riple digits on a daily basis, and in early Ja nu a ry 1994 it hit a one-day re c o rd
of 328 per cent. The situation was so bad that in 1993 the FRY gove rn m e n t
funded 99 per cent of its budget simply by printing money.
P u blic ex p e n d i t u res plummeted, resulting in a significant fall in the
s t a n d a rd of health care , education and in agri c u l t u ral output.
U n e m p l oyment ran well over 30 per cent, while crowds of people gathere d
d ay and night in front of We s t e rn embassies, seeking visas. Pensions - often
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late by four or more months - we re re n d e red almost wo rthless by
hy p e ri n fl a t i o n . M a ny of the FRY ’s most capable citizens simply fl e d ,
d e p riving the country of some of its best human capital.
E c o n o m i c a l ly, the FRY retained many of the wo rst elements of commu n i s m
while adding a pernicious criminal element. The NATO bombing in the
summer of 1999 then destroyed significant portions of Serbia’s heav y
i n d u s t ry and infra s t ru c t u re that, a c c o rding to the independent group of
economists G-17, could cost as mu ch as $4.1 billion to re p a i r. By 1999, t h e
G ross Domestic Product (GDP) had fallen to approx i m a t e ly 57 per cent of
its 1989 leve l . In real term s , a p p rox i m a t e ly 40 per cent of Serbia’s
population surv i ves on $15 per month.
In spite of ge n e rous international aid since the October revo l u t i o n , p owe r
cuts still occur,caused in part by the inability of the electrical grid to handle
the re q u i red load, as well as by the inability of Serbia’s poorly maintained
p ower plants to meet demand. Had Serbia not enjoyed an ex c e p t i o n a l ly
mild and pro l o n ged autumn, w h i ch reduced demand for heating and
e l e c t ri c i t y, the power cuts would have been far more widespre a d . In colder
we a t h e r, the heating systems are taxed to their limit, caused in part by
re s t ricted gas fl ows from Russia because of Serbian non-pay m e n t . T h e
c o u n t ry could face increased power cuts during the 2001-2002 winter,
caused in large part by the inability of the distribution netwo rk to handle
the demand.4 2
M i l o s evic left the FRY saddled with $12 billion in ex t e rnal debt,n e a r ly equal
to the FRY ’s 1999 GDP of $14.2 billion.4 3 The National Bank of Yu go s l av i a
gove rnor Mladjan Dinkic is uncove ring new debts - both fo reign and
domestic - eve ry day. Resolving the debt burden is critical to the DOS
gove rn m e n t , w h i ch has ex t re m e ly low fo reign ex ch a n ge re s e rves of
a p p rox i m a t e ly $525 million and only minimal reve nue collection. T h e
gove rnment is hoping to reduce the fo reign debt by at least $6.1 billion,
t h rough negotiations with the IMF, London Club and Pa ris Club: this is a
major source of policy leve rage for the international commu n i t y.
Internal debt is also massive. As of December 2000,the FRY banking sector
had approximately $4.81 billion in accumulated uncovered losses, equal to
over 40 percent of the country’s gross domestic product. This excludes the
additional $3.2 billion owed to citizens by both the banks and the
government for hard currency savings frozen by the Milosevic regime in the
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early 1990s. Such enormous levels of indebtedness block payments and stifle
economic activity and new investment. The banking sector is further
hampered by the existence of the old Yugoslav payments bureau that
monopolises most banking services while controlling access to most of the
country’s financial assets.
At the end of 2000 there we re 31,850 insolvent fi rms in FRY, but instead of
closing the large inefficient fi rms that tra d i t i o n a l ly employed the large s t
number of wo rke rs ,M i l o s evic permitted fi rms to default on tax payments and
g ave soft loans to avoid social unre s t . C o n s e q u e n t ly, h e a l t hy companies
subsidised under-perfo rm e rs . S i m i l a r ly, p rices of goods and services we re
a rt i fi c i a l ly depressed to maintain social peace. As a result 54 per cent of
companies are selling goods and services at prices below their manu fa c t u ri n g
or acquisition cost. O n ly 8.3 per cent claimed to make a pro fit on business
t ra n s a c t i o n s . The remainder bare ly bro ke eve n .
The upshot is that the FRY will at some point be fo rced to raise costs to
c o n s u m e rs ,who are alre a dy struggling with the consequences of last ye a r ’s 113
per cent infl a t i o n . The gove rnment has a publ i cly announced inflation targe t
of approx i m a t e ly 25 per cent for the current ye a r. Yet public pro n o u n c e m e n t s
mask planning in higher gove rnment circl e s ,w h e re a more realistic fi g u re of 50
to 60 per cent is fo re c a s t . E ven with that high an inflation leve l ,p rices are still
far short of their appro p riate leve l s , and the gove rnment plans to perm i t
gradual price liberalisation throughout 2001. G i ven the low standard of living,
high unemployment and low earning powe r, these price increases - part i c u l a r ly
in energy and food - will create tremendous hard s h i p , perhaps causing social
u n rest and jeopardising DOS’s chances for real re fo rm .
The chief result of Serbia’s catastrophic economic state is that the gove rn m e n t
must operate under seve re financial re s t rictions and is unable to re s o l ve energy,
i n f ra s t ru c t u re and social pro bl e m s . Little money is ava i l able to repair the
t ra n s p o rtation and power infra s t ru c t u re , or in social serv i c e s , health or
e d u c a t i o n . P ri vatisation threatens to dislocate large nu m b e rs of re d u n d a n t
wo rke rs .
The FRY ’s economic condition gi ves Montenegro yet another reason to go its
own way. M o n t e n e gro has over the past 18 months moved mu ch fa rther with
economic re fo rm s , making its economic and financial system incompatibl e
with Serbia’s . M o n t e n e gro also feels it will have better chances of obtaining
i n t e rnational financial aid as an independent state, not an unre a s o n abl e
assumption gi ven that constraints on World Bank and other institutional
lending to non-sove reign entities would no longer be applicabl e .
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In an effo rt to demonstrate to Serbian vo t e rs the immediate rewa rds of
choosing the democratic option, the EU gave DOS a 200 million Euro “ p e a c e
d i v i d e n d ” to help it through to the December elections. This included a
c o n t i nuation of the EU “Fuel for Democra c y ” and “Asphalt for Democra c y ”
p ro gra m s . The U. S . also announced a $100 million aid pack age ,i n cluding dire c t
p u rchases of imported electricity for the Serbian gri d . So too the Germ a n
gove rnment has announced 100 million German Marks in aid. B e fo re the
December elections, this aid was large ly unconditional.
The main question now facing international policy make rs is how can the
i n t e rnational community best use the leve rage and influence it has at its disposal
to influence Serbian politicians to implement constru c t i ve economic policies
that create ge nuine stability in the Balkans. Except for emergency and
h u m a n i t a rian aid,the international community should apply a system of rewa rd s
for positive policy ch o i c e s . In the event that rewa rds for good behaviour prove
u n p ro d u c t i ve and Serbia’s nationalist fo rces gain the ascendancy over the more
re fo rm-minded liberal elements in DOS, the international community should
consider moving from carrots to stick s . Options include reimposing partial or
full sanctions on a recidivist gove rnment in Belgra d e , and sharply reducing or
suspending international financial assistance.
The FRY ’s needs are so sweeping that the international community has
s i g n i ficant leve rage . I n t e rnational aid will be vital in the energy fi e l d , both in
t e rms of electricity imports and re c o n s t ruction of the electrical gri d , as well as
assistance with heating fuel during the winter months. Debt relief remains an
a rea of significant international community cl o u t . Without full participation in
i n t e rnational financial institutions, i n cluding international bank cl e a ri n g
m e ch a n i s m s , m a ny Serbian products would not be competitive in wo r l d
m a rke t s . The FRY ’s participation in international bank cl e a rance mech a n i s m s
was only made possible through a recent loan. The FRY is curre n t ly an IMF
m e m b e r, but that status will not prove meaningful without significant debt
re s cheduling or fo rgi ve n e s s , and talks on membership with the World Bank are
o n going as of March 2001. Pa rticipation in these institutions could be offe red as
a rewa rd for successful implementation of difficult policies. Access to EU
m a rke t s , World Trade Organisation members h i p , and full Council of Euro p e
m e m b e rship could also be conditional on Belgrade implementing positive
policies and pursuing domestic re fo rm .
The EU and the Council of Europe have both stated that Serbia’s coopera t i o n
with the ICTY would be a pre requisite for eventual members h i p . Access to EU
m a rkets is a powerful incentive for Serbia gi ven its potential to be a major
ex p o rter to the EU marke t .
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If stability and peace in Serbia are a precondition for stability and peace
in the wider Balkans, then the international community has to make the
plans to support Serbia’s fledgling democracy and enable the libera l s
inside DOS to not be ove r b o rne by the nationalists. In spite of the sudden
i n flux of fo reign aid, i n t e rnational organisations and financial institutions,
the international community will be seve re ly ch a l l e n ged in helping
S e r b i a ’s re fo rm-minded politicians make real pro gress while maintaining
s u fficient popularity and social peace to prevent the re s u rgence of the
n a t i o n a l i s t s . Neither the EU nor the U. S . has put more compre h e n s i ve
economic assistance pack ages on the tabl e . R a t h e r, mu ch of the assistance
seems to be going towa rd the most seri o u s ly threatened social catego ri e s ,
s u ch as re f u ge e s , p e n s i o n e rs , and in broad social assistance in areas such
as infra s t ru c t u re and energy. Although this aid is welcome and necessary,
the DOS gove rnments despera t e ly need technical assistance to re fo rm
ra p i d ly the old socialist economic laws and carry out pri va t i s a t i o n , w h i l e
re - o rd e ring the financial sector and creating job grow t h . The future of
DOS re fo rm effo rts and Balkan stability may rest on the success of such
e ffo rt s .
Conclusions and recommendations on Serbia
o Serbia and the international community need to recognise that early
clarification of the legal and constitutional stru c t u res of the FRY and the
final status of both Montenegro and Kosovo is in the best interests of all
p a rt i e s .
o The international community should make clear that a range of policies
still supported by Belgrade are unacceptable, including its policies toward
ethnic minorities, support for the SDS party and VRS forces in Bosnia
and aid to Serb extremists in nort h e rn Kosovo.
o Nationalism is still a power ful political force in Serbia, and the
i n t e rnational community should closely condition financial assistance on
S e r b i a ’s ability to meet clear benchmarks with re g a rd to economic and
democratic re f o rms and cooperation with the ICTY, including tr y i n g
Milosevic and others for war crimes.
o Both the EU and U.S.  should develop a comprehensive economic
assistance strategy for providing the FRY desperately needed technical
assistance to rapidly re f o rm the old socialist economic laws and carr y out
privatisation, while setting the financial sector in order and creating job
g ro w t h .
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o The international community should coordinate strong support for the
re f o rm of state-controlled broadcasting in line with Council of Euro p e
n o rms, and for the adoption of liberal media laws and regulations, while
continuing support to independent media of proven quality and influence.
o In relation to the situation in southern Serbia:
- The international community should maintain pre s s u re on both the
F RY and the UCPMB guerrillas to conduct face-to-face talks.
- KFOR should more robustly enforce the Kosovo-Serbia border to stem
the flow of weapons and personnel involved in the conflict.
- The EU should ensure that its monitors in southern Serbia have the
p roper skill set and language skills for such a demanding task.
– KFOR should agree to serve as an extraction force for these monitors
if they are under threat.  
– C o n c rete measures to be put forw a rd in the peace negotiation should
include mutual demobilisation and the creation of a police forc e
which re p resents the local populations pro p o rt i o n a t e l y, and
incorporates former rebels to ensure their compliance.  
o The Montenegrin government has rightly disowned any territorial claim to
the Prevlaka peninsula, at the southern tip of Croatia.  The intern a t i o n a l
community should urge Belgrade to do likewise, and then encourage it
and Zagreb to settle the Prevlaka issue through bilateral demilitarisation,
along the lines proposed by Croatia in 1998.
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4.  MONTENEGRO
M o n t e n e g ro continues to focus its energies on resolving its constitutional
status, within the FRY or outside it.  President Djukanovic has committed
to a public  re f e rendum on the question of independence following
p a r l i a m e n t a r y elections scheduled for 22 April 2001 - assuming the re s u l t
is politically suppor tive - and Montenegro will need to handle this pro c e s s
t r a n s p a re n t l y, democratically and on the basis of the rule of law.  In the
post-Milosevic environment, international assistance should be shifted fro m
unconditional budget support toward conditional support for sustainable
re f o rm .
A. Introduction
For the last three years, political life in Montenegro has been dominated by
the question of the republic’s relationship with Serbia. Still a part of the FRY,
Montenegro has, since the ruling party split in 1997, increasingly distanced
itself from Belgrade. As the Montenegrin government adopted a pro-Western
stance in opposition to Milosevic,the United States (U.S.) and the European
Union (EU) provided substantial political and financial assistance. While the
primary purpose of this support was to shore up President Milo Djukanovic,
Western countries also provided advice and technical assistance for wide-
ranging reforms promised by Djukanovic, with the aim of transforming
Montenegro into a democratic, law-governed republic with a functioning
market economy.
While the U.S. and the EU supported Montenegrin moves to distance the
republic from the Milosevic regime in Belgrade,Djukanovic’sWestern backers
were consistent in opposing any move toward a formal break with the
Yugoslav federation for fear of handing Milosevic a pretext for military
intervention. However, following the events of October 2000, rather than
rebuilding bridges with Belgrade, as many in Serbia and internationally had
expected, the Montenegrin government was further emboldened to pursue
independence. Djukanovic opted to formalise the independence that
Montenegro had in practice established,and to seek, following a referendum,
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international recognition of Montenegro as a fully independent state. Having
distanced themselves from Belgrade, and with the risks associated with an
independence move now considerably diminished, Djukanovic and the
Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) were loath to go back.44 Yet this remains
c o n t e n t i o u s , both domestically, w h e re a significant pro p o rtion of the
population favours a reformed union with Serbia,and among an international
c o m munity afraid that Montenegrin independence will upset curre n t
prospects for peace and stability in the region.
In Chapter 6,The Future of the FRY, we argue that the risks of Montenegrin
independence have been overstated and that the international community
should not discourage Montenegro from seeking it, but that Podgorica and
Belgrade should certainly be encouraged to put an orderly process in place
for resolving the issue of political status,as well as a number of lesser issues.
Given the speed with which events are unfolding in Montenegro, this effort
will need to move forward expeditiously.
Table 7.  Montenegro at a glance
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
B. Security
Since 1997,the potential for a violent crackdown by Belgrade cast a pall over
almost every aspect of Montenegrin life. Milosevic’s defeat has considerably
diminished,if not eliminated,the threat of direct aggression by Belgrade,and
the possibility that Montenegro can now decide its fate free from intimidation
has greatly increased.
Tensions between Serbia and Montenegro reached their height during the
NATO bombardment of Yu go s l avia in 1999, when the Montenegri n
government refused to recognise emergency measures adopted by Belgrade.
Despite a number of potentially explosive stand-offs between the VJ and the
Montenegrin police,a clash was avoided.
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Population:680,158
Elections:Local elections held on 11 June 2000.
Parliamentary elections to be held on 22 April
2001,presidential elections due in 2003.
President:Milo Djukanovic
Prime Minister: Filip Vujanovic
During the months that followed, tensions for the most part subsided,
although there were frequent small incidents, any one of which could have
spun out of control. The presence of the VJ on Montenegrin territory was a
constant source of consternation, and repeated threatening statements by
senior VJ officers maintained a highly charged atmosphere of potential crisis.
In response,the Montenegrin government built up its own large paramilitary
police force, ready to meet a VJ challenge.
F u rther fuelling concern s , M o n t e n e gro has ex p e rienced a number of
gangland or political killings of the kind that have plagued Serbia. The
assassination in May 2000 of a key adviser to the president was followed in
June by the attempted assassination in Montenegro of the prominent Serbian
political figure Vuk Draskovic. In January 2001 a senior Montenegrin Interior
Ministry official,Darko Raspopovic, was gunned down in central Podgorica.
The uneasy atmosphere has an ex t ra edge of bitterness because
Montenegrins are sharply divided about their future. Indeed,they have been
divided over their relationship with Serbia since 1918,when,at the end of the
First World War, with Serbian troops present in Montenegro, a slim majority
opted in a referendum for union with Serbia. This decision was followed by
a long, low-level civil war between pro-independence “Greens” and pro-
Serbian “Whites”, named after the colours of the ballot papers used in the
referendum.
Just as Montenegrin politics are polarised,so Montenegrins have been divided
over the role of the VJ in their republic. The defining feature of the main pro-
Belgrade Montenegrin party, the Socialist People’s Party (SNP) and its
supporters,is their self-identification as Yugoslav patriots. From this point of
view, it was inconceivable that the VJ could present a threat to its own
people. Rather, the SNP threw back the accusation at the government,
pointing to its formation of paramilitary units as the real threat to peace.
Particularly menacing from the perspective of the government and its
supporters was the formation of the Seventh Battalion of the VJ military
police, recruited mainly from among SNP supporters and regarded by
Djukanovic’s ruling “For a Better Life” (DZB) coalition as a political force,
whose purpose was to foment trouble prior to a crackdown.
Since Milosev i c ’s depart u re , B e l grade has taken steps to re a s s u re the
Montenegrin government. On 25 December 2000, Djukanovic attended a
session of Yugoslavia’s Supreme Defence Council, comprising the federal
president and the presidents of Serbia and Montenegro,for the first time since
1998. At this meeting, a number of personnel changes were made in the
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military stationed in Montenegro,including the removal of the commander of
the Second Army (whose area of responsibility includes Montenegro),
General Milorad Obradovic. Reportedly the disbanding of the Seventh
Battalion was ordered.45 VJ chief-of-staff General Nebojsa Pavkovic has
asserted that the army will not interfere in Montenegro’s decision over its
future status.46
If Montenegro were to opt for independence,some opponents in the country
might refuse to accept it and try to resist. Yet,as further discussed below, the
prospects for successful resistance appear poor. The main pro-Serbian parties
in Montenegro have stressed their intention to work within the constitutional
framework. Local SNP leaders in areas where the party is strong are scornful
of the notion that they might operate in any way other than politically, and
are adamant that there will be no sanction for any kind of violent opposition
to independence. Any effort to resist an independence move would in any
case prove futile without active support from Belgrade. The commander of
the Seventh Battalion unit in Bijelo Polje (the largest town in the north) has
stated that the unit will not be a de-stabilising factor in the region.47 With the
prospect of VJ intervention probably gone,the only serious military force in
M o n t e n e gro is the large para m i l i t a ry police fo rc e , w h i ch is loyal to
D j u k a n ov i c . H oweve r, gi ven the Fe d e ral authori t i e s ’ opposition to
Montenegrin independence and the VJ’s record over a decade,an element of
uncertainty must remain.
C. Governance
Relations with Serbia and the FRY
Over the past three years,Montenegro has increasingly come to operate as a
separate state. This process was in large part a response to actions by
M i l o s evic that ended meaningful Montenegrin participation in joint
institutions.48 Following Montenegrin parliamentary elections in 1998, in
which the three-party DZB coalition was victorious,Belgrade did not accept
the nomination of new Montenegrin representatives to the federal Chamber
of Republics. In response, DZB ceased all participation in the federal
parliament, with only the pro-Milosevic Montenegrin parties continuing to
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participate. Following his split with Djukanovic’s DPS, former SNP leader
Momir Bulatovic was appointed as federal prime minister. Bulatovic,acting as
a Milosevic puppet,served in this post until his master’s defeat in September-
October 2000. During his term, the ruling coalition in Montenegro was
excluded from power at the federal level. Djukanovic was excluded from
meetings of the Supreme Defence Council from 1998 until the end of
Milosevic’s rule, preventing the Montenegrin authorities from decision-
making regarding the VJ.
Montenegro’s posture during the NATO bombardment in 1999 led to a
v i rt u a l ly complete ru p t u re with Belgra d e . M o n t e n e grin officials we re
excluded from the work of the Yugoslav central bank, leading Podgorica to
introduce the German Mark as a parallel cur rency and to takeover control of
foreign currency policy. For its part,Belgrade terminated electronic payments
between the two republics through the centralised payments system. Since
November 2000,only the German Mark is legal tender in Montenegro.
As Montenegro ’s institutional ties with the fe d e ration ero d e d , t h e
Montenegrin government refused to recognise the jurisdiction of federal
institutions in the republic. It has maintained its own foreign relations and
has explicitly denied the right of Yugoslav diplomatic representatives to speak
for Montenegro.49 The Montenegrin authorities control Montenegro’s borders
and collect customs duties at them. In contrast to Serbia, Montenegro does
not impose visa requirements on foreign visitors. Following changes to the
federal constitution pushed through by Milosevic in July 2000, which
diminished Montenegro’s equal status in the federation, the Montenegrin
government opted to boycott the federal elections in September 2000. Due
to the DZB-led boycott, only 20 per cent of the Montenegrin electorate
turned out to vote.
H oweve r, p ro - M i l o s evic parties in Montenegro , i n cluding the SNP, d i d
participate in those elections. Because of the disproportionate Montenegrin
representation in the federal parliament,after the election the SNP held the
balance between the victorious Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) and
Milosevic’s left bloc, made up of his own Socialist Party of Serbia and his
wife’s Yugoslav United Left. According to the federal constitution, if the
president, like Kostunica, is a Serb, then the prime minister must be
Montenegrin. Given the SNP’s numerical strength in the new parliament,the
new federal president,Vojislav Kostunica,and DOS decided to appoint as the
new federal prime minister Zoran Zizic, a vice-president of the SNP. This
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appointment was made over objections from the Montenegrin government
that the SNP could not legi t i m a t e ly re p resent Montenegro in fe d e ra l
institutions.
Thus, while welcoming Milosevic’s defeat, the Montenegrin government
recognises neither Kostunica as a legitimate representative of Montenegro
nor the federal constitution under which he was elected. As federal
institutions lack participation by legitimate Montenegrin representatives with
the support of a majority of the Montenegrin electorate, Kostunica and the
new federal government are inevitably regarded - not only by the government
and its support e rs - as re p resenting Serbia. The authorities re m a i n
determined to continue to take responsibility for their own affairs and to
represent the interests of Montenegro internationally.
In an effort to put the basis for Montenegro’s relationship with Serbia on a
n ew fo o t i n g , the Montenegrin gove rnment in August 1999 adopted a
“Platform” which proposed transforming FRY into a loose confederation of
two equal partners.50 According to this proposal, the two republics would
each be “sovereign”,but with a single UN seat between them,and linked by
a common currency and some joint responsibilities for foreign affairs and
military matters.51 Even in areas left to the federation, powers were to be
strictly limited.The president of each republic would command military units
stationed there and appoint their commanders.
Following the changes in Serbia, two of the parties in Montenegro’s ruling
coalition,Djukanovic’s DPS and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) prepared
a revised Platform,which was officially adopted on 28 December 2000.52 This
new Platform is similar to that of August 1999 in that it envisages a loose
association with Serbia, with joint institutions, a common currency and
cooperation in foreign affairs and defence. However, unlike its predecessor,
this document envisages a union between two fully independent states,each
with its separate international identity and UN seat.
Officials in Belgrade reacted negatively to the new Montenegrin Platform,and
on 10 January 2001 Kostunica published his counter proposal, envisaging
federal institutions with responsibility in such areas as defence, foreign affairs,
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the economy and commu n i c a t i o n s .5 3 P ro-independence parties in
Montenegro quickly rejected Kostunica’s plan, while the DOS in Serbia
endorsed it.
Table 8. Main Political Parties in Montenegro
The Internal Politics of Independence
With the publication of the revised Platform proposal,and Belgrade’s reaction
to it, the Montenegrin government was quickly plunged into crisis, as the
third partner in the DZB coalition,the People’s Party (NS),withdrew from the
government. The NS largely speaks for people who consider themselves as
Serbs, but were opposed to Milosevic. Faced with a choice of turning for
support to the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (LSCG), the most consistent
advocate of Montenegrin independence over the past ten years,or calling a
parliamentary election,Djukanovic opted for the latter course.
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Political Party
For A Better Life
Coalition (DZB)
Democratic Party of
Socialists (DPS)
Social Democratic
Party (SDP)
Liberal Alliance for
Montenegro (LSCG)
Socialist People’s
Party (SNP)
People’s Party (NS)
People’s Socialist
Party (NSS)
Political Alignment 
Governing coalition: Comprised of the DPS, SDP
and NS,until the NS’s departure in December 2000.
Headed by President Milo Djukanovic. The DPS - a
communist successor party - forms the core of the
gove rning coalition and has moved to a pro -
independence position.
A pro - i n d e p e n d e n c e , p ro - We s t e rn part y, led by
Zarko Rakcevic.
The most consistently, radically pro-independence
party, led by Miodrag Zivkovic.
P ro - Yu go s l av Montenegrin Pa rty opposed to
independence. The SNP split from the DPS in 1999.
P re d rag Bulatovic has headed the SNP since
February 2001.
A pro - S e r b i a , a n t i - M i l o s ev i c , a n t i - i n d e p e n d e n c e
party led by Dragan Soc. The NS left the DZB
coalition in December 2000 due to the latter’s pro-
independence stance.
P ro - Yu go s l av party that split with the SNP in
February 2001 after the SNP forced former leader
Momir Bulatovic to resign.
54  Vijesti, 25 January 2001.
The SNP had prev i o u s ly demanded elections befo re any independence
re fe re n d u m . While it rejected Djukanov i c ’s initial proposal of elections by
the end of March , a compromise agreement was re a ched that elections
would take place on 22 Ap ril 2001. The possibility of the SNP and NS
b oycotting parliamentary elections appears to have been re m oved by this
agre e m e n t , but the possibility that they would sit out a re fe rendum on
independence is still a distinct possibility. M u ch room for discord re m a i n s ,
e s p e c i a l ly over state media cove rage ,w h i ch the SNP and the NS complain is
h e av i ly biased in favour of independence, and over the rules for a
re fe re n d u m .
Impatient to hold a re fe rendum and fo rmalise the break with Yu go s l avia as
soon as possibl e , the SDP was unhappy with the decision to hold elections
fi rs t . H oweve r, its insistence on a commitment in advance that a re fe re n d u m
be held by the end of June at the latest was rejected by the DPS as well as
the SNP, the fo rmer appare n t ly anxious to re a ch a compromise that wo u l d
s e c u re SNP participation in the electoral pro c e s s . D j u k a n ovic re a s s u red his
SDP allies that, fo l l owing an expected election victory for the pro -
independence part i e s ,he would speedily call for the promised re fe re n d u m .5 4
Election results and opinion polls over recent ye a rs point to a steady
i n c rease in pro-independence sentiment, as patience with Belgra d e ’s
b u l lying has wo rn out and as the re p u blic has managed successfully to cut
m a ny of the cords that bound it to Serbia. D j u k a n ov i c ’s policy of caution and
patience won widespread support with Milosevic in powe r. But with
M i l o s evic go n e ,s u p p o rt e rs of independence argue that so too has the re a s o n
for patience. H oweve r, M o n t e n e grins remain deeply divided over the future
status of their re p u bl i c , and opinion polls pers i s t e n t ly show that none of the
va rious options for the re p u bl i c ’s future status enjoys ove r w h e l m i n g
s u p p o rt . Polls taken in the period Ja nu a ry - M a rch 2001 gave the re s u l t s
indicated in Table 9.
The data from the three public opinion polls presented here all show a
p re fe rence of around 50 per cent of the sample for either one of the pro -
independence options, whether outright independence or the union of two
independent states proposed in the Montenegrin gove rn m e n t ’s December
2000 Platfo rm . I n d e e d , the CEDEM poll, t a ken in Ja nu a ry 2001, s h ows that if
a s ked a stra i g h t fo r wa rd question, for or against independence, a small
m a j o rity would opt in favour (49.8 per cent we re fo r, as opposed to 39.8 per
cent ag a i n s t ) .
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Table 9.  Montenegrin Opinion Polls on Preferred Status Options55
While such a re fe rendum question would appear like ly to produce a pro -
independence re s u l t , it seems clear that a broad consensus is lack i n g .
Opponents of independence arg u e , p ro b ably with re a s o n , that if a diffe re n t
question we re asked which did not suggest an independence outcome, a
p o s i t i ve result could also be obtained. The opinion-poll evidence pre s e n t e d
ab ove supports the contention that there is a broad support in Montenegro fo r
some fo rm of future association with Serbia.
M u ch uncertainty re m a i n s , but the opinion poll evidence suggests that the
p ro-independence parties combined would pro b ably win a parliamentary
m a j o ri t y. The result may depend on what, if any, coalition agreements are
re a ched befo re the election. M u ch speculation has focused on whether the
N S , whose support appears to have risen lately, m i g h t ,h aving left the fo rm e r
ruling DZB coalition, re a ch an arra n gement with the SNP. The SNP has tried to
distance itself from its fo rmer support for Milosev i c , and fo l l owing a meeting
of the part y ’s Main Board on 29 Ja nu a ry 2001 Momir Bulatovic was pre s s u re d
into resigning as party leader.5 6 At a party congress on 24 Fe b ru a ry, a part y
v i c e - p resident called Pre d rag Bulatovic (no relation) was elected to succeed
M o m i r, whose support e rs bro ke away to fo rm the Pe o p l e ’s Socialist Pa rt y
(NSS) two days later. While Pre d rag Bulatovic enjoys strong popular support ,
and is re g a rded as more moderate and less compromised than his pre d e c e s s o r,
the split in the SNP’s ranks may harm the pro - Yu go s l av vote in Ap ri l .
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 71
Opinion polls
CEDEM Medium Institute for 
Social Research
Option % % %
Fully independent state 36 32 30
Union of two independent 
states,with two UN seats 15.2 19 19
Loose confederation of two
republics with one UN seat 18.5 21 30
Revived federation of two
republics 16.1 24 15
Unitary Yugoslav state 7 - -
No reply given 7.2 4 7
57  The NS leader,Dragan Soc,warned on 30 January 2001 that if state television’s editorial team were not replaced,the NS would
not participate in a pre-referendum campaign. Vijesti, 31 January 2001.
58  Vijesti, 6 March 2001.
59  OSCE Of fice for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Assessment of the Draft Referendum Law for Conducting
Referendum Elections in the Republic of Montenegro,Warsaw, 22 January 2001.
60  The federal Constitutional Court has said that a referendum decision should not be binding on parliament,but only of an
advisory character Vijesti, 15 March 2001.
The possibility of a damaging boycott of an eventual referendum by the pro-
Yu go s l av parties remains re a l .5 7 The SNP and the NS argued that
Montenegrins living in Serbia should be able to vote in the referendum,
rejecting the stipulation proposed by the pro-independence parties that only
Montenegrin citizens resident in Montenegro for at least two years may take
part. The pro-Yugoslav parties also asserted that a majority of the whole
electorate should be required for a pro-independence decision to be carried.
The pro-independence parties have asserted that a simple majority of those
who vote would suffice,provided that at least half of the electorate takes part.
The pro-Yugoslav position has apparently been supported by the U.S.,whose
ambassador to the FRY reportedly informed the Montenegrin government on
5 March 2001 that the referendum law was problematic, suggesting that
Montenegrins in Serbia should be allowed to vote, and that more than a
simple majority should be required in order for a pro-independence vote to
be valid.58
The chances of the referendum producing a vote in favour of a continued
union with Serbia would on balance be slim unless the rules were changed
along the lines that the pro-Yugoslav parties have urged. The Organisation for
S e c u rity and Cooperation in Euro p e ’s (OSCE) Office for Democra t i c
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) provided expert advice on the
referendum law. Citing relevant international standards, this advice did not
support the issues objected to by the SNP and the NS.59 The inclusion of
Montenegrin voters resident in Serbia for more than two years would be hard
to justify, particularly since Serb voters resident in Montenegro for the
stipulated two years will be able to participate. The proposal that a majority
of the whole electorate take part in a referendum for an independence
decision to be valid does, however, have much to commend it, as it would
ensure that any move toward independence would be based on a reasonable
consensus among the population. A referendum boycott would be highly
damaging and potentially destabilising, sending as it would a message to
opponents of independence, some of whom might be prepared to struggle
other than through political means,that the referendum was illegitimate.
A re fe rendum result in favour of independence does not automatically
d e t e rmine that outcome. Although the re fe rendum law adopted in
Fe b ru a ry 2001 states that decisions made by re fe rendum shall be binding,6 0
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61 In case Monteneg rins were not already weary of voting,Djukanovic has indicated that he would also submit himself to an
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62 Constitution of The Republic of Montenegro.
Article 1 states that Montenegro is a part of the FRY.
Article 2 states that the status of Montenegro cannot be altered without the prior holding of a referendum.
Article 117 states that a proposal for a change to the constitution must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of all parliamentary
deputies. If it is not adopted,then the same proposal cannot be repeated for one year after its rejection.
Article 118 states that a change to the constitution must be ratified by a two-thirds majority of all parliamentary deputies.
Article 119 states that in the case of a fundamental change to the constitution,including a change to the status of Montenegro,
on the day of the adoption of a proposal for the constitutional change the parliament must be disbanded, and a new
parliament called within 90 days. The new parliament must then ratify the proposed constitutional change (and it must be
the specific proposal adopted by the pr evious parliament) by a two-thirds majority of all parliamentary deputies.
63  Vijesti, 4 January 2000.
64  See ICG Balkans Report N. 101,Cur rent Legal Status of the Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and of Serbia and Monteneg ro,19
September 2000.
a c c o rding to the Montenegrin constitution, s u ch a ch a n ge in the status of
the re p u blic would need to be proposed by a two - t h i rds majority of
p a r l i a m e n t : that proposal would then need to be put to a re fe re n d u m , a n d
fo l l owing a re fe rendum decision in favour of independence, t h e re wo u l d
need to be further parliamentary elections,6 1 and a two - t h i rds majority of
the new parliament would then be re q u i red to confi rm the independence
d e c i s i o n .6 2
The question of the pro c e d u re for confi rming an independence decision
has aroused some debate within Montenegro , e s p e c i a l ly as it is far fro m
clear that a two - t h i rds majority of the seats in parliament could be secure d
by the pro-independence part i e s . Va rious ways around this pro blem have
been sugge s t e d . These include the suggestion that a re fe rendum decision
in favour of independence would re p resent a revo l u t i o n a ry situation, a n d
would be the one circumstance in which the constitutional stri c t u res need
n o t , and should not, a p p ly. Another suggestion argues that as the FRY
constitution has for some time been inopera t i ve , due to the abuses of the
M i l o s evic re gime which made it impossible for Montenegro to exe rcise its
constitutional rights as an equal member of the fe d e ra t i o n , a rt i cles of the
M o n t e n e grin constitution that re fer to Montenegro ’s place in the FRY have
also lost their fo rc e . Another argument is that as the current status quo is
an unsustainable state of constitutional para ly s i s , t h e re would be no sense
in adhering stri c t ly to constitutional principles that would mitigate in
favour of the maintenance of that ve ry status quo.
Despite calls from Kostunica for Montenegro to abide by the fe d e ra l
constitution in determining its future status,6 3 the argument that the FRY
constitution has alre a dy lost all fo rce or meaning is compelling.6 4 H oweve r,
in order for the process by which Montenegro decides on its future status
to have cre d i b i l i t y, s t rict adherence to the Montenegrin constitution is
a d v i s abl e . Otherwise it would appear that constitutional rules and
p ro c e d u res could be stre t ched and manipulated at will in mu ch the same
way that Milosevic abused the fe d e ral constitution to suit his political ends.
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people of Montenegrin origin from Serbia.
66  VIP Daily News Report, 6 March 2001.
The Risk of Unrest from Independence Moves
The issue of Montenegro ’s future status is unquestionably highly divisive in
M o n t e n e gro . Opposition to independence is stro n g , and in some areas of
the re p u bl i c ,e s p e c i a l ly in parts of the nort h , but also in the coastal re gi o n
of Herceg Nov i , near the border with Cro a t i a , the pro - Yu go s l av, a n t i -
independence SNP is in power at the local leve l . The question is whether
the divisiveness is enough to ge n e rate confl i c t .
While Milosevic was in powe r, t h e re we re serious fe a rs that Belgrade might
seek to exploit divisions within Montenegro in order to foment unrest pri o r
to an army cra ck d own against the tro u bl e s o m e , p ro - We s t e rn Djukanov i c
a d m i n i s t ra t i o n . S u ch fe a rs we re in part based on concerns that the tactics
that Milosevic had employed earlier in Croatia and Bosnia we re being
repeated in Montenegro . In Montenegro , as in Croatia and Bosnia, l o c a l
s u p p o rt e rs of Belgrade we re mobilised to oppose the legally constituted
gove rn m e n t . In 1999, c o n c e rns we re raised by the holding of ra l l i e s , the so-
called tribal assembl i e s , at which decl a rations we re issued that
independence moves would not be accepted.
The prospects for any domestic opponents of Djukanovic who might have
been pre p a red to stir up unrest in Montenegro in any case always depended
on support from Belgrade and from the VJ in Montenegro . Since Milosev i c ’s
d e p a rt u re , s u ch support has virt u a l ly disappeare d . It is most like ly that
B e l gra d e , i n cluding SNP fi g u res based in Belgra d e , stood behind activities
s u ch as the tribal assembl i e s ,w h i ch we re cl e a r ly intended to intimidate the
a u t h o rities in Po d go ri c a .6 5 Without Belgra d e ’s support for such activities,
t h e re is little prospect of provoking serious unre s t .
Since the tense days of 1999, re l a t i ve ly little has been heard of the tri b a l
a s s e m bl i e s . In March 2001 the Council of Pe o p l e s ’A s s e m blies announced
that it would not recognise the result of an independence re fe re n d u m
unless Montenegrins in Serbia we re allowed to part i c i p a t e .6 6 T h i s
d e cl a ration lacked the menace of earlier pronouncements in 1999,
re flecting not only the ch a n ged env i ronment since the depart u re of
M i l o s ev i c , but the lack of support among serious political fo rces in
M o n t e n e gro to opposition to independence moves other than thro u g h
l e g a l , political means.
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It had been apparent since early 2000 that differences of perception and
approach had opened up between leading SNP figures who were based in
Belgrade and others who were based in Montenegro, with the local party
participating pragmatically and increasingly constructively in Montenegro’s
political life.67 The readiness of senior SNP figures such as Predrag Bulatovic
to participate constructively on the Montenegrin political scene was also
seen in the framing of electoral legislation prior to the municipal elections in
Podgorica and Herceg Novi, which was adopted by consensus among the
main parties.68 Such positive participation has been an important factor in
calming what has often been a tense political atmosphere.
The generally constructive participation that has characterised the SNP’s
activity at the central level can also be found among SNP leaders at the local
level,including in Pljevlja,despite the resolution of October 1999 mentioned
above. Senior SNP figures in Podgorica and in northern Montenegro have
emphasised to the ICG that their opposition to Montenegrin independence
will be solely political,and they will in no way give approval to any attempt
to resist violently. Further, a commander of the Seventh Battalion unit in
Bijelo Polje has insisted that the unit will not be a destabilising factor in the
region.69 All these assurances do not guarantee that there will not be
instances of people trying to stir up trouble. However, without the support
either of Belgrade or of the main pro-Yugoslav political forces in Montenegro,
any such incidents would be dealt with easily by the Montenegrin police,and
would not constitute a serious threat.
Other Governance Issues
In terms of the democratic participation and the development of civil society
within Montenegro , t h e re have been undoubted advances since the
government turned away from the Milosevic regime and embraced reform.
However, these achievements have been somewhat constrained by a highly
abnormal political environment, in which, until recently, the overriding
concern has been to survive in the face of the perceived threat from
Belgrade.
Key areas in which re fo rms are urge n t ly needed, and in which the
government has promised action,are public administration and the judiciary.
The system of administration inherited from the communist era lacks the
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capacity to carry out the type of far-reaching reforms that Montenegro
requires,while much of the administrative structure is infused with a culture
of non-transparency that is not at all conducive to efficiency. The judiciar y
functions poorly, and will require wholesale reform and retraining if it is to
meet up to the challenges of a democratic state and an efficient market
economy.
That reforms have been slow is in part explained by the fact that, in the
fraught atmosphere since the Kosovo conflict, in which so much political
energy has been devoted to the vexed question of Montenegro’s troubled
relationship with Serbia,such matters have understandably assumed a lower
priority. However, the real commitment of the authorities to reform is also
open to question. Djukanovic came to power in 1997-1998 with the backing
of the majority of the existing party-state apparatus, which the DPS had
i n h e rited from the fo rmer commu n i s t s . In the often-tense political
environment in Montenegro, Djukanovic has continued to depend on the
support of that same,deeply entrenched elite.
In addition, the circumstances of war and international sanctions presented
c o n s i d e rable adva n t ages for personal enri chment for we l l - c o n n e c t e d
individuals through a variety of semi-legal or outright criminal practices,
including large-scale smuggling. Many members of the ruling elite, right up
to the highest levels, as well as their families and associates, have hugely
exploited such opportunities.70 For all the democratic forms and rhetoric,
Montenegro’s political life is in practice dominated by a narrow oligarchy
which does very well out of the current,unreformed system. For this reason
too, the situation is perhaps not conducive to a declared reformer such as
Djukanovic sweeping away the privileges of an elite upon which he depends
and to which he himself belongs.
D. Human Rights
The position of minorities is, by the standards of the region, remarkably
favourable,and Montenegro has escaped extreme polarisation among ethnic
groups. The government includes members of ethnic minorities in senior
positions and the ruling coalition re c e i ves considerable support fro m
members of ethnic minorities. Montenegro’s largest minorities,Muslims and
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Albanians,making up 14.6 and 6.6 per cent of the population respectively,are
mainly concentrated in the north-east and close to the Albanian border.71 So
far, in marked contrast to other parts of the region,most of them have voted
for mainstream Montenegrin parties, and not for narrowly ethnic parties.
Leading figures from minority groups complain of under-representation in
local government and the police, even where they form a substantial part of
the population. However, the government has emphasised its determination
to build Montenegro as a multi-ethnic society. The republic’s openness to
refugees has also won international praise. During the Kosovo conflict,tens
of thousands of Ko s ovo Albanian re f u gees we re accommodated in
Montenegro.
The constitution does provide for full guarantees and protection of minority
rights. However, the task of bringing Montenegrin legislation up to European
standards has barely begun. In this regard,the engagement of the Council of
Europe and the OSCE in Montenegro are particularly important.
Another area in which there is room for improvement is freedom of the
media. There is some diversity in the print media, with two dailies, Pobjeda
and Vijesti,tending toward the government,and one,Dan,supporting the SNP.
There is also a wide availability of Serbian newspapers in Montenegro. The
picture regarding electronic media is more problematic.The ODIHR election-
monitoring mission noted in June 2000 that the state media, operating in a
highly regulated environment, gave the incumbent administration a distinct
advantage in terms of quantity of coverage in news broadcasts. Thus although
state television respected election rules guaranteeing each party its own slots
on television, the preponderance of positive news stories concerning the
ruling coalition in the news broadcasts gave it an unfair advantage over
opposition parties. The only alternative view available on television was YU
Info, which, broadcasting from sites under VJ control, supported the SNP.
Generally, the issue of pro-government bias in the state media remains highly
contentious.
E. Economy
The economic situation is difficult. The unemployment rate was estimated at
29.7 per cent in the second quarter of 2000,up from 27 per cent in the same
period in 1999.72 The Centre for European Policy Studies and the Institute for
Strategic Studies and Prognoses stressed rapidly increasing labour costs as
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one reason for rising unemploy m e n t .7 3 The total labour cost, i n cluding all social
c o n t ri b u t i o n s , rose from 342 German Marks in Ja nu a ry 2000 to 472 in October
2 0 0 0 . The slowness of economic re s t ru c t u ring has large ly pre s e rved Montenegro
f rom mass layo ff s , but there is significant under-employment within enterpri s e s
and opportunities for entry into employment for new wo rke rs are few.
In order to avoid rising labour costs many employe rs and individuals opt instead
to wo rk in the grey economy. In the second quarter of 2000, a c c o rding to
M o n e t ’s estimate, the share of unre c o rded economic activity in the total lab o u r
fo rce was around 31 per cent, indicating that, in conditions of considerabl e
economic hard s h i p , a significant part of the population relies on the info rm a l
e c o n o my. The importance of the grey economy is also indicated by a survey
c a rried out by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian A ffa i rs
(OCHA) and Belgra d e ’s Economics Institute, a c c o rding to which 21 per cent of
adults in Montenegro ack n ow l e d ged receiving some income in the grey
e c o n o my.7 4
The ave rage disposable monthly wage fell as low as 117 German Marks at stre e t
value in September 1999, b e fo re the introduction of the German Mark as the
p a rallel curre n c y. Since then it has incre a s e d , and in October 2000 stood at 203
G e rman Mark s . As an indicator of pove rt y, the re p o rt revealed that some 30 per
cent of households had not made any purchases of new clothing or fo o t we a r
d u ring the previous ye a r.
The increase in wages has not been matched by a corresponding increase in
p u rchasing powe r, as inflation has continued to be re l a t i ve ly high. Fo l l owing a
jump in prices at the end of 1999, the inflation rate dropped from an ave rage
m o n t h ly increase of 20.6 per cent in the last quarter of 1999 to an ave rage 2.6
per cent in the fi rst quarter of 2000 and 1.3 per cent in the third quart e r. W h i l e
an improve m e n t , the rise in retail prices of 21.7 per cent from December 1999
to November 2000 is still high. In November 2000 the monthly rate was 2.5 per
c e n t .
P rices are ge n e ra l ly higher in Montenegro than in Serbia. In part , this is because
in Montenegro a mu ch smaller ra n ge of goods is ava i l able at gove rn m e n t -
c o n t rolled prices than is the case in Serbia,and the controlled prices are lower in
S e r b i a . One effect of price controls in Serbia is that it is more afflicted by
s h o rt ages of certain go o d s ,w h i ch is not the case in Montenegro . N o n - c o n t ro l l e d
p rices are also ge n e ra l ly higher in Montenegro ,but so are wage s .
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Monet 2 provides a partial explanation as to why relatively high inflation has
continued in Montenegro since the introduction of the German Mark. Before
its introduction, the currency black market meant that, whereas prices in
German Marks at the official dinar exchange rate were artificially high,at the
black market exchange rate they were artificially low. In other words, for
someone exchanging German Marks for dinars at the black market rate,prices
were very low. However, having introduced the German Mark, prices
gradually rose to their realistic German Mark level. In the short-term this
results in a period of rising prices. But in the longer term, the greater
transparency that this entails, the end to artificial exchange controls and
manipulation can be expected to deliver a healthier economy.
The introduction of the German Mark can now be counted a notable success.
For political reasons,so as not to provoke the VJ,which paid its way in dinars,
the German Mark was initially introduced in parallel with the dinar, which
continued to be legal tender. However, the dinar was rapidly supplanted in
almost all transactions,and in November 2000 it was withdrawn.75 A law on
the central bank was passed in November 2000. Given that Montenegro uses
the currency of another country, it has in effect opted not to run its own,
independent monetary policy. Nevertheless,the new law is an important step
in ensuring sound regulation of a sector whose health will be key to future
economic development.76
Fiscal policy is rather more worrisome, with revenue collection well below
target in 2000. In the first eleven months of the year the budget deficit
reached 82 million German Marks. For the time being,this deficit is financed
by foreign assistance,but such practice is not sustainable. In the longer term
greater order and transparency will need to be brought to government
finances.
The privatisation process has been proceeding since 1991,but in recent years
slowed almost to a halt. In 1998 the government opted for a program of mass
voucher privatisation. It is also envisaged that there would be a number of
international tenders of individual enterprises. The privatisation process
contains serious dangers,particularly given that the perceived high political
risk associated with Montenegro means that foreign investment is likely to be
limited for some time to come. With the help of international advisers, the
government plans reforms to make the business environment more attractive
to foreign firms. However, a major problem for Montenegro is that as long as
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the question of its relationship with Belgrade is not re s o l ve d , the continu i n g
u n c e rtainty over jurisdiction will deter many fo reign companies from inve s t i n g .
In pra c t i c e , p ri vatisation may, as in seve ral other transition countri e s , e n abl e
people close to the ruling elite to gain control ove r, or confi rm their contro l
over economic assets. In that eve n t , p ri vatisation would not herald deeper
re s t ru c t u ring of enterprises or the introduction of new ex p e rtise or
i nve s t m e n t . Thus re fo rm may serve to solidify the control of the ru l i n g
o l i g a rchy over the economy, mu ch to their own benefi t , but not to the benefi t
of the economy or society.
Faced with a Montenegrin gove rnment turning towa rd the We s t , p ro m i s i n g
d e m o c ratic re fo rms and threatened by the ag gre s s i ve Milosevic re gi m e ,
i n t e rnational support for Montenegro was unpre c e d e n t e d . D e t e rmined to
avoid again being left to react after a war had alre a dy bro ken out, the United
States and the EU in 1999-2000 implemented a conflict prevention stra t e gy
designed to shore up the Djukanovic administra t i o n , with a speed not seen
e l s ew h e re in the re gi o n . The pri o rity was ex p l i c i t ly short - t e rm , designed to
s t abilise the position of the gove rnment and ensure its surv i va l . Thus the bulk
of international assistance was in the fo rm of direct budget support .
N eve rt h e l e s s , a secondary international aim from the beginning was to
p romote and nu rt u re the re fo rm process in Montenegro . In the context of the
ve ry real threat posed by the Milosevic re gi m e , the international stress on
s t abilising Djukanov i c ’s position with few strings attached was unders t a n d abl e .
Fo l l owing the ch a n ges in Belgrade and the diminution of the threat to
M o n t e n e gro , it is like ly and quite correct that the emphasis of the intern a t i o n a l
c o m munity should shift. I n t e rnational support for peacefully re s o l v i n g
M o n t e n e gro ’s constitutional status should be a particular pri o rity and is dealt
with in Chapter 6. We s t e rn gove rnments should avoid any tendency, in the ru s h
to help rebuild Serbia, to neglect Montenegro . R a t h e r, attention should be
sw i t ched from unconditional budget support towa rd sustainable re fo rm ,
i n cluding a thorough overhaul of the party-state appara t u s ,t o gether with all the
n e t wo rks of cro ny i s m , nepotism and corruption that go with it. T h e
conditionality attached to We s t e rn assistance should be applied more
ri go ro u s ly in the new env i ro n m e n t , w h e re expectations of real pro gress can
l e gi t i m a t e ly be gre a t e r.
Conclusions and recommendations on Montenegro intern a l l y
o In order for the process by which Montenegro decides on its future status to
have cre d i b i l i t y, strict adherence to the terms of the Montenegrin
constitution would be highly desirable.
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o State influence over the media must be reduced, and new media legislation
p re p a red and adopted in consultation with the media community, and in
line with Council of Europe standards.  
o I n t e rnational assistance should be shifted from unconditional budget
s u p p o rt toward conditional support for sustainable re f o rm, including
t h o rough overhaul of the party-state apparatus and bringing gre a t e r
t r a n s p a rency and efficiency to government finances.
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5.  KOSOVO
Kosovo is adrift, and real stability will continue to elude it and the
adjoining areas in Serbia and Macedonia until substantial self-
government and a process for resolving the province’s political status are
in place. The international administration should set an early date for
Kosovo-wide elections, while continuing to act to improve the security
environment and set the framework for a stronger economy.
A. Introduction
Kosovo was relatively quiet during the year 2000. Killings of Kosovo Serbs,
Roma and other minorities greatly decreased, local elections were held
peacefully. The government was democratically changed in Belgrade. The
impression in the international community was that if Kosovo was not going
well, at least it was not going badly. However beneath this surface the
province is troubled, as outbreaks of violence in early 2001 made clear.
Renewed rioting in Mitrovica,violence in Serbia’s Presevo valley, clashes on
the Kosovo-Macedonia border and the attacks on bus convoys escorted by
the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) all served to drive home this point.
Issues surrounding Kosovo’s final status remain central to virtually all the
challenges facing the province, from security to economic growth to basic
governance. The position taken in this report is that almost two years after
the end of the war in Kosovo it is time for the international community to
acknowledge that it cannot rule Kosovo as a protectorate forever. Much more
rapid pro gress needs to be made towa rd establishing the prov i s i o n a l
institutions of democratic self-rule called for under United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, and by setting fo rth a clear and
transparent process spelling out how the issue of final status will be resolved.
Elections for some form of assembly need to be held soon,and the best way
to do this will be to set a date,as was done for the local elections. Time is a
luxury the international community does not enjoy in the province. With
Kosovo’s final status deeply uncertain,the Kosovo Albanians remain united in
their desire for independence and fearful of a re-imposition of Belgrade’s rule.
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The arguments for and against diffe rent final status options, and the
p rocess by which the status issue might be re s o l ved with intern a t i o n a l ly
assisted nego t i a t i o n s , a re addressed in Chapter 6, The Future of the FRY.
This chapter deals with the internal situation in Ko s ovo . While the
s e c u ri t y, gove rn a n c e , human rights and economic issues here are all
u l t i m a t e ly interconnected with the status issue, and this point will be
re p e a t e d ly made, it is necessary to gi ve them detailed attention in their
own ri g h t .
The lack of cl a rity concerning Ko s ovo ’s political status is thwa rting the
i n t e rnational community from making greater pro gress on a number of
i n t e rnal fro n t s . M a ny economic and legal issues cannot be solved since
t h e re is a fear of “ p re - j u d ging final status” and destabilising the new
a u t h o rities in Belgra d e . Justice and policing remain ineffe c t i ve , with no
clear laws on many issues or an effe c t i ve court system in place. I n d e e d ,t h e
ge o graphic integrity of the province remains in question, with Belgra d e
e ffe c t i ve ly running the province north of Mitrov i c a , against the will of the
i n t e rnational commu n i t y. This uncertainty encourages ethnic Albanians -
whether in Macedonia or the Pre s evo re gion of Serbia - to reason that if
Serb violence in Mitrovica is rewa rd e d , it should be a viable option fo r
them as we l l .
The international commu n i t y ’s major preoccupation in Ko s ovo is not fi n a l
status but securi t y. In contra s t , the agenda of Ko s ovo Albanians continu e s
to be heav i ly dri ven by effo rts to avoid Belgra d e ’s ru l e . These twin
c o n c e rns of security and status are inex t ri c ably linke d . The approx i m a t e ly
42,500 KFOR troops provide re l i able ex t e rnal security against the fo rc e f u l
re t u rn of Serbian tro o p s . But KFOR and the approx i m a t e ly 4,000 United
Nations (UN) police have been less effe c t i ve in providing internal securi t y.
Despite some recent improve m e n t s , the police have not been able to stem
either inter-ethnic violence or political and criminal violence and reve n ge
within the Albanian commu n i t y.
The lack of any fo re s e e able resolution of the status of Ko s ovo and the
resulting continued insecurity for its people complicates almost eve ry one
of Ko s ovo ’s other pro bl e m s ,e s p e c i a l ly effo rts to encourage re c o n c i l i a t i o n
b e t ween Albanians and Serbs. As long as Albanians fear and Serbs hope that
B e l gra d e ’s rule might re t u rn , e a ch side will be pre p a ring both
p s y ch o l o gi c a l ly and pra c t i c a l ly for the next wa r, d e flecting attention fro m
other pressing political, e c o n o m i c , and social pro bl e m s . The intern a t i o n a l
c o m munity must avoid creating a situation where Ko s ovo ’s citizens view
violence as the most viable means to secure their go a l s .
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Despite ongoing security problems, the international mission has pressed
ahead with building institutions to pave the way for a transfer of power to
local structures, and elections for local authorities were held in October
2000. Unfortunately, progress has been slow. At the end of 2000 efforts to
build effective institutions of governance, a functioning judicial system and
the legal and institutional environment necessary for a modern market
economy all remain in their infancy, bedevilled by the lack of final status.
Kosovo still lacks a constitution. It appears to be impossible to settle
important questions of ownership or law in any stable way when the final
question of even the most basic structures of governance remain at issue.The
international community’s seeming determination to establish fully the
powers of a provincial-wide legislative body before starting preparations for
such an election has slowed progress toward Kosovo-wide elections.
Table 10.  Kosovo at a glance
Source: EU/World Bank Joint Office, available at www.seerecon.org
B. Security
As long as Milosevic remained in power, it was impossible to rule out the
renewed use of military force in Kosovo by Belgrade, either through direct
incursions or continual low-level guerrilla attacks aimed at creating a climate
of instability. Providing that the new democratic regime in Belgrade remains
in power and consolidates its control over the Serbian military and police,
overt use of force to regain control of Kosovo is unlikely. But Kostunica and
his supporters have been just as rhetorically insistent in defence of Serbian
national interests in Kosovo, calling for the return of Serbian troops and
access to patrimonial sites,both provisions that are contained in UN Security
Council Resolution 1244. This has heightened suspicions among Kosovo
Albanians that despite the democratic developments in Serbia, Belgrade
remains hostile,both to them and to their aspirations.
While the possibility of direct military action has indeed diminished,Serbia’s
relative military strength has clear strategic implications. As the inheritor of
much of the weaponry of the former Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA),Serbia is,
at least on paper, the major power in the western Balkans. Kosovo Albanians
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Population:2.2 million (1998 pre-conflict estimate)
Elections: Municipal elections held on 28 October 2000.
Assembly elections expected later this year.
United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-
General (UNSRSG):Hans Haekkerup
77  Kosovo/Kosova:As seen,As told, OSCE,1999,p. xii, available at www.osce.org
understand that the independent Kosovo they desire could never stand up
militarily to Belgrade, and so they seek a more or less permanent NATO
presence. The long-term resolution of political status will have to be forged
with this fundamental military imbalance in mind. Arms control and
confidence-building measures are part of the answer but are unlikely to be
enough. The only lasting solution lies through building constructive relations
between Pristina and Belgrade.
Kosovo’s internal security difficulties stem largely, but not solely, from
communal violence between the Albanian and Serb communities and from
the existence of armed underground political and criminal groups af filiated
with both communities. The inability to prevent Albanian revenge attacks
against Serbs and minorities, which began as soon as Albanian refugees
returned to Kosovo hard on the heels of entering KFOR troops,has been the
most serious internal security failure of the international mission in Kosovo.
Initially these attacks were a spontaneous response to the brutality of the
Serb campaign against the Kosovo Albanian civilian population. Soon,
however, the attacks assumed,it is widely alleged,a systematic and organised
ch a ra c t e r, aimed at driving the Serb population out of Ko s ovo . A n
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) report on the
violence found that the evidence pointed “to a careful targeting of victims and
an underlying intention to expel”. The report also contained references to
“numerous witness statements testifying to the alleged involvement of former
members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)”.77 More than 100,000 Serbs
- half of the claimed Kosovo Serb population - are alleged by Belgrade to have
left the province,(though most of the population movement came as KFOR
entered the province). However, the UNHCR has only registered 25,000
internally displaced Serbs as having left Kosovo.
Hamstrung by concerns about casualties and careful to act within the bounds
of intern a t i o n a l ly recognised human rights standard s , the UN-led
international mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has struggled to counter the
perpetrators of violence. In a practical sense,without any clear vision of the
future of law, justice, ownership or governance, the military and civilian
peacekeeping presence has been unable to change the pervasive political
culture of violence on the ground. Instead of declaring martial law and using
force - if necessary lethal force - against those responsible for the killing,the
burning,and the intimidation,KFOR troops are often alleged to have failed to
take decisive action. Suspects were often released either because the
absence of a functioning judicial system made it impossible to bring charges
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against them or because there were insufficient regular detention facilities.
This early failure to move against the violence established a climate of
impunity that still prevails.
Even after many Serbs remaining in Kosovo had moved into de facto enclaves,
neither KFOR nor the UN police were able to stop the violence against the
Serbs. Over the year 2000, roughly twice as many Albanians were killed as
Serbs, but this still represents a very unfavourably high risk for Serbs.
Fortunately the rate of incidents greatly decreased in the latter half of the
year, but inter-ethnic hatred and desires for revenge remain very much in
being. There has been a major and admirable reduction in violence across the
province from the 1997-1999 period, but with roughly twenty times more
Albanians than Serbs living in Kosovo, a Kosovo Serb was ten times more
likely to be killed in ethnic violence than a KosovoAlbanian. The violence has
fuelled charges by Kostunica and other members of the new Yugoslav
government that the international mission in Kosovo is not doing its job and
is skewed toward the interests of the Kosovo Albanians, and bolstered
demands for the return of Serbian troops and displaced civilians to the
province.
February 2001 saw two serious attacks against KFOR escorted Kosovo Serb
convoys heading for shopping or visits to Serbia. These attacks appear to be
d i ffe rent from previous reve n ge attacks against neighbours , and may
represent a direct political thrust by ethnic Albanian extremists to keep the
lack of progress in Kosovo at the forefront of the international community’s
thinking.
It is unfortunately very unlikely that an international military or international
police force will solve these security problems, though concrete steps by
KFOR against the extremists would be welcome. Only a local police force,
with local knowledge, acting under local political direction - backed by
international support - will stand a chance of protecting the remaining Serbs
from further revenge attacks over time. The creation of an indigenous
government whose international survival depends on establishing peace and
security will be key to stemming violence.
But communal clashes are not the only type of violent activity in Kosovo.
Armed groups operate beneath the surface in both the Serb and the Albanian
communities. Under Milosevic, Serbian security and intelligence forces
appeared to operate throughout Kosovo. After withdrawing from Kosovo at
the end of the war, Serbian police,including the State Security Service (DB),
the secret police,established an active base in Raska,35 kilometres north of
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the border with Ko s ovo . A n t i - M i l o s evic activists said that DB pers o n n e l
o p e rated ro u t i n e ly in the north of Ko s ovo , and residents of the encl ave s
h ave also re p o rted their pre s e n c e . It was also widely believed that some of
the so-called “ b ri d ge wa t ch e rs ” - young thugs who guarded the Serb side of
the line in the divided city of Mitrovica - we re employed by the Belgra d e
police authori t i e s . This ch a rge was lent credibility when some of the
“ b ri d ge wa t ch e rs ” - until then under the partial control of the ch a ri s m a t i c
leader of the Mitrovica Serbs, O l i ver Iva n ovic - we re used by the Milosev i c
re gime to dri ve Kostunica from the podium during a campaign visit to
M i t rov i c a . On 25 Ja nu a ry, the bri d ge wa t ch e rs seri o u s ly assaulted a Russian
s t a ff member from the OSCE, setting off a tit-for-tat series of incidents
culminating in serious rioting by both sides. This resulted in a virtual re - ru n
of the Fe b ru a ry 2000 riots in Mitrov i c a , with KFOR re i n fo rcements ag a i n
b rought in to take on serious rioting and civil disord e r.
F u rt h e r, the leaders of a moderate Serb faction centred around the
m o n a s t e ry in Gra c a n i c a , Bishop A rtemije and Father Sava , we re re p o rted to
h ave re c e i ved death threats from Belgrade in the summer of 2000, and just
b e fo re the 24 September FRY elections a substantial arms cache was fo u n d
in the vicinity. It remains to be seen whether the new authorities in
B e l grade will be able or willing to stop this kind of activity.
Po l i t i c a l ,c riminal and personal violence within the Albanian community has
also peri o d i c a l ly assumed dange rous pro p o rt i o n s . In the months befo re the
municipal election campaign got underway in September 2000, violence in
the Albanian community escalated dra m a t i c a l ly. M a ny of these attacks we re
against individuals associated with the Democratic League of Ko s ovo
( L D K ) , led by Ibrahim Rugova . S eve ral LDK activists we re killed, o t h e rs
we re shot or intimidated and a number of LDK offices we re ra n s a cke d ,
although at least some of these disputes related to actions or inaction
d u ring the wa r. S u r p ri s i n g ly to most observe rs violence then sharply
d e c reased in the run up to elections. T h e re have also been a number of
h i g h ly visible killings in which the victims - prominent fi g u res - we re
a p p a re n t ly killed in response to actions which appeared to threaten the
economic or political interests of underground criminal or political
s t ru c t u re s . M a ny other instances of violence can also be attributed simply
to personal disputes and vendettas in the wa ke of the 1999 confl i c t .
The KLA,n ever a ve ry stru c t u red org a n i s a t i o n , fo rm a l ly disbanded in the fa l l
of 1999, but many observe rs believe it continues to maintain a loose
u n d e rground stru c t u re . A rmed groups associated with the fo rmer KLA -
u n d e rstanding that the KLA was always composed of disparate groups with
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d i ffe rent agendas at re s p e c t i ve local levels - have been re p o rted to be
associated with the violence against the LDK. T h e re is also the possibility
that some of this is connected with internal disputes within the LDK. S o m e
senior fi g u res within the LDK believe the killings to be connected with
Serbian state security org a n s , pointing out that not even they believe these
killings are in the interest of their ethnic Albanian political ri va l s .
H oweve r, ex-KLA elements are suspected to be behind mu ch of the cri m i n a l
violence as we l l . The pattern of violence would appear to demonstrate that
at least some of the groups behind it have an effe c t i ve system of command
and control and a re l a t i ve ly sophisticated sense of political timing. Po l i t i c a l
violence against the LDK dropped short ly after the beginning of the
municipal election campaign in the autumn of 2000, s h owing a
conspicuous awa reness of the negative international publicity associated
with these attack s .
Albanian concerns over We s t e rn responses to the new gove rnment in Serbia
could also have an impact on violence in Ko s ovo . As the new Ko s t u n i c a
gove rnment in Belgrade trumpeted its intention to re t u rn Serbian control to
Ko s ovo , m a ny Albanians - including fo rmer senior KLA commanders -
wa rned that if the international community tilted too far towa rd Belgra d e ,
Albanians might “ re t u rn to the hills” to pre p a re for another round of
c o n fl i c t .
Although mu ch of the violence in Ko s ovo is re p o rted to be linked with
groups associated with the fo rmer KLA, t h e re are appare n t ly other eve n
m o re shadowy armed Albanian ex t remist groups also operating in the
p rov i n c e . Albanians invo l ved in the 1999 war against the Serbs told ICG in
the autumn of 2000 that a group of ex-KLA fi g h t e rs , m a ny of them fo rm e r
political pri s o n e rs with ties to A l b a n i a , b ro ke apart and fo rmed an arm e d ,
ex t remist underground group in order to pre p a re for any future confl i c t
resulting from a Serbian re t u rn . These men are angry in equal measure with
the international community for continuing to entertain FRY sove re i g n t y
over Ko s ovo and Albanians they see either as “ s o f t ” on Serbia or cove rt ly
associated with Serbia.
This group was re p o rt e d ly re s p o n s i ble for the mu rder on 15 September of
Selim Bro s h i , who until 1988 headed the Yu go s l av secret police in Ko s ovo .
The “ N ew KLA” is said to be beyond the control of fo rmer KLA leaders ,s u ch
as Hashim T h a c i , in part because they view him as too close to the
i n t e rnational community and out of anger at the widespread corruption fo r
w h i ch they blame Thaci and others .
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KFOR and the UN police have undertaken some measures aimed at curbing
the worst violent excesses. Beginning in September, they adopted a series of
“Special Local Security Measures” (SLCM) in areas where Serb communities
are located. SLCM include mobile police stations manned by UN police,
KFOR troops,and by Albanian and Serb personnel of the newly established
local police force, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). This effort has also
entailed fixed and mobile checkpoints in Serb areas, heightened vehicle
checks including the use of surveillance cameras and the targeting of
international intelligence, surveillance and criminal investigative assets on
areas where Serbs live. In reality this has only succeeded in institutionalising
what are now in effect Serb enclaves. These measures were deeply unpopular
with the Kosovo Albanian parties,who saw them as “special treatment”.
Efforts against organised criminal activity and some of the figures associated
with it have also been stepped up. In mid-October,KFOR international police
officers and British marines raided thirteen homes, bars and brothels,
arresting 25 people. The raids were directed against properties owned by the
Geci clan, a well known criminal family and former KLA fighters who are
widely believed to control an extensive criminal network in Pristina and its
vicinity.78 KFOR also announced plans to rotate the regional leaders of the
Kosovo Protection Corps, the civil defence organisation founded out of the
KLA,some of whom were widely suspected of turning their commands into
local fiefdoms where they engaged in a variety of illegal fundraising activities.
By the end of 2000, there were tentative indications that these stepped up
security measures were having some effect. Some of the most visible political
violence declined as the municipal election campaign moved into full swing,
although lower-level intimidation continued. For example,in the strong-hold
of Thaci’s Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) at Skenderaj,local shop keepers
complained to ICG in October 2000 that they were forced to display PDK
campaign posters and that those who refused were subjected to threats of
violence. Attacks against Kosovo Serb communities also seemed to decline
almost totally in communities where the new security measures (SLCM plan)
were being implemented.
A deeply instilled culture of intimidation, fear, silence and resentment of any
foreign government, and any police, including that of the United Nations
Missions in Kosovo (UNMIK),combine to make it extremely rare for victims
or witnesses of criminal and communal violence to come forward to
cooperate with authorities. Ultimately, as noted above, the only answer to
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political and organised criminal violence in Kosovo will be the more rapid
creation of an effective and legitimate system of Kosovo self-government,and
the formation under that government of a professional and politically neutral
police force,secure in its future. This will not be easy, especially in view of
the reported presence in the Kosovo Police Service of significant numbers of
officers loyal to various political factions. Nevertheless, stronger self-
government is as the only feasible long-term approach to improving security
in the province while allowing the international community to move out of
its role as a de facto,and often ineffective,police presence.
KFOR and UNMIK can both take important steps to help destroy the illegal
a rmed groups that operate among both the Albanian and the Serb
communities. This will require a more focused and aggressive posture against
both ethnic and political violence. Mobile patrols and quick reaction counter-
violence teams,which the international mission began to deploy in defence
of some threatened Serb areas in the autumn of 2000,are part of the answer.
The development of effective intelligence will require breaking the code of
silence that inhibits both victims and witnesses from coming forward with
evidence. Penetrating and destroying underground groups will also require
local support and informants, which will require enlisting local security
forces in the struggle,and Kosovo Police Service officers of Albanian and Serb
nationality will need to be included in the fight against violence in their
respective communities. KFOR should also continue vigorous efforts to
locate covert weapons caches and those responsible for them should be held
accountable.
The fight against violence requires that the ultimate sources of the violence
be identified and countered. On the Serb side, this means drying up
Belgrade’s ability to operate in Kosovo,through tough controls over the entry
of people and material into Kosovo from Serbia. On the Albanian side it
means a willingness to identify and take action against political and economic
interests or groups identified with the aims and objectives of those carrying
out the violence. However, tougher military and police measures alone are
not enough to defeat the violence and improve the internal security situation
in Kosovo - creation of a functioning and impartial judicial system is also an
essential component of such a strategy. There will not be an end to the
violence until victims, perpetrators and witnesses understand that those
guilty of crimes will be apprehended,detained and convicted.
UNMIK should make the establishment of a functioning judicial system its
highest priority in the area of local administration. Recognising that a
functioning judicial system will have to rely primarily on local personnel and
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institutions,UNMIK should immediately raise the salary of local judges,with
the salaries of other judicial personnel raised commensura t e ly. T h e
international mission should continue to closely monitor the performance of
Kosovo judicial personnel,and judges and other personnel who demonstrate
ethnic bias in the performance of their duties should be disciplined,including
by removal if necessary (as has already been done in some cases). Work on
introducing modern criminal and civil law codes should be accelerated with
the objective of having them in place no later than the introduction of the
first Kosovo-wide interim government. This will need strong support from
the international community as a whole,since the whole question of whose
justice, and what law, is intertwined with that of movement toward final
status. Without clarity on the key questions “whose law” and under what
sovereignty - establishing a fully functioning independent judiciary will be
impossible.
Beefing up the capabilities of both the UN police and the Kosovo Police
Service (KPS) is an important element of the internal security struggle in
Kosovo. The international mission should establish a date - for example 12
June 2002,three years after the entry of the international mission - at which
time primary responsibility for policing Kosovo will be assigned to the KPS,
under continued international supervision. The international mission should
focus on providing the KPS with the training, street experience, and
equipment needed to accomplish this task. As a first step in that direction,
the pay of KPS officers should be significantly increased. In the interim,the
international community should provide the UN police with the equipment
and specialised personnel it needs to function as a modern police force with
the expectation that this equipment and the expertise of the specialised
personnel will be available to the KPS as the role of the UN police gradually
diminishes.
KFOR and UNMIK also need to develop a coordinated and consistent policy
for dealing with the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). Financing of the KPC
has been regularised by including it - beginning in 2001 - as part of the
Kosovo consolidated budget. The international donor community should also
provide the funds and equipment necessary to allow the KPC to carry out its
missions of disaster relief and civil defence. KFOR and UNMIK should work
with the KPC leadership to end improper activities. This should include such
measures as raising the salary levels in the KPC to at least those of equivalent
civilian employees of the Ko s ovo gove rnment and banning so-called
“donations”(little more than local extortion) as a vehicle for financing. KFOR
and UNMIK should vigorously investigate allegations of improper activities
by some KPC leaders,and prompt action should be taken against those who
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are found to have engaged in improper activities. Over the longer term - and
linked to resolving Kosovo’s final status - the international community should
work with local representatives to shape the KPC’s role in Kosovo’s future
defence and its relation to any ongoing peacekeeping presence.
It has been standard international theory and practice in post-conflict
situations to convert former fighters into defence forces, with international
supervision and training. Unfortunately in Kosovo this meant creating an
unarmed, ill-equipped and mostly unfinanced civil defence corps, the KPC,
providing jobs for only a few ex-fighters. It is hardly surprising that this has
not entirely succeeded in transforming former KLA fighters into model fire
fighters and ambulance persons. In addition, the KPC is currently being
considerably reduced in strength,which will create more unemployed former
fighters with time on their hands, with a possible spill-over into both
southern Serbia and Macedonia 
A critical element in dealing with the Serbs of Kosovo, and indeed in
preserving Kosovo as a single entity, is regaining control of Mitrovica. Despite
recognising the problem, the UN administration on the ground has failed to
heed recommendations to provide the UN administrators in Mitrovica with
adequate powers or budgets to make any progress in what are exceptionally
difficult circumstances.79 As a result, three well-known and respected
international figures have held the post for six months in turn and left. The
de facto partition of Mitrovica and northern Kosovo has been the result of a
tacit decision by the French-led KFOR elements in the area not to use force
in reuniting the city. One consequence of this stalemate is probably the rebel
activity in the Presevo valley of southern Serbia,adjoining Kosovo,where the
Albanian majority has been alienated by years of Serbian misrule.
To overcome the problem, NATO governments will have to be prepared to
move against the “bridge watchers” in northern Mitrovica and, when that is
accomplished, be prepared to prevent returning Albanians from driving out
Serb civilians residing in Mitrovica. This must be followed by a coordinated
campaign of political and economic measures aimed at reuniting Mitrovica,
protecting the Serb and the Albanian populations, and giving the Serbs
political and economic incentives to remain within Kosovo. While UNMIK
has announced plans to do this, it remains unclear if there is any serious
intention to implement them. Almost two years on,and three distinguished
administrators later, the UN head in Mitrovica still has little power or budget.
This is in sharp contrast to other divided cities such as Mostar or Brcko
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(comparably“difficult”towns in Bosnia). If this is not done promptly, the Ibar
River is likely to become a permanent partition, whatever other intentions
final status negotiators may have.
C. Governance
Establishing Democratic Institutions
UN Security Council Resolution 1244, adopted on 10 June 1999, creates
Kosovo’s present “interim”system of government - effectively an international
protectorate, administered by the United Nations Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo.80 It authorises the establishment of “an international civil
presence ...to provide an interim administration ... under which the people
of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia”.81 As well as performing “basic civilian administrative functions
where and as long as required”,the UN administration is given responsibility
(albeit not in very precise terms) for overseeing a four-stage process of
political development:
o Fi rs t , “ O rganising and ove rseeing the development of prov i s i o n a l
institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a
political settlement,including the holding of elections”;
o S e c o n d ly, “ Tra n s fe rri n g , as these institutions are establ i s h e d , i t s
administrative responsibilities”;
o Thirdly, “Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s
future status,taking into account the Rambouillet accords”;and 
o “In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s
p rovisional institutions to institutions established under a political
settlement”.82
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84 The AAK is the second,and smaller, party to be formed by ex-KLA fighters led by Ramush Haradinaj.
While the roadmap and timetable for ach i eving these goals is left large ly
u n s p e c i fied in the UN re s o l u t i o n , its clear intent is to promote a high
d e gree of democratic self-gove rnance in Ko s ovo . But by Ap ril 2001, s o m e
22 months after the end of the wa r, even the fi rst stage of this pro c e s s
remains incomplete.
While municipal elections on 28 October 2000 began the process of
c reating democratic institutions on the local leve l , the mu n i c i p a l
a s s e m blies established by this vote have only limited powe rs and are
subject to veto authority by local international offi c i a l s . After the October
municipal elections, UNMIK should have moved quick ly to begin the
complicated and potentially dange rous process of creating prov i s i o n a l
d e m o c ratic institutions. U n fo rt u n a t e ly the reasons for inactivity and
caution are cl e a r. Without strong international support , the UN
a d m i n i s t ration is afraid any pro gress or decision may be seen as
p rejudicing the question of final status, and disturb the new gove rnment in
B e l gra d e . That strong support has been denied - as a result of divisions in
the international community on the status issue and over how mu ch
s u p p o rt the new gove rnments in Belgrade re q u i re .
The process of creating the local assemblies established under the October
elections has re q u i red that local leaders associated with the ex-KLA - who
in 1999 had moved in quick ly after the depart u re of the Serb authorities to
e s t ablish their own administra t i ve stru c t u res - surrender local control to
the new ly elected party re p re s e n t a t i ve s .8 3 This is curre n t ly happening,
albeit slow ly, but has encountered a number of diffi c u l t i e s . The new ly
elected LDK re p re s e n t a t i ves have often refused to share power with other
elected part i e s , and the local assemblies remain almost mori b u n d .
C o n c e rns over independence dominate local politics, and with the
exception of the Alliance for the Future of Ko s ovo (AAK), no political
p a rties seem ve ry interested in supporting what are seen as large ly
p owerless local stru c t u re s .8 4
The next and most complicated step was to introduce what amounted to
an interim constitution for democra t i c , Ko s ovo-wide institutions. T h i s
p ro c e s s , w h i ch the Special Repre s e n t a t i ve now describes as producing a
“basic legal fra m ewo rk ” , is again proceeding ve ry slow ly. M o re ove r,“ l e g a l
f ra m ewo rk ” is itself a controve rsial choice of wo rds with Ko s ovo A l b a n i a n s ,
who feel that since Ko s ovo had a constitution in 1974, t h ey cannot - if they
a re to maintain the momentum for independence - accept any lesser term
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n ow. One of the key substantive decisions to be made is the choice of an
a p p ro p riate electoral system. In this re s p e c t , if speed is a major
c o n s i d e ra t i o n , as it is, it would make more sense to opt for a prov i n c e - w i d e
e l e c t o rate using a pro p o rtional re p resentation system with party lists,
rather than any mu l t i - d i s t rict system.
The remaining step is for the international mission to set a date for ge n e ra l
elections to Ko s ovo ’s provisional institutions, an event which Ko s ovo
Albanians have demanded should occur no later than the spring of 2001,
but which Ko s ovo Serbs and some members of the intern a t i o n a l
c o m munity would like to see delaye d . UNMIK has indicated that ge n e ra l
elections in Ko s ovo will be held no sooner than the fall of 2001, and there
is increasing concern that the date will slip well into 2002. M o re ove r, t h e
handling of the issue has been contra d i c t o ry. Although the new Special
R e p re s e n t a t i ve , Hans Haekke ru p , has confi rmed his wish to have elections
as soon as possible (a reve rsal of his initial stance), he has also said that all
the proper stru c t u res and pro c e d u res - not just the electoral system - mu s t
be in place fi rst for this to take place, i n cluding the fra m ewo rk for the
f u t u re powe rs of a Ko s ovo-wide parliament. As a re s u l t , t h e re is grow i n g
c o n c e rn that the UN’s current appro a ch is a recipe for an almost indefi n i t e
p re p a ration peri o d , since the OSCE estimates it needs two months to
re c ruit the staff for an election, and then six months to pre p a re for any
substantial new system.
G o v e rnance Generally
E ven befo re Milosev i c ’s depart u re , Ko s ovo Albanians we re incre a s i n g ly
doubtful of the UN’s ability to administer the prov i n c e . D i fficulties in
p roviding a number of social services - ra n ging from delays in ru bb i s h
collection to repeated interruptions in power and water - unders c o red the
often cumbersome bure a u c ratic process of UN administra t i o n . S l owness in
c reating a functioning and impartial judicial system has also been one of
the biggest gaps in the UN’s interim administra t i o n . An OSCE study of the
c riminal justice system in Ko s ovo found it to be “ failing the impart i a l i t y
t e s t ” . E ven after a pro l o n ged period of rev i ew by UN offi c i a l s , the OSCE
s t u dy found that “ t h e re are a number of significant cases that have ra i s e d
real concerns as to the actual bias of the court s .”8 5 E q u a l ly the whole legal
s t ru c t u re gi ves rise to doubts. T h e re is no law of “ h abeas corpus”, e n abl i n g
a p p a re n t ly indefinite detention at times, and no clear pro p e rty law. L aw in
Ko s ovo is not decided locally at all, but is at the mercy of UN law ye rs in
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N ew Yo rk , whose main concern appears not to be so mu ch fo l l owing the
guidelines established in UNSCR 1244, as not in any way risking pre -
j u d ging final status. Neither the law nor the judiciary will become
e ffe c t i ve without ge nuine state institutions, and that in turn entails making
p ro gress on the status issue.
P resident Ko s t u n i c a ’s electoral victory brought the issue of independence
b a ck to the fo re f ront of debate among Ko s ovo A l b a n i a n s . While virt u a l ly all
Ko s ovo Albanians believe that Ko s ovo must someday become independent,
these aspirations had been somewhat re s t rained by the belief that the
i n t e rnational community was heading in that dire c t i o n . But with the
Kostunica gove rnment vo c a l ly re a s s e rting its intention to maintain Serbian
s ove reignty and re t u rn a limited gove rnment presence to Ko s ovo , eve ry
major Ko s ovo Albanian leader has publ i cly re i t e rated his support fo r
independence as the only acceptable outcome.
Ko s ovo Albanians understand that independence remains a longe r - t e rm
goal and they are willing to exe rcise some patience - provided they do not
come to believe that the international community has fo re closed that
o p t i o n . H oweve r, Ko s t u n i c a ’s rhetoric has fo rced Ko s ovo Albanians to
c o n f ront their own powerlessness under their current status as an
i n t e rnational pro t e c t o ra t e . D e l ays in establishing interim institutions has
left Ko s ovo Albanians with no legi t i m a t e , d e m o c ratic re p resentation to
p resent their interests to either Belgrade or the international commu n i t y.
When fo rmer UNMIK chief Bern a rd Ko u chner attempted to begin his ow n
d i rect dialogue with Ko s t u n i c a , Ko s ovo Albanians quick ly and ri g h t ly made
it known that neither Ko u chner pers o n a l ly nor the UN as an institution had
p roper authority to re p resent their interests in Belgra d e . Ko u ch n e r ’s
s u c c e s s o r, Hans Haekke ru p , has announced his intention to open an offi c e
in Belgra d e , and this has again tri g ge red debate amongst Ko s ovo A l b a n i a n s
as to his intentions. Put another way, as long as Belgrade remained an
i n t e rnational pari a h , Ko s ovo Albanians we re willing to be treated as wa rd s
of the international commu n i t y. H oweve r, as Serbia re - e m e rges as an active
member of the international commu n i t y, Ko s ovo Albanians also expect a
seat at the tabl e .
I n t e rnal Politics
The municipal elections of October 2000 we re an important symbolic step
in demonstrating Ko s ovo ’s commitment to democra c y. By and large ,
Albanian political part i e s , c a n d i d a t e s , and media behaved in a re s p o n s i bl e
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fa s h i o n . The political parties devoted considerable effo rt to getting their
m e s s ages to vo t e rs , the media re p o rted ex t e n s i ve ly (if not alway s
a c c u ra t e ly or impart i a l ly) on the campaign, and the people of Ko s ovo
t u rned out massive ly and peacefully to vo t e . Political violence - a major
c o n c e rn at the campaign’s onset - abated considerably as it pro gre s s e d .
Ko s ovo Albanians voted ove r w h e l m i n g ly in support of Rugova ’s LDK, a
p a rty that has long advocated non-violent resistance to Serb domination,
and in most areas rejected parties associated with the fo rmer KLA.
Statements by the leaders of the two largest parties after the election also
s h owed a willingness to act re s p o n s i bly. The losers , Hashim Thaci and
R a mush Hara d i n a j ,p romised to respect the results of the ballot, while the
w i n n e r, I b rahim Rugova , has moved cautiously.
Table 11.  Main Political Parties in Kosovo
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Political Party
Democratic League of
Kosovo (LDK)
Democratic Party of
Kosovo (PDK)
Alliance for the
Future of Kosovo
(AAK)
Parliamentary Party of
Kosovo (PPK)
Political A l i g n m e n t
The LDK is the largest established Ko s ovo A l b a n i a n
political part y. Under its Pre s i d e n t ,I b rahim Rugova ,i t
fo l l owed a line of peaceful non-coopera t i o n , ru n n i n g
a parallel gove rnment stru c t u re throughout the last
d e c a d e . D u ring the October 2000 local elections it
gained around 60 per cent of the vo t e . Wi d e ly
re g a rded as the leading moderate part y, it re m a i n s
t o t a l ly committed to full independence for Ko s ovo .
The PDK headed by Hashim Thaci is the second
l a rgest party in Ko s ovo and was founded by members
of the fo rmer KLA.
A new Ko s ovo political coalition/movement led by
Ramush Haradinaj, a former KLA fighter from
D u k ag j i n i ,w h e re it has a strong base, taking over 13
per cent of the ove rall vote in Ko s ovo .
Parties in the coalition include: the People’s
M ovement of Ko s ovo (LPK), Albanian Unifi c a t i o n
Pa rty (UNIKO M B ) ,Albanian Christian Pa rty (PSHDK)
and Alliance for Citizens of Ko s ovo (AQK) also led by
R a mush Hara d i n a j .
The PPK was born out of the student movements of
the 1980s. The party was led by Veton Surroi until
1 9 9 4 , and now by Bajran Ko s u m i . Until the October
2000 elections, the party was a member of the AAK
coalition.
Some international observe rs have criticised Albanian parties and leaders fo r
focusing on independence at the expense of local issues. S u ch cri t i c i s m
would seem to ignore the difficult cultural ex p e rience the Ko s ovo A l b a n i a n s
h ave suffe red over the last decade, while underestimating the importance of
resolving final status. Ko s ovo Albanians are no longer pre p a red to wait for the
i n t e rnational community to sort out its own disagreements befo re democra t i c
institutions are introduced across Ko s ovo . Nor should they be re q u i red to.
Kosovo Serbs and the Political Pro c e s s
Ko s t u n i c a ’s victory is also having an impact on the mood and political
alignment within the Ko s ovo Serb commu n i t y. In the September 2000 FRY
elections Ko s ovo Serbs voted in substantial nu m b e rs for Milosev i c , and in the
December 2000 elections most also voted for the more ex t reme nationalist
p a rt i e s . This was not necessari ly just out of enthusiasm for Milosevic pers o n a l ly,
but rather because Belgra d e ’s instruments of coercion and pro p ag a n d a
remained effe c t i ve and many Ko s ovo Serbs saw it as dire c t ly in their securi t y
i n t e re s t s . To a certain ex t e n t , Ko s t u n i c a ’s ability to control deve l o p m e n t s
within the Ko s ovo Serb community will depend on how pro m p t ly and how
e ffe c t i ve ly he takes ch a rge of the pro p ag a n d a ,p o l i c e ,and financial instru m e n t s
M i l o s evic used to maintain his control among that commu n i t y.
The initial effect of Ko s t u n i c a ’s victory was to enhance the stature of Ko s ovo
Serb politicians associated with him - who had refused to cooperate with the
i n t e rnational mission in Ko s ovo - and to diminish the stature of the modera t e
“ G racanica Serbs”who had cooperated with the UN. O l i ver Iva n ov i c , leader of
the Mitrovica Serbs, who endorsed Kostunica during the election campaign
and stood by Kostunica when ro ck - a n d - ve ge t abl e - t h rowing Milosevic thugs
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National Movement of
the Liberation of
Kosovo (LKCK)
People’s Movement of
Kosovo (LPK)
Albanian Unification
Party (UNIKOMB)
The LKCK was an illegal political movement for
ten years. The party was a member of the AAK
until the October 2000 elections. It remains an
important if small party.
The LPK was one of the first political groupings in
Kosovo to advocate armed resistance to Serb rule
from Belgrade. During the war some of the most
p rominent politicians in Ko s ovo we re LPK
members. It remains an influential,if small party.
Born out of the Albanian resistance movement,the
U N I KOMB has always advocated A l b a n i a n
unification. A member of the AAK coalition.
fo rced him off the podium in Mitrov i c a , has emerged as a more pro m i n e n t
leader of the Serb community throughout Ko s ovo . Another benefi c i a ry of the
n ew re gime is like ly to be Marko Ja k s i c , Ko s t u n i c a ’s re p re s e n t a t i ve in
M i t rov i c a . I m m e d i a t e ly after Ko s t u n i c a ’s victory, I va n ovic and other Ko s t u n i c a
s u p p o rt e rs hinted at a more coopera t i ve stance towa rd the intern a t i o n a l
m i s s i o n . H oweve r, by early November 2000 Iva n ovic was backing off, t e l l i n g
the pre s s , for ex a m p l e , that it would be pre m a t u re for Ko s ovo Serbs to
p a rticipate in the local assemblies to be established by the intern a t i o n a l
mission on the basis of the October municipal elections. As a result UNMIK
has been reluctant to recognise him as a legitimate re p re s e n t a t i ve in the
c u rrent Mitrovica talks. N ow it has become clear that with the appointment
( by Belgrade) of Momcilo Tra j kov i c , leader of the Serbian Resistance part y, a s
the leader of Ko s ovo Serbs, I va n ov i c ’s power is wa n i n g . Tra j kov i c ,who share d
the podium with Kostunica in Belgrade the night of Milosev i c ’s fall has also
exhibited a more moderate stance, and some ve ry slight pro gress may be
v i s i ble here .
As a commu n i t y, Ko s ovo Serbs have not been willing to wo rk within the
institutions of the autonomous Ko s ovo called for by UNSCR 1244 on an
i n t e rim basis, let alone consider more sweeping final status talks. Almost all
Serbs refused to re gister and vote in the October 2000 municipal elections in
Ko s ovo , and few Ko s ovo Serb leaders have been willing to wo rk with the
Ko s ovo-wide interim institutions established by the international mission.
H oweve r, some Ko s ovo Serb leaders have cooperated on a local level with the
i n t e rnational mission. Ko s ovo Serbs should be encouraged by the
i n t e rnational community and UNMIK to take part in the self-gove rn m e n t
e ffo rt s .
The international community needs to develop a compre h e n s i ve stra t e gy fo r
dealing with the Serbs that is cl e a r ly understood and implemented by both
c o m mu n i t i e s . This should include three elements:
o c o n t i nuing integration of Serbs into municipal administration fo l l owing the
appointment of Serbs to municipal assemblies in the wa ke of the October
e l e c t i o n s ;
o c reation of institutions to allow Serbs in the encl aves to control their ow n
local affa i rs ;a n d
o adoption and implementation of a plan, w h i ch the UNHCR is curre n t ly
wo rking on, to complete the re t u rn of all Serbs who wish to do so over a
t h re e - year peri o d .
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For their part , Ko s ovo Serbs need to do more to demonstrate their willingness
to live in a democratic Ko s ovo and to cooperate with the institutions set up
by the international mission. UNMIK should make clear that Serbs who have
not re gi s t e red as residents of Ko s ovo in the civil re gi s t ration being conducted
by the UN, and who have not obtained the Ko s ovo identity document that
s u ch re gi s t ration makes possible by an agreed date, will not be allowed to
p a rticipate in self-gove rnment or enjoy other special arra n gements that the
i n t e rnational mission has set up for Serbs.
D. Human Rights86
The inability either to fully protect Serbs or have them included in Kosovo’s
emerging administrative structures remains the most serious human rights
issue in Kosovo,and the precarious status of Serb communities continues to
undermine broader progress in peacefully resolving final status issues. Serb
c o m munities are dire c t ly dependent on the protection of KFOR and
assistance from the international mission for their immediate survival.
The approximately 90,000 Serbs remaining in Kosovo live completely
separately from their former Albanian neighbours. Some 40,000 live in
several dozen de facto enclaves scattered across the southern and central part
of Kosovo,their security and every aspect of their daily life provided for by
KFOR and other elements of the international mission. Approximately 50,000
live compactly in a purely Serb zone that stretches from the northern part of
the divided town of Mitrovica to the border with Serbia proper about 40
kilometres to the north.
Serbs in the enclaves lack almost all the basic preconditions for a normal life.
They cannot work,shop,or receive basic social services outside the enclaves.
Travel among the encl aves or between the encl aves and Serbia is
accomplished on special bus lines or on a daily train that runs between
Kosovo Polje, near Pristina, and Mitrovica. Convoys of cars and trucks run
regularly between the larger enclaves and Serbia, the source of most of the
supplies for the enclaves. This travel is only possible under KFOR escort.
Serbs in the enclaves cannot use Albanian medical facilities and depend on
treatment in Serbia or at clinics established under international auspices.
There is almost no economic activity in the enclaves other than individual
agriculture,small-scale trading and cafes.
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Before Milosevic’s fall the institutions of the pre-war Belgrade regime
continued to function underneath a thin veneer of international presence
throughout the Serb-inhabited areas of Kosovo. In the primarily Serb
municipalities of the north, pre-war Serb mayors and local administrations
occupied their former offices and continued to carry out their functions in
accordance with the directives of Belgrade. These local administrators
received salaries both from both the UN administration and Belgrade. Even
in the enclaves, Belgrade continues to pay the salaries and pensions and to
provide a certain amount of social services. Schools throughout the north
and in the enclaves are run according to the Serbian curriculum,and Belgrade
has forbidden Serb teachers to sign UNMIK contracts.
The international mission in Kosovo has failed to come up with an effective
strategy for dealing with the two key issues regarding Serbs in Kosovo: first,
how to allow expelled Serbs to return to their homes;and secondly, how to
integrate Serbs within the interim institutions of administration established
by the UN Mission. In the spring of 2000, after Bishop Artemije visited
Washington, the United States began to push energetically for the quick
return of a substantial number of Serbs to some villages in the north-western
part of Kosovo,from which they had fled shortly after the 1999 war. The U.S.
initiative met with considerable scepticism from much of the international
community,which pointed out that the Serb villages initially proposed as sites
for return had been totally destroyed and were surrounded by hostile
Albanian villages, meaning any returning Serbs would require permanent
KFOR protection. A committee was established to coordinate preparations
for return,but ultimately the U.S. initiative was stillborn.
The only instance where the international community has succeeded in
encouraging Serb returns has been “Operation Trojan”, begun by British
forces in Kosovo in spring 2000. Working on a local level with Serb
communities to improve security and living conditions,British and associated
units deployed in the vicinity of Serb communities and adopted an active and
aggressive security patrol posture. They also mobilised and coordinated
international donor support to provide Serb villages in the Trojan zone with
elementary schools and primary medical care facilities, and then to link
groups of villages through road projects, clinics, high schools and even a
projected Serb university.
By September 2000 about 40 Serbs had returned to the village that was the
centre of Trojan, and perhaps two hundred had returned to the region as a
whole. Although Trojan shows what can be accomplished through a
consistent and well thought out policy at the local level, it probably owes
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some of its success to the isolated nature of the mountainous region where it
was conducted, which facilitates providing security and reduces pressure
from Albanians. Although UNMIK is now taking over Trojan from British
KFOR, it is thus not likely to serve as a model in the densely populated
Kosovo plain,let alone in cities such as Pristina from which as many as 25,000
Serbs may have fled,and KFOR lacks the manpower and resources to conduct
any such operation so widely. Lasting security - and,eventually, reconciliation
- can only be achieved through a broader stabilisation of the political
environment. In other words,Serbs will not return until they know what they
face in Kosovo;this,in turn,depends on Kosovo Albanians knowing what the
future holds for them.
E. Economy
A c t i vated by entre p re n e u rial instinct and fuelled by money from the
i n t e rnational community and the Albanian diaspora , the small business sector
in Ko s ovo is fl o u ri s h i n g . Fo rmer UNMIK chief Ko u ch n e r, despite opposition
f rom the UN bure a u c racy in New Yo rk , took an essential fi rst step towa rd
Ko s ovo ’s economic re c ove ry in September 1999 by establishing the Germ a n
M a rk as Ko s ovo ’s legal tender, an act that gave Ko s ovo a stable currency and
opened it to trade with the outside wo r l d .
By the end of 2000 UNMIK had also put together the skeleton of some
gove rnment economic institutions. Tax policy is an area where the
i n t e rnational mission has made some pro gress in developing a practical long-
t e rm plan. The “ e m e rge n c y ”customs re gime (consisting of a 10 per cent tari ff
and 15 per cent sales tax) put in place after the war will be slow ly phased out
over the next eighteen months in favour of a more equitable policy passing the
b u rden on to businesses and individuals. A tax on reve nue for hotels,
re s t a u ra n t s , and bars making more than 10,000 German Marks per month wa s
implemented in Fe b ru a ry 2000. Compliance in the autumn of 2000 wa s
a round 40 per cent. The Year 2000 budget projected 50 per cent of
gove rnment ex p e n d i t u re being met from internal reve nue (i.e. t a x a t i o n ) . I n
fact there was a surplus over this fi g u re , but there is some evidence that legal
c o m m e rce is incre a s i n g ly going underground to avoid taxe s .
S eventy per cent of re c o n s t ruction funds for Ko s ovo have come from EU
member states. In order to administer re c o n s t ruction activities funded by the
E u ropean Commission, B russels established the European A gency fo r
R e c o n s t ruction (EAR) in Pri s t i n a . In 1999,the EAR allocated 127 million Euro s
for Ko s ovo re c o n s t ruction and 180 million Euros in 2000. In 2000, the EAR’s
highest pri o rities we re housing and rebuilding energy, t ra n s p o rt a t i o n , a n d
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water infrastructure. However, its success in these areas has been distinctly
mixed. By the autumn of 2000 a reasonable portion of the planned road
reconstruction had been either completed or was under way. These efforts,
however, touched only part of Kosovo’s rapidly crumbling road network.
Complaints were also rising about slowness in housing reconstruction. And
despite tens of millions of dollars spent on utilities reconstruction, Pristina
and other parts of Kosovo continued to experience regular prolonged power
and water cuts, which in the case of electricity were only prevented from
being worse by major and expensive imports of electric power. In mid-June
2000, the senior British commander in Kosovo, Brigadier General Richard
Shirreff, voiced public frustration at the EU’s slowness in actually getting
promised reconstruction projects up and running, lamenting, that “the EU
seems incapable of getting anything done without a bureaucratic wrangle.”87
The continuing struggle to define the basic nature of Kosovo’s public
institutions has also severely hampered prospects for creating a modern
economy able to attract vital domestic and foreign investment. The remnants
of Yugoslavia’s legal and regulatory framework are largely unsuitable for such
a market system. Delays in establishing the institutions of a regular economic
system have also given succour to a flourishing grey economy that feeds
much of the violence and corruption continuing to disrupt Kosovo’s political,
economic,and social life.
In May 2000, UNMIK Pillar Four (Reconstruction and Economic
Development, managed by the European Union) drafted a White Paper on
managing Kosovo’s transition to a market economy, which called for a two-
stage process of verifying the ownership of Kosovo enterprises and then
privatising the bulk of those that appeared to be economically viable.88 This
effort would have both tremendous economic utility, and represent an
important step in breaking the nexus between the monopoly of economic
and political power in the province.The development of a more independent
business class, not directly associated with government structures, would
represent an important step in the development of Kosovo’s civil society.
In the first stage of privatisation, an independent Ownership Adjudication
Commission would have determined the ownership and legal status of
medium and large-sized enterprises in Kosovo on an accelerated basis. In the
second stage, a Kosovo Privatisation Agency would have restructured the
e n t e r p rises to enhance competitiveness and increase attra c t i veness to
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prospective buyers. Privatisation was to be carried out through a competitive
bidding process open to domestic and foreign bidders. Twenty per cent of
the shares in an enterprise to be privatised would be reserved for employees
and managers, in return for which workers would renounce any claims
toward the enterprise. Proceeds from privatisation would go into the Kosovo
budget.
The White Paper ran into opposition from some parts of the UN bureaucracy
in Pristina and New York and from some Security Council members worried
that proceeding with privatisation now could be seen as undermining
Belgrade’s sovereignty over Kosovo. There is some nervousness about pre-
judging the question of who owns such assets — the Belgrade government,
Belgrade banks who had made loans, foreign companies who had taken part
in Milosevic’s “clientelist”scams,or numerous other claimants,including pre-
communist owners. There was also concern about controversies over
ownership,and that the UN might face lawsuits from Serb directors currently
recognised by the FRY as owners. And there was concern that few legitimate
investors would be attracted if privatisation were carried out before the rule
of law had been secured and before the real value and status of the assets to
be privatised had been established. In the end,the whole idea was in effect
shelved. This lack of sense of ownership will in turn likely seriously deter
both investment and much needed efforts toward job creation.
Pending resolution of the issue of privatisation and market reform, UNMIK
came up with an interim scheme. In June 2000, an agreement was
announced regarding an investment program for the reconstruction and
renewed operation of the Sharr cement plant in Kacanik, near the border
with Macedonia. The agreement guaranteed the foreign investor a ten-year
period of full control and management of all matters relating to operation of
the plant. In September 2000 UNMIK announced a tender for a second such
interim management contract, for the Ferro-Nickel metallurgical enterprise,
although as of March 2001 there were no bidders. Investment under such
interim schemes is likely to be applicable in a limited number of situations
where investors can be confident of obtaining a profitable return over a
relatively short period. In the longer term such schemes are no substitute for
far-reaching economic re-structuring.
It should be possible to find more imaginative and effective ways for
privatisation, and the economic stimulation that should come with it, to
proceed. One way might be to put any proceeds from sales into a trust fund,
pending resolution of ownership. Another, more radical notion would be to
declare that since Kosovo is to enjoy a substantial degree of autonomy, under
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the usual international conventions the former provincial state assets (which
were provincial assets prior to Milosevic’s illegal constitutional changes) will
belong to the autonomous province.
N o rmal life will not re t u rn to Ko s ovo until the local economy begins to function
in a more regular fa s h i o n . The international mission in Ko s ovo must move
i m m e d i a t e ly to address the large and growing disparity between Ko s ovo ’s
fl o u rishing small business economy and the absence of activity in the “ o ffi c i a l ” ,
fo rm e r ly state or socially owned economy. M a n aging Ko s ovo ’s transition from a
socialist to a market system is the highest pri o rity task of economic policy,
without which all other aspects of re c o n s t ruction will only serve as stop-gap
m e a s u re s . The international mission should quick ly set up the Owners h i p
Adjudication Commission called for in the UNMIK white paper, “ E n t e r p ri s e
D evelopment Stra t e gy ” , or an equivalent body to re s o l ve pro p e rty ow n e rs h i p
i s s u e s , as a prelude to pri vatisation of Ko s ovo ’s large and medium-sized
e n t e r p ri s e s ,w h i ch should begin in 2001. D rawing on appro p riate models fro m
c o u n t ries that have successfully gone through the transition pro c e s s , U N M I K
should as an urgent pri o rity put in place the commercial law codes and other
economic legislation needed for a modern market economy.
The international mission in Kosovo also needs to work with appropriate
international and local institutions to draw up a development strategy for
Kosovo, including plans for attracting international, domestic, and diaspora
capital. As part of this strategy, the international community should direct the
attention and planning of Kosovo leaders away from the “socialist dinosaurs”
of the past, but on which they remain fixated, toward the development of
modern economic institutions capable of creating much needed jobs for a
young growing population. Here too, however, the final status question
intrudes. For foreign private investment cannot be secured without a
dependable legal framework.
Conclusions and recommendations on Kosovo intern a l l y
o UNMIK should greatly increase the intensity of its eff o rts to develop self-
g o v e rning Kosovo-wide provisional institutions with minority
p a rt i c i p a t i o n .
o UNMIK should, in cooperation with the local parties, immediately identify
a suitable initial electoral system for elections to a Kosovo pro v i n c i a l
assembly: the most quickly and easily implemented system probably being a
p rovince-wide electorate, using a pro p o rtional re p resentation system on
p a rty lists.
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o UNMIK should set an early firm election date to enable OSCE to star t
serious preparations for an election.
o KFOR should continue to take more effective steps to protect Serb civilians,
especially convoys, including crackdowns on illegal Serb and Kosovo
Albanian paramilitary and intelligence forces, and more robustly patrol the
b o rder with southern Serbia.
o The international community must take control of the situation at
M i t rovica.  KFOR and UNMIK police should act, with legal force if
n e c e s s a r y, against the “bridge watchers”, increase the size and eff e c t i v e n e s s
of the zone of confidence there, and work harder at the so-called joint
institutions, such as health and hospitals.
o UNMIK and UN New York should increase the powers and finance
available to the UN Administrator in Mitro v i c a .
o UNMIK should increase the salary of local judges as an anti-corru p t i o n
m e a s u re, and take steps to devolve the issue of local laws from the UN in
New York to an independent judicial commission composed of a small
number of international jurists.
o The KPS and KPC should be given more intensive training and better
equipment, and a firm date should be set for KPS to takeover most policing
d u t i e s .
o UNMIK should move forw a rd with its privatisation plan as outlined in the
White Paper.  
o The international community needs to develop a comprehensive strategy for
engaging Kosovo Serbs in the governance of Kosovo including: 
- The continuing integration of Serbs into municipal administration
following the appointment of Serbs to municipal assemblies; 
- C reation of institutions to allow Serbs in the enclaves to control their
own local affairs; and
- Adoption and implementation of a plan, which the UNHCR is
c u rrently developing, to enable the complete re t u rn of all Serbs who
wish to do so.
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6.  THE FUTURE OF THE FRY
The constitutional and legal stru c t u res of the FRY were neither intended nor
designed to meet the needs of any modern, democratic state.  The intern a t i o n a l
community needs to confront the reality that the status quo is not sustainable;
to identify processes that will move things forw a rd constructively for all thre e
entities; and to find ultimate solutions that are principled and consistent, and
d o n ’t make things worse, including within the wider region.  In resolving final
and future status issues for Montenegro and Kosovo either the G-8 or OSCE
could play a useful facilitating ro l e .
A. Introduction
Serbia and Montenegro , and Ko s ovo as part of Serbia, a re bound toge t h e r
as the Fe d e ral Republic of Yu go s l avia under a 1992 constitution that has
n ever functioned effe c t i ve ly, is widely re g a rded as illegi t i m a t e , and to
w h i ch all three have objections. T h e re is no popular support in Ko s ovo fo r
the continued existence of the FRY. A majority in Montenegro appears to
favour re fo rm so pro found that, if implemented, the association with Serbia
would surv i ve only as a union of two sove reign states. Political and publ i c
opinion in Serbia itself seems more favo u rable to salvaging the FRY, ye t ,
s i g n i fi c a n t ly, B e l grade has produced no bl u e p rint for ach i eving this on
t e rms acceptable to Montenegro , let alone Ko s ovo . In short , n o
c o m p re h e n s i ve or cre d i ble proposals for reviving the FRY have been
p re s e n t e d .
The stakes invo l ved in resolving the final political status of the FRY are
h i g h ,c rucial in determining whether the re gion emerges into a new era of
s t ability and re l a t i ve pro s p e rity or continues to be plagued by divisions
c a p able of escalating into wa r. U n t i l , at the ve ry least, some process is set
in train for resolving these matters , the FRY ’s current constituent parts and
mu ch of the Balkans, will remain in an uneasy limbo. Fo reign inve s t o rs will
be deterred by the continuing uncert a i n t y, issues of ow n e rship and other
basic legal rights will remain clouded by mu d dy constitutional stru c t u re s
and politics will remain plagued by nationalism. It is difficult to imagi n e
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s e rious strides towa rd re fo rm or reconciliation in any of these societies
unless cl a rity is brought to the basic legal principles around which they are
o rg a n i s e d .
This is not to suggest that all the remaining status issues in the re gion need
to be settled in a precipitate fa s h i o n . Nor is it to suggest that it is possible at
this point to draft a complete constitutional bl u e p rint that would addre s s
and re s o l ve all outstanding issues. But it is time for the intern a t i o n a l
c o m munity to recognise that these issues cannot be wished away, and that
time will not by itself wash them away. T h e re does have to be some
s i g n i ficant fo r wa rd move m e n t , and sooner rather than later.
The following guidelines should govern the overall process of democratic
dialogue between the parties:
o Contentious issues should be resolved exclusively by peaceful means and
without threats of violence.
o Negotiations on final status issues should be based on the rule of law and
conducted wherever possible within the emerging democra t i c
frameworks of these societies.
o C h a n ges to established bord e rs should only be made by mu t u a l
agre e m e n t . Under no circumstances should ethnic cleansing be
rewarded.
o The relationship between majority and minority populations within any
entity should be reciprocal and unconditional. Full individual rights and
protection before the law should be guaranteed to the minority, with
respect paid to its collective identity and culture; the minority, thus
protected, owes the larger entity respect for both its laws and its identity.
o The international community should play an active role in advancing
political status and rights issues,including by hosting and facilitating talks,
and also by offering economic incentives and,where appropriate,security
guarantees.
There are a number of technical arguments already in play as to whether or
not the FRY exists now as a legally recognisable entity, and whether it would
if Montenegro were to secede. The formal destruction of Montenegro’s role
and status within the FRY made it possible to argue, certainly after the
Milosevic-driven constitutional amendments in 2000,that the FRY was in the
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process of dissolution - if not already dissolved.89 The argument that the FRY
would automatically dissolve if Montenegro were to leave it has been
addressed (and rejected) earlier in this report, in Chapter 3 on Serbia.
Whatever the FRY’s status is or might be,so far as Kosovo is concerned any
constitutional competence the FRY might have had to govern the province
has in any event been suspended by Security Council Resolution 1244,90
which put in place a UN-run civil administration for Kosovo (UNMIK). While
that resolution implies that the FRY, so long as it exists, is the relevant
sovereign entity of which Kosovo is part during the present “interim”phase,
it leaves quite open who might exercise sovereignty after a final political
settlement is reached.
While policy makers will need to take account of the technical constraints,
such as they are,posed by the existing constitutional rules governing the FRY
and its constituent parts, these should not be regarded as determining
outcomes. Experience shows that such constraints cannot be absolute when
momentous ch a n ge is afo o t . In considering the pros and cons of
independence or new forms of association of the entities in the FRY, the
process will necessarily be far more political than legal in character. Partly
that is because of the limits of the legal process: even the 1992 Yugoslav
constitution,other than declaring equality between the Republics, was silent
on any mechanism for possible secession.
The task confronting internal and international actors is a huge one:to accept
that the status quo is not sustainable; to identify processes for both
Montenegro and Kosovo that will move things forward constructively;and to
pursue ultimate solutions that are realistic and do not make things worse,
including within the wider region.
Some international hopes seem to be pinned on the possibility that the FRY
can be reconstituted - on a transitional or permanent basis - as a loose
confederation with very little power vested in central authorities, and each
entity largely autonomous. Yet, even these hopes appear to be painfully
detached from political reality on the ground. There has not been a glimmer
of debate in Podgorica, Belgrade and Pristina about conducting three-way
talks to strike such an arrangement, nor is there likely to be any for the
foreseeable future. The three-way federal or confederal model breaks down
when considered in a practical light. Both Montenegro and Serbia remain
reluctant to enter into a revised federal arrangement where they would be
roughly co-equals, as is discussed in more detail below. The notion that
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Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo would willingly enter into an arrangement
where central authority was split in thirds simply lacks credibility. Further,
given UNMIK’s slow progress in establishing self-government in Kosovo, a
loose confederation would lash together three different societies at very
d i ffe rent stages of democratic deve l o p m e n t . While the intern a t i o n a l
c o m munity using all its leve rage might be able to impose such an
arrangement on an interim basis, this would do little to stabilise these
societies,and indeed might have the opposite effect.
Table 12.  FRY at a glance
Source: Economic statistics from the G-17 available at www.g17.org.yu;
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
B. Montenegro and the FRY
The Options
Broadly speaking, five options for the future relationship between Serbia and
Montenegro can be envisaged:
o Two separate, independent, sovereign states, without any power-sharing
institutions or arrangements between them.
o Two independent, sovereign states, in a loose union or association with
some shared institutions, along the lines proposed in the Montenegrin
government’s revised Platform of December 2000.
o A single sove reign state, in the fo rm of a “ t h i n ” fe d e ration or
c o n fe d e ra t i o n ,9 1 along the lines env i s aged in the Montenegri n
government’s original August 1999 Platform, with few powers being
exercised by the central government.
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GDP per capita :$1,643
Population:10.6 million (Serbia,Montenegro and Kosovo)
Elections:Presidential and parliamentary elections held
on 24 September 2000.
President:Vojislav Kostunica
Prime Minister:Zoran Zizic
92  Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic has stated that while there can be no compromise over the principle of a single,
common state,there is room for compromise in many areas,including the type and competencies of the joint organs. Vijesti,
7 March 2001.
93  Discussions of the future relationship between Serbia and Montenegro concentrating on the practical questions of how a
proposed union,whatever its form, would function include the European Stability Initiative,“Sovereignty, Europe and the
Future of Serbia and Montenegro:a Proposal for International Mediation”,Berlin,12 February 2001;and CEPS,“A European
Solution for the Constitutional Future of Montenegro”,Michael Emerson,Brussels,23 February 2001.
o A single sovereign state,in the form of a more traditional federation,along
the lines envisaged by the DOS proposal of January 2001, with a wider
range of powers being exercised by the federal government than under
the August 1999 Montenegrin platform proposal (though not as many as
under the 1992 Yugoslav Constitution).
o A single, sovereign, unitary Yugoslav state, with all significant powers
being exercised by the central government.
Opinion poll evidence for Montenegro over a period of several months, as
discussed in Chapter 4, shows that the last of these options should be
discounted, as having only negligible support among the Montenegrin
population. Neither is any serious political force in Montenegro,or Belgrade
itself, proposing a resurrection of the FRY as it was after 1992.
It is clear that between the second, third and fourth options there is
considerable room for common ground, and this is further discussed below
under the heading “Moving Forward”. The Democratic Opposition of Serbia
(DOS) has indicated its willingness to compromise over the nature and
competencies of common institutions.92 Whether within a single state,or in
a loose union or association of two independent,sovereign states,it should be
possible to find a large measure of agreement over how common institutions
would function in practice. 93
The Issues
The international community has re p e a t e d ly made clear its opposition to
M o n t e n e grin independence. On 22 Ja nu a ry 2001 the European Union (EU)
Council of Ministers urged a solution of Serbian-Montenegrin re l a t i o n s
within the fra m ewo rk of Yu go s l av i a . In this re g a rd it welcomed what it
d e s c ribed as the readiness shown by Kostunica to play a constru c t i ve ro l e
to that end. In re m a rks cl e a r ly aimed at Montenegro , it urged that no
u n i l a t e ral steps should be take n . A few days later the US State Depart m e n t
s u p p o rted the EU’s stance, S e c re t a ry of State Colin Powell declined to meet
with Djukanovic when he was in Washington in early Fe b ru a ry 2001,
f u rther signalling Wa s h i n g t o n ’s reluctance to revisit political status issues
in the re gi o n . The EU’s clear ex p ression of support for the DOS position
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on the future relationship between Montenegro and Serbia was only
s l i g h t ly ameliorated by a statement by the spoke s p e rson of the ex t e rn a l
relations commissioner,C h ris Pa t t e n , that ultimately the wish of the people
of Montenegro , ex p ressed in a re fe re n d u m , would be re s p e c t e d .9 4
We s t e rn wo rries about the potential consequences of a Montenegri n
independence move have focused on four particular concern s :
o t h a t , gi ven the divisiveness of such a step within Montenegro and the
c o n t i nued strength of opposition to independence, p a rt i c u l a r ly in
c e rtain areas of the country, s u ch a radical step might have
d e s t abilising consequences for the re p u bl i c , and could even lead to
violent confl i c t ;
o that the break-up of the FRY at this stage might undermine the fragi l e
d evelopment of democracy within Serbia;
o that the end of the FRY will complicate effo rts to re s o l ve the status of
Ko s ovo and might lead to unilateral steps by Ko s ovo Albanian leaders to
c o n fi rm the prov i n c e ’s own independence; a n d
o that Montenegrin independence might tri g ger a “domino effe c t ” , i n
w h i ch fi rst Ko s ovo , and then Macedonia and Bosnia would suffe r
n e g a t i ve consequences. M o re specifi c a l ly, the wo rry is that pre c i p i t a t e
m oves towa rds Ko s ovo independence will encourage separa t i s m
among Macedonia’s large Albanian minority and among the Serbs of the
R e p u blika Srpska.
E a ch of these concerns appears to be ove rs t a t e d , neither individually nor
c o l l e c t i ve ly sufficient to justify the active discouragement of Montenegri n
independence aspirations in which the West has so far engage d . T h e
question of the like ly extent of unrest and conflict within Montenegro has
been addressed alre a dy in Chapter 4. What of the other fe a rs ?
The Impact on Serbia. While the authorities in Belgrade would not
welcome Montenegrin independence, it seems unlike ly that such a step
by Montenegro would seri o u s ly undermine the development of
d e m o c racy in Serbia. Senior fi g u res in Belgrade have , in March 2001,
indicated to the ICG that the authorities there ,h owever re l u c t a n t ly, a c c e p t
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the likelihood of Montenegro ’s depart u re . Both Djindjic and Ko s t u n i c a
h ave said that Belgrade would accept the will of the Montenegri n
p e o p l e .9 5
It is true that Montenegrin independence wo u l d , to the extent that this
resulted in the destruction of the FRY as a constitutional entity (and we have
a l re a dy argued in Chapter 3 that this would not automatically fo l l ow )
d e p ri ve Kostunica of his position as fe d e ral pre s i d e n t . H oweve r, fo l l ow i n g
the victory of DOS in December 2000 parliamentary elections at the
re p u blic level in Serbia, the ending of the FRY need not re p resent a reve rs a l
for DOS. On the contra ry, in putting an end to the constitutional para ly s i s
that exists in the FRY, Serbia as well as Montenegro could actually be better
placed to tackle the task of building a functioning state. And Pre s i d e n t
Kostunica has an obvious new role to play as the next president of Serbia,
should he choose to run for that office when it falls due in September 2002
or earlier.
None of this is to say that independence is the only possible satisfa c t o ry
o u t c o m e . Of key importance is that the relationship between Serbia and
M o n t e n e gro should be re d e fined in a mu t u a l ly acceptable way, by
n e gotiation and agre e m e n t ,w h a t ever the outcome. What should be avo i d e d
is an acrimonious split that could poison relations between the two
re p u blics for ye a rs to come.
The Impact on Kosovo. Of particular concern to the intern a t i o n a l
c o m munity appears to be the fear that independence for Montenegro wo u l d
complicate matters for Ko s ovo . The linkage between the fates of
M o n t e n e gro and Ko s ovo is vigo ro u s ly rejected in Montenegro .9 6 The diffi c u l t
question of Ko s ovo ’s future is a matter that the international community is
going to have to address at some stage ,w h a t ever solution is found betwe e n
Serbia and Montenegro .
A widely held assumption seems to have been that early Montenegri n
i n d e p e n d e n c e , to the extent again that it resulted in the end of the FRY,
would fo rce the issue of Ko s ovo ’s status to the top of the agenda befo re the
i n t e rnational community is re a dy to tackle it. T h i s , it is arg u e d , fo l l ows fro m
the fact that UN Security Council Resolution 1244, w h i ch established the UN
p ro t e c t o rate in Ko s ovo , states that Ko s ovo remains a part of the FRY, b u t
does not re fer to Ko s ovo as a part of Serbia. We have alre a dy argued (in
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Chapter 3, Serbia) that Resolution 1244 would continue to have fo rc e , a n d
a p p ly to whatever entities into which the FRY dissolve d ,w h a t ever happened
to the FRY. But fe a rs have also been ex p ressed that Ko s ovo Albanian leaders
m i g h t , in the event of Montenegro becoming independent, t a ke some
u n i l a t e ral action to affi rm their claim to independence, w h i ch is something
that the international community is unre a dy at this stage to accept.
M a i n s t ream Ko s ovo Albanian leaders ge n e ra l ly accept that Ko s ovo has to go
t h rough a process of pre p a ration befo re its final status can be re s o l ve d . T h a t
p rocess invo l ves building functioning institutions that can take on the
responsibility of gove rn i n g . T h ey insist that the final status must be
i n d e p e n d e n c e , and that there is no possibility of a continued union with
S e r b i a . H oweve r, while they might welcome the independence of
M o n t e n e gro and the end of the FRY that that would imply, t h ey see no
p ractical consequences for Ko s ovo ,w h i ch would still have to go through the
same pro c e s s , i rre s p e c t i ve of what solution Montenegro arri ves at with
S e r b i a . On the question of possible unilateral move s , one senior Ko s ovo
Albanian fi g u re made the point to the ICG that Ko s ovo ’s Albanians alre a dy
d e cl a red independence in 1992. T h e re would be no purpose in making
another unilateral decl a ra t i o n . R a t h e r, the point is to gain intern a t i o n a l
recognition of their independence.
To discourage Montenegrin independence out of fear of possibl e
consequences for Ko s ovo actually makes little sense. The idea that Ko s ovo
and Montenegro could in future fo rm a loose thre e - re p u blic fe d e ration with
Serbia is, w h a t ever its theoretical attra c t i o n s , w h o l ly unre a l i s t i c . Ko s ovo ’s
Albanians reject any fo rm of continued state union with Serbia. A continu e d
fo rm of fe d e ral union between Serbia and Montenegro , within a single state,
would have no prospect of being seen by Ko s ovo Albanians as an attra c t i ve
model for their future relationship with Serbia. R a t h e r, the kind of loose
association between independent, s ove reign states, as now env i s aged by the
M o n t e n e grin gove rn m e n t , in which members would cooperate as mu ch as
t h ey perc e i ved to be in their common intere s t , might be a type of
relationship that could serve as a model more widely in the re gi o n ,i n cl u d i n g
Ko s ovo .
The Domino Effe c t . The international commu n i t y ’s fear of spre a d i n g
i n s t ability in the Balkans is unders t a n d able enough gi ven recent eve n t s . Wi t h
violence fl a ring in southern Serbia and Macedonia, and with the Bosnian
C roats ch a l l e n ging the Dayton settlement, the last thing that the re gi o n
n e e d s , some might arg u e , is for Montenegro too to press its claims fo r
s e p a ra t i o n . H oweve r, s u ch reasoning is again mistake n . It starts from the
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p remise that a Montenegrin independence move would encourage unilatera l
steps by Ko s ovo ’s A l b a n i a n s , and that that in turn would encourage ethnic-
Albanian separatists in Macedonia and Serbia and ethnic-Serb and Cro a t
s e p a ratists in Bosnia to fo l l ow suit. T h e re is no direct parallel betwe e n
M o n t e n e gro on the one hand and, for ex a m p l e , ethnic-Albanian inhab i t e d
a reas of Macedonia or the Republika Srpska in Bosnia on the other.
M o n t e n e gro was a fully - fl e d ged constituent re p u blic of the fo rmer Socialist
Fe d e ral Republic of Yu go s l avia (SFRY ) , and its case is, ra t h e r, a n a l o gous to
that of other ex - Yu go s l av re p u bl i c s ,s u ch as Slovenia and Cro a t i a . And as has
a l re a dy been arg u e d , M o n t e n e grin moves are unlike ly to have dire c t
consequences for Ko s ovo .
The violence in the southern Balkans and the continued resistance to the
i n t e gration of Bosnia are serious enough pro blems for the intern a t i o n a l
c o m mu n i t y. But the answer is not to delay a settlement betwe e n
M o n t e n e gro and Serbia,w h i ch can be re a ched re l a t i ve ly easily and painlessly
in comparison with some of the more intra c t able pro blems in the Balkans.
Rather the international community needs re s o l u t e ly to tackle the seri o u s
p ro blems that it faces in the re gi o n , neither putting off questions that need
to be addressed nor seeking scapegoats for inaction.
Moving Forward
M a ny uncertainties exist as to the political course of events ahead - whether
the pro-independence parties will win the Ap ril election in Montenegro ,a n d
if so by what political margi n ; whether they will win any subsequent
re fe re n d u m ; and if so whether that will be by the necessary technical margi n
to ensure that the ch a n ge can be ach i eved within the fra m ewo rk of
M o n t e n e gro ’s own constitution. While these issues are wo rking themselve s
o u t ,t h e re is no reason for the Montenegrin and Serbian authorities to delay
in ex p l o ring practical matters and seeking solutions acceptable to both.
T h e re is no sense in leaving such important details as citizenship, a single
m a rket (which both say they wa n t ) , a unified monetary policy, t a x a t i o n
m a t t e rs , competition and env i ronmental re g u l a t i o n , c o o p e ration ove r
education and healthcare provision and a host of other matters to the end of
the pro c e s s . It is pre c i s e ly such matters which should be at the heart of the
p rocess of defining how a new relationship will wo rk .
M o n t e n e gro and Serbia need to begin by defining what key interests each of
them needs to ensure in any future re l a t i o n s h i p . O n ly then will it be possibl e
to identify ways of finding common gro u n d . From the pers p e c t i ve of
M o n t e n e gro , key interests include the fo l l ow i n g :
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o M o n t e n e gro should have control of all security fo rces on its terri t o ry,
i n cluding the military. (The Yu go s l av navy should be reduced and
re fo rmed to suit Montenegro ’s needs.) While the present authorities in
B e l grade appear re l a t i ve ly benign, M o n t e n e gro needs to be assure d
that never again will it face threats from its bigger neighbour.
o The Montenegrin gove rnment has signalled its readiness to have a
common monetary policy. The mechanisms for this would need to be
s u ch as to ensure that Montenegro will never again be subject to the
kind of irre s p o n s i ble monetary policy that has re p e a t e d ly been
p ractised by Belgrade in the past decade.9 7
o The Montenegrin gove rnment is concerned that it should have dire c t
access to international financial institutions, fe a ring that its needs will
be inadequately served if contact with the IFIs is through the medium
of Belgra d e .
o M o n t e n e gro should be able to pursue its own fo reign re l a t i o n s ,
i n cluding with its other neighbours , and in areas such as fo re i g n
economic re l a t i o n s . This need not pre clude joint fo reign policy
i n i t i a t i ves in areas of mutual intere s t .
o M o n t e n e gro has introduced a highly libera l , open fo reign trade re gi m e ,
with simpler pro c e d u res and lower tari ffs than those curre n t ly
e m p l oyed by Serbia. As a small economy with limited dive rs i t y, s u ch an
open economy is in Montenegro ’s best intere s t . A ny future
a rra n gement with Serbia should not jeopardise Montenegro ’s appro a ch
in this are a .
o M o n t e n e gro , in contrast to Serbia, does not impose visas on fo re i g n
v i s i t o rs . G i ven the importance attached to reviving Montenegro ’s
t o u rism industry, it is vital that this policy is continued for EU and
other European visitors .
o A ny future arra n gement should guarantee complete freedom of
m ove m e n t ,without the need of passport s , and employment for citizens
of Serbia and Montenegro , t h roughout both re p u bl i c s . W h a t ever state
s t ru c t u re is adopted, citizenship of either re p u blic should not be a bar
to full equal rights in the other.
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o Property rights of individuals and enterprises in each republic should be
guaranteed (while giving due attention to restitution claims for property
confiscated under communism). Just arrangements should be made for
the division of federal property in both republics.
In addition,there are numerous practical areas of common interest for which
arrangements will need to be made,whatever the future relationship. These
include:
o Pensions. Already Montenegro has had to take on the payment of the
pensions of former federal employees who had been left un-provided for
by Belgrade. The position of people who earned their pensions in one
republic but who now reside in the other is complicated by the fact that
Serbia and Montenegro now use dif ferent currencies.
o Healthcare. Each republic should pay for medical treatment of its citizens
in the other. Given Montenegro’s small size and limited capacity to
provide specialist treatment, it is important that a mechanism be found
that would allow Montenegrins to continue to travel to Serbia for
treatment, and which would ensure appropriate compensation for the
Serbian healthcare service.
o Higher education. Many Montenegrin students study in Serbia, and as
domestic students do not have to pay. Arrangements should be made to
ensure that Serbian higher educational establishments receive appropriate
compensation for admitting Montenegrin students, e n abl i n g
Montenegrins who choose to study in Serbia to continue to do so.
For its part,the international community should help Montenegro and Serbia
to find a mu t u a l ly satisfa c t o ry basis for their new re l a t i o n s h i p . T h e
international approach until now of seeking to pressure Montenegro into
drawing back from independence has not worked and has not been
constructive. Neither is it necessary given that,as has been argued here,the
consequences of Montenegrin independence need not be seri o u s ly
destabilising. This approach has actually discouraged Belgrade from engaging
in meaningful dialogue,believing that it had the international community on
its side.
The international community might also be able to offer its services as a
mediator or facilitator in attempts to bring the Serbian and Montenegrin
positions closer together. Such a service is unlikely to be useful until it is
clearer what Montenegro’s opening negotiating position will be, following
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elections and a possible referendum. But this should not stop Belgrade and
Podgorica from immediately beginning to discuss the practical arrangements
of their future arrangement,as already stressed. It is precisely in such details
that Serbia and Montenegro may find the common ground that will make it
easier to resolve the status issue. And the international community may be
able to assist in proposing arrangements in many areas.
The success of any international mediating or facilitating role would depend
on the real will of both Belgrade and Podgorica to resolve the issues between
them in a satisfactory manner. The EU may not be best placed to fulfil this
mediating or facilitating role. In part this is because it does not include the
United States or Russia, both key players in the Balkan region, and in part
because since the Council of Ministers decision of 22 January 2001 the Union
is widely perceived in Montenegro as having lost credibility as a neutral
player. Rather, the appointment of an individual, high profile, experienced
mediator, backed by a small team with relevant expertise, may be the most
effective way for the international community to facilitate negotiations
between Serbia and Montenegro. Such an effort could potentially be placed
under the auspices of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE), which would give it the weight of that organisation and its
member states, including the EU countries, the United States, Russia and all
the neighbouring countries in the region. The G-8 would also be credible in
this role.
C. Kosovo and the FRY
The differences between Montenegro and Kosovo are stark. In Montenegro,
the question of independence is divided along political lines, and is
c o n t rove rsial within commu n i t i e s . The situation in Ko s ovo is totally
polarised. While Kosovo’s remaining Serbs want the province to stay in the
FRY, among Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians support for independence is universal.
The option of any substantive link has been foreclosed by all KosovoAlbanian
leaders and by the people they represent. The Kosovo Commission put the
point bluntly:“The simple truth is that no Kosovo Albanian will accept to live
under Serb rule,however notional, ever again”.98
The situation in Belgrade is equally clear. As was noted in Chapter 3,Serbia,
while it easy to find DOS politicians willing to concede privately that Kosovo
is lost, and certainly that the VJ and police are never likely to return to
Albanian controlled areas, it is politically impossible for them to say so
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publicly. The popular mood, still not able or willing to acknowledge the
nature and scale of the discrimination and persecution against Kosovo
Albanians which led NATO to interve n e , is ove r w h e l m i n g ly ag a i n s t
independence.
The profound gulf between Belgrade and Pristina has led many in the
international community to assume that Kosovo’s final status remains too
explosive a subject to tackle in the near term. However as we have made
clear in Chapter 5, Kosovo, and elsewhere,99 substantial progress toward
building a viable economy, deradicalising the province, and stabilising the
neighbourhood will be virtually impossible unless greater clarity is brought
to the fundamental legal and constitutional framework in Kosovo. This is not
to suggest that Kosovo should become independent overnight. At the very
least, this would be impermissible under the terms of UN Security Council
Resolution 1244 - and thus make international recognition effe c t i ve ly
impossible - until after a provisional Kosovo assembly has been elected and
an executive constituted. But we do argue here that it is time to move
forward, and that the international community should support an orderly
process that can produce a final political settlement sooner rather than later.
Moving Forward
As was described in Chapter 5,Resolution 1244 lays out - albeit without much
detail or clarity - a four stage process for the development of governance in
Kosovo. The “international civil presence” - now UNMIK, headed by the
Secretary-General’s Special Representative Hans Haekkerup - is required to
ove rsee or fa c i l i t a t e : fi rs t , the establishment of provisional democra t i c
i n s t i t u t i o n s ; s e c o n d ly, the tra n s fer of responsibilities from the UN
administration to those institutions;thirdly, the political process designed to
determine Kosovo’s future status; and finally,“the transfer of authority from
Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established under a political
settlement.”
Resolution 1244 refers elsewhere to Kosovo’s “substantial autonomy within
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”100 and to the political process “taking full
account of...the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”.101 But the surrounding language in each case
makes abundantly clear that the matter of FRY sovereignty is addressed only
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in the context of the “ i n t e rim administra t i o n ” and “ i n t e rim political
framework”:when it comes to the political process associated with the final
settlement stage, 1244 is absolutely silent on this question (as are the
Rambouillet accords).102
The care f u l ly vague language of 1244 was the product of intensive
n e gotiations among G-8 members as they sought to conclude the 1999 Ko s ovo
c ri s i s . It is clear enough that the responsibility for advancing all of the fo u r
s t ages of the process set out lies with “the international civilian pre s e n c e ” ,b u t
no detailed guidance is gi ven as to mech a n i s m s . On the critical final political
settlement stage , the only re fe rence is to the international civil pre s e n c e
“ Facilitating a political process designed to determine Ko s ovo ’s future status,
taking into account the Rambouillet accord s ” .1 0 3
The Rambouillet accords, to which Belgrade never consented, were only
marginally more forthcoming,providing that:
“Three years after the entry into force of this agreement, an international
meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement
for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant
a u t h o ri t i e s , e a ch Pa rt y ’s effo rts re g a rding the implementation of this
Agreement,and the Helsinki Final Act...”104
A Kosovo-wide referendum was seen as the likely means to establish the “will
of the people”in such a case. But it was also clear that the referendum itself
was just one of the factors that the international community would consider,
and would not itself have been binding. 105
What,then,can and should be done to now move the process forward? 
o The first step is to establish with no further delay a full system of
democratic and autonomous self-government within Kosovo - the full set
of “provisional institutions”,legislative, executive and judicial, referred to
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in Resolution 1244 and described in much more detail in the Rambouillet
accords. That is not only the precondition for having a genuinely
representative Kosovo voice at the table in any subsequent negotiations,
but also - as suggested above - for relieving the sense of drift and
frustration now evident, and dampening some of the inflammatory
momentum now developing,among ethnic-Albanians.
o The second step should be to establish a focal point for 1244’s “political
process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status”. The most obvious
candidate for that role is the “international meeting”contemplated by the
Rambouillet accords as occurring three years after those accords were
intended to come into force (if there had actually been an agreement
signed by all re l evant part i e s ) , i . e . in the fi rst quarter of 2002.
International meetings of this kind don’t normally come about until there
is some prospect of a useful purpose being served,but the setting of even
a notional date,and the process of even very preliminary preparation for
them, can be a very useful way of concentrating attention on issues that
might otherwise continue to drift: in international relations the urgent
always tends to drive out the important. A high powered working group
representing the key participants at Rambouillet itself - the Contact Group
states, Pristina and Belgrade - could certainly do much to explore and
clarify the issues,and it would be appropriate for such a meeting to occur
shortly after elected Kosovo representatives were in place. The issue of
which hat Belgrade’s representatives would wear - the FRY, Serbia or both
- is essentially immaterial, for reasons argued elsewhere.106
o The third step would be for consultations to occur - pre fe rably, but not
n e c e s s a ri ly, in the context of an anticipated international meeting of the
kind just described - on the principles that might constitute the fo u n d a t i o n s
for a final political settlement. The list of ge n e ral principles set out in
Chapter 2, and repeated at the outset of this ch a p t e r,might be a useful place
to start . Not all of them are bland or easy to apply : giving content to the
p rinciple of minority protection would not be easy in the pre s e n t
e nv i ronment either north or south of the Ibar Rive r, and the question of
b o rder ch a n ges - even by peaceful means and by agre e m e n t , as re q u i re d
(and allowed) by the Helsinki Final A c t1 0 7 - is always immensely sensitive .
Among the other matters that might be ex p l o red in such consultations are
the kind of “ t ru s t e e s h i p ”a rra n gements that might be part of a “ c o n d i t i o n a l
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i n d e p e n d e n c e ”solution (discussed further below as a future status option).
Yet another, w h i ch could prove quite pro d u c t i ve in moving the pre s e n t
situation fo r wa rd , is the possibility of a “ n e g a t i ve guara n t e e ” being gi ven to
the Ko s ovo Albanians to the effect that they would never again be subjected
to the uninvited presence on their soil of Serb military or police (or, go i n g
f u rther still, gove rnment) pers o n n e l : the idea is that it may ultimately be
easier to re a ch agreement about how things will not be than how they will
b e .
The border issue. This is like ly to arise in almost any conceivable fi n a l
settlement nego t i a t i o n , and it will be important to be clear from the outset
about the basic principles and issues invo l ve d . In Belgra d e ,c o n s i d e ration has
long been gi ven to partitioning Ko s ovo ,with eve rything north of the Ibar Rive r
going to Serbia;and it has often been suggested elsew h e re that a possible tra d e -
o ff for that might be control over the Pre s evo va l l ey of Southern Serbia,with its
i n c re a s i n g ly volatile ethnic-Albanian majori t y.
If it we re ever possible for Belgrade and Ko s ovo to re a ch agreement along these
lines - and that is a ve ry big if - then there would be no reason in principle fo r
the international community not to accept it. The Helsinki Final A c t , as just
n o t e d ,a l l ows such peaceful agre e m e n t s , and there would be no question here
of ethnic cleansing being rewa rded by terri t o rial gains. The big diffe re n c e
b e t ween Ko s ovo and Republika Srpska, for ex a m p l e , as we note in Chapter 8,
is that the current ethnic identity of Republika Srpska was ach i eved by an
attempted ge n o c i d e ,w h e reas Ko s ovo ’s ove r w h e l m i n g ly Albanian ch a racter wa s
a ch i eved in no such way, and long predated the conflict of the 1990s.
Agreement would certainly not be easy. The vast mining complex to the east
of Mitrovica in the north of Kosovo, famous since Roman times, has
traditionally been the basis for much of Kosovo’s economy, and has great
symbolic significance for both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. However badly
run-down the Trepca mine may be as a result of under-investment and over-
exploitation,and however unlikely its rehabilitation,108 it will not be given up
lightly. Similarly, the road through the Presevo valley has been seen for
centuries as Serbia’s lifeline to the Mediterranean: although the ethnic-
Albanians who live on the high ground alongside the road and rail line are
seen as capable of strangling it if lost to Serbian authority, this is more a
symbolic than a practical problem in the modern military age (when gun
emplacements on high ground do not quite have the immunity they might
have had in an age before aircraft).
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Facilitating Negotiations. If progress is to be made in bridging the present
gulf between Pristina and Belgrade,some international negotiating assistance
is going to be required. For the moment the head of the UN civil presence,
whose responsibility under Resolution 1244 this is, is showing no great
enthusiasm for the task. In any event,the United Nations may not be the best
vehicle for facilitating progress in a highly politically charged negotiation.
Although special representatives of the UN Secretary-General have done
important work around the globe and could lead such talks,the buy-in of the
major powers is really necessary if the talks are to have a chance of success,
and the P5 group of permanent members is not an easy institutional vehicle
to engage in an extended mediation. Neither is the EU ideally suited to
facilitate such a dialogue because the United States and Russia are not
institutionally represented. Talks could be better conducted under the aegis
of G-8 (which seems to have now largely superseded the Contact Group109 -
the G-8 less Japan and Canada) or the OSCE, with whatever decision is
ultimately reached being ratified by the Security Council.
The G-8 played an instrumental role in ending the 1999 conflict in Kosovo
and establishing the terms that were later codified as UNSCR 1244. Given its
membership,it is unlikely any agreement that this group could reach on final
status issues would be blocked at the level of the Security Council (China is
the only Security Council member who is not a G-8 member as well.) Because
the Russian Federation is a member of the G-8,Belgrade would likely feel that
its interests were well defended by the body facilitating such talks. Given the
rather elite basis of its membership,the G-8 would allow for a unique mix of
i n t e rnational authority on a small enough scale to avoid making
representation at the talks unduly cumbersome. Because the G-8 represents
the major industrialised economies,it would also be in a key position to wield
a sound balance of “carrots and sticks” to help bring the parties to an
agreement. Talks could be managed at the G-8 political directors level,with
the Foreign Ministers finalising any potential agreement. In helping to forge
UNSCR 1244 the G-8 pledged “to collaborate closely to ensure the United
Nations’success in carrying out its complex mission”. That complex mission
will not be completed until final status issues are resolved and the G-8 could
usefully again be called on to lend its good offices to helping promote
stability in the Balkans.
The OSCE has a far broader membership - not least in Europe itself - than the
G-8, and has taken a very active and credible role in monitoring and
mitigating sources of conflict in the region. It enjoys a wealth of practical
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field ex p e rience in the re gion combined with a broad institutional
perspective. The FRY was readmitted into its ranks on 10 November 2000.
Given the high stakes involved in peacefully resolving the final status issues,
OSCE member states clearly have a vested interest in taking a lead role. The
OSCE Secretary General could appoint a high level working group - whose
representation should include both the U.S. and Russia among its other
members - to facilitate final status talks between the entities that currently
make up the FRY. Given also that the OSCE can reach decisions by
“consensus minus one”, the FRY could also be prevented from playing a
purely obstructionist role by dint of its membership. Given the far ranging
membership of the OSCE, it is also unlikely that the UN Security Council
would block any agreement that it could successfully broker.
Future Status Options
In considering what could be the ultimate outcome of the kind of process
described above,there are four principal options that require consideration.
Maintaining the Protectorate Indefinitely. If Ko s ovo ’s current status as a
de facto international pro t e c t o rate we re to be maintained for the indefi n i t e
f u t u re , it would enjoy “ s u b s t a n t i a l ”a u t o n o my as well as the protection of KFOR.
The presence of NATO troops would help ensure that outbreaks of violence
we re containabl e , and Ko s ovo ’s democratic institutions would be gi ven gre a t e r
time to mature and deve l o p . The international community would gi ve civil
society in both Serbia and Ko s ovo longer to mature , and tamp down fe a rs in
Macedonia of the creation of a “ G reater Ko s ovo ” . “ C reating a new Cypru s ”t h i s
m ay be: but maybe some conflicts can be avoided in no other way.
But that is about as much as can be said for this approach. First,the notion
that avoiding resolution of final status issues is a sound approach to regional
security may be fundamentally flawed, as this report has argued. Neither
Serbia nor Kosovo will be able to operate as modern economies or political
entities without cl a rity being brought to their fundamental legal
u n d e r p i n n i n g s . In addition, l e aving these important political matters
unresolved may encourage extremism,with nationalists on both sides of the
debate seeing violence as the best means to achieve their aims within an
otherwise static environment. Further, continuing progress in “substantial
self-government”could well place Kosovo’s emerging democratic institutions
firmly at loggerheads with the UN civil administrator over time. Given the
UN’s performance to date in the province, it is also a fair question as to
whether its prolonged international management would be effective in
meeting the needs of Kosovo Albanians.
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In addition, i n d e finite extension of de facto pro t e c t o rate status would also ru n
d i re c t ly counter to the intentions of the authority that helped create the
i n t e rnational presence in Ko s ovo . Both the Rambouillet accords and UN
Resolution 1244 we re clear in articulating that they we re defining a tra n s i t i o n a l
p ro c e s s , not the creation of a fo rmal pro t e c t o ra t e . If the intern a t i o n a l
c o m munity tru ly wants Ko s ovo to indefi n i t e ly exist as a fo rmal pro t e c t o ra t e , a
n ew mandate is called fo r.
Autonomy within the FRY. What of the notion of re a ffiliating Ko s ovo and
Serbia - or Ko s ovo , Serbia and Montenegro - in a ve ry loose or “ t h i n ” fe d e ra t i o n
in which no significant sove reign powe rs would be exe rcised by the centra l
a u t h o ri t y, but the appearance of common sove reignty would be maintained?
While appealing to any number of We s t e rn fo reign ministri e s , it is fraught with
p ractical pro bl e m s . Unless UNMIK - backed by KFOR- we re to fo rce such an
a rra n gement on Ko s ovo , it is difficult to imagine that any majority of A l b a n i a n s
would ever accept such a deal on anything more than,at best,a short tra n s i t i o n a l
basis (which is how they see their present status) and pro b ably not even then.
For any UNMIK administrator to pursue an objective that contradicted the
wishes of most citizens of Ko s ovo in such a fashion would be rash as well as
u n d e m o c ra t i c . S u ch a move would also like ly create a significant back l a s h ,a n d
KFOR peaceke e p e rs could quick ly find themselves the object of attack s .
Full Independence. Full and unconditional independence for Ko s ovo
re m a i n s ,for all practical purposes,an end state that could only come as the re s u l t
of a larger pro c e s s ,s u ch as one detailed earlier in this ch a p t e r. No new unilatera l
d e cl a ration of independence would be like ly to win widespread re c o g n i t i o n ,
and there is cert a i n ly scant prospect that the UN Security Council, with Russia
and China among its permanent members , would recognise Ko s ovo as a
s ove reign state without there having been a broader understanding with
B e l grade as to the ground rules for such a “ d i vo rc e ” .
The argument that Ko s ovo would not be able to defend itself is irre l evant as a
p recondition for recognition as a sove reign state: t h e re are many other
independent states in that situation. But as a practical matter, that again limits its
f reedom of action: w h a t ever its final status, Ko s ovo will need intern a t i o n a l
s e c u rity guarantees for the indefinite future .
Conditional Independence. The option of Ko s ovo being gi ven this status
has been proposed by the Ko s ovo Commission,1 1 0 and it has been widely
seen - including by us - as an attra c t i ve outcome, not least gi ven the obv i o u s
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d i fficulties with each of the altern a t i ve s . But “conditional independence” i s
not a term with any previous pedigre e , and the Ko s ovo Commission itself
n ever seems entire ly clear whether the conditionality invo l ved is a matter
of preconditions having to be satisfied befo re sove reign independence is
re c o g n i s e d ; or of some continuing limitations or qualifications being
imposed on the extent to which sove reign independence can be enjoye d
even after re c o g n i t i o n ; or both.
T h e re is a good case for saying that Ko s ovo ’s recognition as a sove re i g n ,
independent state should be made conditional in three diffe rent way s :
o Fi rs t , the international community has a pro found interest in ensuri n g
the full protection of minority ri g h t s , and it is re a s o n able to insist that
p roper standards be met for a period of time befo re all the benefits of
i n t e rnational recognition (including membership of intern a t i o n a l
o rganisations like the UN, and access to international fi n a n c i a l
institutions and trade arra n gements and the like) are awa rd e d .
o S e c o n d ly, Ko s ovo could be re q u i red as a condition of recognition to
p e rm a n e n t ly renounce some kinds of action which would norm a l ly be
within the competence of a sove reign independent nation. While we
h ave described elsew h e re as ove rstated the fe a rs often ex p ressed that
independence for Ko s ovo would increase the threat of a “ G re a t e r
Ko s ovo ” , the international community would also be in a position to
re q u i re a binding commitment that it would not seek to expand its
re gional boundari e s .1 1 1
o T h i rd ly, and most fa r - re a ch i n g ly, a fo rm of trusteeship could be imposed
on Ko s ovo by the UN,under which , for the duration of that arra n ge m e n t ,
its gove rnment - while exe rcising all normal day to day gove rn m e n t
p owe rs , and not subject to either FRY or Serbian sove reign authority -
would be subject to the exe rcise of veto powe rs by the tru s t e e s h i p
re p re s e n t a t i ve , either at large or in certain defined are a s . The notion
h e re is that such powe rs would be exe rcised with a lighter touch than
under the present pro t e c t o rate arra n gements in both Ko s ovo and
B o s n i a , but in a way that retained ample leve rage for the intern a t i o n a l
c o m mu n i t y.
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Conclusions and recommendations on the future of the FRY
o The constitutional and legal stru c t u res of the FRY were neither intended
nor designed to meet the needs of any modern, democratic state.  The
i n t e rnational community needs to confront the reality that the status quo is
not sustainable; to identify processes that will move things forw a rd
c o n s t ructively for all three entities; and to find ultimate solutions that are
principled and consistent, and don’t make things worse, including within
the wider region.  
o In resolving final and future status issues for Montenegro and Kosovo
either the G-8 or OSCE could play a useful facilitating ro l e .
o The following guidelines should govern the overall process of democratic
dialogue between the part i e s :
- Contentious issues should be resolved exclusively by peaceful means
and without threats of violence.
- Negotiations on final status issues should be based on the rule of law
and conducted wherever possible within the emerging democratic
frameworks of these societies.
- Changes to established borders should only be made by mutual
a g reement.  Under no circumstances should ethnic cleansing be
re w a rd e d .
- The relationship between majority and minority populations within
any entity should be re c i p rocal and unconditional.  Full individual
rights and protection before the law should be guaranteed to the
m i n o r i t y, with respect paid to its collective identity and culture; the
m i n o r i t y, thus protected, owes the larger entity respect for both its laws
and its identity.
- The international community should play an active role in advancing
political status and rights issues, including by hosting and facilitating
talks, and also by offering economic incentives and, where appro p r i a t e ,
security guarantees.
o The international community should not discourage Montenegro fro m
seeking independence, instead it should help Montenegro and Serbia find a
mutually satisfactory basis for their new re l a t i o n s h i p .
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o For Kosovo 
- The first step must be to establish with no further delay a full system of
democratic and autonomous self-government within Kosovo.
- The second step should be to establish a focal point for 1244’s
“political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status” in the
f o rm of an “international meeting” as contemplated by the Rambouillet
a c c o rds.  
- The third step would be for consultations to occur - pre f e r a b l y, but not
n e c e s s a r i l y, in the context of an anticipated international meeting of
the kind just described - on the principles that might constitute the
foundations for a final political settlement.
o The most appropriate of the options for Kosovo’s status as determined in a
final political settlement may be “conditional independence”.
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PART III.
BOSNIA, CROATIA, MACEDONIA
AND ALBANIA 
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7.  BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Bosnia is still burdened by the legacy of war and trapped by the contradictions
of the Dayton Peace Agreement.  Since 2000, the international community has
been more active in building up Bosnia’s state institutions and breaking down
the influence of nationalist extremists.  But, even with more cooperative
g o v e rnments now at state and Federation levels, more vigorous enforc e m e n t
m e a s u res remain necessary for Bosnia to achieve stability.  Eff e c t i v e l y
implementing a landmark Constitutional Court ruling may be the key to
achieving a smoother transition to a more viable post-Dayton govern a n c e
s t ru c t u re - built not around the entities, but stronger central plus community-
sensitive local institutions.
A. Introduction
Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth “Bosnia”) in its present form was
n e gotiated into existence by the country ’s nominal, Muslim-led but
internationally recognised government and its two powerful neighbours,
Croatia and Serbia,at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton,Ohio in
November 1995. The negotiations were forced forward by the United States,
with re p re s e n t a t i ves of the European Union acting in support . T h e
representatives of the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats were subsumed in
the delegations of their ‘mother’countries,and were not effective parties to
the Dayton Peace Agrement (DPA),signed the following month in Paris. The
DPA created a state with one weak central government,a strong Serb “entity”
(Republika Srpska), a tenuous Bosniak (i.e. Muslim) and Croat entity (the
Federation), populated overwhelmingly by these two groups), and three
“constituent peoples”(Bosniaks,Serbs and Croats). The Federation is further
subdivided into ten “cantons”,each enjoying substantial powers.
Ultimate authority in Bosnia lies with the NATO-led Stabilisation Force
(SFOR) and the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the latter being
responsible for implementing the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace
A gre e m e n t . The High Repre s e n t a t i ve can impose measure s , i n cl u d i n g
l e gi s l a t i o n , w h i ch have been bl o cked or rejected by Bosnia’s ow n
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legislatures.112 The OHR is assisted by a range of international organisations,
including the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH),the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the European
Commission.
Since 1995, the international community has devoted more than $5 billion to
re c o n s t ru c t i o n , p e a c e keeping and establishing functioning institutions in
B o s n i a . This effo rt has brought a number of successes. Bosnia has many new
ro a d s ,s ch o o l s ,h o s p i t a l s ,b ri d ge s ,h o u s e s ,and power lines. NATO ’s presence has
e n abled the military disengagement of the opposing fo rces in Bosnia and
p revented further confl i c t .
P ro gress has been made in creating some of the common institutions and the
a t t ributes of a common state. Bosnia now has a central bank and common
c u rre n c y,ve h i cle licence plates,p a s s p o rts and state symbols. The EU’s Customs
and Fiscal A d v i s o ry Office (CAFAO) has made pro gress in re fo rming the
customs serv i c e , and seve ral key laws have been passed and are slow ly being
i m p l e m e n t e d , i n cluding those relating to citizenship, t e l e c o m mu n i c a t i o n s ,
f reedom of info rm a t i o n , and pro p e rty (crucial for re f u gee re t u rn s ) .1 1 3 R e f u ge e
re t u rns as a whole, although still far below desired leve l s , appear to be on the
u p sw i n g .1 1 4 The Office of the High Repre s e n t a t i ve is making gradual headway
with re fo rms in education, election campaign fi n a n c i n g , re s t ru c t u ring the
b roadcast media and creating economic tra n s p a re n c y. The long-delaye d
p ri vatisation pro c e s s , although still burdened by corru p t i o n ,a p p e a rs fi n a l ly to
be moving fo r wa rd , accompanied by other financial sector re fo rm s .
These successes have one thing in common: the international commu n i t y
d rove them thro u g h ,p o l i t i c a l ly and fi n a n c i a l ly. B o s n i a ’s stability still depends
on international support because, w h a t ever it’s fo rm , it is still divided in
substance into three ethnically defined systems with large ly separa t e
i n s t i t u t i o n s , s e rv i c e s , c u l t u res of info rmal powe r, p a t ro n age and corru p t i o n .
This re n d e rs the state politically and economically unwo rk abl e .
Within this fra m ewo rk , B o s n i a ’s nationalist politicians have pre s e rve d
c o n s i d e rable populist appeal,often paying little more than lip service to Day t o n
while bl o cking the provisions that threaten their own powe r. O p e rating in a
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q u a s i - p ro t e c t o ra t e , local officials enjoy the luxury of posturing befo re citizens
without being held accountable for avoiding the difficult re fo rms needed to
b ring the country through the double transition out of war and commu n i s m .
On the contra ry, these elites have devoted their energies over the last fi ve and
a half ye a rs to thwa rting re fo rm . What the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)
c o n cluded in May 2000 could have been said at any time since Dayton wa s
s i g n e d : “ n a rrow nationalistic and sectarian political interests have impeded
eve rything from re f u gee re t u rn to economic re fo rm to the functioning of
gove rnment institutions.”1 1 5
Fru s t ration at the lack of fundamental pro gress has led some intern a t i o n a l
c o m m e n t a t o rs to propose international disengagement or outright partition as
the most realistic routes to stab i l i t y. These appro a ches would risk undoing all
the gains to date and potentially tri g ger re n ewed confl i c t . The intern a t i o n a l
c o m munity must use the enfo rcement mechanisms granted by the Day t o n
A greement to strengthen Bosnia’s central institutions while re d u c i n g
b u re a u c ratic laye rs and eroding the power base of factions that oppose the
d evelopment of a functioning, d e m o c ratic state and the re i n t e gration of
B o s n i a ’s ethnic commu n i t i e s . Sooner or later the re p re s e n t a t i ves of these
c o m munities will have to replace the Dayton gove rning stru c t u res with
something more viabl e ,but this will only be pro d u c t i ve after a longer period of
v i go rous Dayton implementation.
Table 13.  Bosnia at a glance 
*World Bank Atlas methodology.
Source: The World Bank;Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
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GNP per capita*:$920
Population:3.8 million
E l e c t i o n s : Municipal elections held on 8 Ap ril 2000,
fo l l owed by 11 November 2000 elections fo r
representatives at the state level parliamentary assembly
and entity parliamentary assembly level, and cantons
within the federation. Presidential elections due before
September 2002.
Presidency: Elected in September 1998, two members
changed in March 2001. Beriz Belkic (Bosniak), Zivko
Radisic (Serb), Jozo Krizanovic (Croat).
High Representative:Wolfgang Petritsch
116  See Interview with the Minister of Defence of Republika Srpska,“Neka bude smena”, Reporter, 26 July 2000,p. 11.
B.  Security
Fi ve ye a rs after Day t o n , Bosnia faces no significant ex t e rnal securi t y
t h re a t s , but its long-term stability is threatened by the continu e d
existence of separate armies (two on paper, t h ree in practice) within its
b o rd e rs .
The current Fe d e ration A rmy consists of an uneasy alliance fo rmed in
1994 between the A rmija BiH and the Croat Defence Council (HVO ) ,n ow
subsumed as the Bosniak and Croat components of the Fe d e ration A rmy.
These components operate in para l l e l , re flecting the ori gins of the HVO
in the early 1990s as an extension of the Croatian A rmy (HV), d i re c t e d
f rom Zagre b . Last ye a r ’s ch a n ge of gove rnment in Croatia (coupled with
that country ’s pressing economic difficulties) has led Zagreb to ex p re s s
n ew - found respect for Bosnian sove reignty and cut off of its funding to
Bosnian Croat separa t i s t s .
N eve rt h e l e s s , the desertion of substantial nu m b e rs of Croat soldiers fro m
the Fe d e ration army in March 2001, at the “ re q u e s t ” of the so-called Cro a t
National Council (HNS), d e m o n s t rates the continued links between the
nationalist political parties and the arm i e s . This political control stems
f rom the control of financial re s o u rces and the ability to pay salari e s . T h e
HNS has re p o rt e d ly offe red to pay Croat soldiers who agree to leave their
Fe d e ration barra cks a monthly salary of 500 German Mark s . The ability of
the HNS to establish parallel stru c t u res shows how mu ch the
i n t e rnational community still has to do in terms of limiting the ability of
nationalist parties to control public reve nu e s .
D e m o c ratic ch a n ges in Serbia have yet to push the A rmy of Republ i k a
Srpska (VRS) into some fo rm of a unified command stru c t u re . Within the
R e p u blika Srpska, civilian and military officials are unanimous in their
d e fence of the inalienable right of Serbs to maintain a separate military.1 1 6
The VRS continues to re c e i ve funding and material from Belgrade while
being dire c t ly linked to the Yu go s l av army chain of command. Yu go s l av
P resident Kostunica has openly championed the nationalist aspirations of
the separatist Serb Democratic Pa rty (SDS) in Bosnia. G i ven such a
dy n a m i c , it will be difficult to engage the VRS in more unified military
s t ru c t u res without significant international pre s s u re on both Republ i k a
Srpska and the Fe d e ral Republic of Yu go s l avia (FRY) to ch a n ge their
way s .
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The existence and potential ri va l ry of three separate armies that we re at
war a few ye a rs ago re p resents an ongoing security ri s k , as does the
c o n t i nued presence of persons potentially indictable for war cri m e s
within their ra n k s .1 1 7 Under international guidance, B o s n i a ’s militari e s
h ave alre a dy begun the process of significant fo rce re d u c t i o n s , and this
e ffo rt should be intensifi e d . In addition to regular military units, t h e
i n t e rnational community must address the security threat of ab o u t
15,000 special police troops under the entity Ministries of Interi o r.
Disbanding para m i l i t a ry organisations should be seen as an integra l
c o n fidence building measure within this pro c e s s . T h reats and violence
against re t u rning re f u gees and displaced persons also continu e .
E x t remists - often funded and organised by political parties - still bomb
and torch the homes of re t u rning re f u ge e s . Police and the judiciary,
often powerless or sympathetic to the political goals of ex t re m i s t s , d o
not provide sufficient pro t e c t i o n .1 1 8 Pa rt of the responsibility lies with
the UN’s International Police Task Fo rce (IPTF), w h i ch has failed in
l a rge measure to fulfil its mandate to create pro fessional local police
fo rc e s . The fact that a number of individuals allege d ly invo l ved in
“ethnic cl e a n s i n g ” c o n t i nue to serve as offi c e rs is sufficient indication
of the local police’s willingness to provide security for minori t y
re t u rn e e s .1 1 9
In 2000, over 400 incidents against minorities throughout Bosnia we re
re p o rted to the IPTF.1 2 0 With the re c o n s t ruction of re t u rnee homes in the
S re b renica and Bijeljina mu n i c i p a l i t i e s , the Republika Srpska witnessed
an upsurge in re t u rn - related violence, i n cluding the burning of more than
ten re t u rnee homes, mob violence, bomb attack s , beatings and a
mu rd e r.1 2 1 Violence directed against minorities at the end of last ye a r
o c c u rred twice as fre q u e n t ly and at more seve re levels in the Republ i k a
Srpska than in the Fe d e ra t i o n , with the majority of incidents in the
Fe d e ration occurring in Cro a t - m a j o rity are a s . In both Srpska and Cro a t -
m a j o rity re gi o n s , the presence of indicted war criminals in the police
fo rce and the continued existence of para m i l i t a ry org a n i s a t i o n s
intimidate minority re t u rn e e s .1 2 2
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SFOR has often failed to provide adequate protection to re f u gee re t u rn e e s
in hard-line are a s . Italian and Russian units stood by while mobs attacke d
m e m b e rs of minorities in Janja and Bra t u n a c . All these fa c t o rs have
combined to prevent greater nu m b e rs from re t u rning to their homes,
while cementing the results of wa rtime “ethnic cl e a n s i n g ” and the hold of
the ethnic-cl e a n s e rs on powe r. The establishment of a U. S . A rmy base in
B ra t u n a c , announced in early 2001, should improve the security situation
for re t u rnees to that area of eastern Republika Srpska. W h e rever wa r
c riminals have been appre h e n d e d , re f u gee re t u rns have later accelera t e d .
The IPTF must re d o u ble its effo rts to establish a pro fessional police fo rc e ,
and SFOR must provide maximum protection to re t u rnees and appre h e n d
war cri m i n a l s .
For the time being, d e p l oyment of a large-scale international securi t y
p re s e n c e ,i n cluding NATO fo rc e s , remains essential to keep the peace. N o
re s p o n s i ble exit stra t e gy can be framed befo re the fundamental and
s t ru c t u ral sources of insecuri t y, i n cluding constitutional arra n ge m e n t s ,
h ave been addre s s e d .
C.  G o v e rn a n c e
The international architects of the Dayton A greement seem to have hoped
that the entity stru c t u re would facilitate reconciliation among the
“constituent peoples” over time. H oweve r, the hope behind the DPA , a n d
the reality in today ’s Bosnia, a re quite diffe re n t . The nationalist parties have
a lways had another view of Day t o n . For them, the Dayton stru c t u re s
l e gitimised their war-time terri t o rial gains and supported the ethnic
s e gregation of Bosnian politics and society. Bosnia still consists of thre e
s u b s t a n t i a l ly mono-ethnic systems, with separate education, health care ,
p e n s i o n s ,p ower ge n e ra t i o n ,c o m mu n i c a t i o n s ,m i l i t a ry and police.
C o n s e q u e n t ly the central gove rnment is virt u a l ly powe r l e s s , and serves as
little more than a fi g u re h e a d . The entities we re granted virtual statehood
under the Dayton constitution, with strong sway over internal affa i rs , t h e
maintenance of separate armies and the collection of reve nu e , and have
assumed powe rs even more sweeping over time by large ly ignoring the
c e n t ral gove rn m e n t . U n fo rt u n a t e ly, the Constitutional Court , ch a rged with
resolving disputes between central gove rnment and entities, l a cks any
m e chanism to enfo rce its ru l i n g s .
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The Role of the International Community
The only Dayton mechanism capable of ensuring viable state institutions is
the intern a t i o n a l ly appointed High Repre s e n t a t i ve , the final authority in
t h e a t re to interpret the civilian aspects of the peace agre e m e n t . Thus the
functioning of the central gove rnment and the protection of many of the
rights of Bosnia’s citizens depend on the ability and willingness of the OHR,
along with other international org a n i s a t i o n s , to use their Day t o n - p re s c ri b e d
p owe rs . This applies ab ove all to SFOR, w h i ch is authorised to support
civilian implementation tasks, b u t ,n o t o ri o u s ly, is not obl i ged to do so.
For mu ch of the past fi ve and a half ye a rs , the international community has
been loath to exe rcise its powe rs ,p re fe rring to negotiate with the stro n ge s t
p a rt i e s , w h i ch had an interest in obstructing the central gove rnment and
re f u gee re t u rn , and maintaining the status quo. The continued ability of
these nationalists to finance themselve s , their para m i l i t a ry and military
s t ru c t u res through patro n age and corruption means they have been fa r
better equipped to obstruct than the international community has been to
ove rcome their effo rt s . G e nuine re fo rm will not come without
u n d e rcutting these vested intere s t s , by :
o eliminating political party control over pension funds, p u bl i cly - ow n e d
e n t e r p ri s e s , the judiciary, the civil service and police;
o t racing the funding mechanisms and patro n age netwo rks of nationalist
political part i e s , i n cluding illegal monetary fl ows and links to bl a ck
m a rket activities, and enabling the local judiciary to prosecute corru p t
o ffi c i a l s ;
o implementing a multi-ethnic state border service and other institutions
to ensure the collection of reve nues directed to support state
i n s t i t u t i o n s ;
o a greater willingness on the part of international organisations to use the
sweeping powe rs that they have been mandated to counter these
individuals and part i e s ; and 
o boosting international security effo rts to support the ICTY, i n cl u d i n g
a c c e l e rated arrests of indictees.
After four more or less timid years, however, an international strategy
emerged in 2000 to build up Bosnia’s central institutions and undercut the
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nationalist parties.124 This new strategy has been signalled by OHR actions
earlier in the year. Recognising that the state of Bosnia cannot function
without dependable revenue, and that control of the borders by the three
nationalist regimes supports the financing of parallel institutions, the High
Representative imposed a law creating a state border service in January 2000.
The Bosnian parliament had earlier failed to adopt the law due to significant
o b s t ruction from the Serb delegates.1 2 5 H oweve r, owing to lack of
international financial support,the new border service has taken control of
only a few of Bosnia’s 420 road border crossings.
In February 2001,the High Representative also established a special auditor
for the Cantons of the Federation,with the authority to conduct full financial
reviews of any institutions, ministries, companies, government agencies and
“extra-budgetary funds established by law”.126 According to the OHR, the
auditor will bring much needed transparency to the collection, custody and
expenditure of public revenues. The auditor has the authority to unravel
many of the illegal connections exploited by extremist political parties.
Companies closely connected to the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) and
Pa rty of Democratic Action (SDA ) , s u ch as Aluminj in Mostar and
Elektroprivreda in Sarajevo, as well as special funds such as those ostensibly
for war veterans should be targets for early investigation.
The international auditor must also focus on ministries and publ i c
c o m p a n i e s , wo rking with the existing gove rnmental Supreme Au d i t
Institution of the Federation. Given the deep roots of Bosnia’s patronage
system, the auditor will need expert staff and strong support of all other
international actors to be effective. Unfortunately, the absence of such an
auditor in the other entity raises questions about international resolve to
clarify the financing structures of the SDS, and their links to Serbia.
Appointing an auditing institution in the Republika Srpska should be an
urgent priority for the OHR.
The imposition of the state border service law and appointment of the special
auditor we re two examples of the OHR’s incre a s i n g ly pro a c t i ve ro l e . S o m e
h ave criticised this appro a ch as a “ c reeping pro t e c t o ra t e ” . R a t h e r, the OHR -
sometimes backed by SFOR - appears to be using these robust enfo rc e m e n t
m e a s u res as a means to the right end: n a m e ly, the creation of legitimate and
self-sustaining stru c t u res that could surv i ve international disengage m e n t .
140 AFTER MILOSEVIC
127  “Bosniaks,Croats,and Serbs,as constituent peoples (along with Others),and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina hereby
determine...”The General FrameworkAgreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,Annex Four (“Constitution of Bosnia
and Herzegovina”),Preamble.
128  The Federation Deputy Minister of Justice remarked to ICG that in the Federation alone,about 3,000 laws would have to be
amended to abide by the Constitutional Court decision.
The Constitutional Court Decision
The Bosnian constitution provides for a Constitutional Court of six Bosnian
and three international judges with jurisdiction to determine if entity laws
and constitutions are in violation of Bosnia’s constitution. In February 1998,
the Court was asked to scrutinise fourteen provisions of the Republika Srpska
constitution and six provisions of the Federation constitution for compliance
with the Bosnian constitution. These provisions dealt with the political and
legal concept of the “constituent peoples”of Bosnia,as well as portions of the
Republika Srpska constitution implying the sovereignty and independence of
that entity. While the Bosnian constitution defines Serbs,Croats,Bosniaks and
others as having equal rights,the disputed clauses of the entity constitutions
grant the Serbs a privileged status in Republika Srpska, while Croats and
Bosniaks are likewise privileged in the Federation. 127
After a highly politicised 28-month process of deliberation,the Constitutional
Court ruled that these provisions of the entity constitutions were indeed in
violation of the Bosnian constitution because they failed to grant equal status
to Serbs in the Federation and to Bosniaks and Croats in Republika Srpska.
This ruling strikes at institutional discrimination in law,education,the police,
the work place and the provision of basic social services. While it does not
question the existence of the entities,it challenges their ethnically weighted
structures. First, the entity constitutions would have to be amended. In
principle,the structure of the entity parliaments would have to be changed,
as well as the voting procedures,since rules about who can vote and run for
office were ethnically defined in a prejudicial manner. Secondly, numerous
entity laws would also have to be reviewed and changed in light of the new
equal status of all three ethnic groups within the entities.128 For example,
Federation courts, under the entity constitution,“shall have equal number of
Bosniak and Croat judges. Others,too, should be represented appropriately
at each of those Courts.” But if Serbs have the same status as Bosniaks and
Croats in the Federation, this provision would likely also be deemed
unconstitutional.
In the long term , the re fo rms entailed by the Court decision should make
the institutions and gove rning stru c t u res of the two entities more similar,
with a broad unifying effe c t . This in turn would set the stage for the
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129  To avoid these commissions holding up legislation,they would have three days to reach judgement on proposed legislation,
after which the High Representative would determine the outcome. OHR,Decision establishing interim procedures to
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Predictably, the Commissions missed the March deadline.
e m e rgence of post-Dayton constitutional stru c t u re s . H oweve r, as noted,
the Constitutional Court lacks enfo rcement mechanisms to back its
d e c i s i o n s . E n fo rcement depends on the will of the entity gove rnments to
recognise the court ’s authority and comply with the provisions - an
u n l i ke ly outcome gi ven the power of nationalist part i e s . By Ja nu a ry
2 0 0 1 , a full six months after the decision, the entities had taken no action
on it.
At this point the High Repre s e n t a t i ve intervened and establ i s h e d
Constitutional Commissions in the Republika Srpska A s s e m bly and
Fe d e ration House of Repre s e n t a t i ve s . E a ch commission consists of sixteen
m e m b e rs - four Bosniaks, four Cro a t s , four Serbs, and four “ o t h e rs ” - selected
by the OHR. The Commissions we re tasked to pre p a re proposals by 15
M a rch 2001 for revising the entity constitutions. In addition, t h ey wo u l d
h ave power to rev i ew and bl o ck entity legislation that might be judge d
d i s c ri m i n a t o ry.1 2 9
Election Results and a Constitutional Crisis
The State. The fi rst chance to judge public reaction to the more ro b u s t
i n t e rnational agenda of state-development and to the end of the Milosev i c
e ra came in November 2000, when ge n e ral elections gave a majority in the
state parliament to a coalition of moderate part i e s , the “Alliance fo r
C h a n ge ” . The Alliance duly fo rmed a central gove rnment without any of the
main nationalist part i e s . Bosnia is now gove rn e d , for the fi rst time, by
p a rties appare n t ly dedicated to the we l fa re of the whole country. T h e
Alliance also gove rns one of Bosnia’s two entities, the Fe d e ra t i o n ,w h i ch had
h i t h e rto been run as a condominium of Bosniak and Croat nationalist
p a rt i e s , the SDA and HDZ.
The existence of non-nationalist gove rning coalitions at state and
Fe d e ration levels may re p resent a turning point, but only if the A l l i a n c e ,
b a cked by the international commu n i t y, can ove rcome nationalist
o b s t ru c t i o n . For international pre s s u re was instrumental in fo rming the
A l l i a n c e , and nationalist majorities retain the power to obstruct pro gress in
the Fe d e ration (at both entity and cantonal levels) and in the Republ i k a
S r p s k a .
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Table 14.  Main Political Parties in Bosnia  
The Federation. In the Federation, the Alliance government faces an even
more dramatic challenge than at the state level. This challenge is led by a
grouping of hard-line Croat parties,led by the HDZ and calling itself the Croat
People’s Assembly (HNS). On 3 March, the HNS declared withdrawal from
Federation structures and the formation of “Croat self-government”, linking
Croat-majority cantons and municipalities, and parallel structures in areas
where Croats are outnumbered by Bosniaks.
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Political Party
Republika Srpska
Serb Democratic Party (SDS)
Party for Democratic Progress
(PDP) 
Serbian Radical Party (SRS)
Socialist Party of Republika Srpksa
(SPRS)
Federation 
Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) in
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Party of Democratic Action (SDA)
SDP (Social Democratic Party) 
NHI (New Croat Initiative)
Alliance for Change
Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina
(SBiH)
HNS (Croat People’s Assembly)
Political Affiliation
Hard-line nationalist party. Won the
Presidency and Vice-Presidency posts
in Republika Srpska. Pa rt of the
governing coalition.
Moderate party led by Mladen Ivanic.
Nationalist parties wo rking ag a i n s t
implementation of DPA.
Right-wing Croat nationalist part y,
founded by party of same name in
Croatia.
Bosniak (Muslim) nationalist party, led
by Alija Izetbegovic.
SDP is led by current Foreign Minister
Zlatko Lagumdzija.
NHI is a Croat centrist party, led by
former HDZ leader, Kresimir Zubak.
The Alliance for Change is a coalition
led by these two parties.
Mainly Bosniak party led by long-time
Fo reign Minister Haris Silajdzic,
campaigns under slogan “For a Bosnia
without Entities”.
Grouping of Croat nationalist parties,
led by HDZ.
130  This rule altered the method of election to the Federation Parliament’s House of Peoples,a body designed to protect the
“vital interests”of ethnic groups. See ICG Balkans Report No. 106, Turning Strife to Advantage:A Blueprint to Integrate
the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 15 March 2001.
This decision had been brewing since July 2000, when HDZ hard-line war
ve t e rans such as Ljubo Cesic-Rojs, S t a n ko Sopta and Slobodan Pra l j a k
strengthened their positions in the party, leading in September 2000 to the
defection of the pragmatic Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic. The defeat of HDZ
in Croatia had not moderated the sister party in Bosnia.
The development which more than any other had angered the HDZ was an
October decision by OSCE (still responsible for elections) to adopt new rules
and regulations for the November elections. The changes were somewhat
transparently designed to undermine the nationalist parties’ ability to control
membership of the Federation House of Peoples (the upper chamber) and
the appointment of Federation leaders.130 The HDZ exploited concerns
among Croats to whip up electoral support. Their campaign was marked by
dire warnings about the extermination of Croats in Bosnia,and culminated in
a “referendum” on their status. The HDZ was opposed by more moderate
Croat parties such as the New Croat Initiative (NHI),and in some instances
by the Catholic Church hierarchy, but it won an overwhelming majority of
Croat votes, above all in western Herzegovina.
The HDZ attempted to thwart the formation of governments led by the
Alliance for Change,accusing it of being “anti-Croat”,since it did not include
the party with the majority of Croat votes. The cynical partnership between
nationalists from all three groups surfaced again in February 2001, when
Bosnia’s three-person presidency, all from nationalist parties,nominated HDZ
member Martin Raguz as prime minister of the country. This was rejected by
parliament,which was dominated by the Alliance for Change coalition.
Eventually, the Serb and Bosniak members of the presidency agreed to back
the Alliance nominee,Bozidar Matic,a Croat in the SDP. The HDZ announced
it would boycott parliament. It also delayed the formation of a Federation
government by refusing to participate in naming representatives to the
Federation House of Peoples. When it lost the struggle to block a non-
nationalist government in Sarajevo,it pulled out of the Dayton structures. The
High Representative responded to HDZ leader Ante Jelavic’s declaration by
removing him from his post as the Croat member of Bosnia’s presidency and
banning him from further public political activity.
In this context,it is clear why the Alliance for Change has openly appealed for
international assistance in combating the influence of extremist political
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parties. The Alliance recognised that Bosnia can only function within the
Dayton framework with the full use of the High Representative’s powers. But
Alliance members also set conditions for their compliance. A key member of
the coalition, Haris Silajdzic made it clear that his Party for Bosnia and
Herzegovina (SBiH) would withdraw if the international community did not
vigorously implement Dayton by setting deadlines for the return of refugees
and displaced persons, the functioning of state institutions, and economic
reforms 
The crisis precipitated by the HDZ reflects both the structural flaws in the
Dayton settlements,and the belated success of the international community
in undermining nationalist power bases. The ease with which the HNS has
formed the structures of self-government in western Herzegovina reflects the
fact that parallel Bosniak and Croat budgets and administrations already
existed,but the international community never mustered the political will to
dismantle them.
As for the international success, there are several reasons why the Croat
nationalist leadership in Bosnia was more threatened by the OHR’s pro-active
implementation than the Bosniak or Serb leaderships. First, the Croat
community is by far the smallest of the three “constituent peoples”. Secondly,
it is not protected by size (as the Bosniaks are) or by its own entity (as, in
effect,the Serbs are). Thirdly, the changes in Croatia in early 2000 brought an
end to the flow of financial and political support from Zagreb. Lastly, the HDZ
had been losing ground in mixed communities in central and northern
Bosnia. Unlike in the Croat heartlands of western Herzegovina, where civil
s e rva n t s , p u blic companies and customs authorities supported the
declaration of 3 March 2001, it is reported that none of the Croat police in
the Central Bosnian canton have withdrawn from the multi-ethnic police
force. In addition, while several thousand HVO troops in Mostar and Vitez
readily abandoned Federation barracks at the HNS behest,Croat forces in the
Posavina region (northern Bosnia) announced they would remain in the
Federation army.
Against this background,the party’s bold declaration of “self-government”was
cl e a r ly a stra t agem to pre s e rve the existing parallel institutions in
Herzegovina (“Herzeg-Bosna”) while unifying the party and forcing out the
moderates. The HDZ’s indifference to protecting Croat rights throughout
Bosnia was seen by the fact that the Croat judge in the Constitutional Court
dissented (albeit under pressure) from the decision. The HDZ also refused to
participate in naming representatives to the recently created Constitutional
C o m m i s s i o n s , even though these bodies we re designed to addre s s
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131  “OSCE Condemns SDA Walkout Threat”,OSCE Mission to Bosnia press release,Sarajevo,30 Mar ch 2001.
132  See War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska , 2 November 2000.
discrimination against ethnic groups and individuals. In this, the HDZ was
true to the record of nationalist opposition to measures that would define the
concept and delimit the application of national rights.
So far, the main Bosniak nationalist party has not followed the HDZ into
boycotting government bodies which it cannot influence. But this may yet
happen. On 30 March 2001, SDA Vice President,Sulejman Tihic, threatened
that his party would consider withdrawing from the state and Federation
parliamentary bodies if its demands for a share of leadership positions were
not met.131
Republika Srpska. Discontent among Bosnia’s Croats has been fuelled by
the abysmal lack of progress in Dayton implementation in Republika Srpska,
and the fact that the international community has consistently applied a more
lenient standard in that entity.
Backed by the Kostunica government in the FRY, the SDS won the presidency
and vice-presidency in the Republika Srpska,and the largest number of seats
in the entity parliament. Although the international community threatened to
cut aid to Republika Srpska if the SDS was allowed to participate in the
government,the OSCE, SDS and Mladen Ivanic,leader of the moderate Party
for Democratic Progress (PDP), quietly agreed that government ministers
from the SDS would declare themselves as independent “experts” rather than
members of any party. Also,as a result of the April 2000 municipal elections,
the SDS controls the majority of municipalities in Republika Srpska.
Under threat of losing international aid,the SDS announced it would use its
position in government to support Dayton, facilitating minority return and
implementing property laws. Yet the leading political parties in Republika
Srpska continue to act whenever possible as if their entity were a sovereign
state next door to Bosnia, rather than a unit within Bosnia. Both Kostunica
and several Bosnian Serb politicians have gone as far as to suggest that eastern
Republika Srpska would have to join Serbia if Kosovo were to become
independent.
T h roughout the Republika Srpska, p o t e n t i a l ly indicted war cri m i n a l s
continue to influence and control political and economic life,particularly on
the municipal level,where many of them are police chiefs,mayors, municipal
councillors and directors of public companies.132 Under their tutelage, the
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R e p u blika Srpska continues to oppose fulfilling the most elementary
conditions of Dayton, while still blatantly opposing most efforts to increase
refugee return and implement property laws.
The March 2001 signing of a parallel relations agreement between Yugoslavia
and Republika Srpska highlighted the fact that this entity remains politically
oriented more towards neighbouring Serbia than towards the Bosnian state.
While the DPA allows for such agreements,it is ironic that Kostunica and the
new Republika Srpska government chose to sign such an agreement just as
Croatian authorities were deciding to provide support for Bosnia’s Croats
exclusively through the mechanisms of the state.
In any case, the international community must begin to hold the Republika
Srpska and FRY authorities accountable for implementing Dayton. Under the
previous government, led by Milorad Dodik, the international community
provided support for the Republika Srpska, despite its poor record, not
wanting to put political pressure on another “moderate”administration. This
mistake must not be repeated. Continued aid should be strictly set to
concrete benchmarks, particularly in refugee return and support for central
institutions. At the same time, the FRY and Serbian governments must be
pressured to develop trade and other relations with Republika Srpska
through the state of Bosnia.
D.  Human Rights
While the Dayton agreement and the Bosnian constitution provide a
framework for protecting human rights, politicised institutions, frequent
disrespect for the rule of law and rampant corruption present major
challenges to enforcement. Individuals not in the current “majority” group,
especially returning refugees, are subject to systematic discrimination in
terms of education, employment and a range of other social and economic
and rights. These problems are particularly acute in parts of the Republika
Srpska and Cro a t - m a j o rity areas in the Fe d e ra t i o n . Although the
Constitutional Court decision on constituent peoples and a number of laws
imposed by the High Representative have begun to chip away at the legal
f ra m ewo rk of official discri m i n a t i o n , the full implementation of these
decisions will require continuous effort from the international community.
Bosnia’s judiciary and police suffer from persistent political interference.
Despite some progress in unifying Bosniak and Croat elements of the police
and courts,and integrating the police forces,ethnic divisions cut through the
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133  Update of UNHCR’s Position on Categories of Persons from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Need of International Protection,
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134  The Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF) coordinates the international support for the return of refugees and
displaced persons in Bosnia. Comprising the OHR,UNHCR,OSCE,UNMIBH,SFOR,the World Bank and other international
organisations,the RRTF has proven to be one of the most successful practical efforts at international coordination in the
Balkans.
135  See ICG Balkans Report No. 95, Bosnia’s Refugee Logjam Breaks:Is the International Community Ready?, 30 May 2000.
136  “2000-Minority Returns:The Highest Number Since Dayton”, UNHCR Press Release, 6 February 2000.
justice system. Last year, the OHR imposed a law creating a state-level court,
w h i ch had not existed prev i o u s ly, and the international community has been
wo rking cl o s e ly with local courts and police to promote their
i n d e p e n d e n c e . S eve ral crucial steps in this re g a rd we re taken in 2000. T h e
L aw on Judicial Serv i c e ,s e c u ring a greater independence of the judiciary is
n ow in place in both entities. In addition, the material status of judges and
p ro s e c u t o rs has been substantially improve d , reducing opportunities fo r
c o rru p t i o n . An eighteen-month vetting process of judges and pro s e c u t o rs ,
aiming for full compliance with pro fessional standard s , has been applied
since June 2000 in both entities.
The right of re f u gees to re t u rn to their pre - war homes and re claim their
p ro p e rty remains the most pressing human rights issue. The war cre a t e d
about 1.3 million intern a l ly displaced people and 1.2 million re f u gees (in a
total population of 4.3 million), and increased re t u rns are fundamental to
e s t ablishing a stabl e , d e m o c ratic society.1 3 3 The international commu n i t y
waited four ye a rs to seri o u s ly pre s s u re and enable local authorities to
s u p p o rt the re t u rn of displaced populations, in fact discouraging re t u rn by
a l l owing displaced populations to vote in their current places of re s i d e n c e .
(And after ye a rs of living in ethnically separate encl ave s , it seems logical that
B o s n i a ’s populations have been slow to drop their support for nationalist
p a rties.) 
S i g n i ficant pro gress has, h oweve r, been made through the Reconstru c t i o n
and Return Task Fo rc e1 3 4 and the inter-agency Pro p e rty Law Implementation
Plan (PLIP). The year 2000 saw a bre a k t h ro u g h ,i n cl u d i n g , albeit margi n a l ly,
in hard-line political re gi o n s . In a May 2000 re p o rt , the ICG called attention
to an unprecedented level of spontaneous re t u rn , that is re t u rn without
i n t e rnational assistance,p a rticular in parts of Republika Srpska where re t u rn
had prev i o u s ly been non-existent or negligi bl e .1 3 5 The main success story,
h oweve r, is Middle Bosnia in the Fe d e ra t i o n , w h e re significant re t u rns and
p ro p e rty repossessions have now taken place, local SDA and HDZ offi c i a l s
h ave moderated their positions, d e m o n s t rating the positive political effe c t s
of minority re t u rn . N eve rt h e l e s s , c o n c e rns that international donations fo r
re c o n s t ruction we re insufficient to support the level of interest in re t u rn
we re re i t e rated by UNHCR at the end of 2000 in a call for increased donor
s u p p o rt .1 3 6
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137  Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina,Priorities for 2001, Human Rights Coordination Centre,5 February 2001
138  Human Rights Quarterly Report,May 15-August 31,2000,Human Rights Coordination Centre,a cooperative effort of OHR,
OSCE,OHCHR,UNMiBH,and UNHCR within the Office of the High Representative.
While there is ground for optimism,Annex Seven (“Agreement on refugees
and displaced persons”) of Dayton is still far from fulfilment. First of all,the
country-wide rate of 20 per cent for the processing claims for return of pre-
war pro p e rty re flects a mu ch higher success rate in specific are a s .
Meanwhile, the level of implementation remains almost negligible in HDZ-
controlled areas of Herzegovina and in parts of eastern Republika Srpska.
According to members of the RRTF, the rate of property law implementation
can be expected to slow down again, as the easiest cases have now been
resolved. At the same time,the international community must address some
of the more systemic social and economic issues which continue to
discourage return or render it unsustainable. These include lack of access to
educational opportunities and employment, administrative discrimination
against returnees,unequal access to the privatisation process.
In addition, the donor community should be prepared to continue, if not
increase, support for housing reconstruction. Such continued support is
justified by the fact that recent political developments as well as the success
of the PLIP, have finally made the implementation of Annex Seven more than
a remote possibility.
The general reluctance of local authorities to respect the rule of law has been
most vividly demonstrated in their failure to implement property laws and
procedures for reclaiming housing abandoned during the war. While
continuous pressure by the international community has produced gradual
improvement,only 20 per cent of claims filed with local housing authorities
have resulted in a resolution for the pre-war occupant.137 Housing authorities
in Croat-controlled areas such as west Mostar, Capljina, Stolac, Drvar and
Glamoc,and in eastern Republika Srpska,have the worst records in property
law implementation, well below 10 per cent. 138
The basic difficulties which minorities face in reclaiming their property are
compounded by the fact that re t u rnees are denied equal access to
employment, health care, pensions, education and other social rights upon
return. Pupils study under three separate,ethnically defined curricula, with
returnee children often segregated from the dominant ethnic group. The
Republika Srpska Minister of Education and Croat Federation Minister of
Education recently blocked the implementation of an education agreement
providing for all schools in the country to devote 40 hours per year to
common modules on language, literature, culture and culture of religions.
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143  See ICG Balkans Report No. 64, Why Will No-one Invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina?, 21 April 1999.
Although the Ministers had agreed to the measures earlier, t h ey re n e ged on
their earlier commitments, a rguing that such a harmonisation of curri c u l a
would harm their ethnic identities.1 3 9
Freedom of the media and ex p ression in Bosnia continues to be hampered by
p e rsistent politicisation and the intimidation of journ a l i s t s . In the second half
of 2000,the OSCE’s free media help line re c e i ved 39 cases of incidents ag a i n s t
j o u rn a l i s t s , sixteen involving explicit thre a t s . The most disturbing aspect of
these data is that since the hotline began operation in November 1999, t h e
highest number of perpetra t o rs we re local gove rnment or party offi c i a l s .1 4 0
The OSCE has done other good wo rk in assisting the pre p a ration of media
l e gislation and building journ a l i s t s ’ a s s o c i a t i o n s . The OHR, m e a n w h i l e , h a s
l a u n ched and ove rseen the highly complex transition of the state-contro l l e d
b roadcasting netwo rks into public service bro a d c a s t e rs for both entities and -
to the dismay of all three nationalist re gimes - for Bosnia as a whole. These are
essential institution building pro j e c t s , extending the fro n t i e rs of Day t o n
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . T h ey will take ye a rs to complete, and indeed never will be
completed without strong and sustained international support .
Tra ffi cking in women for prostitution is another serious human ri g h t s
p ro bl e m . From May to August 2000, 43 women we re re p a t riated to Moldova ,
R o m a n i a ,U k ra i n e ,B e l a rus and Serbia,h aving been freed from va rious bars and
c a fes during local police ra i d s .1 4 1 U s u a l ly local police only carry out such ra i d s
under the insistence of IPTF. Most of the women we re lured from Eastern
E u rope with the promise of legitimate wo rk , o n ly to arri ve and have their
p a s s p o rts confiscated by bar ow n e rs . B o s n i a ’s police and judiciary have been
unwilling or unable to bring those re s p o n s i ble to justice.
E.  E c o n o m y1 4 2
B o s n i a ’s economy is in dire stra i t s , and deeply dependent upon donor support .
We re it not for direct and indirect donor ex p e n d i t u re - which may account fo r
as mu ch as 25 per cent of official gross domestic product (GDP) - economic
growth would pro b ably be negative .1 4 3 The fact that the Fe d e ra t i o n ’s incre a s e
in GDP over the previous year slowed from 51.9 per cent in 1997 to 10.6 per
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cent in 1999 indicates a correlation between declining economic growth and
the decrease in donor support . I n d u s t rial production is also slow i n g , a s
i m p o rts outpace ex p o rts in the Fe d e ration and Republika Srpska by ab o u t
t h ree to one.
A c c o rding to official statistics, u n e m p l oyment in the Fe d e ration was 39 per
cent in November 2000, with 412,799 employed and 265,971 unemploye d .1 4 4
As more than 52,000 employees are on “ waiting lists” for defunct state-ow n e d
e n t e r p ri s e s , actual unemployment in the Fe d e ration runs to some 47 per cent,
although significant business activity in the “ grey ” m a rket still takes place.1 4 5
The ave rage wage , about $208 a month, remains slightly lower than the
ave rage cost of a basket of necessary products for a household.1 4 6 E ven more
disturbing is the fact that only about 5,000 additional jobs we re cre a t e d
b e t ween 1999 and 2000, a 1 per cent incre a s e .1 4 7
In the Republika Srpska, w h e re data is mu ch more difficult to come by, t h e re
a re offi c i a l ly 157,026 unemployed re gi s t e red with the Employment Bure a u .
This amounts to an official unemployment rate of ro u g h ly 40 per cent. I n
re a l i t y, the Republika Srpska fi g u re may run as high as 60 per cent.1 4 8 T h e
ave rage monthly wage in the Republika Srpska is about $130.1 4 9
Bosnia continues to be an unattra c t i ve investment cl i m a t e , s u ffe ring fro m
s t rangling bure a u c ra c y, ex c e s s i ve ly high taxe s , c o rru p t i o n , a slow ly re fo rm i n g
financial system and a wholly inefficient legal system.1 5 0 Another major obstacl e
to successful pri vate investment is the ex t re m e ly porous nature of Bosnia’s
b o rd e rs ,w h i ch places all legal business operating in Bosnia’s highly taxed and
h e av i ly regulated business climate at a distinct competitive disadva n t age . T h e
p ro blem lies in large part with police, customs agents and politicians at the
highest levels invo l ved in bl a ck market dealings. In October 2000, then Pri m e
Minister of the Fe d e ration and SDA politician,Edhem Bicakcic, signed a wa i ve r
d ropping legal ch a rges and customs duties against the ow n e rs of about 900
c a rs ,w h i ch had been smuggled into the Fe d e ration using fo rged papers . T h e
High Repre s e n t a t i ve was fo rced to annul this decision and censure the Pri m e
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M i n i s t e r, in a Ja nu a ry 2001 decision.1 5 1 The corrupt and selective monitoring of
B o s n i a ’s border constitutes a major loss of reve nue for the central gove rn m e n t
and contributes to its ge n e ral ineffe c t i ve n e s s .
The active invo l vement of officials in illegal activities has also contributed to an
e nv i ronment conducive to the tra ffi cking of women for prostitution and large -
scale smuggling of high tari ff goods such as cigare t t e s , we a p o n s , and dru g s ,a s
well as illegal aliens. B o s n i a ’s inability to control its own bord e rs has bro a d
economic and social re p e rcussions that undermine its ve ry viability as a state.
At the end of 2000, the High Repre s e n t a t i ve imposed a series of necessary
economic re fo rm measures in both entities, relating to pensions, t h e
e m p l oyment bure a u x , social security for the unemploye d , l aws on pay m e n t s
and financial operations in the Republika Srpska and amendments to the
Fe d e ration laws on Wage Tax and Contri b u t i o n s . Additional significant re fo rm
will be needed to stimulate inve s t m e n t , c reate jobs, and curb the corru p t i o n
that is crippling the country ’s economy.
P ri vatisation has been slow, f raught with corruption and disappointing in its
re s u l t s . This is large ly due to two fa c t o rs : a poorly designed pri va t i s a t i o n
p ro gram and obstruction by Bosnian politicians. In ge n e ra l , p ri va t i s a t i o n
unaccompanied by meaningful stru c t u ral re fo rms will only solidify the contro l
of political elites over economic assets, as it has alre a dy done in a number of
c a s e s .
Because of the skewed political control over the pro c e s s ,p ri vatisation of publ i c
e n t e r p rise to date has ove r w h e l m i n g ly favo u red the majority ethnic group in
a ny particular are a , m o re specifi c a l ly consolidating the power of nationalist
p a rties controlling pri vatised companies. A revolving door between elected
o ffice and management in public or pri vatised companies continues to be the
n o rm in Bosnia. Recent cooperation between the U. S . A gency for Intern a t i o n a l
D evelopment and the German Gesellschaft f_r Te ch n i s che Zusammenarbeit
h ave shown promise for a more coherent and rapid pri vatisation appro a ch .
The international community has been successful in re fo rming pay m e n t s
b u re a u x .1 5 2 This effo rt culminated on 5 Ja nu a ry 2001, when a new pay m e n t
s y s t e m , via commercial banks, b e g a n . To ensure a smoother transition to this
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s y s t e m , the High Repre s e n t a t i ve imposed three new laws in Republika Srpska
and two amendments to laws in the Fe d e ra t i o n .1 5 3 I ro n i c a l ly, this success
o c c u rs against the back d rop of the impending fa i l u re of seve ral of Bosnia’s
p rincipal commercial banks, w h i ch service the majority of businesses in the
re l a t i ve ly pro d u c t i ve Tuzla re gi o n . This may, in turn , s e ri o u s ly affect the
c o u n t ry ’s few healthy businesses.
The seve re economic dow n t u rn , n e g a t i ve GDP growth and cuts in donor
assistance may ge n e rate sustained social unre s t . Pensions are months in arre a rs
and social discontent has alre a dy burst into the open, with demonstra t o rs
re g u l a r ly bl o cking highways and buildings. C o n t i nuing stag n a t i o n , p a rt ly
caused by the para lysing and unsustainable complex of gove rning stru c t u re s ,
could also ultimately undermine the fragile ach i evements in implementing the
D PA .
F. Beyond Dayton?
Should the international community persevere with its efforts to implement
difficult aspects of the peace accords, reckoning they will overcome Bosnia’s
disintegrative forces in the end? Should the extreme measure of simply
walking away from Bosnia be contemplated? If not,has the time at least come
to seriously consider other solutions,such as partition,or revising the whole
Dayton constitutional structure? 
While it has been possible for some time to argue that Dayton has been
failing,154 to claim that the agreement has simply“failed”would be premature,
since for the first four years the international community did not try hard to
make it work. Initial fumbling in implementation was exacerbated by the
reluctance to arrest indicted war criminals and tackle parallel structures and
their funding sources. Equally important,if less spectacular, was the lack of
international attention to building up the central organs and competencies of
the state. Not until 2000 did the international community shift the burden of
its expectations from the entities to the state level.
But there are glaring flaws in the agreement,and they are partly responsible
for Bosnia’s continuing fragility. Insofar as it accommodated the separatist
aims of two signatories, and the nationalist exclusivism of all three, Dayton
provides great scope for obstructing the common institutions of the state.
The devolution of authority from a dysfunctional state to a nearly sovereign
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Republika Srpska has been the aim of the SDS Serbs. Meanwhile, the HDZ
Croats counted on the further devolution of power from a toothless Bosniak-
Croat Federation to ethnically determined cantons.
Outspoken criticism of the Dayton structures has become increasingly
common among international officials and local politicians, both in Bosnia
and in neighbouring Croatia. This new frankness should be welcomed. In
this section, we review some of the more obvious structural problems with
the DPA,and discuss the various options for moving forward.
The Problems
Too many levels, too many borders. Thirteen of Bosnia’s various levels
of government have their own constitutions and the authority to pass major
legislation:the state,the two entities,and the ten Federation cantons. Two of
the cantons contain parallel Bosniak and Croat governing structures. In
Cantons Seven and Nine, a level of government exists between the Canton
and the municipality, the “cities”of Mostar and Sarajevo.155 There are at least
181 ministers serving a population of approximately 3.5 million.
The pro blems caused by this density of gove rning stru c t u res are
compounded by the problem of internal borders. The Washington, Dayton
and other agreements have confi rmed entity, cantonal and mu n i c i p a l
boundaries drawn according to the logic of “ethnic cleansing”,i.e. intended
to define ethnically homogeneous voting blocks. Many areas previously
linked by geography, natural resources,trade and other economic factors now
suffer the social and economic consequences of arbitrary separation.
As one example, until 1992, a group of about 20 municipalities gravitated
toward Sarajevo, drawn by education, employment opportunities and trade.
Four of these municipalities, closest to the centre of the town, now form a
political unit:the “city”of Sarajevo. Likewise,these four municipalities,plus
six others, form the “canton”of Sarajevo. Others of these 20 municipalities
are now Bosniak-majority municipalities in the Bosniak-Croat Middle Bosnian
Canton,while yet others have Croat majorities and orient themselves toward
Travnik,Zenica or Mostar. Gorazde is a separate canton essentially consisting
of a single municipality. Finally, many of the municipalities formerly oriented
toward Sarajevo,such as Pale and Sokolac now belong to Republika Srpska. A
number of pre - war municipalities have been split by the inter-entity
boundary line (IEBL) dividing the Federation from the Republika Srpska.
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G i ven the saturation of political stru c t u res with ethnocentric prov i s i o n s , t h e
s t rength of ethnically-based patro n age , the weakness of central authority and
the illogic of internal bord e rs , Bosnia is both ungove rn able and economically
u n s u s t a i n abl e .
A ny new constitutional arra n gements should abolish mono-ethnic veto powe r
within the central organs of state, reduce bure a u c ra c y, and also consider
solutions that allow re gions to cooperate according to economic and social
fo rc e s , rather than ethnic ge rry m a n d e ri n g . Recent moves by the OHR to
c reate a Sara j evo Economic Region across current canton and entity lines,
a ck n ow l e d ge that re - e s t ablishing shattered economic links is a sensible way to
ove rcome divisions imposed by violence. With this idea in mind, s o m e
p rominent local politicians have suggested that an independent team of local
and international ex p e rts (law ye rs ,e c o n o m i s t s , ge o gra p h e rs) should conduct
a study to establish cri t e ria for determining municipal and cantonal
b o u n d a ries according to natural and economic fa c t o rs . Implementation of this
idea could fo rm one element of adequate re fo rm of the Dayton arch i t e c t u re .
Powers of the Entities. Under the current stru c t u re , Bosnia is at the merc y
of the entities and even of the cantons. Under the constitution, d o m e s t i c
policy devo l ves to the entities, i n cluding law enfo rc e m e n t , education and
s eve ral other competencies not ex p l i c i t ly assigned to state institutions.
B eyond their powe rs to gove rn intern a l ly, the entities have the right to enter
into parallel relations with neighbouring states, and into other types of
agreements with other states and international org a n i s a t i o n s . In the
Fe d e ra t i o n , the cantons enjoy almost equivalent powe rs .
Under the current gove rning stru c t u re , the fi rst obstacle to an empowe re d
c e n t ral gove rnment is the collection of taxes and control of finances by the
entities and cantons. While the Dayton constitution provides for the state to
d e t e rmine “customs policy”, the international community has only re c e n t ly
begun to empower the central gove rnment in this re g a rd . As long as entity
customs administrations collect these reve nu e s , the state budget will remain a
h o s t age of entity go o dw i l l .1 5 6
Besides the challenge that the entities - and their separate armed forces - pose
to the sovereignty of the country of which they are parts, the Republika
Srpska has a negative effect on the perceived position of Croats. As long as
the Serbs have“their”entity, the Croats will view the Federation as a Bosniak
domain in which they are a threatened minority.
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Calls to abolish the entities have found no significant international support,
and any moves in that direction would unite the Republika Srpska in
defiance. The simplest way for the international community to erode the
abuse of entity prerogatives is by pushing refugee return. Other than that,
rigorous implementation of the recent Constitutional Court ruling on the
“constituent peoples” would - as further discussed below - dismantle the
ethnic bias of entity institutions. Eventually, if a single economic space can
be created in Bosnia, the population should come to see that economic
development,and all that goes with that,depends on turning the entities into
symbols,or empty shells.
“Vital Interests”. The vague notion of “vital interests”, with regard to
Bosnia’s three main national communities, has been given fatal authority by
the Dayton Agreement. In the state constitution,“a proposed decision of the
Parliamentary Assembly may be declared to be destructive of a vital interest
of the Bosniak, Croat, or Serb people by a majority of, as appropriate, the
Bosniak, Croat or Serb Delegates”.157 The content of these interests is
nowhere defined. In practice, elected members of one or another political
party have obstructed legislation required for the benefit of all Bosnians, on
the ground that it would violate the “vital interest” of one or another
nationality.
Such confusion is also exploited at the level of the Federation, where, for
example,the construction of a road was recently blocked on the ground that
it violated a vital interest.158 During the recent deadlock between the
presidency and the parliament on the selection of a prime minister for the
central government,Ante Jelavic claimed that by refusing to back the HDZ
candidate, the parliament was harming Croat “vital interests”, since the
majority of Croats voted for the HDZ.
Also, this provision relegates Bosnia’s “Others” (those who do not identify
themselves as Bosniaks, Serbs or Croats) to second-class rank; not only are
they hostages to the nationalist parties’ conception of “vital interests”, they
also lack the means to assert “vital interests”of their own.
The successful exploitation of these concepts by nationalist politicians points
to people’s genuine fear for their ethnic security. Any future constitutional
arrangements must address these fears. The future lies in a system with strong
protection of individual rights, that acknowledges the need for ethnic
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security without yielding, as Dayton unfortunately does, to the supposition
that ethnic groups have objectively competing and mutually exclusive
interests.
“ Vital intere s t s ” should be ex p l i c i t ly and narrow ly defi n e d , re l a t i n g , fo r
instance to questions of language and education. The International Ta s k
Fo rc e , appointed by the OHR to guide the entity Constitutional
C o m m i s s i o n s , has suggested the fo l l owing re a s o n able defi n i t i o n : “ t h e
capacity of the Constituent Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
O t h e rs to maintain and develop their culture and to pre s e rve the essential
elements of their identity, n a m e ly their re l i gi o n , l a n g u age , t ra d i t i o n s , a n d
c u l t u ral heri t age ” . In addition, n ew permanent bodies within the state
parliament and the Republika Srpska, akin to the Constitutional
C o m m i s s i o n s , could ensure that laws we re neither discri m i n a t o ry, n o r
t h reatening to the “vital intere s t s ” of any gro u p . These bodies should be
competent to rev i ew legislation which may be discri m i n a t o ry or violate
individual human ri g h t s . The Constitutional Court would have juri s d i c t i o n
to stri ke down laws in violation of these pro t e c t i o n s , as well as to decide on
the content and limits of vital intere s t s .
The Options
Withdrawal. Bosnia’s nationalist forces have been counting on the fact that
the international community will not stay in Bosnia forever, seeking to
preserve their war gains until the international commitment waned beyond
the point of being able to undermine them. This waiting game has been
predicated on the assumption that SFOR, OHR and other international
agencies would never make full use of their Dayton powers to weaken the
nationalist hold.
Disengaging from Bosnia would be a drastic move with equally drastic
consequences. It would represent an intolerable admission of failure in
combating the forces of nationalism and communal hatred. Following such a
step,Bosnia could well revert to conflict and violent partition.
International disengagement could encourage Serbian nationalists in Belgrade
to press Bosnia’s Serbs to hold a referendum on secession. The result of a pro-
secession referendum among Bonsia’s Serbs would likely be positive. Such a
result would evoke a strong response from the Bosniaks, who would view
secession as a violation of Bosnia’s territorial integrity, the legitimation of
“ethnic cleansing”, and a breach of the DPA. A Bosniak military response
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could not be ruled out,particularly since Serb secession would include taking
a number of cities that had a Bosniak majority prior to the atrocities of 1992,
such as Zvornik,Srebrenica,Visegrad, Foca,and Vlasenica.
In sum, p re m a t u re withdrawal would carry high social, p o l i t i c a l , economic and
m i l i t a ry costs. It would re p resent a loss of the monetary and human re s o u rc e
i nvestment of the international community to date. Fi n a l ly,pulling out of Bosnia
would amount to a final acceptance of ethnic cleansing and the ab a n d o n m e n t
of the idea that the international community has a moral obligation to pro t e c t
human ri g h t s . The belated intervention of 1995 would be exposed as futile.
E ven if conflict we re avo i d e d ,l o n g - t e rm re gional instability would ensue, w i t h
Bosnia becoming a haven for criminal activity and, quite possibly, t e rro ri s m .
Partition. The destruction of Bosnia by fo rc i ble partition was the purpose of
the Serb attack that started the war in 1992. C roat fo rces later joined in,
intending to coerce the Bosniaks into a small encl ave in central Bosnia. The end
of hostilities did not put paid to Serb and Croat bl u e p rints for part i t i o n ,i nvo l v i n g
the secession of parts of Bosnia and their annexation to the Croatian and Serbian
“ m o t h e r l a n d s ” . A d vocates of this position usually argue that a single Bosnian
state is unwo rk able for whatever historical or national reasons so the existing de
facto partition should be ra t i fi e d .
The notion that partition would produce re gional stab i l i t y, still propounded by
local ex t remists and a few international pundits, is fundamentally fl awe d .
Pa rtition would only complicate the pro blem of attempting to ensure re f u ge e s
and displaced persons had the right to re t u rn home. P re s u m ably, a part i t i o n
would mean that Bosniaks from eastern Republika Srpska and Herzegov i n a ,
C roats from central Bosnia, and Serbs from any w h e re but eastern Republ i k a
Srpska would have to abandon hope of re t u rning to their homes. From both a
m o ral and legal pers p e c t i ve , this would be unacceptabl e .
F u rt h e r, the suggestion that Bosnia can be neatly carved along ethnic lines does
not confo rm to demographic reality even after the wa r. G i ven the signifi c a n t
p o ckets of va rious ethnicities, a ny partition would tri g ger further clashes ove r
t e rri t o ry and population move m e n t s .
By destroying the hope of a democra t i c , multi-ethnic Bosnia, and potentially
fo rcing the Bosniaks into a mini-state surrounded by a greater Serbia and Cro a t i a ,
the international community would not only rewa rd the war aims of Tu d j m a n
and Milosev i c . It would also run the risk of radicalising a fo rm e r ly secular
population of Bosniak re f u ge e s , with gri evous consequences for re gi o n a l
s e c u ri t y.
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Moreover, the partitionist agenda has been dropped by neighbouring Croatia.
At a roundtable of Bosnian Croat and Croatian experts and politicians held in
February 2001, shortly before the declaration of “Croat self-government” in
Mostar, the Croatian participants (who included President Stipe Mesic)
agreed that Bosnian Croats must look to Sarajevo and defend Croat interests
throughout Bosnia, not in terms of some ethnically pure enclave.159 The
reality is that Croatia is no longer willing to finance the separatist aims of
Bosnian Croats.
The situation in Republika Srpska is quite different, with FRY President
Kostunica apparently supporting the separatist Bosnian Serb SDS and linking
the final status of Kosovo with the status of Republika Srpska. While some
have expressed concern that resolving Kosovo’s final status on terms
acceptable to its Albanian population will spur Serb separatism in Bosnia,the
two cases are wholly unlike. For a start, if all the refugees and displaced
persons from the territory of Republika Srpska were able to return home,the
entity would have only a slender Serb majority. The current ethnic identity of
Republika Srpska was achieved by an attempted genocide,whereas Kosovo’s
overwhelmingly Albanian character was achieved in no such way, and long
predated the conflict of the 1990s.
Beyond that,international law and precedent are clear that a region such as
the Republika Srpska has no vested authority to pursue its sovereignty. In
contrast, both UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Rambouillet
A c c o rds (which 1244 re fe rences) made clear that the intern a t i o n a l
community would play a role in resolving Kosovo’s status,and that this effort
would include an expression of the will of the people of Kosovo, such as a
referendum,and the development of substantial self-government over time.
Rewriting Dayton: A New Governance Structure? Although there has
been no shortage of frustration with the present two-entity constitutional
structure,there has been to date very little serious or sustained debate about
what could replace it that would be acceptable in principle, capable of
winning strong international support, and have some chance of ultimate
political acceptance - if not in the present highly charged climate - by the
different communities.
The only proposal for potentially democratic revision of the Day t o n
agreement that has gained any currency inside and outside Bosnia goes by the
name of “cantonisation”. The idea was first floated in the early 1990s by
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liberal-minded Bosnian Croats. Its best known advocate since Dayton has
been Haris Silajdzic, whose SBiH party campaigns under the slogan “For a
Bosnia without Entities”:the proposal is to drop the entities and form cantons
similar to those in the current Federation, across the entire territory of
Bosnia.
Any proposal which involves bypassing the entities in favour of a stronger-
state plus-community-sensitive local institutions has obvious attractions,but
there are some real problems with this one. The most obvious are
straightforwardly political. First, Republika Srpska politicians have become
the loudest defenders of the Dayton structure, realising that any alternative
arrangement will reduce the quasi-sovereign attributes of their entity. No
leadership of the Republika Srpska in the present climate could be expected
to support an erosion of their remarkable prerogatives. Secondly, there is no
sign at present of the international community having the collective will to
tackle the entity problem head on.
The more substantive problem is that Bosnia’s existing cantons are part of the
problem and not a model to be emulated. Under the Washington Agreement,
w h i ch created the Fe d e ration in 1994, the cantons have their ow n
constitutions, executive branches and legislatures. They establish cantonal
police,determine education and housing policy,run public-service media,and
most significantly collect their own revenues. It is through these powers that
the Bosniak and Croat elements of the Federation maintained de facto
separate institutions.160
Accordingly, an effective option for reform would eliminate the Federation
cantons as a level of governance, on the grounds that they needlessly
encumber the operation of a small state, siphoning revenue from the
municipalities below and the central government above.
There is a variation on the cantonisation proposal, however, that deserves
further serious discussion, even if the climate is not now conducive to its
implementation. Units akin to the pre-war “okruzi”(literally, circles) could be
established in place of cantons. Still in place in the Republika Srpska, the
o k ruzi are loose re gional groupings serving a pri m a ri ly administra t i ve
function. They include a level of the judiciary between the municipalities and
the entity. While Federation cantons would be in effect demoted, the
Republika Srpska okruzi could be elevated somewhat by the devolution of
some government powers.
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Below this level, the municipalities could exercise greater power. Major
policy would be created by the central government,but municipalities would
collect their own revenue and resolve existential issues on the local level.
With political decisions affecting citizens’ everyday lives being made by their
municipality and not by the entity or canton government, voter attention
could be focused more towards existential and less towards ethnic issues.
Working within Dayton. Maintaining and applying the Dayton agreement
in its present form in perpetuity is not a credible option. A full-scale
international protectorate of the kind now in place, with governmental
powers so undemocratically concentrated in an unelected international
official,and with such a major commitment of resources involved, is simply
not sustainable in the long term,either in principle or practice. International
impatience at the snail’s pace of political progress is increasing,especially in
the U.S. As already indicated,Bosnia’s disintegrationists have always believed
- and they are right - that the international community is not prepared for an
indefinite commitment to guarantee Bosnia’s overall security, subsidise post-
war reconstruction and build up core institutions.
That said, how can one reconcile this reality with - as just argued - the
impossibility of the international commu n i t y ’s now withdrawing fro m
Bosnia,the unacceptability of the partition,and the unachievability,at least for
the time being, of a radical new governance structure for the country? The
answer is to continue to work within the existing Dayton framework for the
time being, but enforce it even more vigorously than has been the case in
recent times.161
The primary purpose in this period of more vigorous implementation must
be to implement fully the integrative aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement,
particularly refugee return and the strengthening of central institutions,while
a p p lying the same standard to all part i e s , based on their concre t e
performance. Some of the most urgent and crucial tasks are finally abolishing
the system of dual financing within the Federation,162 and the further
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centralisation of border and customs policy leading as soon as possible to a
single,central,state-level customs administration.163 While working within the
current framework,the OHR and Bosnia’s elected governments can begin the
structural adjustments that will both highlight the points where the Dayton
framework must be reformed,and also set the stage for a smoother transition
to a post-Dayton arrangement.
The real key for getting out of the Dayton trap with minimal disruption lies
in robust implementation of the Constitutional Court ruling in the
constituent peoples’case. As noted in the discussion of this case earlier in this
chapter, the High Representative has now established two Constitutional
Commissions to assist him in this respect. It is crucial that they now come
up with appropriate reform proposals - and that if they do not, the High
Representative be prepared to act anyway to bring the entities’constitutions
and laws in line with the Constitutional Court’s 2000 ruling.
The International Task Force appointed by the OHR to guide the commissions
has proposed certain amendments,demonstrating the types of change which
the ruling must entail. In Republika Srpska, removing clauses which define
the entity exclusively as a Serb homeland will not be sufficient. Clauses will
have to be added which mandate that non-Serbs “are fairly well represented
in the Government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at every level,
including in the public administration,the law enforcement agencies and the
judiciary”.164 Logically, the very name of the entity may come into question.
In addition,some permanent body for the protection of the “vital interests”of
Croats,Bosniaks and “Others”will have to be created in the Republika Srpska.
Whether this should involve establishing a body akin to the House of Peoples
in the Federation,or turning the temporary Constitutional Commission into a
permanent body, is open to debate. In both entities, the concept of “vital
interest” should be better defined in any new constitutional changes, as
discussed above.
Much legislation will require revision in both entities. In Republika Srpska,
this would include laws mandating that there be a certain percentage of non-
Serb ministers. In short, the international community must make it clear to
Bosnia’s Serb politicians that their entity will no longer be tolerated as a
t e rri t o ry outside Bosnia, w h i ch pri v i l e ges Serbs and systematically
discriminates against other groups.
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Tackling the institutionalised discrimination in the Republika Srpska will be a
crucial element in building confidence inside the Croat community that it has
a promising future in Bosnia. In this context, the implementation of the
Constitutional Court decision is of central importance to helping the
country’s transition into a post-Dayton arrangement. Given the inevitability
of an eventual revision of Dayton,Bosnia’s Serbs must realise that their entity
can only survive over the long term if it changes radically.
In tandem with driving through changes to the entity constitutions, the
international community should ensure that the administrative capacity of
the state government is expanded so the state can play a coordinating role
between the entities on economic policy, law enforcement, refugee return
and other issues. These competencies we re fo reseen by the Day t o n
agreement but never developed in practice. With the change in the
composition of the central government, such capacity-building is now
possible. The same holds for the creation of a single economic space. Apart
from strengthening integrative dynamics, this is absolutely essential for
economic sustainability.
With the Alliance for Change running the state and Fe d e ration gove rn m e n t s ,
Bosnia has for the fi rst time a group of leaders actually interested in making
the system wo rk . It is not unrealistic to hope that when Dayton has been
h o n e s t ly and compre h e n s i ve ly tri e d , with effe c t i ve international support ,a n
i n d i s p u t able case for stru c t u ral re fo rm will be able to be made to, and by, t h e
i n t e rnational community and local leaders . W h a t ever final constitutional
settlement emerge s , it will re q u i re the consensus of Bosnia’s major ethnic
gro u p s . So long as disintegrationist parties such as the SDS and HDZ are abl e
to dominate the political re p resentation of Serb and Croat “ i n t e re s t s ” , a
dialogue on post-Dayton stru c t u res cannot begin in earn e s t . T h e
i n t e rnational community can play a major role in shaping the conditions fo r
lasting peace in Bosnia, as elsew h e re in the Balkans, not least here by
s y s t e m a t i c a l ly undermining the power and authority of the ex t re m i s t
n a t i o n a l i s t s , but ultimately the future of the country lies in the hands of its
own people.
Conclusions and recommendations on Bosnia 
o The international community must use more vigorously the enforc e m e n t
mechanisms granted by the Dayton Peace Agreement to strengthen Bosnia’s
central institutions while reducing bureaucratic layers and eroding the
power base of factions that oppose the development of a functioning,
democratic state and the reintegration of Bosnia’s ethnic communities.
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o The integrative aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement must be vigoro u s l y
implemented, particularly refugee re t u rn and the strengthening of central
institutions, while applying the same standard to all parties, based on
their concrete perf o rmance.  
o The implementation of a single, unified, multi-ethnic customs agency
under central government control, and the final abolition of the system of
dual financing within the Federation, are urgent priorities.
o Working within the cur rent framework, the OHR and Bosnia’s elected
g o v e rnments - controlled, for the first time, by anti-nationalist parties -
can begin the structural adjustments that will both highlight the points
w h e re the Dayton framework must be re f o rmed, and also set the stage for
a smoother transition to a post-Dayton arr a n g e m e n t .
o While building Bosnia’s central institutions, the High Repre s e n t a t i v e
must use his authority to eliminate political party control over pension
funds, publicly-owned enterprises, the judiciary, the civil ser vice and
police; trace the funding mechanisms and patronage networks of political
p a r ties; and enable the local judiciar y to prosecute cor rupt officials.  
o The OSCE, OHR, UN and all other international agencies in Bosnia,
under the direction of OHR, must develop a detailed plan for pushing the
full implementation of the Constitutional Court decision on the
constituent peoples of Bosnia.  In part i c u l a r, the OSCE should
investigate voting rules and governing stru c t u res which violate the
d e c i s i o n .
o The logical end-point for re f o rm of the Dayton stru c t u re would be a
s t rengthened central government, replacement stru c t u res for the cantons
( resembling the pre-war “okruzi”) with reduced fiscal and administrative
powers), and municipalities with enhanced powers.  The constitution
and laws would provide strong protection of individual rights while
acknowledging people’s need for ethnic security without, however,
reflecting the supposition, as Dayton does, that ethnic groups have
objectively competing and mutually exclusive intere s t s .
o The international community must hold the Republika Srpska and the
F RY or Serbian authorities accountable for implementing Dayton and the
i n t e rnational community must put pre s s u re on both the Republika Srpska
and FRY governments to sever the militar y links between Republika
Srpska and Belgrade.  
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o The High Representative should appoint a special auditor for Republika
Srpska, equipped with an expert staff, to uncover money flows that continue
to support nationalist parties.  
o The international community must address the systematic social and
economic factors which continue to discourage refugee re t u rns, including
lack of access to educational opportunities and employment, administrative
discrimination against re t u rnees and unequal access to the privatisation
p rocess.  
o I n t e rnational donors should increase assistance to Bosnia for housing
re c o n s t ruction and sustainability initiatives linked to refugee re t u rns.  
o B o s n i a ’s militaries should continue the process of significant forc e
reductions, and disbanding paramilitar y organisations should be seen as
an integral confidence building measure within this process.  The
i n t e rnational community must address the security threat of about 15,000
special police troops under the entity Ministries of Interior.
o The IPTF must redouble its eff o rts to support the establishment of a
p rofessional police force, and SFOR must live up to its obligations to
s u p p o rt the wider humanitarian and institution building objectives of
Dayton, including the provision of maximum protection to re t u rnees and
the apprehension of war criminals.
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165  Strategy Paper, Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress toward Accession by each of the Candidate Countries,
European Commission,8 November 2000.
8.  CROATIA
C roatia continues to make impressive strides in distancing itself from its
nationalist past.  Its restraint in dealing with Bosnian Croat hard-liners and
continued willingness to move toward international standards are welcome.
H o w e v e r, Croatia still has to tackle difficult issues of economic re f o rm and
make further pro g ress with re g a rd to the re t u rn of re f u g e e s .
A.  Introduction
Since parliamentary and presidential elections in Croatia in early 2000,
C roatia has taken major strides in strengthening democracy and the rule of
l aw. It has also played an incre a s i n g ly constru c t i ve role in the re gi o n . T h i s
p ro gress has been wa rm ly re c e i ved by the international commu n i t y, a s
re flected in the country ’s admission to NATO ’s Pa rt n e rship for Pe a c e
p ro gra m , the ending of the Council of Euro p e ’s monitoring re gime and the
N ovember 2000 initiation of negotiations for a Stability and A s s o c i a t i o n
A greement with the European Union.1 6 5
The gove rn m e n t ’s condemnation of the Bosnian Croat leaders h i p ’s
w i t h d rawal from the Dayton A greement stru c t u re s , on 3 March 2001,
re c o n fi rmed Zagre b ’s rejection of the late President Franjo Tu d j m a n ’s fo re i g n
policy legacy. D o m e s t i c a l ly,h oweve r, the Tudjman legacy continues to we i g h
h e av i ly on re f u gee and displaced Croatian Serbs who want to re t u rn to their
p re - war homes, and on the application of law to potential war cri m i n a l s . I n
e ffe c t , a perc e p t i ble gap has opened up between Cro a t i a ’s pro gre s s i ve
re gional role and its re l a t i ve ly unimproved treatment of its Serb minori t y.
This re s e rvation notwithstanding, C ro a t i a ’s hopes for integration into
E u ropean stru c t u res have been a major spur to effo rts to build democra c y
and a law - gove rned state. L a rge ly intern a l ly stable and with settled bord e rs ,
C roatia is now better placed than ever to move fo r wa rd in realising its
a m b i t i o n .
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Table 15.  Croatia at a glance
• World Bank Atlas methodology.
Source:The World Bank;Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
B.  Security
With the end of war on its soil and in neighbouring Bosnia in 1995, and with
the peaceful re i n t e gration of the Danube Region in Eastern Slavonia at the
b e ginning of 1998, C ro a t i a ’s terri t o rial issues (with the minor exception of
P rev l a k a , on the border with Montenegro) we re laid to re s t . The re s o l u t i o n
of the country ’s major outstanding security issues was crucial in enabl i n g
C roatia to move beyond an agenda dri ven by wa rtime nationalism and to
focus on more normal peacetime pri o rities such as the economy, s o c i a l
we l fa re and good gove rn a n c e . As re g a rds internal securi t y, tension betwe e n
ethnic Serb and Croat inhabitants (including Croat re f u gees from Bosnia) in
the fo rm e r ly Serb-controlled areas of the country has been a continu i n g
c o n c e rn , i n cluding serious intimidation and violent attacks against ethnic
Serbs and their pro p e rty in those are a s . N eve rt h e l e s s , the termination in
October 2000 of the Police Monitoring Group as a separate component of
the OSCE Mission in Croatia recognised the ove rall improvement in the
s e c u rity situation in that still tro u bled re gi o n .
Another internal security issue which has concerned the gove rnment that
took office fo l l owing parliamentary elections in Ja nu a ry 2000, relates to the
activities of fa r - right gro u p s , p a rt i c u l a r ly in opposition to cooperation with
the International War Crimes Tribunal (ICTY) in The Hague and to move s
against Croat war crimes suspects by domestic court s . The most seri o u s
incident was the mu rd e r, in August 2000, of an ethnic Croat who had
c o o p e rated with the ICTY over alleged war crimes against Serbs. T h e
a u t h o rities have peri o d i c a l ly been tro u bled by right-wing demonstrations in
s u p p o rt of Croat war crimes suspects. Most seri o u s ly, Fe b ru a ry 2001
witnessed mass demonstrations and road bl o ck ages in va rious parts of the
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GNP per capita*:$4,520
Population:4.5 million
Elections: Parliamentary (lower chamber) and presidential
elections held in January and February 2000. Elections to
the House of Counties (upper chamber of parliament)
s cheduled for June 2001. Elections to House of
Representatives (lower chamber of parliament) due in
2004.
President:Stjepan (Stipe) Mesic
Prime Minister:Ivica Racan
166  Globus, 9 February 2001;Republika,11 February 2001.
167  In Croatia as in Serbia,however, public opinion appears less squeamish about cooperating with ICTY than politicians
suppose. A recent poll in Croatia for the International Republican Institute found 70 per cent of respondents favouring
cooperation with the Tribunal,including 59 per cent support even among war veterans. Jutarnji list, 21 February 2001.
168  See,e.g. interview with Deputy Speaker Mato Arlovic in Jutarnji list , 13 March 2001. In practice,the “diaspora” voting
mechanism served to enfranchise Bosnian Croats with dual citizenship who have never resided in Croatia.
c o u n t ry in support of General Mirko Nora c , who was under investigation by
domestic courts for his alleged part in the wa rtime mu rder of Serb
c i v i l i a n s .1 6 6 The gove rnment has at times wave red in its support for the ICTY,
b u rdened by divisions within the ruling coalition and fearful of publ i c
o p i n i o n .1 6 7 P resident Stjepan Mesic, by contra s t , has been consistently cl e a r
and unambiguous in insisting that Croatia must not be a safe place for any
war cri m i n a l .
At the end of September 2000,a group of twe l ve ge n e rals joined the Cro a t i a n
D e m o c ratic Union (HDZ) leadership in writing controve rsial letters that
accused the authorities of undermining the legitimacy of the Homeland Wa r
(as the recent war in Croatia is known) and appeared to call for their
re m ova l . H oweve r, the shock with which this was greeted in the media
q u i ck ly dissipated when Mesic re t i red the seven of the twe l ve ge n e rals who
we re still serv i n g . The pre s i d e n t ’s actions we re greeted with widespre a d
p u blic approva l . The episode unders c o red the extent to which the HDZ has
m oved to the margins of Croatian political life and demonstrated that
d e m o c ratic ch a n ge in Croatia may well be more robust than many may have
b e l i eve d .
As re g a rds re gional securi t y, the new gove rnment has played a signifi c a n t ly
m o re constru c t i ve role in the re gion than its pre d e c e s s o r. C roatian state
t ra n s fe rs to the Bosnian Croats have been tra n s p a rent and ab ove board and
relations with Bosnia set on a correct state-to-state fo o t i n g . The prev i o u s
gove rn m e n t ’s practice of support i n g , if not instigating, the anti-Day t o n
activities of the Bosnian HDZ has ended. The gove rning coalition also
a p p e a rs re a dy to abolish or dra s t i c a l ly curtail the controve rsial “ d i a s p o ra ”
voting rights and members of parliament, w h i ch have been a cause of
ag gravation between Zagreb and Sara j evo .1 6 8
The Croatian authorities took early steps to ex p l o re ways of setting re l a t i o n s
with the Fe d e ral Republic of Yu go s l avia (FRY) on a normal footing fo l l ow i n g
the defeat of Milosev i c . As Cro a t i a ’s participation in the Stability Pact has
s h ow n , it is re a dy to play a constru c t i ve role in international effo rts to bri n g
s t ability to the re gi o n . C ro a t i a ’s active support for arm s - c o n t rol and
demining projects within the Stability Pact is part i c u l a r ly commendabl e ,a n d
d e s e rves international support .
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 169
C.  Governance
The government that took over in Croatia following elections in January 2000
faced an array of tasks arising out of the legacy of the former government of
the HDZ. Under HDZ rule the development of democracy had been severely
stunted. Dissatisfaction with the failure of Croatia’s former government to
fulfil its international obligations - in areas such as refugee returns, minority
rights, the implementation of the Dayton Agreement for Bosnia, freedom of
the media and cooperation with the ICTY - led to sustained Western pressure
and international isolation. Nevertheless,the key factors that drove political
change in Croatia in 2000 were more domestic than international.
Table 16.  Main Political Parties in Croatia 
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Political Party
Social Democratic
Party (SDP)
Croatian Social Liberal
Party (HSLS)
Croatian People’s
Party (HNS)
Istrian Democratic
Council (IDS)
Croat Peasants’ Party
(HSS)
Liberal Party (LS)
Croatian Democratic
Union (HDZ)
Croatian Party of
Right (HSP)
Political Alignment
Party of Prime Minister Ivaca Racan. The successor
of the former communists, the SDP is centre-left
leaning and is the largest party in the six-party
governing coalition, formed on 27 January 2000.
A centre - right party with moderate nationalist
profile led by Drazen Budisa. The HSLS, alongside
the SDP, forms the core of the governing coalition.
Formerly the party of President Stipe Mesic, until
his election as president. A centrist party whose
s u p p o rt increased after Mesic was elected in
Fe b ru a ry 2000, the HNS is a member of the
governing coalition and is led by Vesnia Pusic.
R e gional party dominant in Istria led by Iva n
Jakovcic. Member of the governing coalition.
A successor of the dominant pre-1945 party, led by
Zlatko Tomcic. The HSS is a moderate,conservative
party within the governing coalition.
A centrist off-shoot from the HSLS, led by Zlatko
Kramaric. Member of the governing coalition.
R i g h t - w i n g , nationalist party founded by late
President Franjo Tudjman, and now led by Ivo
Sanader, following Tudjman’s death in December
2001. Since 2000 the party’s support has declined
considerably. A sister-party to the HDZ in Bosnia.
Extreme right-wing nationalist party led by Anto
Djapic.
The HDZ, led by the late pre s i d e n t , Franjo Tu d j m a n , came to power in 1990
on a wave of nationalist sentiment fuelled in large part by fear of the
ag gre s s i ve re gime of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia. O ver the next fi ve ye a rs ,
the HDZ was legitimised in the eyes of many Croats by its re c o rd of
c o n f ronting Milosev i c ’s ag gre s s i o n , s e c u ring the country ’s independence
and re s t o ring its terri t o rial integri t y. H oweve r, d u ring peacetime, the HDZ
q u i ck ly saw its popularity begin to wa n e . In successive elections since
N ovember 1995, opposition part i e s , n o t ably the fo rmer communist Social
D e m o c ratic Pa rty (SDP) of current Prime Minister Ivaca Racan, won an
i n c reasing share of the vo t e . His success can be explained by a number of
fa c t o rs :
o Alone among the opposition leaders , Racan positioned his party with a
p l a t fo rm that gave pri o rity to issues such as pro s p e rity and social we l fa re
- a pro gram incre a s i n g ly in tune with the popular mood.
o N u m e rous scandals involving corru p t i o n ,n o n - t ra n s p a rency and abuses of
the intelligence services marred the HDZ administra t i o n . C o l l e c t i ve ly,
this fed the impression of a political, economic and criminal elite,
p re p a red to re s o rt to all manner of undemocratic measures to hold on to
p ower while the majority of the population languished in pove rt y. T h e
high incidence of such scandals in the late 1990s provided fe rtile materi a l
for independent media that, although under pre s s u re from the
a u t h o ri t i e s , remained unbowe d .
o C ro a t i a ’s international isolation was deeply resented among a population
that views its rightful and historical place as being in Euro p e ’s
m a i n s t re a m . As the HDZ’s unpopularity grew, the gove rnment wa s
i n c re a s i n g ly blamed for strained relations with the intern a t i o n a l
c o m mu n i t y.
o In 1998 Racan re a ched agreement with Drazen Budisa, the leader of the
c e n t re - right Croatian Social Liberal Pa rty (HSLS). These two part i e s
fo rmed the nu cleus of a group of six opposition parties (“the Six”) which
opposed the HDZ in the parliamentary elections in Ja nu a ry 2000. W h i l e
relations within this coalition we re fre q u e n t ly tro u bl e d , a united fro n t
was key in capitalising on the widespread dissatisfaction with the HDZ.
The impact on the election result of President Tu d j m a n ’s death in December
1999 is hard to estimate. It cert a i n ly exacerbated divisions within the HDZ
and hastened the part y ’s disintegra t i o n , although the popularity of the HDZ
and of Tudjman had alre a dy considerably diminished. Tu d j m a n ’s death also
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put to rest fe a rs that, fo l l owing an opposition electoral victory, the Six’s take -
over of power might be re s i s t e d . The election of a pre s i d e n t , M e s i c , f ro m
among the opposition coalition, signalled a complete break with the HDZ
e ra .
Since the elections of January and February 2000, the political climate in
Croatia has improved notably. This can be seen in regard to the media and in
the performance of the state-owned broadcaster, Croatian Radio-Television
(HRT). HRT’s political coverage during the presidential election campaign
and subsequently has become generally more balanced. The government,in
consultation with independent domestic and international experts,including
from the Council of Europe,drew up a new Law on HRT, designed to cement
the state broadcaster’s freedom from political interference. After months of
sharp controversy inside and outside Parliament, a new law was adopted in
February 2001. While the new law does widen the gap between HRT and
elected politicians, it leaves ample scope for a determined government to
influence senior personnel appointments and hence editorial output.
Harassment of independent media journalists, through court cases, police
surveillance and occasional questioning has ended. Legal provisions allowing
for special, urgent court proceedings in defamation cases against journalists
have been abolished, as have requirements that criminal action be taken
against anyone deemed to have defamed certain top state officials.
Following Tudjman’s authoritarian leadership,an important plank of the Six’s
election campaign was to alter the Constitution to shift the balance of power
away from the presidency and toward the government and parliament.
Deliberations over the constitutional changes proved highly controversial,
with bitter sniping between President Mesic and senior members of the
government. Nevertheless,the government,in November 2000,achieved the
necessary two-thirds majority for changes that will reduce the power of the
president,strengthen regional government and enhance the voting strength
of minorities. A second round of constitutional amendments at the end of
March abolished the upper chamber of Parliament (the House of Counties),
devolving some its powers to the counties themselves. Along with a package
of laws to strengthen local authorities, this measure should accelerate
meaningful decentralisation.
One cause of controversy has been over responsibility for oversight of the
intelligence services. Under Tudjman, these were persistently manipulated
and abused to serve the ends of the ruling party or individuals within it. The
importance attached to control of the security apparatus is perhaps indicative
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of the fragile state of Croatia’s democratic development and fears of a return
to more autocratic ways. Nevertheless, since the new government took
office, the judicial authorities have moved fairly rapidly against a number of
former high officials in the intelligence services,and the clear impression is
of authorities intent on bringing the security services under democratic
control. Changes are also being applied to the Ministry of Interior, and,
following a Constitutional Court judgement, parliament has introduced
oversight by a parliamentary committee over the minister’s discretion to
order wiretapping or surveillance.
Croatia still needs to make progress in addressing the poor functioning of the
court system. A long-standing shortage of judges has led to a huge backlog of
court cases,officially estimated at around one million. The large backlog has
had a deleterious effect in a number of areas,including the economy, as the
extended delays have held up the resolution of commercial disputes.
While the outside world has generally viewed Croatia as making important
strides since the recent elections,the perspective in Croatia’s media has often
been more jaundiced. A series of episodes since the new government took
office have,as reported in the media, given the impression of instability in the
government and of a risk of a right-wing coup engineered by far-right parties,
remnants of the HDZ, army generals and war veterans groups. Many of the
stories have been grossly exaggerated by the press,but they have succeeded
in maintaining an atmosphere of ongoing crisis with concerns that recent
gains might be rolled back by a resurgent political right, working with its
allies in the security and intelligence services.
While such speculation is sensationalist,the governing coalition has suffered
its share of internal tensions. “The Six”has always been somewhat unwieldy,
and while it was assembled for the urgent purpose of fighting the HDZ, it
includes parties with divergent political views and clashing personalities. The
SDP and the HSLS, standing together with a joint list, won the highest share
of the vote in the January 2000 parliamentary elections,and have divided up
the majority of ministries between themselves. A perception that ministries
belong to particular political parties has undermined any sense of collective
government responsibility and created a counter-productive impression of
jealousy and lack of coordination between ministries.
A particular cause of tension in the ruling coalition has been the issue of war
crimes prosecution and cooperation with the ICTY. The HSLS has in general
adopted a more nationalist stance than the SDP, and was particularly sensitive
to reports that the ICTY might move against a number of senior Croatian
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m i l i t a ry offi c i a l s , i n cluding army chief of staff General Petar Stipetic and
re t i red General Mirko Nora c . As a re s u l t , the gove rnment drew up a list of
conditions for further cooperation with the ICTY. N o rac defied a judicial
summons related to crimes against Croatian Serb civilians in 1991. A massive
d e m o n s t ration of support for Norac in the coastal city of Split was seen as
the gravest ch a l l e n ge that the gove rnment had fa c e d . For a period at the end
of 2000 and the beginning of 2001 it appeared that Racan might be fo rc e d
to choose between abandoning cooperation with the ICTY, with highly
n e g a t i ve consequences for Cro a t i a ’s international position, or risking the fa l l
of his gove rn m e n t . H oweve r, in the event a visit by the ICTY ch i e f
p ro s e c u t o r,Carla Del Po n t e , in mid Ja nu a ry 2001 signalled an end to pre s s u re
on Stipetic, the Racan gove rnment and Croatia for the time being.1 6 9 N o ra c
soon afterwa rds turned himself in, and faces trial along with four others (the
so-called “Gospic group”) in a Croatian court for war crimes against Serb
civilians in 1991. A l s o , a modality was agreed for Stipetic to prov i d e
t e s t i m o ny to the ICTY as a suspect in connection with three military
o p e rations in 1993 and 1995.
T h e re have also been pro blems with the four smaller parties within the
c o a l i t i o n . The Croatian Pe o p l e ’s Pa rty (HNS), fo l l owing the victory of its
c a n d i d a t e , Stjepan (Stipe) Mesic, in the presidential election, has seen its
p o p u l a rity ri s e , most notably in Zagreb municipal elections. Ap p a re n t ly with
its eye on the next election rather than the success of the pre s e n t
gove rn m e n t , it has fre q u e n t ly operated like an internal opposition within the
gove rn m e n t . When a bank close to one of the other members of “the Six” -
the re gional Istrian Democratic Council (IDS) - got into diffi c u l t i e s , l a rge ly
due to its ove r - ex p o s u re to the IDS-controlled city of Pula, the part y
t h reatened a gove rnment crisis unless the gove rnment caved in to demands
( against the sound advice of the central bank) to bail out the ow n e rs .
As a result of these divisions within the ruling coalition, the SDP fre q u e n t ly
p e rc e i ves itself as taking sole responsibility for the business of gove rn m e n t ,
while the other parties busy themselves with striking postures designed to
enhance their future electoral pro s p e c t s . Adding to Racan’s pro bl e m s ,
e s p e c i a l ly in the early period of the new gove rn m e n t , was a widely re p o rt e d
c o n t rove rsy between himself and Mesic over the scope of the pre s i d e n t ’s
p owe rs . In addition, the president and his team of advisers have been
accused of fo rming a “ gove rnment in wa i t i n g ” ,p roposing altern a t i ve policies
in areas such as the economy that the gove rnment considers its pro p e r
d o m a i n .
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Seeing their place as fi rm ly within Euro p e ’s mainstre a m ,C roats tend to be
s e n s i t i ve towa rd any suggestion that their country might be consigned to
the Balkan (even the “ we s t e rn Balkan”) re gi o n . This sensitivity ex p l a i n s
C ro a t i a ’s wa ry response to re gi o n a l ly directed international initiative s .
N eve rt h e l e s s , C roatia has participated active ly and constru c t i ve ly in the
S t ability Pact for South Eastern Euro p e . The participation of Slovenia and
H u n g a ry in this initiative - countries that are more advanced than Cro a t i a
along the path to European integration - has been useful, emphasising that
c o n s t ru c t i ve engagement in the re gion does not mean relegation to the
E u ropean slow lane.
H oweve r, C roatia objects to any notion that re gional integration wo u l d
mean that the Balkan countries would appro a ch integration at the Euro p e a n
l evel as a bl o c . A ny suggestion that Cro a t i a ’s pro gress towa rd EU integra t i o n
could be slowed to the rate of the less developed Balkan states would be
t e rri bly demoralising to Cro a t s , and might result in less constru c t i ve
e n g agement by Croatia in the re gi o n .
This sensitivity over re gional integration explains the stro n g ly negative
response in Croatia to a paper written by the United Nations (UN) Secre t a ry
G e n e ra l ’s special envoy for South East Euro p e , Carl Bildt, w h i ch
recommended an integrated international appro a ch to solving the pro bl e m s
of the we s t e rn Balkans. P u blicity surrounding Bildt’s paper coincided with
an art i cle in the Financial Times which stated that the European Union (EU)
“intends that the countries of the fo rmer Yu go s l av i a , ex cluding Slove n i a ,
should pre p a re for eventual succession - and that, u nu s u a l ly, t h ey should do
so as a gro u p .”1 7 0 Fo l l owing the strong reactions in Croatia to Bildt’s paper,
EU re p re s e n t a t i ves stressed the EU policy that relations with countries in
the re gion would be pursued individually, and that each , i n cluding Cro a t i a ,
would be treated on its own meri t s .1 7 1
D . Human Rights
HDZ rule left an unsatisfa c t o ry legacy in the realm of human ri g h t s ,
m i n o rity protection and the re t u rn of re f u ge e s . Some positive legi s l a t i ve
steps have been taken under the new gove rn m e n t , but mu ch remains to be
d o n e ,p a rt i c u l a r ly on matters concerning re t u rning Serb re f u ge e s .
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In 1998, the previous gove rnment had promised to re m e dy a number of
d i s c ri m i n a t o ry laws that placed citizens of Serb ethnicity at a distinct
d i s a d va n t age in comparison with their ethnic Croat compatri o t s . In Ju n e
2 0 0 0 , a law amending the 1996 Law on Reconstruction was passed,
fo l l owing ex t e n s i ve consultation with international re p re s e n t a t i ves in
C roatia (notably the OSCE Mission). H oweve r, the law as later passed
contained amendments designed to placate critics who we re determined to
retain discrimination in favour of Cro a t s . The Minister of Public Wo rk s ,
R e c o n s t ruction and Construction was called on to issue instructions on
e l i gibility for re c o n s t ruction assistance in accordance with the earlier Law
on the Rights of Croatian Homeland War Defe n d e rs and their Fa m i ly
M e m b e rs . The instru c t i o n s ,when issued,e n s u red that discrimination ag a i n s t
ethnic Serbs in this important area will re m a i n . Amendments to a second
d i s c ri m i n a t o ry law, the Law on A reas of Special State Concern ,h ave re m ove d
d i s c ri m i n a t o ry prov i s i o n s . The OSCE Mission to Cro a t i a , h oweve r, a s s e s s e d
that the amended law will have a “ n e g a t i ve effect on the re t u rn of pro p e rt y ” .
The Mission has ri g h t ly concluded that the gove rnment “ must adopt a
u n i fo rm and compre h e n s i ve legal re gime gove rning the repossession of
p ro p e rty in accordance with international standard s ” .1 7 2
A third law identified in 1998 as discri m i n a t o ry, the Law on the Status of
Expelled Pe rsons and Refuge e s , was amended by the previous gove rn m e n t
in November 1999. The amendments eliminated discrimination in favour of
one catego ry of displaced pers o n s ,“ ex p e l l e e s ”( “ p ro g n a n i c i ” , almost alway s
C ro a t s ) , at the expense of other displaced persons (“raseljene osobe”, a l m o s t
a lways Serbs). H oweve r, the practical discri m i n a t o ry effects of the law
re m a i n e d , as people retained the status and benefits that they had re c e i ve d
under the ori ginal law, to the adva n t age of some (mostly Croats) and the
d i s a d va n t age of others (mostly Serbs).
The new gove rnment quick ly made positive statements and adopted
m e a s u res which improved the climate for re t u rn , i n cluding a proposal to
hasten the re t u rn of 16,500 Serbs who had applied to re t u rn , for which
S t ability Pact funding was sought. H oweve r, as discussed, re t u rning Serbs
still face discrimination over the provision of re c o n s t ruction assistance.
D i fficulties over the repossession of pro p e rty also remain a serious obstacl e
to sustainable re t u rn . As of 1 Fe b ru a ry 2001, gove rnment fi g u res showe d
that around 78,400 ethnic Serbs had re t u rned to their homes in Cro a t i a , o f
whom almost 56,000 had re t u rned from the FRY and Bosnia, the rest being
176 AFTER MILOSEVIC
173  Information from the Ministry of Public Works,Reconstruction and Construction,Department for Expellees,Returnees and
Refugees,1 February 2001.According to the UNHCR,in 2000 there were around 300,000 Croatian Serb refugees in the FRY
and some 30,000 - 40,000 in Bosnia.
i n t e rn a l ly displaced Serbs re t u rning from the Danube Region to other part s
of Cro a t i a .1 7 3 H oweve r,OSCE monitoring in the field suggests that signifi c a n t
nu m b e rs of these Serb re t u rnees do not stay perm a n e n t ly. Reasons for this
i n clude difficulties in repossessing pro p e rty and securing re c o n s t ru c t i o n
a s s i s t a n c e .
The gove rn m e n t ’s Return Pro gram - adopted in June 1998 after ex t e n s i ve
consultations with OSCE,UNHCR and We s t e rn embassies - has proved large ly
i n e ffe c t i ve . L a cking legal status, it re p resented only a political commitment
on the part of the gove rn m e n t ,w h i ch , in HDZ times amounted to little more
than empty rhetori c . N u m b e rs of organised re t u rns under the pro gram have
been small, and gi ven its lack of legal fo rc e , the complex bure a u c ra t i c
p ro c e d u res it established for pro p e rty re t u rns have proved wholly
inadequate in the face of laws under which pro p e rty has been allocated to
o t h e rs (often Bosnian Cro a t s ) . Most sustainable re t u rns that have occurre d
h ave invo l ved re l a t i ve ly easy cases of fa m i ly re u n i fication or re t u rns to
vacant pro p e rt i e s .
The new gove rnment has thus far failed to end obstruction of re t u rn at the
local leve l , and the Housing Commissions set up under the pro gram have
been ineffe c t i ve in most are a s . L a ck of altern a t i ve accommodation fo r
t e m p o ra ry occupants of pro p e rties owned by re t u rning Serbs also remains a
real pro bl e m . The authorities have failed to act against the high incidence of
multiple occupancy of pro p e rties by tempora ry ethnic Croat occupants. I n
August 2000 the OSCE Mission presented the gove rnment with a list of 88
clear-cut cases that could easily be re s o l ved gi ven the will. As of Fe b ru a ry
2 0 0 1 , few of these cases we re re p o rted to have been re s o l ve d .
Another thorny issue concerning discrimination against re t u rning Serbs is
that of occupancy or tenancy rights to so-called socially owned pro p e rt y.
This was the main type of pro p e rty right in urban areas under commu n i s m .
D u ring the wa r, the process by which occupancy rights we re conve rted into
p ri vate pro p e rty discriminated against Serb re f u ge e s , and this discri m i n a t i o n
was re i n fo rced by a decree by the previous gove rnment in November 1999,
w h i ch pre s e rved the occupancy rights of people who had fled the Danu b e
R e gion (mainly Cro a t s ) . M e a n w h i l e , s u ch rights continue to be re j e c t e d
outside that re gi o n , l a rge ly to the detriment of ethnic Serbs whose fo rm e r
flats have been allocated to others . N o n - gove rnmental org a n i s a t i o n s
estimate that some 50,000 to 60,000 households lost their rights thro u g h
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d i s c ri m i n a t o ry laws and pra c t i c e s .1 7 4 The international community ri g h t ly
continues to insist that the government is obliged to resolve the issue of
occupancy rights.
Another factor inhibiting return has been the inconsistent implementation of
the 1996 amnesty law, which grants reprieve to those who participated in
armed uprising against the state,but not for war crimes. This inconsistency,
combined with serious doubts about the fairness and impartiality of war
crimes trials under HDZ rule, discouraged Serbs from returning. The new
government established a working group to consider issues connected with
the amnesty law, and senior officials, as well as the Supreme Court, have
rejected any notion of collective guilt. However, the OSCE Mission has noted
that the Government’s working group did not address such difficult amnesty-
related issues as cases of war crimes charges following an earlier granting of
amnesty. In addition,some ethnic Serbs were convicted for war crimes in a
highly politicised environment under HDZ rule,and remain behind bars.
In September 2000 the Minister of Justice revealed that between 1991 and
1999, 554 persons were convicted for war crimes, the majority in absentia.
All but two of them were ethnic Serbs. However, in 2000,in the face of fierce
right-wing political opposition, investigations have begun into alleged war
crimes committed by Croats against ethnic Serbs. The new government has
also increased Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY. In April 2000, the
parliament adopted a decl a ration affi rming Cro a t i a ’s cooperation and
acknowledging the ICTY’s jurisdiction over the military operations against
Serb-controlled territories in 1995. ICTY forensic experts have been given
access to exhumation sites, and there have been arrests of individuals
suspected of war crimes in Bosnia. In certain respects, such as the handing
over of sensitive documents to the ICTY, Croatia’s cooperation,while much
i m p rove d , has been incomplete. N eve rt h e l e s s , despite the domestic
sensitivity of the issue,described above,Croatia stands out as much the most
cooperative of the countries covered by the ICTY.
E.    Economy
The greatest domestic challenge facing the Racan government is the sickly
state of the Croatian economy. There is a widespread public perception of an
economy in a dire state and a government that has failed to act decisively to
improve matters. Rising unemployment has been a key factor feeding the
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perception of significant hardship. Official unemployment has risen from
240,601 in 1995, to 287,762 in 1998 to 321,866 in December 1999 to
378,544 in December 2000. In December 2000, the rate of unemployed
persons as a proportion of the total active population was 22.6 per cent,up
from 20.8 per cent in December 1999.175
Unemployment would be even more severe were it not for the fact that high
numbers of people took early retirement during the 1990s. Pensioners
currently form an unusually high proportion of the population and,while the
average earnings of those in employment have increased over recent years,
pensioners have been left behind.176 These pensioners also represent an
important electoral constituency that the government can ill afford to ignore.
Despite the perception of severe hardship,Croatia’s economic development
is relatively advanced by the standards of South Eastern Europe. In 1998,GDP
per capita stood at $4,833. Real GDP, after a sharp contraction early in the
1990s, picked up between 1994 and 1997, with annual growth rates of
around 6-7 per cent. However, recently Croatia’s economic performance has
faltered,with growth falling to 2.5 per cent in 1998 and a contraction of 0.3
per cent in 1999. An improvement is forecast for 2000,and data for the first
two quarters of the year show growth of 4 per cent and 3.7 per cent
respectively in comparison with the same periods in 1999.177
Successive governments have made price and exchange rate stability a
priority. Retail price inflation was 3.5 per cent in 1996 and 3.6 per cent in
1997,and jumped to 5.7 per cent in 1998,mainly due to the introduction of
a value-added tax,before falling off to 4.2 per cent in 1999. In 2000 inflation
rose sharply,and in November 2000 the year-on-year inflation rate was 6.0 per
cent.178 This increase has been due to a combination of factors, including
rising oil prices and administered prices (notably for electricity).
The slight but steady increase in prices over recent years, combined with a
relatively stable exchange rate against the German Mark/Euro (Croatia’s trade
is heavily weighted toward the Euro zone),has led many to conclude that the
kuna is over-valued. Among the loudest complainers have been exporters.
Indeed, exports were, in dollar terms, stagnant at around $4.3-$4.6 billion
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b e t ween 1994 and 1999, a n d , p re l i m i n a ry data for the fi rst nine months of
2 0 0 0 , s h owing ex p o rts of $3.4 billion, do not suggest that there was a
s i g n i ficant improvement in 2000. The current account deficit re a ched 11.6
per cent of GDP in 1997, and has dropped off since (it stood at 7.3 per cent
of GDP in 1999) part ly due to the economic slow d own in 1998 and 1999,
w h i ch resulted in lower import s . C ro a t i a ’s current account deficit has in
p a rt been financed by a ballooning ex t e rnal debt, w h i ch rose from 24.2 per
cent of GDP in 1996 to 48.4 per cent at the end of 1999.1 7 9
C ro a t i a ’s ex t e rnal position appears to have improved in 2000, a n d
p re l i m i n a ry data for the fi rst nine months suggest a significant drop in the
c u rrent account defi c i t . A va riety of fa c t o rs have contributed to this,n o t ably
a sharp increase in receipts from touri s m . To u rism is a key sector for Cro a t i a ,
with its long A d riatic coastline. While nu m b e rs of tourist nights had picke d
up since the end of the war (from 12.9 million in 1995 to 31.3 million in
1 9 9 8 ) ,t h ey we re still well below pre - war levels (61.9 million in 1989). T h e
1999 season proved a bitter disappointment (26.6 million tourist nights)
owing to the Ko s ovo cri s i s . Thus the pick-up in 2000 was greeted with gre a t
re l i e f, with nu m b e rs of tourist nights in the fi rst nine months of the year up
some 45 per cent on the same period in 1999.1 8 0
A public debate on ex ch a n ge rate policy was sparked by the contention of
the pre s i d e n t ’s economics adviser, Stjepan Zdunic, that the kuna should be
d eva l u e d . The central bank, s u p p o rted by the IMF, has been adamant that it
will stick to its stable kuna policy, fe a ring that its abandonment wo u l d
m e re ly spark infl a t i o n , and the president himself has more re c e n t ly said that
he does not favour deva l u a t i o n .1 8 1 H oweve r, the interventions of the
p residential office in this sphere may have served to foment doubt as to
whether the gove rnment and central bank will indeed maintain the value of
the kuna.
T h e re has been, since the new gove rnment came to powe r, a loosening of
m o n e t a ry policy, with bank re s e rve re q u i rements and interest rates coming
d ow n . In addition, and of key import a n c e , the gove rnment has stri ven to
reduce its domestic debt, injecting liquidity into the economy and allev i a t i n g
a seve re payments crisis which had constrained economic activity towa rd
the end of HDZ ru l e . Fiscal policy has been more confused, in large part due
to a lack of coordination among parties in the ruling coalition (the fi n a n c e
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minister is from the SDP and the minister for the economy from the HSLS).
Divisions came into the open at an economic summit in August 2000, a t
w h i ch ministers from the HNS and the IDS, as well as Zdunic, c ri t i c i s e d
Finance Minister Mato Crk venac for not doing more to stimulate grow t h .
Problems with fiscal policy were a key reason for delays in reaching a standby
agreement with the IMF in late 2000, which was finally concluded in
December, after the government adopted a tighter 2001 budget.182 As of
September 2000,the budget deficit stood at $428 million.183 A major reason
for Croatia’s fiscal problems is the weakness of the two main off-budgetary
funds, for health and pensions,both of which have had to be supported by
transfers from the central budget, and both of which are in urgent need of
reform. The need for the government to tighten fiscal policy, as required by
the IMF, may well bring the government under further strain,as trade unions,
the opposition,some coalition parties and the broader electorate will demand
more action to alleviate hardship.
A further problem with government finances is that considerable reliance is
placed on privatisation receipts. The delay of the second phase of the
privatisation of the state telecommunications company in 2000 necessitated
f u rther borrow i n g , and the 2001 budget too env i s ages a signifi c a n t
contribution from privatisation receipts. Privatisation in Croatia, as in a
number of other countries in transition,is contentious due to the perception
that earlier phases of pri vatisation resulted in people close to the
government, and sometimes with the help of compliant banks, picking up
assets and growing rich in the process. The government is receiving
international advice on the privatisation of certain high profile state-owned
companies, but a bigger problem lies in the fact that a large number of
enterprises,many of them defunct, remain on the books of the government’s
privatisation fund. This is an issue that the government is committed to
resolving, but it is sensitive given the unemployment that inevitably results.
Here too,the painful measures that the government has to adopt threaten to
strain its support and its unity.
In order to promote sustainable recovery, more fundamental changes are
required than have so far been implemented. A priority is to promote
investment. An investment law has been introduced,providing for incentives
such as tax breaks to foreign investors. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in
Croatia has through most of the 1990s been low in comparison with more
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favoured countries in transition to the north. This is part reflected the
perception of Croatia as a country of high risk in a war-torn region. Indeed,
FDI has picked up somewhat in recent years, from $115 million in 1995 to
$898 million 1998 and $1.4 billion in 1999.184 Nevertheless,Croatia needs to
attract much higher levels of investment,and simply providing incentives is
not sufficient if deeper problems are not addressed. At present,the business
environment is fundamentally unfavourable. Excessive red tape,corruption,
the poor functioning of the courts and widespread confusion over property
rights combine to deter would-be investors and banks from granting loans.
So far the government has been slow in addressing such fundamental
problems. What is perhaps more worrying is that it has failed to present a
clear message as to how it will help deliver the greater prosperity that the
electorate demands. Instead, different parties and ministries have often
seemed to be pursuing their own agendas without any over-arching strategy,
often appearing more interested in gaining political advantage for individual
parties rather than actually developing a successful government policy. Thus
the recent IMF deal may not only be helpful in boosting outside confidence
in the government, but in forcing all of the parties in the government to
commit themselves to a single,coherent policy.
For Croatia,as for several other countries in the region,the Stability Pact has
so far been a great disappointment. Political changes in Serbia offer an
opportunity for the promise of the Stability Pact to be fulfilled for Croatia too.
Efforts to improve communications and promote economic links around the
region will be of great economic benefit to Croatia, as well as helping to
normalise relations with former enemies. As a stable, relatively advanced
country, Croatia could be a natural base for international companies doing
business in the region. However, if Croatia’s full economic potential is to be
realised, technical help and advice will be needed to turn Croatia into an
attractive destination for foreign investment, especially by making the legal
environment more conducive. Every ef fort should be made to increase the
speed and effectiveness of programs being implemented through the Stability
Pact.
Announcements of significant international assistance for the new
democratic government in Belgrade following Milosevic’s defeat triggered
c o n s t e rnation in Croatia and ch a rges of a double standard by the
international community. Where Croatia endured years of international
isolation on account of its failure to meet international obligations in areas
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such as democratisation and cooperation with the ICTY, Serbia appeared to
be receiving immediate rewards despite not fulfilling those same conditions.
Croats also argue that in contrast to the significant assistance being offered to
Serbia, international aid to Croatia has been sparse. While some Croatian
commentators have noted that the changes taking place in Serbia are
ultimately in Croatia’s best interests, it is indeed reasonable to ask if Serbia
will be held accountable for its deeds. Further, to avoid creating a backlash,
Croatia must continue to see tangible returns for the progress that it makes
in meeting its international commitments.
Conclusions and recommendations on Cro a t i a
o I n t e rnational pre s s u re on Croatia should be maintained in relation to its
p romises on refugee re t u rns, pro p e rty rights and equal access to
re c o n s t ruction assistance.  At the same time, international assistance
should focus on helping to create conditions for sustainable re t u rn to the
w a r- a ffected are a s .
o OSCE monitoring of the reintegration of war- a ffected areas should be
continued.  
o The international rush to embrace the new authorities in Belgrade has
c reated concerns in Zagreb that Croatia has been held to far higher
s t a n d a rds - in terms of democratisation, and cooperation with the ICTY -
than Belgrade.  The international community should indeed demand
accountability from Serbia while showing Croatia tangible re t u rn, such as
assistance through Stability Pact programs, for its continued cooperation.  
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9.  MACEDONIA
Recent violence has made clear the need not only to contain conflict in the
s h o rt - t e rm but to bring greater energy to the underlying political task of
i m p roving civil rights and relations between the country ’s Macedonian-
speaking and Albanian-speaking communities.  It has also re i n f o rced the
need to speed pro g ress in Kosovo toward self-government and resolution of its
final status.  Much remains to be done in Macedonia to reduce corru p t i o n ,
remove other impediments to economic growth and improve the quality of
g o v e rn a n c e .
A.  Introduction
In late Fe b ru a ry 2001, violence fl a red in villages in nort h e rn Macedonia
close to the border with Ko s ovo . In mid-March , the fighting spread to
M a c e d o n i a ’s second largest city, Te t ovo , and the world was ag a i n
c o n f ronted with another Balkan country that seemed to be lurch i n g
t owa rd broader confl i c t . The ethnic Albanian guerrillas invo l ved in the
clashes claimed to be an indigenous movement fighting for their national
rights and defending themselves against Macedonian security fo rc e s .
L a cking a central command stru c t u re , the rebels we re appare n t ly a cl u s t e r
of loosely coordinated cells of ex p e rienced ethnic Albanian fi g h t e rs ,
p ri m a ri ly from Macedonia but with some from Ko s ovo and elsew h e re .
W h a t ever the re b e l s ’ i n t e n t i o n s , t h ey cl e a r ly tapped into the fru s t ra t e d
local demands for basic minority ri g h t s :c i t i z e n s h i p , ow n e rs h i p ,e d u c a t i o n ,
l a n g u age and re p re s e n t a t i ve gove rn m e n t .
The coalition gove rnment in Skopje pro m p t ly raised the alarm , bl a m i n g
Ko s ovo Albanian elements for ex p o rting rebellion to Macedonia, a n d
calling for the Ko s ovo Fo rce (KFOR) to seal the bord e r. The intern a t i o n a l
c o m munity reacted sw i f t ly and unanimously with support for Macedonia
and its elected gove rn m e n t , and condemnation of the guerri l l a s . S eve ra l
c o u n t ries offe red direct military assistance; U k raine supplied helicopter
g u n s h i p s ,w h i ch we re pro m p t ly sent into action against the rebel positions
a round Te t ovo .
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 185
On 21 March 2001,the government gave the guerrillas a 24-hour deadline to
lay down arms, or face a full-scale offensive. The rebels initially responded
with a unilateral cease-fire that was rejected by the government, and the
Macedonian military launched an offensive on 25 March. The following day,
the government announced that the rebels had been flushed out of a string
of villages above the city, but sporadic fighting continued as of late March
2001. The international community quickly encouraged the government to
start a political process that addressed minority grievances. While the
government seems to realise that this is inevitable,it also appears tempted to
pursue resolute military action - an approach with a high potential for
backfiring and creating more civilian deaths and sympathy for the insurgents.
Among the countries that broke away from former Yugoslavia in the early
1990s,Macedonia was unique in that it did so without bloodshed. Internally,
Macedonia is also distinguished from other countries in the region by the fact
that representatives of both the Macedonian-speaking and Albanian-speaking
populations have continued to participate in political life within the
framework of the country’s established institutions. Nevertheless, the
country’s course since independence has been fraught with peril,from both
within and without. Each of the countries bordering Macedonia has in the
past harboured designs on its territory. In the decade since its independence,
Macedonia’s neighbours have treated it with everything from benign neglect
to open hostility. Open territorial claims against Macedonia by its neighbours
have been officially put aside, but the violence in early 2001 has again
exposed the country’s inherent weaknesses. Until two months ago,matters
ranging from the country’s name to disputes over language and cultural
heritage were contentious. Now, the very stability of the state,and long-term
prospects for accommodation with Albanians both inside and outside the
country, are in question.
Macedonia survived relatively unscathed the massive influx of some 400,000
Kosovo Albanian refugees during the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s
(NATO) 1999 bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. The eventual resolution
of Kosovo’s status remains of great concern,especially given that any decision
regarding independence for Kosovo might be seen by many ethnic Albanians
in Macedonia as a precedent regarding their own status.
Macedonia’s difficult external and internal relations have exacerbated already
t rying economic conditions, with hardships intensified by the fo rm e r
international sanctions on neighbouring Serbia - a key trading partner.
Further,criminal elements within Macedonia have become more powerful by
exploiting smuggling routes into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
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Overall, Macedonia remains fragile,vulnerable to both internal and external
turbulence. International support,in terms of both funding and security, has
been,and will be,crucial in bolstering the country. The presence of Western
military forces, first under the UN banner and later under NATO, have
contributed significantly to pre-empting the kinds of widespread conflict that
have devastated the region, but which Macedonia has so far narrowly
avoided.
Table 17.  Macedonia at a Glance
*World Bank Atlas methodology.
Source: The World Bank;Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
B . S e c u r i t y
The greatest threat to Macedonia’s security turns on the unre s o l ve d
question of Ko s ovo ’s political status and its impact on relations betwe e n
the Macedonian- and Albanian-speaking commu n i t i e s . Albanians fo rm a
compact majority in we s t e rn areas bord e ring on Ko s ovo and A l b a n i a , a s
well as a significant pro p o rtion of the population of Sko p j e . Fo l l owing the
end of the 1999 Ko s ovo confl i c t , and gi ven the international commitment
to Ko s ovo , the threat of a spill over of instability from Ko s ovo into
Macedonia was suspended but has re s u r faced in Fe b ru a ry - M a rch 2001 as
g u e rrilla fighting continues along the Ko s ovo bord e r. C o n c e rn ab o u t
s e c u rity remains high. The fear among Macedonian-speake rs is that
eventual independence for Ko s ovo will lead to pre s s u re for a bre a k away
of Albanian-speaking areas of Macedonia. The tendency to view A l b a n i a n s
as a factor potentially threatening the terri t o rial integrity of the state has
f u rther eroded trust between the country ’s two largest gro u p s .
Recent fighting re i n fo rces fe a rs that Macedonia could draw the rest of the
re gion into a re n ewed conflict involving ethnic A l b a n i a n s , Macedonia and
S e r b i a . In the usual Balkan fa s h i o n , va rious reasons have been offe red fo r
the outbreak of violence in March , f rom the Macedonian army killing an
u n a rmed Albanian potato fa rm e r ; the gove rnment provoking an incident
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GNP per capita*:$1,290
Population:2.0 million
Elections: Parliamentary elections to be held in 2002,with
presidential elections in 2004.
President:Boris Trajkovski 
Prime Minister:Ljubco Georgievski
185  UNMIK sources confirmed to ICG that the mission was neither consulted about the border demarcation by the FRY
authorities,nor informed of the agreement until after its adoption in Belg rade and Skopje.
to distract from a domestic wire-tapping scandal; a reaction against the
recent border demarcation agreement between Macedonia and Serbia that
was re a ched without consulting the Ko s ovo A l b a n i a n s ; and the desire of
the local underworld to keep the bord e rs porous in order to continue a
ve ry lucra t i ve cigarette smuggling business.
Wa rming relations between Macedonia and the FRY cert a i n ly contri b u t e d
to the rising tensions. In late Fe b ru a ry 2001, a decade after Macedonia
became independent, and after fo u rteen rounds of nego t i a t i o n , the two
c o u n t ries re a ched agreement on the demarcation of their joint bord e r.
The agreement cove rs the whole 260 kilometres dividing the two
c o u n t ri e s , i n cluding the so-called “ p ro bl e m a t i c ” s p o t s , s u ch as the Pro h o r
Pcinski Monastery and the “ S a ra Tri a n g l e ” . The village of Prohor Pcinski
will remain in Serbia as a cultural and historical monu m e n t , although both
c o u n t ries will contribute to maintenance of the cemetery where both
Macedonians and Serbs are buri e d . The Shara Triangle was one of the most
p ro blematic are a s .
The Secre t a ry General of the Democratic Pa rty of Ko s ovo (PDK), Ja k u p
K ra s n i q i , wa rned that “the Macedonian gove rnment was sticking its nose
w h e re it should not”, and suggested that the joint commission could
discuss only the border with Serbia. In response to accusations by the
ethnic Albanians that the border demarcation with Ko s ovo was illegal,
Macedonian negotiator Viktor Dimovski responded that the United
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 cl e a r ly defined which
a u t h o rities we re allowed to determine the state bord e r, a dubious cl a i m .
The Border Demarcation A greement between Macedonia and the Fe d e ra l
R e p u blic of Yu go s l avia was ra t i fied by the Macedonian Parliament on 2
M a rch 2001. The Pa rty for Democratic Pro s p e rity (PDP) parliamentary
group and the two MPs of the soon to-be-established National Democra t i c
Pa rty (NDP) voted against ra t i fi c a t i o n , claiming that it was “ i m m o ra l ” t o
n e gotiate the border between the two countries without the part i c i p a t i o n
of Ko s ovo political leaders and the United Nations Mission in Ko s ovo
( U N M I K ) .1 8 5 This resentment at the ex clusion of ethnic Albanians from the
d e m a rcation negotiations fo rms part of the back ground to the Te t ovo
c ri s i s .
The recent hostilities also have their roots in a series of unre s o l ved bomb
a t t a cks against police stations throughout the country early in 2001. T h e
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22 Ja nu a ry 2001 terro rist attack on a police station in Te a rce (a village
near Te t ovo) killed one police officer and wounded three others . T h i s
a t t a ck consisted of two hand ro ckets and automatic guns; it fo l l owe d
bombings in Oslomej on 20 Ja nu a ry 2001, in Ku m a n ovo on 30 Ja nu a ry
2000 and in Te t ovo on 8 March 2000. The incidents we re initially
dismissed as criminal reve n ge attacks for police raids on smu g g l i n g
o p e rations and brothels in we s t e rn Macedonia. A more like ly ex p l a n a t i o n
points to elements associated with the Liberation A rmy of Medve d z a ,
P re s evo and Bujanovac (UCPMB), w h i ch was fo rmed in Ja nu a ry 2000.
The Macedonian gove rn m e n t , i n cluding Arben Xhafe ri , leader of the
Albanian party in the coalition gove rn m e n t , the Democratic Pa rty of
Albanians (DPA ) , maintained that the attacks we re not carried out fro m
o rganisations ab road but by radical individuals engaged in terro ri s t
activities in southern Serbia.1 8 6 S eve ral of the prev i o u s ly dorm a n t
s muggling channels trave rsing Macedonia and Ko s ovo that we re used by
the KLA have been re a c t i va t e d . The UCPMB separatists in southern Serbia
a re supplied with munitions from Macedonia, p u rchased by A l b a n i a n
s u p p o rt e rs in west European countri e s . T h e re is still no offi c i a l
explanation for the bombings, but many believe the attacks are re t a l i a t i o n
for undelive red supplies.
The Macedonian gove rnment insists that the present tro u bles are the
result of ag gression planned and led from Ko s ovo , and that the Ko s ovo
i nva d e rs enjoy little or no support amongst ord i n a ry Albanians in
M a c e d o n i a . This claim does not stand up. While a core of guerrillas had
fought with the KLA in Ko s ovo , and may have been born there , m a ny of
the fi g h t e rs around Te t ovo we re what they claimed to be: f ro m
M a c e d o n i a . Rather than being part of some grand master plan for ethnic
Albanian domination of the re gi o n , the movement gains its impetus fro m
c o n t i nuing concerns over the legal rights of ethnic Albanians in
M a c e d o n i a .
H oweve r, while there is no direct linkage between the terro rist activities
in the Ta nu s evci area and the Pre s evo va l l ey, t h ey cannot be viewed as
u n re l a t e d . In both instances, the ethnic Albanians sought intern a t i o n a l
s u p p o rt to further their goals of border ch a n ges and to fo rce Serbia and
Macedonia to accommodate Albanian demands for greater recognition and
a ck n ow l e d gement of their civil rights and legal status. The guerri l l a s
claim to number about 4,000 support e rs in Macedonia, a l o n e . T h e
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Macedonian gove rn m e n t , h oweve r, puts the fi g u re in the 300-500 pers o n
ra n ge . What is cl e a r, h oweve r, is that Macedonia is ill equipped to combat
t e rro rist attacks on its ow n , without significant support from NATO. T h e
i n t e rnational community should active ly support a political solution to
the current cri s i s . U n l i ke in Ko s ovo , the international community has
s p o ken in one vo i c e , and it should make clear that the gove rnment should
avoid a large-scale military offe n s i ve that is like ly to inf lict heavy civilian
c a s u a l t i e s , w h i ch , in turn could cause ethnic Albanians in the country to
s u p p o rt the guerri l l a s . F u rt h e r :
o As well as maximising its effo rts in Ko s ovo to control the border with
M a c e d o n i a , NATO - while recognising the need to maintain primacy fo r
a political rather than military solution for Macedonia’s securi t y
c o n c e rns - should continue its existing training and support pro gra m s
in Macedonia, and be pre p a red to consider an active role in support of
the Macedonian security fo rces against further rebel activity if the
c o u n t ry ’s gove rnment so re q u e s t s .
o KFOR should be commended for its recent effo rts to tighten control of
the Ko s ovo-Macedonia bord e r, and tro o p - c o n t ributing countries who
responded to the NATO Secre t a ry Genera l ’s appeal for more tro o p s
should also be commended.
o G i ven that the guerrillas are receiving a degree of logistic and perhaps
financial support from inside Ko s ovo , recent discussion of tri m m i n g
b a ck the Ko s ovo Protection Fo rce (KPC) should be discourage d , as this
would increase the pool of unemployed fo rmer members of the
Ko s ovo Liberation A rmy (KLA) and heighten the security risks to
Macedonia (as well as in Ko s ovo itself).
o The Macedonian gove rnment should consider the fo rmation of a
national  unity  coalition  gove rnment  that  would  include  at  a
m i n i mum the principal opposition part i e s , the Social Democra t i c
Alliance of Macedonia and the Pa rty for Democratic Pro s p e ri t y. T h i s
unity gove rnment would be ch a rged with improving inter-ethnic
relations including through gove rnment decentra l i s a t i o n , n ew
e l e c t o ral pro c e d u re s , and strong anti-corruption measure s . All citizens
of Macedonia must be re g a rded and protected as equal befo re the law.
o E ffo rts should be made to reduce the pro l i fe ration of weapons in the
re gi o n . A stag ge ring quantity of weapons has been hoard e d , f ro m
K a l a s h n i kov s , hand grenades and machine-guns to mort a rs and anti-
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tank launch e rs . A l t h o u g h , the climate may not ripe for vo l u n t a ry
c o m p l i a n c e , the international community nonetheless must begi n
d eveloping mechanisms to reduce the pro l i fe ration of we a p o n s .
C o n s i d e ration should be gi ven to extending the United Nations’
“ Weapons in Exch a n ge for Deve l o p m e n t ”p roject to Macedonia.
o The guerrillas fighting in Macedonia are financed from funds collected
abroad. The international community must begin a crackdown on illegal
funding of guerrilla movements in Macedonia and in the region at large.
o Tensions in nort h e rn Macedonia - as also in the A l b a n i a n - m a j o ri t y
d i s t ricts of southern Serbia - are fuelled by uncertainty over Ko s ovo ’s
f u t u re . This uncertainty should be re m oved insofar as possibl e , a l o n g
the lines discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. The United Nations-led
mission in Ko s ovo should set an early date for Ko s ovo-wide elections
to a provisional assembly, gi ve fo rce to the international promise of
substantial self-gove rn m e n t , and commence the process that will
eve n t u a l ly lead to a final political settlement.
While the threat to Macedonia’s stability stemming from Ko s ovo ’s
u n c e rtain future re m a i n s , i n t e rnational concern that conflict in fo rm e r
Yu go s l avia might spill over into other countries in the southern Balkans
has eased somewhat over time. In 1992, i n t e rnational fe a rs that an
o u t b reak of violence in Ko s ovo might draw in Macedonia, A l b a n i a ,
B u l g a ri a , G reece and even Tu rkey, either dire c t ly or indire c t ly, led the UN
S e c u rity Council to authorise a gro u n d - b reaking “ p reve n t i ve deploy m e n t ”
of some 1,200 peacekeeping troops to monitor Macedonia’s bord e rs - the
United Nations Preve n t a t i ve Deployment Fo rce (UNPREDEP) mission.
This deploy m e n t , while not equipped to suppress conflict was a we l c o m e
d e m o n s t ration of international re s o l ve to prevent it. While it is impossibl e
to say how events would have developed if the UN deployment had not
been made, the action neve rtheless re p resents a ra re international success
in pre - e m p t i ve action. The fo rce was gra d u a l ly re d u c e d , and then
t e rminated when China bl o cked the re n ewal of its UN mandate in
Macedonia because of the wholly unconnected issue of Sko p j e ’s decision
to establish diplomatic links with Ta i wa n . (The termination was not
lamented by Macedonia’s ruling coalition at the time because the fo rc e ’s
p resence was seen as compromising its nationalist credentials in the lead-
up to the 1998 parliamentary elections). The UN troop presence was soon
replaced by a NATO contingent in nort h e rn Macedonia, w h i ch prov i d e s
l o gistical support to KFOR troops in Ko s ovo and remains there today
p l aying to some extent the same role as UNPREDEP.
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M a c e d o n i a ’s relations with its neighbours remain pro bl e m a t i c . S t ro n ge r
ties to Bulgaria and Gre e c e , instead of being seen as an effo rt to improve
re gional coopera t i o n , a re viewed by many Macedonians through a
c o m p l ex , c o n s p i ra t o rial fear of irredentist aspira t i o n s . The Bulgarians and
G reeks have not always acted to reduce those tensions. For ex a m p l e ,
while Bulgaria quick ly recognised Macedonia’s independence, it only
re c e n t ly ack n ow l e d ged the existence of a distinct Macedonian people or
l a n g u age . As the main gove rning part y, the Internal Macedonian
R evo l u t i o n a ry Org a n i s a t i o n - D e m o c ratic Pa rty for Macedonian Unity
( V M RO - D P M N E ) , has distanced itself from Serbia and sought cl o s e r
relations with Bulgari a , the political pull to the north has lessened.
Relations between the two countries may have improved under the
p resent coalition gove rnment in Macedonia, but many in Macedonia
remain suspicious of Bulgari a ’s ultimate intentions.
G reek animosity towa rd Macedonian statehood was ex p ressed more
d i re c t ly. G reece campaigned fi e rc e ly against and successfully delaye d
M a c e d o n i a ’s widespread diplomatic recognition after it decl a re d
independence in 1991. G reece claimed that Macedonia’s name, fl ag and
some provisions of its constitution implied terri t o rial claims on nort h e rn
G re e c e . Macedonia only gained international acceptance and UN
m e m b e rship under a provisional name, the Fo rmer Yu go s l av Republic of
Macedonia (FYRO M ) , w h i ch continues in official use to this day. G re e c e
also pre s s u red European countries and international organisations to
withhold recognition of Macedonia until December 1993, and bl o cke d
M a c e d o n i a ’s membership of the Confe rence on Security and Coopera t i o n
in Europe (the pre c u rsor to the Organisation for Security and
C o o p e ration in Europe) until October 1995. These effo rts did nothing to
i m p rove Macedonia’s security and pro b ably injured its effo rts at
economic re fo rm .
Macedonia and Greece have re s o l ved many of their disputes, but the name
issue linge rs on; d i rect talks between Macedonia and Greece have
c o n t i nued interm i t t e n t ly on this issue since 1993. In late Ja nu a ry 2001,
G reek Fo reign Minister George Pa p a n d re o u ’s comments that Gre e c e
would bl o ck Macedonia membership in NATO and the European Union
(EU) created a frenzy of anti-Greek sentiment in Macedonia. The Fo re i g n
Minister also proposed to freeze 22 bilateral agreements until the name
dispute was re s o l ve d .1 8 7 The Greek gove rnment disavowed the comments
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and asserted that they we re not re p o rted in a proper contex t . Despite the
i m p roved commercial ties, n o rmalised relations between the two
c o u n t ries seem a long way off. I ro n i c a l ly, the business interests of Gre e k
i nve s t o rs may ultimately prove the decisive factor in breaking this
diplomatic logjam.
Relations with Albania have long been pro blematic and we re especially so
in the mid-1990s. Fo rmer Albanian President Sali Beri s h a ’s attempts to
p l ay a role in ethnic Albanian politics in Macedonia resulted in seve re
f riction among both Macedonia’s ethnic Albanian politicians and betwe e n
S kopje and Ti ra n a . Fo l l owing A l b a n i a ’s collapse into anarchy in 1997,
relations with Albania became wo rry i n g ly unpre d i c t abl e . H oweve r, t i e s
b e t ween Albania and Macedonia have improved considerably in the past
t h ree ye a rs due to four fa c t o rs : the election of a gove rnment in A l b a n i a
that seems less inclined to meddle in Macedonian affa i rs , the fall of the
M i l o s evic re gi m e , the victory of the V M RO-DPMNE-led coalition, and the
election of Boris Tra j kovski as pre s i d e n t . The outstanding stumbling bl o ck
to stabilising relations with Albania will pro b ably not be re m oved until
Ko s ovo ’s final status is determ i n e d .
Macedonia has close cultura l , political and economic links with Serbia.
D u ring the conflict in Ko s ovo , the Macedonian Parliament passed a
d e cl a ration that forbade the NATO troops based on its soil from taking
d i rect action from Macedonian terri t o ry without their approva l .
Macedonia maintained this offi c i a l ly neutral stance even after Yu go s l av
fo rces drove nearly a quarter of a million Ko s ovo Albanians re f u gees into
M a c e d o n i a . Although many viewed this as an attempt to destabilise the
c o u n t ry, a majority of Macedonian-speake rs sympathised with Serbia.
Fo rmer Yu go s l av President Slobodan Milosevic and his party re t a i n e d
some contact and influence over the small pro-Serbian political fo rces in
M a c e d o n i a ,p a rt i c u l a r ly the Socialist Pa rt y.
While the country offi c i a l ly welcomed the fall of Milosev i c , S e r b i a ’s
political upheaval was also greeted with a degree of unease. M a ny fe a re d
that Serbia would ove rt a ke Macedonia as a re gional leader and key
p a rtner to the We s t , with fo reign assistance being re d i rected from Sko p j e
to Belgra d e . Soon after his election, Kostunica attended a mid-October
Balkan summit in Skopje that was hosted by Tra j kov s k i , the fi rst visit by a
Yu go s l av head of state in more than a decade. But improvements in
relations between Macedonia and Serbia still have some way to go . T h ey
signed an agreement on 28 Fe b ru a ry 2001 that re s o l ved the contentious
b o rder issue, but Skopje is still waiting to ach i eve a settlement on the
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final division of gold re s e rves and hard currency of the fo rmer Yu go s l av
fe d e ra t i o n . The gove rn o rs of the national banks of Macedonia, C ro a t i a ,
Bosnia and Herzegov i n a , Serbia and Slovenia have met three times since
N ovember 2000 to discuss the division of these remaining fi n a n c i a l
a s s e t s .
That Macedonia has been able to escape serious conflict despite the
intense re gional turmoil of the last decade has been in no small measure
thanks to the international assistance with economic and securi t y
s u p p o rt . As long as the question of Ko s ovo ’s final status re m a i n s
u n re s o l ve d , inter-ethnic tensions in Macedonia will remain a cause of
s e rious concern , and ongoing international support remains essential.
M a c e d o n i a ’s membership in the Pa rt n e rship for Peace pro gram has been
b e n e fi c i a l , but the country has ex c e e d i n g ly high expectations that full-
fl e d ged NATO membership becko n s . If ambiguous We s t e rn promises of
closer European and NATO integration prove illusory, the risk is real that
M a c e d o n i a ’s  ethnic  divisions  could  develop  into  a  more  seri o u s
c o n fl i c t .
C . G o v e rn a n c e
The development of strong democratic institutions and civil society in
Macedonia continues to be undercut by the lack of a pro fessional civil
s e rvice and a perva s i ve political culture of patro n age , nepotism and part y
l oya l t y. G i ven such re a l i t i e s , the credibility of gove rning institutions is
l ow. A d m i n i s t ra t i ve re fo rm s , e s p e c i a l ly at the local leve l , a re cri t i c a l ly
n e e d e d , with  many  of  the  poor  and  minority  groups  lacking  full
access to benefits and serv i c e s . E n s u ring equitable right to take adva n t age
of public services and economic opportunities is an important ch a l l e n ge
that re q u i res constant attention to public spending and inve s t m e n t
p o l i c i e s .
M a c e d o n i a ’s lack of decentralisation and self-financing at the local
gove rnment level also re i n fo rces these pro bl e m s . The country needs
radical decentralisation to move political power closer to citizens. Wi t h i n
the fo rmer Yu go s l av i a , Macedonia had only 34 local mu n i c i p a l i t i e s , in a
system designed to ensure the centralisation of political power and
p a t ro n age . L e gislation passed in 1996 created 124 new local
mu n i c i p a l i t i e s , but did not gi ve these new bodies power to raise reve nu e
or otherwise be self-support i n g . Local gove rnments will remain politically
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p o l a rised and dependent upon the national spoils system until meaningful
re fo rm is implemented. D raft laws on local self-gove rnment have
languished in parliament for more than fi ve ye a rs .1 8 8 Meaningful local
gove rnment re fo rm will go a long way to build confidence in
gove rn m e n t ’s impartial and equal application of the law, a l l ow
c o m munities to manage their own sch o o l s ,h o s p i t a l s ,p u blic serv i c e s ,a n d
d e t e rmine whether minority languages will be used in addition to
M a c e d o n i a n .1 8 9
Institution building has often been ove r l o o ked as a pri o ri t y, and publ i c
institutions are widely seen as both unaccountable and insuffi c i e n t ly
committed to the defence of individual ri g h t s . M i n o rities often complain
that  they  are  subject  to  systematic  discri m i n a t i o n , and  the  lack  of
political cooperation among the country ’s ethnically based political
p a rties re i n fo rces the notion that politicians and state institutions
re p resent only a certain ethnic constituency and not the collective ri g h t s
of all citizens. The lack of a better functioning legal and judiciary system
has also fo rced many citizens to re ly on whatever group protections they
can fi n d .
T h e re is a widespread fear by Macedonians that elections in their country
will always be irregular and subject to international scru t i ny, l e aving the
c o u n t ry typecast in the “Balkan mould” of corru p t i o n ,c o m munal violence
and fraudulent ballots. The increased despondency of the electorate is
evidenced by the lowest ever voter turnout for the local elections held in
2 0 0 0 . The electorate has been through three bruising electoral campaigns
in the past two ye a rs : p a r l i a m e n t a ry elections in 1998, p re s i d e n t i a l
elections in 1999 and local gove rnment elections in 2000. All thre e
contests we re clashes between two blocs of political part i e s : on the one
h a n d , V M RO-DPMNE in coalition with the Democratic A l t e rn a t i ve (DA )
and the Democratic Pa rty of Albanians (DPA ) ; and on the other hand, t h e
Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM) in alignment with the
local Albanian Pa rty of Democratic Pro s p e rity (PDP) and a host of smaller,
left-leaning part i e s .
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Table 18.  Main Political Parties in FYR of Macedonia 
In ge n e ra l , the campaigns have not focused on issues. The OSCE election
o b s e rver missions noted that recent elections consistently fell short of
i n t e rnational standards for balloting in that they we re not free fro m
violence and intimidation and did not safe g u a rd the secrecy of vo t e s .1 9 0 A l l
t h ree elections we re marred by re p o rts of widespread ballot stuffi n g ,
multiple vo t i n g , verbal and physical intimidation inside polling stations,
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Political Party
Internal Macedonian
Revolutionary Organisation -
Democratic Party for
Macedonian Unity 
(VMRO-DPMNE)
Democratic Party of
Albanians
(PDSH) (Albanian)
(DPA ) (Macedonian)
Liberal Party (LP)
Social Democratic Alliance of
Macedonia (SDSM)
Democratic Prosperity Party 
(PDSH) (Albanian)
(PDP) (Macedonian)
Democratic Alternative (DA)
National Democratic Party 
(PDK) Albanian
(NDP) Macedonian
Political Alignment
The main governing party in Macedonia,led
by Prime Minister Ljubco Georgi ev s k i .
Currently holds 46 of the 120 parliamentary
seats. The party traditionally draws from a
right-wing nationalist constituency.
The DPA is the largest Albanian party and
s e rves in the thre e - p a rty gove rn m e n t
coalition. Headed by Arben Xhaferi, the
p a rty has gained signifi c a n t ly in
international stature during his leadership.
The smallest party in the coalition led by
Speaker of Parliament, Stojan Andov, which
provides the critical votes needed for the
parliamentary elections.
Largest opposition party, headed by Former
Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski. Party
has unsuccessfully tried to fo rce early
elections by re p e a t e d ly calling for the
resignation of Prime Minister Georgievski.
Second largest ethnic Albanian Party.
Previously part of the governing coalition.
The majority of its members defected when
the DA’s leader, Vasil Tu p u rkov s k i , t ri e d
unsuccessfully to challenge VMRO-DPMNE.
A new Albanian party formed on 12 March
2001 which acts as the political wing of the
National Liberation Army (NLA) rebels.
191 Approximate English translation of SDSM party stump speeches given during the height of the electoral campaign in late
November 1999.
and ove rt partisan manipulation by members of election commissions.
Fi e rce hostilities among party support e rs during local election polling
resulted in the violent death of an ethnic Albanian vo t e r, and indeed, m a ny
of the more obvious electoral irre g u l a rities occurred in pre d o m i n a t e ly
ethnic Albanian are a s . The international community has unintentionally
c o n t ributed to an env i ronment of mistrust by endorsing election outcomes
notwithstanding these irre g u l a ri t i e s . The international community should
not lower the bar for democratic standards in Macedonia, or else it ri s k s
f u rther undermining gove rnment legi t i m a c y.
The ruling V M RO-DPMNE has been stung by accusations among its ow n
ra n k - a n d - file that it is ove r - i n d u l gent to ethnic A l b a n i a n s ,e s p e c i a l ly after a
gove rnment agreement - fo l l owing lengthy negotiations and a good deal of
i n t e rnational pre s s u re - to create a pri va t e ly funded unive rsity at Te t ovo ,
with some classes taught in the Albanian language . M a ny of the ch a rges of
ex c e s s i ve concessions to minorities stem from opposition ch a rges that
P resident Tra j kovski owes his election to the strong support of the
Albanian speaking electora t e . SDSM Presidential candidate Tito Pe t kov s k i
p o rt rayed V M RO-DPMNE support e rs as Macedonians “who sold their
c o u n t ry and identity to the Albanians in an effo rt to stay in powe r.”1 9 1
H oweve r, the ethnic Albanian support for Tra j kovski came as no surprise in
light of Pe t kov s k i ’s own harsh anti-Albanian and anti-minority campaign
r h e t o ri c .
Ethnic Albanian support for the ruling coalition has fuelled vo c i fe ro u s
speculation among the opposition parties re g a rding the alleged ex i s t e n c e
of a secret pre-poll agreement between the gove rning V M RO-DPMNE and
the DPA to essentially gove rn the country along ethnic lines. O p p o s i t i o n
p a rties led protests against Albanian speake rs , their alleged invo l vement in
election irre g u l a rities and their presumed collab o ration with ethnic
Albanian political leaders in Ko s ovo and A l b a n i a .
The ruling coalition is a hy b rid of nationalist political parties created out
of necessity. After the 1996 local elections, both the nationalist right part y,
V M RO - D P M N E , and the Albanian leftist part y, D PA , e m e rged as stro n g
w i n n e rs . Their electoral successes exposed the weaknesses of the SDSM-
led coalition and fo re s h a d owed its dow n fall in the 1998 parliamentary
e l e c t i o n s . The overwhelming victory of DPA over the incumbent PDP
p a rty of ethnic Albanians was part i c u l a r ly surpri s i n g . P D P, in a cl e a r
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a ck n ow l e d gement of defe a t , later submitted a joint pro p o rtional list for the
1998 parliamentary elections. The PDP agreed with DPA to put up only
one ethnic Albanian politician - a DPA candidate - rather than have a poor
s h owing of their own PDP candidate. The 1996 poll proved that the
e l e c t o ra t e , re g a rdless of ethnic back gro u n d , was re a dy for ch a n ge .
V M RO-DPMNE initially appro a ched the Liberal Democratic Pa rt y ; a
coalition party led by the familiar faces of Petar Gosev and Stojan A n d ov.1 9 2
M o re than any t h i n g , h u b ris seemed to account for their refusal to back a
V M RO-DMPNE coalition. Political insiders re p e a t e d ly dismissed ru m o u rs
of secret negotiations in late 1997 between Ljubco Georgi evski fro m
V M RO-DPMNE and Arben Xhafe ri of DPA . In fa c t ,G e o rgi evski had decided
to fo rm a coalition with Xhafe ri but knew that he still had two pro bl e m s :
fi rs t , he might not win enough parliamentary votes to fo rm a new
gove rn m e n t , and secondly, he needed a buffer between V M RO-DPMNE and
D PA . He then appro a ched the merc u rial Vasil Tu p u rkov s k i ;M a c e d o n i a ’s last
re p re s e n t a t i ve to (and yo u n gest member of) the collective presidency of
the fo rmer Yu go s l av i a .
Tu p u rkovski is a large fi g u re among the rather bland ex - c o m munists in
M a c e d o n i a . His intellect and wily skills make him a fo rm i d abl e , if uneve n ,
p o l i t i c i a n . Tu p u rkov s k i , with his new ly fo rmed part y, the Democra t i c
A l t e rn a t i ve , ex t racted a heavy price for his participation in the 1998
e l e c t i o n s , with the DA receiving many of the choice gove rnment ministri e s
s u ch as fo reign affa i rs , j u s t i c e , e c o n o my, t ra n s p o rt and commu n i c a t i o n s ,
and the agency re s p o n s i ble for coordinating fo reign assistance. M a ny long-
time members of the V M RO-DPMNE exe c u t i ve body we re incensed at the
DA receiving such important posts despite their rather flimsy electora l
s h ow i n g . The ongoing tension between V M RO-DPMNE and DA ro u t i n e ly
e rupted and fell into a pre d i c t able pattern . DA hab i t u a l ly threatened to
l e ave the coalition, called for a press confe re n c e , and then announced its
intentions to remain in gove rnment after being placated by Georgi ev s k i .
M e a n w h i l e , behind the scenes,Arben Xhafe ri of the DPA began to delive r
on his campaign pledges to the ethnic Albanian commu n i t i e s . An amnesty
l aw was passed in order to release two DPA mayo rs who had been
i m p risoned in 1997 for inciting protests and violating constitutional law
for flying Albanian fl ags in defiance of legislation that defined under what
c i rcumstances such actions we re law f u l . Under Xhafe ri ’s leaders h i p , t h e
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D PA accelerated the placement of ethnic Albanians in gove rnment posts -
i n cluding some tra d i t i o n a l ly held by ethnic Macedonians - and succeeded
in establishing the new Te t ovo unive rs i t y.
Xhaferi has also unfailingly supported his VMRO-DPMNE partners,as part of
a DPA political strategy that appears to based on achieving steady, if slow,
gains in placing strong ethnic Albanian party supporters in critical public and
economic institution posts that they have often been denied. The back room
m a n o e u v ring needed to sustain such a political stra t e gy suits both
Georgievksi and Xhaferi well. As long as Xhaferi quietly goes about his
business,the more xenophobic voices of VMRO-DPMNE remain muted.
The greatest source of tension in the ruling coalition has been between the
VMRO-DPMNE and the DA. The DA made its last bid to break the ruling
coalition, leaving on 23 November 2000. However, the DA and the SDSM
failed in their attempt to topple the government and replace it with a
government of technocrats that would rule until new elections. The
subsequently restructured government now contains the VMRO-DPMNE,the
DPA and a host of smaller parties such as the Liberal Party and “independent”
members of Parliament who defected from the DA and the PDP, another
ethnic Albanian party. The coalition could well become stronger freed of the
disruptive influence of the DA leader Vasil Tupurkovski, but it remains
stretched across a number of party alliances,always a challenge to manage.
Macedonia became a member of the Council of Europe on 9 November 1995,
which has helped to raise the benchmarks that Macedonia will have to live
up to in areas such as bilingual education, citizenship requirements, police
enforcement and due process. One of the most important achievements
gained through the process of closer European integration has been the
Council’s evaluation of how Macedonian legislation and institutions compare
to those of Europe. The Council of Europe has pushed hard for legislation on
NGOs and media freedom. Outstanding issues include decentralisation,
p u blic administration re fo rm and adhering to European standards fo r
elections.
Among the emphases of the international community in Macedonia is to
strengthen institutional capacity by reforming public administration. The
Macedonia government estimates that about 3,500 redundant personnel in
the state administration will need to lose their jobs. 193 The $40 million World
Bank loan for public administration is predicated on meeting this target. In
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addition to World Bank assistance,the EU and the UK’s Know-How Fund are
working on public administration reforms. U.S.-funded decentralisation
p rojects through United States A gency for International Deve l o p m e n t
(USAID) and EU Phare/OECD programs also provide important technical
assistance.
D. Human Rights
The war in Kosovo seriously strained the already difficult relations between
Macedonia’s two largest groups,and many Macedonian-speakers continue to
be very nervous about the territorial aspirations of Albanian-speakers. Ethnic
Albanians, by contrast, tend to be more optimistic, seeing the end of
Belgrade’s rule in Kosovo, and the province’s prospects for independence,as
positive developments. Macedonia’s Albanians also view Kosovo’s potential
independence as strengthening their effort to gain more political power
either within Macedonia or through a possible ethnic union with Kosovo.
Macedonia’s ethnic split is a persistent topic of intense controversy and high
political stakes. According to the government’s 1994 census, Albanians
comprise 23 per cent of the population;they claimed at the time to make up
approximately one-third of Macedonia’s population. Albanian leaders charge
that there was intentional bias in counting Albanians in both the 1991 and
1994 censuses,and accuse the government of undercounting them in order
to present an “acceptable” demographic balance. The Albanian-speaking
population has also, by most accounts, been growing faster (due to higher
birth rates) than the Macedonian-speaking community.
A new census is scheduled for April 2001. If the results are accepted by both
the Macedonian and Albanian communities, it could set the stage for far-
reaching agreements on contentious issues ranging from constitutional rights
to education, federalisation and public-sector employment. In a society that
still views itself through an ethnic prism,the census is vital because it directly
affects debates over the number of minority language schools,the number of
hours of minority-language television and radio programming,employment in
the state sector, the use of national symbols and many other daily issues.
Albanian leaders are not optimistic that the census will be conducted fairly.
They suggest that some 100,000-117,000 Albanians residing in Macedonia
lack citizenship documents.194 A restrictive citizenship law adopted in 1992
set a deliberately high bar for Albanians. Citizens were required to meet a
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fi f t e e n - year continuous residency re q u i re m e n t , when it was widely
recognised that many ethnic Albanians had worked in different parts of the
former Yugoslavia. According to the Interior Ministry, progress is being made
on drafting a more equitable citizenship law in order to bring Macedonian
law into line with European standards, including the European Citizenship
Convention.
The State Statistical Office has rebuffed ethnic Albanian party demands that
the new census use minority languages in addition to Macedonian,declaring
that the 1994 census law - which allowed the use of minority languages - was
determined to be unlawful by the Constitutional Court in 1995.195 The
international community,primarily the OSCE,has offered to assist the country
in its efforts to recruit qualified enumerators who are native speakers of
minority languages. The international community must encourage full
participation in the census if it is to carry any real meaning or acceptance by
the country’s minorities. Some success has been made in that the Statistical
Office bowed to outside pressure to employ its first ethnic Albanian in a
senior management position. The forthcoming census should be postponed
until late autumn,so that it can be conducted openly and as accurately, in line
with intern a t i o n a l ly accepted cri t e ria of re s i d e n c y. This may re q u i re
international assistance,not only in processing the census results but also in
preparing it and supervising its conduct.
According to the 1994 census figures, other minorities such as Turks, Roma,
Vlachs and Serbs together account for 11 per cent of the population.196 They
often complain of disproportionate attention and state benefits given to
ethnic Albanians. Aside from the ethnic Albanians, there is a sizeable Roma
community, largely integrated into society and politically very active. A Roma
holds one seat in Parliament,one was elected as a mayor and there are now
nine city councillors who identify themselves as Roma.
The Labour Minister and the Deputy Minister of Justice are customarily drawn
from ethnic Albanian coalition parties. These two ministries have long been
of key importance for ethnic Albanian leaders. In general,the legislation and
regulatory procedures concerning such matters as property registration and
university enrolment for minorities are not blatantly discriminatory but are,
h oweve r, s e l e c t i ve ly interpre t e d . The same holds true for minori t y
participation in public administration. For example, the percentage of
Albanians in the civil service has only recently increased from 4 per cent to
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about 7-8 per cent since 1997,according to statements made by DPA. In the
armed forces,Albanians comprise 40 per cent of enlisted soldiers, but no
Albanian is among the 600-strong elite Wolves and Scorpio units. NATO could
p l ay a stro n ger role in encouraging greater minority re p re s e n t a t i o n
throughout the military command structure.
In general, minorities in Macedonia enjoy more rights and are better
assimilated than in much of the region. However, the constitution still
contains a number of problematic provisions,and many minorities view it as
less equitable than the old Yugoslav constitution. Representatives of all
minorities object to the preamble to the 1991 constitution, which defines
Macedonia as a “national state of the Macedonian people, in which full
equality as citizens and permanent coexistence with the Macedonian people
is provided for Albanians,Turks,Vlachs, Roma and other nationalities”. The
country’s minorities see this statement as implying that ethnic Macedonians
have a higher constitutional status, placing minorities at the margins of
society. Minority representatives also object to the constitutional status of
Macedonian as the sole official language and to the special recognition
granted to the Macedonian Orthodox Church.197
The constitution guarantees the right to primary and secondary schooling in
minority languages,but makes no reference to higher education.198 The near-
total absence of higher education in the Albanian language has dominated the
ethnic Albanian national struggle for nearly a decade. In 1995, ethnic
Albanians established their university when the government refused to
introduce Albanian-language instruction at the state universities in Bitola and
Skopje. The new Tetovo university was largely financed by the Albanian
diaspora and became a lightening rod for nationalist rhetoric on both sides.
The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel,
mediated on the issue for more than five years. He eventually proposed
limited international funding for a new private university to replace the
university in Tetovo. A significant number of Macedonians bitterly oppose the
establishment of an Albanian-language university and criticise President
Trajkovski for agreeing to establish a new multi-lingual university in the
Albanian-inhabited region of the country. Its curriculum will focus on teacher
training, business management and public administration, and will include
202 AFTER MILOSEVIC
courses in the Albanian,Macedonian and English languages. Still,it is unlikely
that the university will become financially sustainable in the absence of
international fundraising efforts or without reaching some agreement on
future public funding.
Macedonia has made much progress in building a civil society in the short
time since independence. There are more than 1,000 registered Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs),many of which are active in seeking to
foster better inter-ethnic relations and media freedom. The early 1990s saw
an explosive growth in media outlets. By 1997 there were 210 registered
broadcasters - numerical pluralism that exceeding anything in Croatia or
Serbia. Although the great majority of stations showed only music videos,
commercials,light entertainment or pornography, there were also some high-
quality outlets such as A1 television and Kanal 77 radio. Nevertheless, the
s t a t e - c o n t rolled netwo rk , Macedonian Radio-Te l evision (MRT V ), e a s i ly
dominates the broadcast sector, and remains firmly under government
control. In the print sector, the giant state-owned Nova Makedonija group,
comprising newspapers, magazines,print-works and a distribution network,
dwarfs everything else on the market. Its products reflect government policy.
Leading positions at MRTV and Nova Makedonija are political appointments.
While their audience share and readership have declined drastically during
the past decade, these unreconstructed, publicly subsidised giants skew the
market,making it hard for better products to achieve commercial viability.
The government-owned and private media must play a more responsible and
constructive role in presenting the country’s multi-ethnic character. Media
coverage of the March 2001 violence in Tetovo by outlets in both languages
contributed to an atmosphere of collective hysteria. The EU, the U.S. and
i n t e rnational organisations should facilitate a dialogue between the
Macedonian and Albanian representatives on improving media portrayal of all
nationalities and minorities,and should require Macedonia to undertake the
same reforms in the media sphere that have been expected of Croatia and
Bosnia.
On more than on occasion, the pri vate media have complained of
intimidation and obstacles to their work. Sitel TV experienced power cuts
during its coverage of election irregularities; Makedonija Denes newspaper
had its bank account blocked after publishing a series of unflattering articles
about the alleged money laundering in the humanitarian activities conducted
by the wife of the Prime Minister. An unknown gunman fired shots at the
front door of the apartment of the news editor of A1 Television. There has
not been enough substantiated proof to directly tie these actions to the
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government. There are also signs that government attempts to influence the
media have been increasing: it is more difficult to obtain licenses; public
subsidies are awarded according to partisan criteria; and the government
mostly controls distribution and circulation.
On 1 February 2001, the three largest private television and radio stations
stopped broadcasting regular programming for 24 hours. The stations
inserted a message that read,“Dear viewers,this is the future of your medium
as a result of the monopoly of the Macedonian state television.”The three
concessions claim that state-owned Macedonian Television (MTV) receives 65
per cent of total available public funding despite having an extremely low
percentage of audience viewing and that MTV routinely exceeds the legal
time limits for advertising.
Public faith in the government’s media policy was further rocked when
Branko Crvenkovski,leader of the largest opposition party, SDSM,accused the
government of wire-tapping the telephone conversations of more than 100
public figures. Crvenkovski alleged to have in his possession hundreds of
p ages of tra n s c ripts taken from the electronic eave s d ropping of 25
p rominent journ a l i s t s , m e m b e rs of Georgi ev s k i ’s own cabinet and
conversations between Trajkovski and a local Albanian journalist.
The timing of the tapped conversations coincided with two government
crises, the campaign period prior to the September local elections and the
p ower struggle between the gove rnment and the opposition. T h e
government clumsily attempted to blame others, such as the Ministry of
Defence and SDSM, of ordering the wire tapping in order to trigger a
government crisis. The ongoing investigation by the specially appointed
parliamentary commission has so far produced little evidence indicating who
or what authority authorised the illegal wiretapping. Most in Macedonia are
sceptical that the truth will be revealed anytime soon.
In late February 2001,the government sent a draft Law on Public Information
to parliament. If adopted,this draft would have reversed some of the gains
Macedonia has made toward building a strong and vibrant civil society. It
contained highly restrictive provisions that would place unnecessary and
u n wa rranted re s t rictions on freedom of ex p re s s i o n . Although the
government had consulted with media experts from renowned international
organisations,their recommendations were not to be found in the draft law.199
Adoption was only averted by a campaign of protest orchestrated by
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international NGOs, led by the Open Society Institute. These NGOs noted
that the Council of Europe had accepted an invitation from the government
to discuss the draft confidentially in autumn 2000.The resulting fiasco should
serve as a warning to inter-governmental organisations not to engage in
private negotiations on human rights issues, excluding both Macedonian and
international groups.
This episode illustrated the peculiar place that Macedonia occupies,in terms
of international assessments of human rights in the Balkans. The international
community has, predominantly through the OSCE and Council of Europe,
repeatedly urged successive governments in Skopje to improve its treatment
of ethnic minorities,practice good governance and avoid irregular, violence-
prone elections. The government generally respects the human rights of its
citizens,but the application of the law is at times arbitrary and often to the
detriment of minorities. However, there has been a reluctance in Western
capitals to draw the sorts of far-reaching lessons from this patchy record that
have been drawn in, for example,Croatia and Serbia. In short,Macedonia has
hardly been subject to international pressure over its human rights record. A
double standard is often applied, holding up Macedonia as the region’s only
multi-ethnic success story while overlooking the heavy-handed tactics that
the government claims are necessary to protect national security.
In March 2001,the human rights deficit was cited by Albanian rebels fighting
in pockets of northern Macedonia, along the Kosovo border. Asked by the
international media why they had taken up arms, they said they were
campaigning for full civil rights for Albanians. Despite the undoubted
inequalities in the treatment and status of the country’s minorities, this
sounded more like an astute use of language designed to appeal to Western
and local audiences than like a genuine explanation of insurrection. In any
event,the human rights deficit cannot condone the armed uprising. Should
the fighting in the north continue and spread to the interior, the human rights
situation for both majority and minorities will deteriorate and the fragile
gains made in developing a civil society in Macedonia will erode.
E.  Economy
The Macedonian economy has hardly flourished since independence but it
has proven remarkably stable - despite a steady increase in the current
account deficit and the regional upheaval of the last decade. The country
achieved nearly 3 per cent annual growth in 1999, and the second half of
2000 was characterised by steady economic growth that resulted in a 5 per
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cent GDP increase. While prices for petrol, electricity and bread have
increased dramatically since VMRO-DPMNE took office in 1998,prices overall
have been stable,with an annual inflation rate of about 2.2 per cent.
In a January 2001 press conference,Minister of Finance Nikola Gruevski and
Prime Minister Georgievski claimed that macro-economic indicators showed
the highest improvement in a ten-year period and a budget surplus is
projected for the second year in a row.200 According to Gruevski, the 2001
budget is projected to be just under $1 billion with $0.9 billion based on state
income and the remaining $85 million on foreign loans. The government
hopes to shift spending from tra d i t i o n a l ly high public administra t i o n
expenses to development of infrastructure. The surplus funds will be
earmarked for poverty alleviation, repayment of frozen individual hard
currency savings accounts, unemployment benefits, delayed pensions and
government issued bonds. A small “rainy day”fund has also been set aside to
cover any dips in macroeconomic stability and balance of payments.
Not all in the country are benefiting from the “new economy”. Like much of
former Yugoslavia, Macedonia has experienced a very significant drop in
living standards in the decade since independence. It continues to suffer high
levels of poverty and debilitating unemployment. According to the June 2000
preliminary Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (jointly prepared with the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund),more than 20 per cent of
the population lives below the level of poverty on about 160 denars per day
or $2.201 Large rural households and those with minimal education are
especially vulnerable. About 56 per cent of the population have less money
in real terms than they did a decade ago.
Nearly every family has first-hand experience of unemployment. In July 2000,
the European Statistics Bureau and the International Labour Organisation
found that 257,485 people of a total working population of 802,553 were
unemployed. More than half of the 32 per cent of people who are
unemployed are young and have never held a job;170,000 of the unemployed
are between the ages of 15 and 29. These figures, however, are likely to be
exaggerated due to the currently strong financial incentives to register as
unemployed.
In early 2000, the Macedonian government made a pledge to complete its
privatisation process by the end of the year, and it nearly succeeded in that
goal. Out of the 1,600 companies scheduled for privatisation, nearly 1,500
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companies, employing some 217,000 people, were sold last year. The total
value of the privatised companies was about $2 billion. There are cur rently
around 50 companies listed on the Macedonian Stock Exchange in which the
government is the partial or majority owner. The Privatisation Agency is
authorised to sell these shares on the Stock Exchange. If the Agency cannot
sell the shares at their nominal value,they can be sold at an auction with a
predetermined discount. If the Privatisation Agency owns at least 50 per cent
of the shares of the package they can sell them via a block transaction (all of
the shares at one go),but there must be more than one investor.
The pri vatisation of state assets has not been unive rs a l ly popular in
Macedonia. The government faces charges that a lack of transparency in
economic policy has led to dishonest sales of state assets. For many years,
government officials or party supporters have bought depreciated public
companies at art i fi c i a l ly low pri c e s , w h i ch , in turn , u n d e rmined the
privatisation process. Recent purchases of the country’s Okta oil refinery,
Buchim Radovish gold mine,Balkan Steel,Stopanska Bank and USJE cement
factory by foreign companies - Greek especially - have led to charges made by
the opposition that the gove rnment is interested only in fi n a n c i a l
commissions rather than pre s e rving the country ’s vital re s o u rces and
i n d u s t ri e s . These same accusations we re made against the prev i o u s
government.
There has been some progress in consolidating and privatising the country’s
chaotic banking system. The government will need to implement difficult
reforms if sustainable growth is to be achieved. It needs to make a level
playing field for foreign investment and to establish consistent business
practices. Issues needing to be addressed in tackling Macedonia’s economic
problems are the same ones afflicting the entire region: lack of financial
discipline; ineffective bankruptcy legislation; weak enforcement of creditor
and shareholder rights; and a bloated,ineffective public administration. The
government has reduced through privatisation the number of large, state-
owned loss making enterprises, but eight remaining major loss-making
enterprises were required to have been privatised or liquidated by 31 March
2001 as part of the conditions for release of the second installment of the
World Bank FESAL II loan.
A major pro blem facing Macedonia is widespread corru p t i o n , w h i ch wa s
exacerbated by the international sanctions imposed on neighbouri n g
Yu go s l avia in 1992. Macedonia became a key transit country for bre a k i n g
i n t e rnational sanctions and the previous gove rnment is assumed to have take n
a large commission. T h e re is increased evidence of organised cri m e , m o s t
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v i s i bly revealed by garish displays of quick ly obtained we a l t h . R u m o u rs pers i s t
of vast corruption netwo rks involving police. A spate of bombings in
Ku m a n ovo , Stip and other pri m a ri ly eastern cities in the past couple of ye a rs
a re pro b ably tied to local gangs,police and disputes over smuggling pro fi t s . O n
15 November 2000 police confiscated nearly $3.5 million wo rth of Tu rk i s h
h i g h - grade heroin in a village near Struga that was bound for European marke t s .
UN and other NGO re p o rts on the netwo rks of human tra ffi ck i n g ,d rugs and
weapons smuggling that use a Macedonian transit route are incomplete and
o n ly hint at the possible levels of “ o ffi c i a l ”Macedonian invo l ve m e n t .
The ever more apparent linkage between politics and organised crime has
also eroded popular confidence in Macedonia’s leadership. It is an open
secret that many current and former members of government have enriched
themselves illicitly. Perennial accusations of government corruption, and
institutional support for smuggling networks,sharpened after the opposition
parties’most recent failure to topple the government,last November. There
were venomous attacks on public officials and a barrage of accusations that
the government was not competent to confront the threats to the country’s
security. This, in turn, increased a sense of popular insecurity. Political
corruption has, in turn, opened the political space for more radical or
nationalist political parties. On the VMRO-DPMNE side, there has been a
gradual splintering that led to the creation of VMRO-VMRO, directed by
p a r l i a m e n t a ry Boris Stoy m e n ov. The Democratic A l t e rn a t i ve has also
fragmented,with many former party members citing vast corruption as the
reason for their dissension.
Integration into Western structures remains a key priority for Macedonia’s
leaders. The help that Macedonia has received notwithstanding,Macedonia
leaders complain that the West has neglected the country and its needs. They
contend that Macedonia should be rewarded for the positive and peaceful
role it played during the decade of regional war. A general sentiment of
dissatisfaction accompanies discussions about relations between Brussels and
Skopje. The EU is accused of keeping Macedonia at arm’s length and trying
to put the country in a type of regional ghetto.202
Carl Bildt, UN special envoy for the Balkans, provoked a highly negative
reaction when he appeared to suggest that countries of the western Balkans,
including Macedonia, should focus on integration within regional structures
before aiming to integrate into Europe.203 This idea was widely viewed in
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Skopje as relegating Macedonia to a second tier or “poor-man’s” Europe.
Bildt’s suggestion was disavowed by the EU, which has emphasised that
efforts to build regional cooperation will not alter the principle that each
country will approach the EU on its individual merits.
Macedonia signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU, at
the EU summit in Zagreb on 24 November 2000,ahead of the other countries
of the western Balkans. Many political figures regret that the country did not
drive a harder bargain over the conditions for the agreement, although
Macedonia will clearly benefit from the new trade provisions. About 80 per
cent of its exports are allowed free access to the EU member states,and new
EU allowances will increase exports of many agricultural products,and likely
boost both production and foreign investment.
Macedonian expectations of further international integration are high. The
international community has a critical role to play in assisting Macedonia in
reforming its institutions and economy. So far, there has been much
disappointment on the Macedonian side. Many of the Stability Pact’s
promised “quick-start”projects in the country, such as transit for KFOR into
Kosovo, are widely viewed as serving international rather than local needs.
The Stability Pact is generally viewed with great disappointment. The two
structures that carry real meaning and expectations are NATO and the
European Union. The presence of international peacekeepers is essential to
guarantee the security and stability of Macedonia. According to most
Macedonians,the European Union will need to find a more efficient way of
bringing Macedonia and the other South Eastern European countries into EU
structures if this large economic and political umbrella is to hold any
meaning.
Conclusions and recommendations on Macedonia
o The Macedonian government should accept, and the intern a t i o n a l
community insist, that the primar y focus in resolving Macedonia’s
i n t e rnal security problems must be political rather than military.  A
serious eff o rt must be made by Macedonian-speakers to address the
reasonable political, cultural and economic concerns of the Albanian-
speaking community.
o The Macedonian government should consider the formation of a national
unity coalition government charged with improving inter-ethnic re l a t i o n s
including through government decentralisation, new electoral pro c e d u re s ,
and strong anti-corruption measure s .
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o The Macedonian government should avoid large-scale militar y off e n s i v e s
likely to inflict heavy civilian casualties and further erode support for
political solutions.
o As well as maximising its eff o r ts in Kosovo to control the border with
Macedonia, NATO - while recognising the primacy of political over
m i l i t a ry solutions to the country ’s security problems - should continue its
existing training and support programs in Macedonia, and be pre p a re d
to consider an active role in support of the Macedonian security forc e s
against fur ther rebel activity if the country ’s government so re q u e s t s .
o Recent discussion of trimming back the Kosovo Protection Force (KPC)
should be discouraged, as such steps would increase the pool of
unemployed former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and
heighten the security risks to Macedonia.  
o Consideration should be given to extending the United Nations’ “We a p o n s
in Exchange for Development” project to Macedonia.  
o The international community must begin a crackdown on illegal funding
of guerrilla movements in Macedonia and in the region at larg e .
o Macedonia will re q u i re extensive assistance to successfully fight
i n t e rnationally organised crime, particularly trade in drugs, illegal
immigrants, weapons, prostitutes and cigarettes.  
o The international community should revitalise stalled initiatives to
radically decentralise political power and move it closer to citizens in
Macedonia.  Meaningful local government re f o rm will go a long ways to
build confidence in the govern m e n t ’s impartial and equal application of
the law, allow communities to manage their own schools, hospitals, public
s e rvices, and determine whether minority languages will be used in
addition to Macedonian.
o The international community should not lower the bar for democratic
s t a n d a rds in Macedonia, or else it will risk further undermining the
g o v e rn m e n t ’s political legitimacy.
o The for thcoming census should be postponed until late autumn, so that it
can be conducted openly and as accurately, in line with intern a t i o n a l l y
accepted criteria of re s i d e n c y.  This may re q u i re international assistance,
not only in processing the census results but also in preparing it and
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s u p e rvising its conduct.  The international community should financially
s u p p o rt the hiring of individuals fluent in minority languages as
enumerators, and ethnic minorities should be given a stronger role in the
Statistical Off i c e .
o The Council of Europe and NGOs such as the Open Society Institute,
A r ticle 19 and Freedom House have significant roles to play in pro m o t i n g
media development and re f o rm.  Given the recent experience with the
a b o r ted draft Law on Public Information, and the loss of public trust in
g o v e rnment respect for free media, the international community and the
EU in particular should put more teeth into their recommendations and
o f fer a serious program for re s t ructuring the state-controlled outlets.  
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10.  ALBANIA
A l b a n i a ’s preoccupations are internal, as it struggles to establish the rule of
l a w, battle endemic corruption, re s t ru c t u re its economy and build the basic
institutions of governance.  We s t e rn eff o rts in support of strategies to stem the
flow of illegal weapons and other forms of trafficking are essential.
A. Introduction
L i ke most countries in Eastern Euro p e , Albania has sought to establish a
f ree market economy, implement widespread pri vatisation and embra c e
n ew fo re i g n , d e fence and internal security policies. H oweve r, h i s t o ry
o ffe rs a shaky foundation upon which to build the stru c t u res of a modern
s t a t e . Ap a rt from a six-month ex p e riment in 1924,Albania has never befo re
had a parliamentary gove rn m e n t . C o n s e q u e n t ly, the understanding of
m o d e rn political parties and their role in a pluralist state remains seve re ly
l i m i t e d .
Hard-line communist rule from 1944 to 1991 profoundly, and negatively,
affected the social and economic development of the Albanian people. This
rule relied heavily upon a small, powerful elite based in Tirana, and post-
c o m munist gove rnments have had difficulty breaking the hold of
undemocratic senior cliques on public institutions. The destruction of
Albania’s one-party state has also revived many older and unsavoury aspects
of Albanian life,including blood feuds and elements of traditional Gheg-Tosk,
north-south rivalries.
The breakdown of communist control resulted in major social disorientation.
This upheaval was most devastatingly manifested in Albania’s degeneration
into anarchy during the winter of 1991, and a virtual state of civil war
triggered by the collapse of extensive pyramid banking schemes in 1997. The
attempted coup of 1998 further underscored Albania’s fragility. It is against
this background that the Socialist-led government, which came to power
following the 1997 uprising,has struggled to combat lawlessness and rebuild
authority.
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In the aftermath of the Kosovo war, the “Albanian National Question” has
dominated Albania’s foreign policy, and the country has begun to play a
prominent role in future pan-Albanian aspirations. However, many Albanians
fear continued regional instability due to Kosovo’s uncertain political status.
While Albania has made important strides in restoring essential order, the
central challenges facing Albania include:
o restructuring an economy severely hampered by outdated and obsolete
industry;
o Filling the social vacuum left by the collapse of a rigid authoritarian state;
o Combating crime and corruption and disarming the civilian population;
and
o Balancing the newly enhanced sense of Albanian national consciousness
throughout the southern Balkans with respect for the multi-ethnic nature
of the region and the integrity of surrounding states.
Table 19.  Albania at a Glance
*World Bank Atlas methodology.
Source: The World Bank;Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
B. Security
Since the attempted coup d’état in September 1998, the restoration of law
and order has been the Socialist-led government’s main priority. State
authority has now been re-established throughout much of the country, and
in central and southern Albania, the security situation has seen dramatic
improvements. However, the population is still deeply traumatised as a result
of the violence of 1997 and 1998, and the perception of insecurity remains
high.
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GNP per capita*:$810 
Population:3.4 million
Elections:Local elections held on 1 October 2000.
Parliamentary elections called for June 2001.
President:Rexhep Meidani
Prime Minister:Ilir Meta
204  U.S.State Department Annual Report on Albania, February 2001, available at www.state.gov
Pa rts of nort h e rn Albania still suffer from endemic crime and banditry
b eyond its major towns and cities. The violent settling of accounts among
gangs of tra ffi cke rs , s mu g g l e rs and other criminals has terro rised many
locals into silence. The situation in the nort h e rn re gion of Tropoja re m a i n s
p a rt i c u l a r ly vo l a t i l e , in an area where the gove rnment is attempting to
rebuild the local police fo rce amid tightly knit clan allegiances and
hostility to interventions from Ti ra n a . M a ny police offi c e rs have dire c t
links to criminal activity, and others are reluctant to apprehend cri m i n a l s
for fear of becoming invo l ved in blood fe u d s . A c c o rding to the U. S . S t a t e
D e p a rt m e n t , one of the most serious pro blems involving public order and
i n t e rnal security is the fact that police offi c e rs are large ly untrained and
often unre l i abl e : “ U n p ro fessional behaviour and corruption remain a
major impediment to the development of an effe c t i ve , civilian police
fo rc e ” .2 0 4
Weapons continue to pro l i fe rate in A l b a n i a . A rmy depots we re widely
looted during the chaos of 1997 and, a c c o rding to the Ministry of
D e fe n c e , some 656,000 we a p o n s , 3.5 million hand gre n a d e s , half a million
land mines and 1.5 million rounds of ammunition we re stolen. E ffo rts to
d i s a rm the population have borne little fruit to date because they have
ge n e ra l ly lacked sufficient financial re s o u rces to be effe c t i ve . The pilot
United Nations Weapons in Exch a n ge for Development project in the
G ramsh district has been a successful fi rst step in beginning the collection
of arm s , with over 5,700 weapons and 100 tons of ammunition and
ex p l o s i ves vo l u n t a ri ly turned in. M a ny of the weapons handed in,
h oweve r, h ave been old military ri fl e s ,m a ny dating back to the Fi rst Wo r l d
Wa r. In November 2000 Defence Minister Ilir Gjoni announced an
ambitious plan to find and destroy more than 100,000 looted we a p o n s . A
N o r we gian weapons collecting project in the nort h e rn Dibra distri c t , wa s
re l a t i ve ly successful. Although other such initiatives are planned, t h e
wider extension and intensification of such projects to re claim we a p o n s
looted during 1997 would be highly benefi c i a l .
Albania is situated on a prime smuggling route for both drugs and people
b e t ween Tu rkey, A s i a , the Middle East and We s t e rn Euro p e . The country
has become an important transit for would-be re f u ge e s , and the A l b a n i a n
M a fia is incre a s i n g ly strong in Italy. A growing number of A l b a n i a n s ,
p a rt i c u l a r ly in Southern A l b a n i a , a re invo l ved in narcotics as fa rm e rs ,
t ra d e rs or couri e rs , and crime has offe red attra c t i ve income in a re gi o n
otherwise lacking industry. An anti-smuggling unit has been set up under
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the European Union’s Italian-run Customs and Financial Assistance Offi c e
( C A FAO) in A l b a n i a , but pro gress will remain difficult until re a l i s t i c
economic altern a t i ves are locally ava i l abl e .2 0 5
Tra ffi cking of people is ra p i d ly ex p a n d i n g . Italian authorities interc e p t e d
m o re than 40,000 people attempting to enter Italy from Albania in 1999 alone.
M a ny thousands more are sure ly entering undetected. O n ly 7,000 of those
a p p rehended we re A l b a n i a n s , i l l u s t rating A l b a n i a ’s growing use as a tra n s i t
p o i n t . For about $1,000 per head, o rganised gangs smuggle people to the
coast and place them on speedboats bound for Italy. G i ven that the ave rage
police wage in Albania is only about $150 a month - rising to $500 after
ove rtime - offi c e rs and port officials are highly susceptible to bri b e ry from the
l u c ra t i ve tra d e . T h e re is a joint Italian-Albanian initiative to create a Centre
Against the Tra ffi cking of Immigra n t s , but finance is needed to build re c e p t i o n
c e n t res for illegal migrants awaiting re p a t ri a t i o n . A new law enables the police
to confiscate speedboats that are used in illegal activities and those that are
u n re gi s t e re d . Despite such initiative s ,h oweve r, a serious lack of re s o u rces and
police corru p t i o n , gre a t ly hinders attempts to curb human tra ffi ck i n g .
The government has pledged its determination to fight illegal immigration
but has put the onus on the West to help. At the beginning of February 2001,
Prime Minister Ilir Meta said he welcomed help in the fight against illegal
i m m i gration but said it would be a struggle until A l b a n i a ’s we s t e rn
neighbours gave the country the logistical and communications equipment
he had requested. Meta argued that more sophisticated equipment was
needed rather than more foreign police to tackle the problem. Meta also
pointed out that his suggestion for a regional centre against illegal trafficking
to be set up in Albania had not been taken up. “We have asked in the context
of the Stability Pact to build such a regional centre”,he said. Meta added,“I
have had a positive response from Italy, Greece and Germany and I have even
put a building at their disposal. But again, we need the right equipment and
the modernisation of the building”.206 Given its strong interest in this matter,
the West should give logistical and communications equipment to assist
Albania in the fight against illegal trafficking and help Albania establish a
regional centre to monitor illegal trafficking.
O ver the past ye a r, s muggling has also blossomed along the A l b a n i a - Ko s ovo
b o rd e r. Police chiefs in nort h e rn Albanian border areas have criticised the
United Nations Mission in Ko s ovo ’s (UNMIK) police for failing to arrest seve ra l
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wanted men who have fled to Ko s ovo during the last two ye a rs ,a l l e ging dire c t
c o o p e ration between smu g g l e rs from A l b a n i a , UNMIK police and Ko s ovo
customs offi c i a l s .2 0 7 O n ly a handful of Albanian criminals have been
a p p rehended in Ko s ovo and re t u rned to stand trial in A l b a n i a , and coopera t i o n
with UNMIK was suspended after the Ko s ovo Fo rce (KFOR) discove red the
i nvo l vement of Albanian police with criminal gangs from the Ku kes re gi o n .
For their part ,Albanian border police have been criticised for not contro l l i n g
their side of the bord e r, and the short age of trained personnel remains a major
p ro bl e m .2 0 8 As a whole, the ge o gra p hy of the border re gion is forbidding and
both locally re c ruited border guards and police are fearful of reve n ge attack s .
R e c ruitment of more personnel from other re gions for use in policing the
b o rder might help alleviate this pro blem - as would increasing their salary.
The international community has rightly pushed Albania to address law and
order,making clear that further assistance will be conditional upon improved
security. Inadequate policing lies behind much of the problem,especially in
rural areas, where citizens are forced to endure what is essentially a self-
imposed curfew - fearing travel after late afternoon. This pattern has
reinforced the image of a central government divorced from the actual needs
of the people,and made breaking regional and district loyalties more difficult.
Since 1997 internal security has noticeably improved. The government has
instigated a series of measures to strengthen law and order including, on
advice of the Western European Union (WEU),a three-year strategic plan for
restructuring the police. Since 1997, a WEU Multinational Advisory Police
Element training mission has been helping to improve professionalism and
restructure the Ministry of Public Order, which has drafted its own follow-on
Strategy for the Reform of the State Police for the period 2000-2003.
The police have had some success in tackling common crime, and since
autumn 1999 a series of operations across the country has sought to wrest
control from armed gangs. However, far less headway has been made in
tackling organised crime. With more than 120 police murdered during the
last three ye a rs , m o rale is low. Ta ckling organised crime re q u i res a
comprehensive overhaul of the justice system,in which corruption is deeply
rooted. Corruption is endemic. According to the Albanian Centre for
Economic Research,Albanians, Bulgarians and Macedonians consider giving
bribes an effective way to solve a problem,and doubt the ability of their states
to fundamentally combat corruption. Customs officers are considered to be
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especially mendacious, followed by tax authorities, police, lawyers and
doctors. The government has pledged to tackle corruption through an Anti-
Corruption Program agreed with the World Bank.
Lack of cooperation between prosecutors and police has been blamed for the
poor performance against organised crime. The main objective is the fight
against drugs. U.S. representatives in Tirana have promised to strengthen
cooperation with the Public Order Ministry and the General Prosecution in
the fight against organised crime through the Ti rana Mission of the
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP).
The U.S. assistance program aims to give priority to the training of various
jurists and specialists from the Prosecution and the Ministry of Public Order.
The unsettled situation in Kosovo and lingering tensions in Macedonia and
Montenegro continue to cause grave concern. Albania fears that another
conflict in the former Yugoslavia might again propel major numbers of
refugees into Albania. The government has ordered its north-western Shkoder
army division to avoid border incidents,and the level of insecurity is such that
President Rexhep Mejdani has asked NATO to establish bases on Albania’s
northern borders as well as in the south of the country.
Whilst welcoming the fall of Milosevic, most Albanian authorities have
reacted to his successor, Vojislav Kostunica, with scepticism, viewing his
policies toward Kosovo as little different than Milosevic’s. The fear that
Yugoslav troops and police could again be posted in Kosovo remains.
Following an approach from the Yugoslav government on 17 January 2000,
Tirana re-established diplomatic ties with Belgrade.209 To calm nationalist
objections that the move was premature, the Albanian government assured
KosovoAlbanian leaders that by having a voice in Belgrade,Tirana could argue
more effectively over issues of concern in Kosovo, such as the return of
prisoners and missing persons and self-determination for Kosovo. In the
wake of the political differences that emerged amongst the pan-Albanian
political elite in the early to mid 1990s, it is acknowledged that no Albanian
voice can speak on behalf of the nation. In this context Albania is now
seeking a role as a regional,but politically separate hearth for ethnic Albanians
living in neighbouring countries.
A l b a n i a ’s authorities welcomed NATO intervention in Ko s ovo , and saw it
as a positive step to stabilise the re gi o n . H oweve r, t h ey have been
d i s m ayed at the slowness of the United Nations-led intern a t i o n a l
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a d m i n i s t ration in Ko s ovo to establish democratic institutions, rev i ve the
e c o n o my and tackle the matter of Ko s ovo ’s final status. Unless this is
p e a c e f u l ly re s o l ve d , A l b a n i a ’s security will remain dire c t ly at ri s k , w i t h
Ko s ovo Albanian insurgent groups stockpiling weapons and seeking
re c ruits inside A l b a n i a . The threat of re n ewed violence in Ko s ovo ,
s o u t h e rn Serbia, and Macedonia also continues to discourage fo re i g n
i nve s t m e n t .
Albania has been an active participant in re gional initiatives such as the
Summit of Balkan leaders , the Black Sea Initiative and Corridor Eight, all of
w h i ch aim to improve re gional coopera t i o n . It has sponsored bilatera l
and tri l a t e ral meetings together with Macedonia and Montenegro , a n d
p a rt i c u l a r ly good relations have been established with the Montenegri n
gove rnment of Milo Djukanov i c . Albania and Montenegro have
c o o p e rated in combating the illegal tra ffi cking of dru g s , weapons and
p e o p l e . What is needed, h oweve r, is a stro n g ,c o n c e rted re gion-wide effo rt
to tackle this phenomenon.
A South Eastern European re gional peacekeeping fo rce was established in
Ja nu a ry 2000, and is scheduled to be fully operational by the end of 2001.
The fo rc e , c o m p rising Italian, G re e k , M a c e d o n i a n , A l b a n i a n , Tu rk i s h ,
Romanian and Bulgarian elements, will be ava i l able for use under UN or
NATO mandates. The fo rc e ’s fi rst exe rcises we re held in September 2000
in Bulgari a , with further exe rcises scheduled for November 2001 in
A l b a n i a . The South Eastern European Defence Ministerial Group (SEDM),
l a u n ched in 1996 in Ti rana - comprising A l b a n i a , B u l g a ri a , M a c e d o n i a ,
G re e c e ,I t a ly, R o m a n i a ,S l ove n i a ,C ro a t i a ,Tu rkey and the United States - also
aims to promote defence relations in the Balkan re gi o n . B roader defe n c e
relationships throughout the re gion are useful in confi d e n c e - b u i l d i n g ,
e n c o u raging greater integration and pro fessionalising these fo rc e s .
Albania remains vulnerable to both internal shocks (such as the attempted
coup in 1998) and ex t e rnal ones (the still unsettled situation in the
A l b a n i a n - i n h abited re gions of the fo rmer Yu go s l av i a ) . The stabilisation of
its economy and the beginnings of a re c ove ry are heav i ly dependent on
i n t e rnational assistance, and cannot as yet be described as self-sustaining.
Against the back d rop of conflict in the fo rmer Yu go s l av i a , A l b a n i a ’s
l e a d e rship has ack n ow l e d ged the complexities arising from the mu l t i -
ethnic nature of the Southern Balkans and the threat this poses to the
socio-economic and political development of Albania and the re gion as a
w h o l e . Pa rt ly as a re s u l t , all but a ve ry few of the political and intellectual
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elite have adopted a re l a t i ve ly re s p o n s i ble attitude towa rds nationalism.2 1 0
The media port ray events in Ko s ovo as “ fo re i g n ” rather than “ d o m e s t i c ”
a ffa i rs , while people in ge n e ral discuss Ko s ovo in relation to the level of
violence in the province as it affects the Ko s ovo A l b a n i a n s ’ relations with
B e l grade and the international community rather than Ti ra n a . The curre n t
p ri o rities of the leadership in Albania on one side, and the leaders in the
fo rmer Yu go s l av countries on the other, a re quite diffe re n t . The fo re m o s t
goal of the latter is independence from the Fe d e ral Republic of Yu go s l av i a
( F RY ) , while the fo rmer concentrates all effo rts on integration with
E u ropean stru c t u res and institutions.
Consequently, in the context of an unstable region,Albania has been keen to
demonstrate that it can be a responsible factor for stability. Albanian leaders
in Kosovo and Macedonia expect Albania to play an important role in raising
its voice in international circles in favour of independence for Kosovo.
H oweve r, despite We s t e rn concerns re g a rding possible demands for a
“Greater Albania”,Albania’s leadership has adamantly opposed the notion of
a unified Kosovo and Albania. This is not just because Albania wants to
comply with the wishes of the international community. Nearly 90 years of
s e p a ration have gi ven Albania a ve ry distinct and dive rse histori c a l
development from the Albanian communities of former Yugoslavia. Recent
developments have further emphasised the differences. Although within
Albania there is almost universal support for Kosovo’s “struggle for self-
determination”,i.e. independence,the strongest national sentiment remains
focused on the internal development of Albania. It seems generally accepted
that for the foreseeable future it is Albania’s national interest to remain
politically separated. Instead, Tirana advocates closer political, cultural and
economic ties among Albanians in the region, hoping to diffuse irredentist
pressures among ethnic Albanians outside Albania.
C. Governance 
In marked contrast to its diplomatic maturity, Albania’s internal politics
remain divisive and confro n t a t i o n a l . M a ny leaders of the opposition
Democratic Party (DP) are unlikely ever to accept the legitimacy of the
present Socialist-led government,and will continue to undermine and disrupt
the political process. Settling past accounts remains high on the agenda.
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Albania’s current political tensions can in large part be traced to the
authoritarian rule of ex-President Sali Berisha and his Democratic Party that
came to power in 1992. Berisha conducted the May 1996 parliamentary
elections in a climate of manipulation and intimidation. The overwhelming
majority of international monitors agreed that serious irregularities occurred
during polling. The Democratic Party declared victory, despite Western pleas
to re-run at least part of the election. Public anger mounted over both the
conduct of the elections and Berisha’s increasingly authoritarian rule.
For the six months that followed,civil unrest was forestalled due only to the
population’s belief that instant wealth was achievable by sinking their savings
into pyramid investment schemes. The sudden and dramatic collapse of these
schemes,and the violent uprising it precipitated, forced Berisha to call new
elections and then reluctantly concede defeat by the Socialists, under Fatos
Nano.
Table 20.  Main Political Parties in Albania 
Any hopes of rapid reconciliation collapsed in September 1998 when a
popular founding member of the Democratic Party, Azem Hajdari, was
assassinated. There followed an attempted coup d’état by Berisha’s party,
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Political Party
Socialist Party (SP)
Democratic Alliance (DA)
Social Democratic Party
(SPD)
Union of Human Rights
Party (PBDNJ)
Democratic Party (DP) 
Political Alignment
Successor to the fo rmer communist part y
(Party of Labour), now primary party in the
present governing coalition led by Fatos Nano.
Part of the governing coalition led by Neritan
Ceka.
Part of the governing coalition led by Skender
Gjinushi.
A gove rnment coalition part n e r, w h i ch
p ri m a ri ly re p resents the ethnic Gre e k
minority led by Vasil Melo.
Headed by Sali Berisha since 1990. I n
February 2001,a splinter group formed a new
political party, the New Democratic Party led
by re fo rmists concerned over the DP’s
commitment to democratic reform. These
developments could affect the DP’s standing
in the fo rthcoming June 2001 national
elections.
211  Azem Hajdari was shot dead by unknown gunmen whilst he was leaving the Democratic Party headquarters on 12
September 1998. His funeral two days later turned into an attempted coup d’état when DP supporters stormed government
buildings and temporarily occupied the Prime Minister’s of fice and the State Television centre.
212  European Commission Report on the Feasibility of Negotiating a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Albania,
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which once again pushed the country to the brink of chaos.211 A bitter
personal feud between Nano and Berisha added fuel to the fire. Berisha
imprisoned Nano,a Prime Minister in the first post-communist government in
1991, in 1993 for allegedly misappropriating state funds. Supporters freed
Nano during the 1997 uprising that forced Berisha from power. The anger,
confusion and social disorder of these serial upheavals have scarred every
facet of Albanian life.
Albania now finds itself trying not only to shed the difficult legacy of one of
the most repressive communist regimes in Europe,but also to recover from
the disintegration of political power that occurred twice in the 1990s. Public
trust in the institutions of law and justice is low, and a climate of apathy,
lawlessness and weak state institutions has weakened the political centre at
the expense of regional loyalties. In less than a decade Albanians have been
catapulted from ex t reme collectivism to ex t reme individualism. T h e
subsequent lack of trust in institutions has created a population with little
notion of civic pride or responsibility. Consequently, people take little
responsibility for what happens beyond the confines of their families and
homes. There is a strong psychological gap to be overcome before ordinary
people can be persuaded that any investment in their community will pay
dividends for the future well being of their families.
The practice of political pluralism is not well embedded. On the basis of the
constitution adopted in 1998,Albania has embarked on a substantial overhaul
of its institutions and legal system - in cooperation with the OSCE and the
Council of Europe - to implement actual separation of powers. Some progress
has been made through the European Union (EU) supported comprehensive
State Institutions and Public Administration Reform Programme. However,
state institutions and the civil service remain weak and unstable,and public
administration functions poorly at all levels.212
The remnants of the one-party state have also left civil society and self-
government weak at the local level. In June 1992,the government approved
a law that for the first time granted political, administrative and economic
autonomy for local government. Since then,a number of initiatives designed
to strengthen local governance have been attempted. The Albanian Non-
Governmental Organisation (NGO) Forum is working with the state secretary
for local government and the Association of Albanian Mayors in a Dutch-
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sponsored project entitled Strengthening Local Government and Citizens’
Participation. At the end of 2000,the government also endorsed a packet of
laws aimed at strengthening and transforming local government. With the
support of the Council of Europe,a three-year strategy will train specialists in
local governance and training centres will be established for elected local
officials.
The process of bringing internal democracy to the major political parties has
begun with yo u n ger re fo rmist factions ch a l l e n ging the older part y
leaderships. Previously, such dissenters would have been automatically
expelled from the party. Both main parties are gaining a growing number of
young recruits who have no recollection of the communist system, which
may be contributing to the development of a new political culture. The 1
February 2001 announcement of the formation of a New Democratic Party
(NDP) is an encouraging sign. The new party, made up of reformists within
the opposition Democratic Pa rty and two parties fo rmed by fo rm e r
Democrats,aims to break the stifling bipartisan arrangement.
There is little doubt that the authorities are committed to the concept of
decentralisation. However, increasing participation in local government will
require raising public consciousness and addressing the impoverished state
of many regions that obstructs decentralisation and local control. Progress
has been painfully slow, and continues to clash with the suspicion of almost
any form of authority.
D. Human Rights
Albania’s only sizeable minority is ethnic Greek. In the past, Greece has
claimed part of the territory where this minority lives. Greece and Albania
have set starkly different estimates as to the size of this minority, with Tirana
claiming it totals around 70,000, and Athens citing a far higher figure of
200,000-400,000.
There are also some 15,000-20,000 Slavic-language speakers in Albania,mostly
in the east, near Lakes Ohrid and Prespa, and the Peshkopia region. Roma
number around 50,000, and there are about 80,000 V l a ch s . A small
community of Montenegrins and Serbs, numbering around 1,500, are found
between Shkoder and the Montenegrin border.
Under communism, political organisation by minorities in Albania was
forbidden, although officially sponsored cultural and educational activities
were tolerated at a local level. Following the collapse of the one-party state
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in 1991, the human rights organisation Omonia was founded to promote the
i n t e rests of the Greek minori t y, and although the Albanian Ort h o d ox Church
was quick ly able to regain its surviving buildings, t h e re we re , as in other
d e n o m i n a t i o n s , almost no indigenous cl e rgy ava i l abl e . C o n s e q u e n t ly, p ri e s t s
we re brought in from Greece and Cypru s . This led to a conflict between the
m i n o rity and the gove rnment when the Ort h o d ox Ecumenical Pa t ri a rch in
Istanbul appointed an ethnic Gre e k , Ya n nu l a t o s , as head of the A l b a n i a n
C h u rch . H oweve r,Ya n nu l a t o s ’s sensitivity towa rds Albanian concerns helped
defuse the cri s i s , and he has made the education of ethnic Albanian priests a
p ri o ri t y.
In Ap ril 1994, violence bro ke out when para m i l i t a ries allege d ly from the
G reek minority attacked a military post near Gjiro k a s t e r, killing two A l b a n i a n
s o l d i e rs . An Amnesty International re p o rt condemning an alleged pattern of
abuses committed by the Albanian police against the Greek minority wa s
also issued. At the same time, the Ti rana gove rnment began encouragi n g
landless Muslim peasants from the north of the country to occupy va c a n t
ethnic Greek land and villages in the ex t reme south, w h i ch ethnic Gre e k s
a t t a cked as “ethnic cl e a n s i n g ” . A purge of Greek law ye rs and military
p ro fessionals continued under Beri s h a , and members of the minority we re
p rominent in organising the rebel committees that took over in the south of
the country during the 1997 upri s i n g .
U n e m p l oyment has hit the community badly, and emigration has been high.
The granting of highly valued Greek visas to minority members in
p re fe rence to their Muslim Albanian neighbours has not helped intere t h n i c
h a rm o ny. Relations between the minority and the gove rnment have
i m p roved under the current gove rn m e n t , but the future is uncl e a r. A l t h o u g h
a number of new schools have been offe red to the Greek minori t y, t h e re is
an acute short age of pupils,most of whom are living and studying in Gre e c e .
T h roughout the Gre e k - i n h abited areas there are ve ry few young people, a n d
for most of the year only a few elderly people live in the southern coastal
v i l l age s , with the rest of the population living and wo rking in Gre e c e . In the
l o n g - t e rm , this is like ly to result in a demographic shift, as landless
n o rt h e rn e rs seek to establish themselves on abandoned Gre e k - i n h ab i t e d
l a n d .
Relations between the Socialist Pa rty and the Union of Human Rights Pa rt y
h ave been ve ry tense since the start of the October 2000 electoral campaign,
w h i ch was marked by strong nationalist ove rtones from both part i e s . In a
letter to Prime Minister Ilir Meta, the Greek Fo reign Minister denounced the
manipulation of the electoral process in the Himara distri c t ,w h e re the two
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p a rties we re in competition. In mid-December, the ch a i rman of Omonia,
Vangjel Dule, c riticised the gove rnment for sidelining minority demands on
land ow n e rship and re p resentation in the armed fo rc e s . Dule cl a i m e d ,“ t h e
gove rnment is also reluctant to respect the quota of Greek minori t y
re p resentation in the police and army stru c t u re s ” .2 1 3 M a ny in the A l b a n i a n
political leadership from both the right-wing alliances and the Socialist Pa rt y
b e l i eve the Union of Human Rights Pa rty and the Greek minority NGO
gather funds from Greek-nationalist lobbies to “ H e l l e n i s e ” the southern
Albanian coast.
In November 2000, after Greece had complained to the European Union
about the mistreatment of the ethnic Greek minori t y, Albania pledged to
i m p rove its citizens’ rights legi s l a t i o n . T h e re have not been many other
re p o rts of widespread minority rights violations. A number of projects by
human rights groups and NGOs wo rk to educate Albanians on the concept
of human ri g h t s . These include the Helsinki Committee, the Albanian Human
Rights Gro u p , and the Centre for Human Rights. These organisations ru n
p rojects to increase citizens’ awa reness of human rights in sch o o l s ,c o l l e ge s
and amongst those arrested or detained by the police, as well as deve l o p i n g
a curriculum on human rights specifi c a l ly aimed at police offi c e rs .
E . Economy 
The difficulties that Albania faces in tra n s fo rming itself into a modern marke t
e c o n o my are uniquely daunting. C o m munist A l b a n i a ’s economy was ri gi d ly
c e n t ra l i s e d ,with fi xed pri c e s , state or coopera t i ve ow n e rship of all means of
p roduction and planned regulation of output. The result was an acute
s h o rt age of skilled manpowe r, a decline in labour productivity due to
absenteeism and low mora l e ,o u t d a t e d ,i n e fficient enterprises and a ch ro n i c
l a ck of consumer go o d s . Fo l l owing the collapse of the one-party state in
1 9 9 1 , all the main political parties we re committed to a ra d i c a l
t ra n s fo rmation of the economic system, i n cluding large-scale pri va t i s a t i o n
and the introduction of a market economy. S u ch a policy, h oweve r, has not
been easy to implement.
Although human re s o u rce deve l o p m e n t , economic re s t ru c t u ri n g , p o l i t i c a l
re a l i g n m e n t , l e gi s l a t i ve re fo rm and new social freedoms re p resented the
o u t wa rd supers t ru c t u re of economic tra n s i t i o n , A l b a n i a ’s hopelessly
inadequate infra s t ru c t u re still presents a major obstacle to pro gre s s .2 1 4
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Wages and salaries of the most skilled and pro fessional strata re m a i n
ex t re m e ly low, p a rt ly as a function of this economic dislocation. H oweve r,
a new class of small entre p re n e u rs , m a i n ly in the retail and agri c u l t u ra l
s e c t o rs , has emerged as an economic powe r.
The collapse of the py ramid investment sch e m e s , and subsequent economic
m e l t d own of 1997, p a i n f u l ly illustrated the complete inadequacy of
A l b a n i a ’s institutional and legal fra m ewo rk . Since Ju ly 1997, the Socialist-led
gove rnment has made considerable effo rts to stabilise the economy and
a d d ress its stru c t u ral defi c i e n c i e s . As a result of these effo rt s , and with the
s u p p o rt of international financial org a n i s a t i o n s , the Albanian economy has
made the beginnings of a successful re c ove ry. S t ru c t u ral re fo rms have been
p ro gressing in line with an International Monetary Fund (IMF) pro gra m ,a n d
a d vances have been made in pri vatising small and medium-sized
e n t e r p ri s e s .
In ge n e ra l , s t ru c t u ral re fo rm is helping A l b a n i a ’s economy slow ly emerge
f rom its deeply dysfunctional state. P rices are stable and the economy is
c u rre n t ly growing at a rate of around 7 per cent, a d m i t t e d ly from a low
b a s e . Tax reve nue increased by 33 per cent in the fi rst half of 2000, a n d
fo reign investment is incre a s i n g . The Bank of A l b a n i a , in a re p o rt publ i s h e d
on 6 October 2000, said the economy was rev i v i n g , with growth in
agri c u l t u re and state-run industrial pro d u c t i o n , in the construction sector
and in pri vate inve s t m e n t . Fo reign trade has also gra d u a l ly been incre a s i n g ,
and inflation is modest with A l b a n i a ’s Central Bank lowe ring its 2000
i n flation fo recast from 4 per cent to 2 per cent because prices have been
falling consistently.
O ve rall the economic outlook remains positive . At the end of Ja nu a ry 2000,
the International Monetary Fund gave a clean bill of health to the A l b a n i a n
e c o n o my, releasing $6 million in fresh loans. S h i gemitsu Sugi s a k i , the IMF
deputy managing dire c t o r, said “The Albanian authorities have been
successful in maintaining macroeconomic stab i l i t y, and the gove rnment had
made pro gress in reducing the budget defi c i t ,i m p roving tax collection, a n d
d evising a stra t e gy to re fo rm the country ’s electri c i t y ” .2 1 5
O ffi c i a l ly, u n e m p l oyment stood in September 2000 at 228,000, or 18 per
cent of the total population, d own from 20.7 per cent in September 1998
and 28 per cent in September 1997. The Ministry of Labour estimates that
up to 200,000 people are employed in the grey economy. With the lowe s t
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l evel of development in Europe (GDP per capita of about $830 in 1998),
Albania is a pre d o m i n a n t ly ru ral economy, with 54 per cent of GDP
ge n e rated by agri c u l t u re , 21 per cent by serv i c e s , 13 per cent by
c o n s t ruction and 12 per cent by industry.
Most people in employment wo rk in small fa m i ly businesses or on fa m i ly -
owned smallholdings. Of all re gi s t e red companies, o n ly 0.2 per cent
e m p l oy more than one hundred people, with 79 per cent of all re gi s t e re d
companies having just one employe e . Wages are often not sufficient to live
o n . For ex a m p l e , a senior poly t e chnic maths teacher earns $85 per month.
M a ny earn ex t ra money through a second job. A c c o rding to the World Bank,
a round 20 per cent of the population is living below the pove rty line of $25
per we e k . The gove rn m e n t , World Bank and IMF re c e n t ly signed a thre e -
year pove rty reduction pro gram aimed at raising living standard s ,e s p e c i a l ly
in ru ral are a s .
Remittances from emigrants have provided a vital economic lifeline for many
fa m i l i e s . The opening of seve ra l ,m a i n ly Gre e k ,p ri vate banks, has fa c i l i t a t e d
these re m i t t a n c e s . Thanks to re t u rning Albanian emigra n t s , fo reign ex ch a n ge
deposits in the banks increased in 2000, and remittances from emigra n t s
we re expected to be more than $400 million by the end of the year - ab o u t
a sixth of the gross domestic pro d u c t , and an increase of $100 million ove r
the previous ye a r.2 1 6 The emigra n t s ’ deposits have played an important ro l e
in the development of small- and medium-term businesses.
The lack of adequate housing is a major pro bl e m . Albania curre n t ly has
54,000 families (approx i m a t e ly 230,000 people) re gi s t e red as being
without shelter. The Ministry of Tra n s p o rt and Housing has announced an
ambitious stra t e gy to alleviate this pro bl e m ,w h i ch aims to house a third of
all homeless within the next three ye a rs .
Despite cheap labour and access to Western markets through its main trading
partners, Greece and Italy, Albania has attracted few investors. Foreign
i nve s t o rs started to appear in Albania in 1990, when the commu n i s t
government eased the ban on foreign investment. Since then, an estimated
500 Italian and 200 Gre e k - owned businesses have been establ i s h e d .
However, foreign direct investment remains erratic,standing at $32 million in
1992, increasing to $97 million in 1996, and then stalling at around $98
million because of the violent uprising during 1997,and halving over the next
t wo ye a rs , due to the attempted coup in 1998 and the Ko s ovo crisis in
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1 9 9 9 .2 1 7 Although 2000 brought a thre e - fold increase to $143 million, t h e
i n t e rnational perception of A l b a n i a ’s political risk and corruption re p e l
i nve s t m e n t .2 1 8
To u rism development has attracted only small inve s t o rs . Ap a rt from the
poor security situation and re gional instab i l i t y, t o u rism is also hampered by
inadequate infra s t ru c t u re . G ove rnment-led effo rts to sell off state-ow n e d
hotels have large ly fa i l e d , despite ge n e rous fiscal incentive s . M u ch of the
n ew construction is illegal. The Committee for To u rism Deve l o p m e n t
announced pri o rities for the sector in 2000, i n cluding twenty inve s t m e n t
p rojects involving the construction of tourist complexes in the south. M o s t
of the inve s t o rs are Albanian pri vate fi rm s . H oweve r, t h ey are hampered by
a lack of bank cre d i t s .2 1 9
The Socialist-led gove rnment has stressed its determination to ach i eve
sustained economic stability and fa r - re a ching stru c t u ral re fo rm s . H oweve r,
this will re q u i re a long-term commitment. One of the main ch a l l e n ges is to
s t abilise the gove rn m e n t ’s own fi n a n c e s ,m a i n ly through an increase of tax
reve nues after a period of continuous decl i n e . The gove rnment is placing
great emphasis on strengthening the fiscal administration in order to
i m p rove tax and customs reve nue collection and to clamp down on tax
eva s i o n . To improve customs administra t i o n ,m e a s u res are being adopted to
u p grade the pro fessional level of customs offi c e rs and to offer special
b o nuses or rewa rds as an incentive to collect customs reve nu e . M e a s u re s
to improve the customs administration include a revised customs code and
the re c ruitment of new anti-smuggling offi c e rs . H oweve r, the capacity to
deal with fraud and corruption needs to be re i n fo rc e d .2 2 0 Both the IMF and
the gove rnment have ex p ressed satisfaction with the functioning of the
Fo reign Debt Management Unit, set up under a United Nations
D evelopment Pro gramme (UNDP) pro j e c t , to strengthen the debt
m a n agement capacity within the Ministry of Fi n a n c e . A group to monitor
the implementation of the Stability Pa c t ’s anti-corruption plan has been set
u p .
P ro gress in re s t ru c t u ring and pri vatising large-scale enterprises in stra t e gi c
s e c t o rs has so far been disappointing. Of the total number of companies
re gi s t e re d , o n ly 10 per cent are in industry, while most of the rest are
e n g aged in import i n g . Of the many companies pri vatised in 1993-1995, t h e
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m a j o rity have ceased manu fa c t u ri n g . T h ey immediately sold off the
equipment as scrap and then used the wa rehouses for tra d i n g . T h e re is little
i n c e n t i ve to invest in manu fa c t u ri n g . The gove rn m e n t ’s pri va t i s a t i o n
p ro gra m , stalled by the conflict in Ko s ovo , is back on tra ck , with sales of the
mobile telecommunications company, the main mining enterpri s e s , a major
bank and the oil and gas industry due to go ahead.
Besides land distri b u t i o n , m a rket liberalisation has contributed to the
re c ove ry of agri c u l t u ral pro d u c t i o n . Small ru ral agro - p rocessing plants and
agri c u l t u ral services have been pri va t i s e d . H oweve r,A l b a n i a ’s arable land is
l i m i t e d , fa rms are small (on ave rage 1.5 hectares) and there is an acute
s h o rt age both of tech n o l o gy and of capital to buy it. F u rther limitations are
imposed by a lack of fe rt i l i s e rs and pesticides, and inadequate irri g a t i o n .
M o d e rnisation of the sector will depend upon attracting fo reign inve s t m e n t
in production and pro c e s s i n g .2 2 1
Since the end of the Ko s ovo confl i c t , Albanian companies have been
rushing to the Ko s ovo marke t . The Albanian Institute for Social Insura n c e
(INSIG) was the fi rst to discover the marke t , to be fo l l owed by many other
companies such as bra n ches of Coca Cola, and the Tepelena and Glina
m i n e ral water fi rm s , and Albanian A i r l i n e s ,w h i ch now flies to Pristina fi ve
times a we e k .
The most important contribution to promoting economic re c ove ry wo u l d
be to ensure law and ord e r. The country is receiving a wide ra n ge of
p ractical assistance to fight corruption and build efficient institutions.
Since A l b a n i a ’s most recent bre a k d own of law and order in 1997, mu ch
p ro gress has been made in rebuilding a functioning state, re s t o ring securi t y
and stab i l i t y. H oweve r, the ach i evement remains fragi l e .
Another pri o rity is to press ahead with a legi s l a t i ve fra m ewo rk to pro t e c t
i nvestment and provide for a soundly re g u l a t e d , functioning fi n a n c i a l
s e c t o r. The revision of banking legislation and of the superv i s o ry
f ra m ewo rk , as well as the pri vatisation or liquidation of the remaining state-
owned banks should be accelera t e d , as should the pri vatisation of publ i c
e n t e r p rises and utilities. The gove rnment and the Bank of Albania are
d e t e rmined to address the stru c t u ral weaknesses of the financial sector,
s p e c i fi c a l ly through pri va t i s a t i o n , w h i ch it is hoped will improve low
s t a n d a rds and high bad debt ra t i o s . With the support of the IMF, the Wo r l d
B a n k , the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the European Bank
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for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), t h ey have embarked upon a
policy aimed at: re s t ru c t u ring and pri vatising the state banks by the end of
2 0 0 1 ; opening up the market to pri vate banks supported by re p u t abl e
s t ra t e gic inve s t o rs , and establishing a competitive and we l l - re g u l a t e d
domestic financial market operating under the close supervision of an
independent central bank.2 2 2
Ap a rt from Ko s ovo , a top fo reign policy pri o rity is to further A l b a n i a ’s
i n t e gration into the EU. The authorities are under no illusions as to a fa s t
t ra ck path for entering the EU. As early as 1995, Albania requested the
opening of negotiations for an association agre e m e n t . D raft nego t i a t i n g
d i re c t i ves we re pre p a red but no fo rmal recommendation was adopted by
the European Commission because of the fl awed parliamentary elections in
M ay 1996 and the bre a k d own in 1997. The EU has pointed out that furt h e r
s t rengthening of contractual relations would depend upon effe c t i ve
p ro gress in stabilisation and re c ove ry. The ultimate test will be A l b a n i a ’s
own ability to maintain the wo rk initiated by the international age n c i e s .2 2 3
H oweve r, eventual accession remains important as a goal and a tool fo r
setting standards for which to aim. The prime minister has set a
S t abilisation and Association A greement with the EU as the curre n t
p ri o ri t y.2 2 4 Albania has benefited from EU assistance through the PHARE
p ro gram (since December 1991) and from the ge n e ralised scheme of tra d e
p re fe rences (GSP since Fe b ru a ry 1992). Implementation of nearly all the
“ Q u i ck Start Pro j e c t s ” in A l b a n i a , under the Stability Pact for South East
E u ro p e , is expected to have begun by Ap ril 2001. A l b a n i a ’s tra n s p o rt
i n f ra s t ru c t u re will be re c o n s t ructed under the pro gra m , made up of seve n
p ro j e c t s , at a cost of $112 million.
Conclusions and recommendations on Albania
o A l b a n i a ’s neighbours - Greece, Bulgaria, Tu r k e y, Macedonia and Italy -
and the administrators of Kosovo should take urgent steps to stre n g t h e n
their cooperation, in particular in closer border monitoring, over the
p roblem of illegal trafficking of people, drugs and weapons thro u g h
Albania.  The provision of logistical and communications equipment for
use against illegal trafficking, and help in establishing a regional centre
against illegal trafficking in Albania, would be particularly valuable.
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o The international community should provide logistical and
communications equipment to border police, and Albania should re c ru i t
personnel from non-border districts for use in policing the bord e r.
o P rojects to reclaim weapons looted during the anarchy of 1997 should be
extended and intensified.  
o M o re re s o u rces could usefully be directed by international donors to
establishing local conflict resolution centres in nort h e rn Albania, to tackle
the issue of blood feuds.
o The revision of banking legislation and of the superv i s o ry framework, as
well as the privatisation or liquidation of the remaining state-owned banks,
should be accelerated, as should the transparent privatisation of public
enterprises and utilities.
o Business advice centres could be established in all major cities where owners
of small businesses could learn basic business administration skills.
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PART IV.
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS
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11.  REGIONAL COOPERATION AND 
THE STABILITY PACT
In the immediate term, regional cooperation in the Balkans is more likely to
develop incre m e n t a l l y, from the ground up rather than arc h i t e c t u r a l l y, fro m
the top down.  Economic and trade areas, infrastru c t u re, security
a rrangements and cro s s - b o rder cultural ties are all fertile areas for such
p rograms.  The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, welcomed in 1999 by
some as a latter day Marshall Plan, was meant to improve coordination of
i n t e rnational assistance while emphasising regional cooperation.  While it
seemed like a good idea at the time, the question is whether the quality of its
implementation can be improved before key participants totally lose intere s t
and confidence in it.
A.  Cooperation from the Ground Up 
Since the traumatic dissolution of the fo rmer Yu go s l av i a , “ re gi o n a l
cooperation” has become a loaded term in the Balkans. Suspicions are
common that regional cooperation might serve as a Trojan horse for
reconstituting Yugoslavia and infringing upon hard-won sovereignty. Indeed,
while most of the countries in this report are eager for greater forms of
association with major regional and super-national bodies such as the EU and
NATO, they remain distinctly wary of closer ties to some of their own
neighbours.
In many parts of the world, regional cooperation is highly institutionalised
affair, with many regional institutions - not least the EU itself - developing on
a “top-down” basis after initial agreements at high level meetings. The
environment in the Balkans is,however, not very conducive to that approach
at the moment. This perspective was underscored by the near-universal
condemnation in the region that greeted the January 2001 suggestion by UN
Special Envoy Carl Bildt that the EU consider the Balkans “en bloc” for
membership.225 There is a broad view in the region that if the Balkans is
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treated as a group, progress will move forward at the pace of the slowest
c o u n t ry, p roducing lowest common denominator ch a n ge while gi v i n g
international organisations such as the EU a convenient excuse to defer
membership. Many also fear that major efforts to more closely integrate the
Balkan states with each other will divert energies and resources away from
the primary goal of securing some form of association with the EU.
Against this background,it is difficult to see support building rapidly for the
ambitious proposal of the Soros Foundation in February 2001 for the creation
of a “common economic space”for South Eastern Europe. The idea included
creating a Balkans task force that would oversee the creation of a customs
union between the EU and the countries of the region negotiated on a
regional basis; the introduction of the German Mark, then the Euro,as legal
currency with or without a local currency;and coordination of local reforms.
Clearly ef forts to improve customs procedures, the investment climate and
financial discipline are of vital importance and widely shared by the
international community. A greater spirit of cooperation has much to offer,
and significant efforts are being made to stimulate it through the Stability Pact
for South Eastern Europe, discussed fully below, the Southeast European
Cooperative Initiative (SECI),and a range of World Bank and OECD programs
that are included under the umbrella of the Stability Pact. The “common
economic space”concept is entirely consistent with those kinds of efforts.
Given that the countries and entities covered by this report all have
struggling and fragile economies, are deeply dependent on trade and suffer
from cross-border crime and sporadic instability, regional cooperation has
obvious potential. If the countries of the Balkans are developed as economic,
social and cultural islands,all will experience difficulty generating the critical
mass needed for a lasting recovery. Further, without rudimentary regional
collaboration, the task each country faces in preparing for some form of
affiliation with the European Union will only be complicated and delayed.
Most of the countries in the region recognise these facts.
E ven taken toge t h e r, the Balkans economies are small and underd eve l o p e d .
The populations of Bosnia, S e r b i a , Ko s ovo , M o n t e n e gro and Macedonia
(16.8 million) amount to less than one fifth of the population of Germ a ny.
The GDPs of those fi ve entities combined (totalling $24.9 billion) come to
mu ch less than half the GDP of Ire l a n d , w h i ch has less than a quarter of
their population. The per capita GDP of Bosnia is less than one thirtieth of
the per capita GDP of Germ a ny.2 2 6 L u xe m b o u rg , c ove ring an area of only
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227  Luxembourg’s GDP of $14.7 billion equals 58 per cent of the five entities combined GDP.
2,586 square kilometres and with a tiny population, has more than half the
GDP of the fi ve core entities combined.2 2 7 All of these countries can benefi t
f rom pooling skills, ex p e rience and best pra c t i c e s .
The ch a n ge of the gove rnment in the FRY may speed these effo rt s . T h e
b i g gest obstacle to normalised relations in the re gion was eliminated in
N ovember 2000 when the FRY accepted that it was not the sole successor
state of the fo rmer Yu go s l av i a . This new stance bro ke the impasse that
bl o cked the division of pro p e rty and hard currency re s e rve s . T h e
G ove rn o rs of the fi ve National Banks have met three times since Nove m b e r
2000 to discuss the division of the 46 tons of gold in the Bank fo r
I n t e rnational Settlements in Basel. The division of the hard curre n c y
re s e rves of the fo rmer Yu go s l avia is just the fi rst in a series of divisions of
the pro p e rty of the Fe d e ra t i o n , and further pro gress in this vital area wo u l d
do mu ch to build confidence in the re gi o n .
All that said, it is mu ch more like ly for the fo re s e e able future that any
i m p rovements in trade liberalisation or fa c i l i t a t i o n , or in other macro- or
m i c ro-economic policy coord i n a t i o n , will grow out of a patch wo rk of
b i l a t e ral and limited mu l t i l a t e ral agreements and arra n gements rather than
a ny compre h e n s i ve new re gional arch i t e c t u re . C o o p e ration is most like ly
to occur in areas where collab o ration can be quick ly implemented, w i t h
few political ove rtones and with tangi ble short - t e rm benefit to the
p a rticipating part i e s . This “bottom up” a p p ro a ch is not to be scorn e d , i n
relation to economic or any other fo rm of re gional coopera t i o n . It is
p o s s i ble in this way to make pro gress on many substantive fro n t s , while at
the same time gra d u a l ly developing habits of contact and cooperation more
ge n e ra l ly, w h i ch cannot be anything other than helpful in re - e s t ablishing a
m o re civilised political climate in the re gi o n .
Some of the economic and trade areas obv i o u s ly wo rth pursuing in this way
a re :
o I n f ra s t ru c t u re deve l o p m e n t . Tra n s p o rt , c o m munications and energy
s u p p ly needs inva ri ably spill over state bord e rs , and are the most visibl e
candidates for early joint action. This is beginning to happen on a
s i g n i ficant scale. For ex a m p l e , in Fe b ru a ry 2000, Macedonia along with
A l b a n i a ,B o s n i a ,B u l g a ri a ,C roatia and Romania signed a Memorandum of
U n d e rstanding to establish a re gional pro gram to improve trade and
t ra n s p o rt in South Eastern Euro p e . M o n t e n e gro demonstrates the wide
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variety of possible infrastructure projects that could improve regional
prospects for economic growth, and the following projects would be of
great benefit.
o Border controls. Macedonia and Bulgaria have instituted a customs
regime that could serve as a regional model:the two countries agreed to
set up a single customs collection and inspection border post rather than
maintaining two separate and competing customs posts kilometres apart.
That simple example could be followed with rather more ambitious
p rojects (for which funding is re a d i ly ava i l able) such as better
coordinating efforts to track and document corruption at the Balkans
borders; synchronising and streamlining border procedures building on
the work of the SECI initiative in this area;and using the EU’s Customs and
Fiscal Advisory Office (CAFAO),which has been effective in Bosnia,to play
a useful role in the region in helping to improve efficiency and reduce
corruption in the customs service.
o Trade agreements. Some bilateral free trade agreements in the region are
already in place - Croatia with Slovenia and Macedonia, and Macedonia
with Croatia,Slovenia,the FRY, Bulgaria and Turkey. Macedonia signed its
first regional Free Trade Agreement with Slovenia nearly three years ago.
Macedonia imported $47.7 million dollars worth of Slovenian goods last
year and exported about $7.3 million in goods to Slovenia. Bosnia and
Macedonia have made progress towards signing a Free Trade Agreement
and hope to have one in hand by the end of the year. Currently Macedonia
exports about $30 million in goods annually to Bosnia but hopes this will
increase to $100 million after the agreement is signed. In energy,
Montenegro has the capacity with its hydro-power to be a major regional
supplier.
Economics and trade areas are not the only fertile ones for major
cooperative efforts. Two others are particularly fruitful and should be
intensely encouraged:
o Cultural Cooperation. Too often,people in the region have insisted that
redrawing the map or creating ethnic enclaves are the only ways to
preserve their heritage. Instead, the notion those communities can
peacefully reach across democratic borders in cultural exchanges needs to
take root. Another persistent challenge for the whole region is to ensure
that a sense of shared culture and identity can be preserved across
country borders and community lines. Many small scale cooperative
projects can address these needs.
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o Security Cooperation. Under the OSCE’s program of confidence and
security-building measures (CSBMs) a good deal of information exchange
and verification activity is already going on. One of the Stability Pact’s
working tables - of which more below - also addresses military and
security affairs in the region, and a number of projects are underway in
that re g a rd , most notably a re gional arms control ve ri fication and
information centre that opened in Zagreb last year, bringing together
military experts from around the region. These larger canvas programs
can readily be supplemented by more localised arrangements.
B.  The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
The concept of a Stability Pact for the Balkans dates back to late 1998,but it
was the 1999 crisis over Ko s ovo that ge n e rated support for a more
c o o rdinated re gional appro a ch to prevent further crisis and pro m o t e
development in the region. On 10 June 1999,as a direct result of a German
Presidency-led European Union initiative,the Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe was announced by Foreign Ministers meeting in Cologne. More than
40 countries and organisations agreed to take a “comprehensive and coherent
approach”to bolster the countries of South Eastern Europe “in their efforts to
foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity
in order to achieve stability in the whole region”.228 The idea was essentially
to improve coordination of international assistance, while emphasising
regional cooperation. While the European Union was credited with a “leading
role”, the enthusiasm of the Clinton Administration was an important asset
from the outset.
Objectives
At a summit meeting in Sarajevo on 30 July 1999,the Pact was confirmed by
Heads of State and Government,who reaffirmed their “shared responsibility
to build a Europe that is at long last undivided, democratic and at peace”.
“Speedy and measurable progress” towards Euro-Atlantic integration was
promised to all the countries in the region, linked to their respect for “the
objectives of democracy, respect for human rights, economic and social
development and enhanced security”. The magnetic pull of international
integration, culminating in eventual accession to the European Union, was
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w i d e ly viewed as the corn e rstone of the effo rt to provide the leaders and
peoples of the Balkans with a clear altern a t i ve , and disincentive , t o
re n ewed conf l i c t .
The pomp of the Sara j evo Summit encouraged many to hail the Stab i l i t y
Pact as signalling a stro n g , l o n g - t e rm political commitment by the
i n t e rnational community to steer the Balkan countries fi rm ly into the
We s t e rn mainstre a m . H oweve r, t h e re was also concern in some quart e rs
about the ge n e ra l , often vag u e , l a n g u age of the Pact documents, w h i ch
we re long on decl a ra t o ry language and short on operational detail or
p o t e n t i a l . For ex a m p l e , while the European Union had agreed to prov i d e
the lion’s share of re s o u rces needed to implement the Stability Pa c t ,t h e s e
re s o u rces we re now h e re more cl o s e ly defi n e d .
T h e re we re also concerns that the Stability Pact would be preve n t e d
f rom living up to its own launch by lack of re s o u rces and stru c t u re . T h e
Pact would not create a new international org a n i s a t i o n , nor would it
command independent financial re s o u rces or establish new
implementing stru c t u re s . The only staff position env i s aged was a Special
C o o rdinator to gi ve political direction to the Pa c t ’s wo rk . B o d o
H o m b a ch , a fo rmer German cabinet minister, was appointed to this
p o s i t i o n , re flecting Germ a ny ’s driving-seat role in establishing the Pa c t .
E s t ablishment of the Stability Pact appeared to demonstrate political will,
based not only on fo rmal consensus but also on a practical readiness by
the EU and other part i c i p a n t s , to match a ge n e ral agreement on
p rinciples with specific commitments on funding. The invo l vement and
funding of the U. S . also helped emphasise the international ch a ra c t e r
and broad support behind the Pa c t . C o n t i nued support from the U. S .
will be essential if the Pact is to be tra n s fo rmed into a more effe c t i ve
m e ch a n i s m .
The Pact was premised on the idea that the countries of the Balkans
needed “to develop a shared stra t e gy for stability and growth of the
re gi o n ” , and that by wo rking together on “ s t ru c t u ral short falls and
u n re s o l ved issues” the international community could facilitate both
economic and democratic deve l o p m e n t . Local gove rnments wo u l d
commit themselves to meaningful re fo rm , non-violence and the basic
tenets of democracy and re gional coopera t i o n . The intern a t i o n a l
c o m munity would underwrite this effo rt through assistance pro gra m s
and its own commitment to open the doors for integration into the Euro -
Atlantic commu n i t y. This arra n gement built on other successful fo re i g n
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assistance models in identifying “local ow n e rs h i p ” ( i . e . i n c re m e n t a l
commitment by the benefi c i a ry countries themselves) as a key to
e n d u ring economic and political tra n s fo rm a t i o n .
The Pact set self-consciously ambitious economic objective s , with countri e s
p l e d ging to cooperate to establish “ v i b rant market economies based on sound
m a c ro policies, m a rkets open to gre a t ly expanded fo reign trade and pri va t e
sector inve s t m e n t , e ffe c t i ve and tra n s p a rent customs and
c o m m e rc i a l / re g u l a t o ry re gi m e s ” . The Pact also committed the countries of the
Balkans to “ d eveloping strong capital markets and dive rs i fied ow n e rs h i p ,
i n cluding pri va t i s a t i o n , leading to a widening circle of pro s p e ri t y ” . O t h e r
agenda items incl u d e :“ p romotion of free trade are a s ;b o rd e r - c rossing tra n s p o rt ;
e n e rgy supply and sav i n g s ; d e regulation and tra n s p a re n c y ; i n f ra s t ru c t u re ;
p romotion of pri vate sector business; e nv i ronmental issues”, and more .
The Pact established three “Working Tables”under which the bulk of its work
would be carried out: human rights and democra t i s a t i o n ; e c o n o m i c
reconstruction,development and cooperation;and security issues. Each table
was charged with identifying priority projects and establishing working plans
to achieve these objectives.
These tables were intended to help participants identify new opportunities
for cooperation and improve the coordination of existing efforts. At the same
time, a number of specific targeted actions were launched, such as the
S t ability Pa c t ’s A n t i - C o rruption Initiative ; the Investment Compact; t h e
Business Advisory Council; the Charter for Media Freedom; the “e-Balkans”
initiative (recently renamed e-SEE), intended to accelerate the spread and
commercial benefits of information technology; the Steering Committee on
Refugee Returns,and others.
Initially, the Pact excluded the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) because
its government contravened the Pact’s basic principles. Nevertheless, the
Pact was instrumental in ensuring that some direct help re a ch e d
municipalities in Serbia run by opposition parties, and independent media
under heavy pressure from the regime. Montenegro, meanwhile, was made
an “early beneficiary of the Pact”and given substantial aid until Milosevic was
removed. This support continues, though some international institutions
appear to have lost enthusiasm since the changes in Belgrade. The FRY was
accepted as a full and equal participant into the Stability Pact on 26 October
2000 in Bucharest,only three weeks after Milosevic’s fall. It was a creditably
rapid response to democratic change. The FRY now has equal rights and
duties under the Stability Pact,and the same conditionality.
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Apart from its function as an umbrella for coordinating new and existing
re gional initiative s , the Stability Pact organised a Regional Funding
Conference in Brussels in March 2000,when pledges amounting to 2.4 billion
Euro were made in support of regional programs.
The Record
In eve ry entity cove red in this re p o rt , as well as in We s t e rn capital cities, t h e
S t ability Pact seems to have ge n e rated more fru s t ration than satisfa c t i o n . T h e
h i g h - p ro file launch in Sara j evo in 1999 encouraged a misconception in the
re gion that the Pact would serve as second Marshall Plan, b ri n gi n g
u n p recedented levels of funding and effi c i e n c y. In fa c t , the Pact was not
p rovided with independent funds, nor can it claim invo l vement in all the
funding pro grams for the re gion by its own We s t e rn participants - the
E u ropean Union and G-8 countries - and the international fi n a n c i a l
i n s t i t u t i o n s .
The Pact will never become more effe c t i ve than its participants - ab ove all,
We s t e rn gove rnments - allow it to be. It depends on their fi n a n c i a l
re s o u rc e s , k n ow - h ow and political commitment. G i ven the multiplicity of
other organisations wo rking in the Balkans that are also funded by these
same We s t e rn gove rn m e n t s , the Pact will always suffer from a re a s o n abl e
cl o u dy and diluted mandate and must focus its effo rts to where it has a
c o m p a ra t i ve adva n t age .
The Stability Pact was established in something of a no-man’s-land among
existing international and state stru c t u res with responsibilities that seemed
to stre t ch past its authori t y. Donor coordination is never easy, and many
d o n o rs have been reluctant to compromise their pre ro g a t i ves to enhance
the effe c t i veness of the Stability Pa c t . So while it is easy to be critical of the
p e r fo rmance of the Pact itself, mu ch of the blame must ultimately rest with
the gove rnments that created it.
A perception of superfluous planning, unneeded pre p a ra t o ry re p o rts by
c o n s u l t a n t s ,i n nu m e rable meetings, b u re a u c ratic delays and a mu rky system
for rewa rding projects and pro grams - with re l a t i ve ly few successful pro j e c t s
o ri ginating in the Balkan countries themselves - has convinced many that the
Pa c t ’s commitment to “local ow n e rs h i p ” was large ly rhetori c a l . T h e re is a
feeling that the Pa c t ’s potential was dra m a t i c a l ly ove rsold in 1999, t h a t
confusion and competition among donors has mired pro gress in an
i n t e rm i n able series of meetings and assessments, and that far more money
was promised - or at least intimated - than has been delive re d . R e c i p i e n t s
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h ave not always done an effe c t i ve job organising to re c e i ve assistance, a n d
c o n t i nue to over-estimate the local capacity to absorb fo reign re s o u rc e s
while ensuring that funds are pro p e r ly spent and accounted fo r.
D o n o rs themselves have been fru s t rated with the slow speed of actual
re fo rm , by gove rn m e n t s ’ reluctance to ch a l l e n ge the vested interest of
p owerful local elites and by the same inflated expectations that they helped
c re a t e . T h e re is also continuing concern that many leaders in the Balkans
v i ew European integration as a cure-all for their pro blems when they should
be making the hard decisions to overhaul their economic and political
s y s t e m s .
G i ven the Stability Pa c t ’s sweeping age n d a , its broad participation and
tendency towa rd committee-style manage m e n t , these disappointments are
h a rd ly surpri s i n g . The pledges at the re gional funding confe rence in 2000
we re impre s s i ve , yet sceptics argue that this sum would have been made
ava i l able for the same purposes if the Pact had not ex i s t e d . A d vo c a t e s
respond that the value of the Stability Pact does not depend on fund-ra i s i n g
as such , but rather on sustaining a high pro file for the re gion over a peri o d
of ye a rs . The High Level Steering Group - comprising G-8 Finance Ministers
and IFIs, c reated as part of the Pact process - has decided that a second such
c o n fe rence will be held in autumn 2001. If this goes ahead, the scale of
p l e d ging will provide a better measure of the Pa c t ’s ability to mobilise
f u n d e rs .
The Stability Pact has re gi s t e red its best results in issues relating to economic
d evelopment and re c o n s t ru c t i o n . It is notable that most of the more
successful initiatives take place outside the thre e - t able stru c t u re that has
p roven a cumbersome instrument for operational activity. E ffo rts such as the
I nvestment Compact, the wo rking group on Tra d e , and effo rts to cl a rify the
location of the second bri d ge over the Danube between Romania and
B u l g a ria have all been constru c t i ve .
What the Stability Pact has not done is encourage significant pro gress in
l i b e ralising and re fo rming the economies of the re gi o n , so as to create a
m o re favo u rable climate for fo reign inve s t m e n t . The mechanisms of the Pa c t
h ave so far proven too unwieldy for the demanding process of helping
c o u n t ries shed the burden of command economies and the legacy of
Yu go s l av “ s e l f - m a n age m e n t ” s o c i a l i s m . In part i c u l a r, because the Pact is a
conduit for other assistance effo rt s , it has not been in the position so far of
e ffe c t i ve ly demanding the kinds of terms and conditionality that are re q u i re d
to secure lasting economic re fo rm s . For ex a m p l e , both the EU and the
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i n t e rnational financial institutions are far better positioned to demand
s p e c i fic re fo rms because neither EU membership nor continued access to
lending will be made ava i l able to those countries not meeting specifi c
b e n ch m a rk s .
It is one thing to set an agenda of ambitious economic goals, but quite
another to identify and implement an effective progression of steps to ensure
that those goals can be approached and met. Real reform has yet to catch up
with the lofty rhetoric expressed under the auspices of the Stability Pact by
the countries of the region. While investors may welcome the countries’
stated commitment to embracing free markets, the weakness of the rule of
law,continued insecurity and political/economic cronyism have been enough
to frighten most investors away.
While the Stability Pact is obliged to make extensive use of public financing,
in the medium- term there is no alternative to private sector funding. This is
well recognised by the Special Coordinator. At this stage,however, the Pact
package offers investors one lucrative new area for involvement (in the
process of privatisation), some guarantees about security of funds and
repatriation of profits and a few token assurances relating to bribery and
corruption. The consequence is that even the Pact’s creative initiatives are
trapped between,on one hand, Balkan states that do not reform themselves
rapidly or convincingly enough to draw significant private investment, and,
on the other hand,Western governments that are beginning to question the
wisdom of allotting resources to a venture - the Stability Pact - that has limited
“added value”to show after nearly two years.
The Investment Compact, for ex a m p l e , is intended to address many of these
issues - commercial law, c o rru p t i o n , accounting re gi m e s , small and medium-
sized enterprise fo rm a t i o n , p u blic pro c u rement practices and, m o s t
s p e c i fi c a l ly, i nvestment guara n t e e s . Yet the Task Fo rce on Good Gove rn a n c e ,
w h i ch should be playing a vital and active role in these essential questions
of institution-building,has produced little. The Investment Compact is hence
a hostage to the lack of actual re fo rm in the Balkan countries but also to the
i n e ffe c t i veness of other organs of the Stability Pa c t .
T h e re is also a clear need to ge n e rate greater local ow n e rship of pro gra m s .
For ex a m p l e , the fi rst re gional funding confe rence in March 2000 saw a
s e rious short age of projects ori ginating inside the countries that stood to
b e n e fit from them. This pattern is at odds with the discourse of “ l o c a l
ow n e rs h i p ” often used in connection with the Pa c t . The next round of
funding should break with this pattern .
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G i ven the reluctance of We s t e rn states to create a new org a n i s a t i o n , a n d
gi ven the lack of an independent budge t , the Office of the Special
C o o rdinator of the Stability Pact (OSCSP) cannot be effe c t i ve as a wo u l d -
be secre t a riat for ove rall assistance effo rts to the re gi o n , let alone as an
implementor of re gional pro j e c t s . The OSCSP has spent too mu ch time
in supervising projects and mechanisms that have been conceived by
p a rticipants in the Pa c t , while failing to galvanise a broader appro a ch to
the tasks at hand. The effo rts of the re s p e c t i ve Wo rking Tables has been
quite uneven and until Task Fo rce leaders are paid for their serv i c e s , i t
seems unlike ly that the Tables will ach i eve a satisfa c t o ry level of
p ro fe s s i o n a l i s a t i o n . If this cannot be done, c o n s i d e ration should be gi ve n
to reducing the number and ra n ge of Task Fo rc e s .
G i ven the scale and importance of the Pa c t ’s re m i t , and the inev i t abl e
c o m p l exity of its political contex t , mu ch depends on the leadership ro l e
of the Special Coordinator and his offi c e . It is their task to stimu l a t e
political leaders outside and inside the Balkans to take hard - and often
ex p e n s i ve - decisions on coordination and re fo rm . U n fo rt u n a t e ly, u n d e r
its current leaders h i p , the Pact has yet to develop a clear identity or
c reate an Office capable of producing ideas that can either mobilise
re gional leaders to take hard decisions, or impress donors and pers u a d e
them to ch a n ge their hab i t s .
F u t u re 
The Stability Pact could still become the central stra t e gic political
agreement that galvanises and orients the international commu n i t y,
i n cluding the re gion itself, to implement a common and sustainabl e
policy for peace and stability in South Eastern Euro p e . For this to occur,
h oweve r, a fresh start must be made. To begin with, the broad objective s
outlined in the Pa c t ’s founding documents should be elab o rated in a
detailed operational stra t e gy, commanding the support of all part i c i p a n t s .
A l s o , the Pact would have to be allocated sufficient funds to re c ru i t
a p p ro p riate staff and “ s e e d ” a number of re gional pro j e c t s .
The effe c t i veness of the Stability Pact could be improved in a number of
other ways as we l l . Pa rt i c u l a r ly in the sphere of economics, the EU and
other participants should consider introducing bench m a rks (the
I nvestment Compact has them alre a dy) and deadlines. This would allow
the rhetorical commitments to economic re fo rm to be pro p e r ly
m o n i t o re d , with public encouragement or re p roofs to fo l l ow. This kind
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of technique wo rks in ch e cking on candidate members ’p ro gress towa rd s
compliance with the acquis, and would be useful in helping the countri e s
of the re gion better pre p a re for that pro c e s s .2 2 9 C o n s i d e ration should
also be gi ven to supplying incentives to encourage gove rnments to
p e rsist with economic re s t ru c t u ri n g , and to softening the social impact
of tra n s i t i o n .
The Balkans countries might also look at one of the more old-fa s h i o n e d
d evices for encouraging funding, a standard Investment Pro t e c t i o n
A gre e m e n t . For the EU’s part , some concessional arra n gements fo r
p rovision of ex p o rt credits might be in ord e r. T h ey could consider
s t a rting their economic wo rk together by trying to curb corruption and
s muggling at their bord e rs . T h ey could attempt to provide cre d i bl e
a s s u rances that projects to be funded with Stability Pact money will not
be captured by the corru p t i o n , m i s m a n age m e n t , c ro nyism and org a n i s e d
c rime now preva l e n t . A mu ch strengthened and re a l ly effe c t i ve anti-
c o rruption initiative should be a high pri o ri t y.
On a broader leve l , the lack of any stra t e gy linking the Pa c t ’s goals with
s p e c i fic actions is a major handicap. This outstanding fa i l i n g , and others
d e s c ribed ab ove , point to an urgent need for a radical overhaul of the
systems and stru c t u res at the heart of the Pa c t . Some important elements
of ch a n ge (relating to staffi n g , wo rking methods, and ge n e ra l
a d m i n i s t ra t i ve quality at the centre) could be carried out autonomously
by the Special Coord i n a t o r, if he we re convinced of their necessity - as,
until now, he appare n t ly has not been. Other re fo rms will re q u i re cl e a r -
headed and determined engagement by the Pa c t ’s part i c i p a n t s , f rom the
EU to the G-8, the IFIs and the countries of South-Eastern Euro p e
t h e m s e l ve s .
A l t e rn a t i ve ly, or additionally, the Pact could take a short-cut to stra t e gi c
s i g n i ficance by trying to connect up with the European Union’s
S t abilisation and Association Process (SAP). It was the European Union
that took the initiative to launch the Stability Pact for South Eastern
E u ro p e . Ye t , relations between the EU and the Pact have not ru n
s m o o t h ly. The ori gin of the sometimes vexed relationship between the
S t ability Pact and the European Commission can be traced to the Cologne
document of June 1999. Pa ragraph 20 stated that “The EU will draw the
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re gion closer to the pers p e c t i ve of full integration of these countries into
its stru c t u re s . ...this will be done through a new kind of contra c t u a l
relationship taking fully into account the individual situations of each
c o u n t ry. . . We note the European Union’s willingness that...it will
consider the ach i evement of the objectives of the Stability Pa c t . . . i n
evaluating the merits of such a pers p e c t i ve .” The “ n ew kind” o f
relationship crystallised as the Stabilisation and Association Pro c e s s
( S A P ) , discussed in Chapter 12. It seems like ly that the launch of the Pa c t
s t i rred the Commission’s competitive spiri t , a c c e l e rating the start of
n e gotiations with Macedonia in Ju n e .
The  SAP  soon  dwa r fed  the  va rious  initiatives  under  the  umbrella of
the  Stability  Pa c t . The  gap  has inev i t ably  widened  with  time, ye t
t h e re is one vital political aspect of “ i n t e gra t i o n ” w h e re the Pact could
and should make an essential contri b u t i o n . This is the re gi o n a l
d i m e n s i o n , w h i ch has been marginalised by the necessari ly stro n g
b i l a t e ral  focus  of  the  SAP  nego t i a t i o n s . One promising  ave nue  wo u l d
be to develop the Pact as a fo rum for the political resolution of issues
with a re gional scope, s u ch as energy and tra n s p o rt . This role wo u l d
m a ke the Pact more re l evant by bri n ging it within the orbit of the
E u ropean Commission’s integra t i ve pro gra m , without however binding it
to the Commission’s re l a t i ve ly ponderous mu l t i l a t e ral pro c e d u re s . I t
would also enable the Balkan countries to have a cl e a rer sense of the
Pa c t ’s utility to them, giving a more concrete meaning to the term “ l o c a l
ow n e rs h i p ” .
Conclusions and recommendation on the Stability Pact for South Eastern
E u ro p e
o The Stability Pact should more closely focus its agenda with a far more
limited number of priorities.  In areas where the European Commission or
other bodies have already established an effective role, the Pact should let
such institutions take the lead.  Consideration should also be given to
reducing the number and range of Task Forc e s .
o The broad objectives outlined in the Pact’s founding documents should be
elaborated in a detailed operational strategy.  The Pact will need to allocate
s u fficient funds to re c ruit appropriate staff and seed a number of re g i o n a l
p rojects.  
o Continued support from the U.S.  will be essential if the Stability Pact is to
be transformed into a more effective mechanism.
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o T h e re is a clear need to generate greater local ownership of programs, and it
is crucial that the next round of funding should have greater design input
f rom the region.  
o The Stability Pact should be developed as a forum for the political re s o l u t i o n
of issues with a regional scope, such as energy and transport.  This would
make the Pact more relevant by bringing it within the orbit of the Euro p e a n
C o m m i s s i o n ’s activity, without tying it to the Commission’s re l a t i v e l y
p o n d e rous multilateral pro c e d u res.  It would also give the Balkan countries
a clearer sense of the Pact’s utility to them, and hence strengthen local
o w n e r s h i p .
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12.  EUROPE
E u rope is well positioned to take a coordinated and forw a rd looking appro a c h
to the Balkans, but it cannot simply hope that a “common European home” will
c u re all the re g i o n ’s ills.  Both the EU and the Balkan countries face much
steeper challenges than they have publicly acknowledged in working toward
eventual accession, and the EU will need to closely focus its immediate
assistance to generate tangible benefits and maintain the momentum for re f o rm .
Wa s h i n g t o n ’s increasingly distant approach to Balkans diplomacy gives the
E u ropeans new opportunities to set the necessary conflict prevention agenda,
but it is hard to break old habits of doing too little too late.  
A. European Interests and Objectives 
“ E u ro p e ” is treated for convenience here as embracing all those Euro p e a n
c o u n t ries that are member states of either the European Union or NATO.
This collective group of countries has come to understand that it has
p ro found interests in the Balkans, and remains key in setting policy
t owa rd the re gi o n . M a ny of the EU’s international ambitions - whether
m a n aging a coherent fo reign policy, d eveloping coordinated military
p o l i c i e s , maintaining cohesion or establishing international credibility -
h ave been stern ly tested in South Eastern Euro p e . L i kew i s e , NATO ’s basic
c redibility and effe c t i veness as a military alliance, its policies towa rd
expansion and its new stra t e gic concept have all been re p e a t e d ly on tri a l
in the Balkans.
O ver the last ten ye a rs ,E u rope has come to terms with the high price of
fa i l u re in Balkans policy: m a s s i ve re f u gee fl ow s ;c rimes against humanity;
s p i ralling relief and re c o n s t ruction costs; extended peaceke e p i n g
c o m m i t m e n t s ; rising tensions with Russia; ge n e ral law l e s s n e s s ; the thre a t
of broader wa r ; and deep strains upon re gional stru c t u re s . Time and
ag a i n , E u rope looked nervo u s ly to the Balkans - seemingly amazed at the
ability of events to move beyond its contro l . The wide impact of the
Balkans on the social, economic and security fab ric of Europe has
become painfully self-ev i d e n t . In short , E u rope has discove red that if it
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does not ex p o rt stability to the Balkans, then the Balkans will ex p o rt
i n s t ability to Euro p e . T h e re is no substitute for a peaceful, s t able and
d e m o c ratic South Eastern Europe on the f l a n k .
E u ro p e ’s continued military and diplomatic invo l vement in the re gion is
also part of a larger European political agenda of considerabl e
i m p o rt a n c e . If the Balkan entities cove red in this re p o rt re m a i n
dy s f u n c t i o n a l , it will undermine the broader prospects for expanding the
zone of European integration eastwa rd , and undercut Euro p e ’s ability to
e s t ablish itself as a global re gional and security powerhouse able to stand
toe-to-toe with emerging blocs in Asia and the A m e ri c a s . It appears that
E u rope will continue to take on a more and more influential role with
re g a rd to the Balkans. This seems the only logical outcome in a situation
w h e re the U. S . is incre a s i n g ly interested in “ b u rden shari n g ” a n d
E u ropeans are eager to lead on their own continent. The only fa c t o r
l i ke ly to alter this dynamic would be a re t u rn to a situation where NATO
exe rted military fo rce on a large scale. U l t i m a t e ly, E u ro p e ’s interests in
the re gion lead to a rather simple question that these countries mu s t
fa c e : what is the best way to create the conditions that will allow the
Balkans to move beyond ch ronic instab i l i t y ?
In rhetorical term s , E u rope has answe red this question with a single
wo rd :i n t e gra t i o n . L a n g u age ra n ging from “a common European home” t o
“a new Marshall Plan” has created the appearance that simply bri n gi n g
the re gion into mainstream European stru c t u res can solve the pro bl e m s
of the Balkan countri e s , by reducing the significance of the bord e rs that
divide them. I n t e gration into the EU and other mu l t i l a t e ral institutions is
seen as a means to prevent violent conf l i c t , a t t ract fo reign inve s t m e n t ,
eliminate trade and cultural barri e rs and provide employ m e n t
o p p o rt u n i t i e s . The EU itself has led the ch a rge in promoting this
ex p a n s i ve vision by re p e a t e d ly telling the Balkans countries that they
should re g a rd themselves as European and must adhere to all the
s t a n d a rds re q u i red of a modern European state. The 24 November 2000
c o m muniqué issued after the EU-Balkans summit talked ab o u t
“ ra p p ro ch e m e n t ” b e t ween the Balkans and the Union, and decl a red that
the opportunity was “open to all countries to move closer to the EU”.2 3 0
While the document’s language contained some residual ambiguities, i t
p rovided a re l a t i ve ly stra i g h t fo r wa rd promise that - provided that cert a i n
s t a n d a rds we re ach i eved - the Balkans countries could expect to
eve n t u a l ly gain EU members h i p .
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While integrating South Eastern Europe into the arch i t e c t u re of Euro p e a n
s e c u ri t y, economic and political stru c t u res is a viable long-term stra t e gy fo r
the re gi o n , it will have to be coupled with mu ch more effe c t i ve and
immediate effo rts in the short ru n . E m e rging from bitter re gional confl i c t
and bare ly having begun the process of re fo rming communist economies,
C ro a t i a , B o s n i a , S e r b i a , M o n t e n e gro , Ko s ovo , Macedonia and Albania all
h ave more pressing concerns that will have to be addressed to prevent a
re t u rn to confl i c t . Most import a n t , fundamental constitutional and status
issues in Ko s ovo ,M o n t e n e gro ,S e r b i a ,Bosnia and Macedonia will have to be
a d d ressed if meaningful re fo rm and long term integration are to take place.
This will re q u i re tremendous European political will up front - not ye a rs
d own the ro a d .
Some re l a t i ve ly simple, s t ra i g h t fo r wa rd lessons on security matters have
been learned over the past decade. In the Balkan confl i c t s , We s t e rn
t h re a t s , a d m o n i t i o n s , wa rnings and deadlines have been taken seri o u s ly
o n ly when backed up by a cre d i ble military deterre n t . Hesitation and
d e l ays over introduction of troops have only exacerbated pro blems on the
gro u n d . M i l i t a ry initiatives in the re gion wo rked best when NATO
m e m b e rs we re able to fo rge a common vision for their effo rt s . That said,
m i l i t a ry planners have been right to be concerned about the open-ended
n a t u re of troop deployments amid uncertain political env i ro n m e n t s . O n
m i l i t a ry matters , E u rope has not acted as an independent actor from the
United States, and decisions have been made within the stri c t u res of NATO
as an org a n i s a t i o n . NATO has collective ly set fo rce leve l s ,m i l i t a ry aims and
c o o rdinated on the full ra n ge of planning that such effo rts entail. I n
ge n e ra l , the use of military fo rce and peacekeeping operations in the
Balkans only became effe c t i ve when these operations we re NATO dri ve n
and dominated. That lesson is an important one, and both Europe and the
U. S . should be careful not to ex c e s s i ve ly tinker with success as it tries to
deal with the difficult issues still on the tabl e .
That said, the European members of NATO should not be shy in pushing
the alliance to take a fo rceful role in the re gi o n . I n d e e d , it seems a
d a n ge rous iro ny that while NATO as an organisation seems to have learn e d
the value of taking early and robust action to deal with emerging issues
s u ch as unrest in southern Serbia or fighting on the Macedonian border -
and seeking the troops and military commitment needed to back such an
a p p ro a ch - the U. S . a p p e a rs incre a s i n g ly reluctant to see it play such a ro l e .
If the European members of NATO speak with one voice on such issues, i t
might be possible to help convince the U. S . to support more ro b u s t
re s p o n s e s .
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Table 21.  The EU and European Members of NATO 
It is not clear how the EU’s effo rts to become a more important player in
the security realm will play out against NATO ’s role in the Balkans. T h e
c o n t i nuing situation in the Balkans, and linge ring tensions within the
a l l i a n c e , g ave impetus to the EU’s effo rts to define a common securi t y
policy and establish a 60,000-member rapid reaction fo rce by 2003. G i ve n
that some of the European members of NATO are not EU members , t h e re
is a clear concern that a greater EU security role could either come at the
expense of those members or be a divisive fo rce within the alliance -
e s s e n t i a l ly creating an EU bloc within NATO, or a NATO bloc within the
E U. S i m i l a r ly, a va riety of sometimes-contra d i c t o ry statements fro m
Washington re g a rding the U. S . i n t e rest in reducing its military pre s e n c e
in the Balkans has also complicated this debate. While expectations that
the EU could fo rge a common fo reign and security policy have alway s
been modest, t h e re has been considerable pro gress in recent ye a rs , and in
m a ny re g a rd s , the Balkans we re the cru c i ble that helped fo rge this
a p p ro a ch .
The appointment of Javier Solana as High Repre s e n t a t i ve for the Common
Fo reign and Security Policy was a wise ch o i c e . No other individual has a
better institutional pers p e c t i ve on the ch a l l e n ges invo l ved in fo rging a
common security appro a ch among the EU’s dive rse members h i p . F u rt h e r,
no other individual would have been as well positioned to re a s s u re NATO
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Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
European Union
Members
not in NATO
Austria
Finland
Ireland
Sweden
European NATO
Members
not in the EU
Czech Republic
Hungary
Iceland
Norway
Poland
Turkey
Members
of both 
the EU and NATO
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
United Kingdom
231  EU membership for Kosovo or Montenegro would require international recognition of sovereign status outside the FRY.
that EU stru c t u res would not become competitive and to wo rk
c o l l ab o ra t i ve ly with EU and NATO members alike . That said, Solana has
c o n t i nued to be concerned that the EU’s fo reign policy appro a ch is
ex c e s s i ve ly bure a u c ra t i c , ove r ly cautious and unable to function
e ffe c t i ve ly in real time. Old conflict prevention habits of doing too little
too late die ve ry hard .
B.  EU Membership: Dream and Reality
Helping the Balkan countries rev i ve their moribund economies is
fundamental to any sort of sustainable future for re gi o n . But economic
p ro gress has been mostly disappointing, re fo rms remaining superfi c i a l ,
b rittle and reve rs i ble across virt u a l ly all of the entities cove red in this
re p o rt .
This comes as the European Union continues to wo rk its way through a
h i s t o ric tra n s fo rm a t i ve process as it expands from its current fi f t e e n
m e m b e rs to what will like ly eve n t u a l ly become twice that nu m b e r.
A l re a dy stressed by the ch a l l e n ges of bri n ging greater nu m b e rs of
fo rm e r ly communist Central and Eastern European countries towa rd EU
m e m b e rs h i p , the organisation now finds itself committed to bri n gi n g
C ro a t i a , M a c e d o n i a , the FRY, Bosnia and Albania towa rds potential
m e m b e rs h i p .2 3 1 Expansion has been a mammoth undert a k i n g , and has cut
to the ve ry core of how the EU views itself, i d e n t i fies candidates fo r
m e m b e rship and wo rks with them to ach i eve the cri t e ria for accession.
This re m a rk able period of expansion also comes against the back d rop of
c o n t i nuing tensions among current members about how best to stru c t u re
re p resentation and voting rights within the org a n i s a t i o n .
The EU needs to address stra t e gi c a l ly how it will appro a ch the task of
m oving these re s p e c t i ve states through the waiting rooms fo r
m e m b e rs h i p , while not sacri ficing a ge nuine commitment to re fo rm . A l l
of these effo rts natura l ly must also be viewed within the larger context of
the widely shared goal of the EU to prevent a re t u rn to deadly conflict in
the Balkans. The Balkans countries continue to be seized by the notion of
joining the European Union, often feeling that such an association wo u l d
re m e dy the host of economic ills they curre n t ly fa c e . While the political
elites and the people of the re gion appear to have convinced themselve s
that EU members h i p , and nothing less, will suffice to meet their needs,
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h a rd questions persist about whether they have come to terms with the
ex t ra o rd i n a ri ly difficult and lengthy adjustments they must undert a ke , i f
t h ey are to pro gress from their ranks of pre - p re-accession to join the pre -
accession candidates in Central and Eastern Euro p e .
The Process
The EU has now put into place a systematic process of association with the
Balkans, one that has clearly been shaped by the regional conflict. This
process envisages a series of unilateral trade concessions from the EU (as
confirmed at the Zagreb summit),in a form and on a scale greater than those
offered to other potential accession candidates. This generosity was made
possible by the smaller economies of the Balkans countries,with their limited
export potential. Each of the countries is expected to take preparatory steps
t owa rd economic re fo rm - with economic stabilisation and industry
privatisation two key bench-marks - accompanied by initial negotiations on
agreements with the EU. The EU would then negotiate a Stabilisation and
Association Agreement (SAA) with each countr y.
The SAAs are a new kind of contractual relationship offered by the EU to the
Balkans countries,as a means of facilitating gradual rapprochement with the
EU. Modelled on the EU’s agreement with Slovenia,the SAAs are tailored to
each of the Balkan countries according to their specific circumstances and
are intended to provide strong guidelines and incentives for wide-ranging
economic, social and political reform. The agreements will set demanding
political and economic conditions, with a strong emphasis on cooperation
with neighbouring countries. The conditions for opening negotiations on the
S t abilisation and Association agreements include compliance with
democratic principles, human rights, and the rule of law, respect for and
protection of minorities,market economy reform,and regional cooperation.
Once negotiations are fo rm a l ly opened the principle mandates fo r
negotiation include:
o increasing political dialogue;
o provisions on the free movement of goods, workers,capital,and services;
o bringing local legislation into line with EU standards;and
o enhanced cooperation in a wide range of fields (economy, industry,
customs,employment,justice and home affairs,social security, education,
culture,transport,telecommunications,health,and tourism).
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After those conditions are met,an association agreement is reached.
Table 22.  Progress Toward European Union Stabilisation and
Association Agreements
Croatia N e gotiations for Stabilisation and Association A gre e m e n t
opened in November 2000.
Albania Feasibility study released in November 2000 highlighted
additional reforms to be undertaken. A European Commission
report will be submitted to the Council in preparation for the
negotiation of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement in
June 2001.
FRY Following the confirmed prospect of the Stabilisation and
Association Agreement with the FRY, a feasibility study is
currently underway with a view to negotiating directives for a
Stabilisation and Association Agreement.
Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Agreement concluded in February
2001.
The European Commission reviews progress in fulfilling the SAA as the
countries develop their governance and economies into rough conformity
with the EU’s acquis communautaire. The acquis comprises the entire body
of legislation of the European Communities which has accumulated,and been
revised, over the last 40 years, involving some 80,000 pages of material. It
includes:
o the content,principles,and political objectives of the EU treaties;
o the legislation adopted in application of the treaties and the case law of
the Court of Justice;
o the declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union;
o measures relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP);
o measures relating to justice and home affairs;and 
o internal agreements concluded by the EU and among the Member States
themselves in the field of the Union’s activities.
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Thus the acquis comprises not only EU law in the strict sense, but also all acts
adopted under the second pillar (Common Fo reign and Security Policy) and
t h i rd pillar (Justice and Home A ffa i rs) of the European Union, and ab ove all, t h e
common objectives laid down in the Tre a t i e s . Applicant countries have to
accept the a c q u i s b e fo re they can join the European Union. E xemptions and
d e rogations from the a c q u i s a re granted only in exceptional circumstances and
a re limited in scope. As the guardian of the a c q u i s, the European Commission
is not pre p a red to soften these conditions, w h i ch will like ly grow even more
c o m p l ex and demanding over time, for the Balkans countri e s . What it has done,
a ck n ow l e d ging that fully confo rming to the a c q u i s will be beyond the capacity
of Balkans economies and gove rnments for some time, is to fo c u s ,t h rough the
S A A s , on core elements of the a c q u i s, giving these countries a chance to
swa l l ow the fo rm i d able mass of conditions in more easily dige s t i ble pieces.
This would eve n t u a l ly pave the way for agreements between the EU and specifi c
c o u n t ries in the re gion on a timetable for accession negotiations and
c o n fi rmation that the Balkans economies meet the Copenhagen cri t e ria for EU
m e m b e rs h i p , s p e c i fi c a l ly the tests of political pro gre s s , economic growth and
a d m i n i s t ra t i ve competence.
EU membership would fo l l ow the successful conclusion of those accession
n e go t i a t i o n s . This appro a ch avoids treating the countries in the Balkans as a
group and recognises that pro gress towa rd meeting the cri t e ria for members h i p
will often be va ri e d , and the EU has large ly avoided setting deadlines for this
p rocess of members h i p . I n d e e d , the EU’s existing Stabilisation and A s s o c i a t i o n
p rocess confi rms the need for diffe re n t i a t i o n . Those countries that are more
successful in pursuing re fo rm and difficult economic tra n s fo rmation should be
rewa rd e d , just as those taking a go - s l ow appro a ch should be penalised. That is
not to say however that some economic pro blems cannot best be tackled on a
re gional basis. Tra n s p o rt netwo rks and corri d o rs are the best ex a m p l e ,but there
a re plenty of others ,i n cluding energy supplies, t e l e c o m munications and bord e r
c o n t ro l s . T h e re is,h oweve r, no good reason why the economies showing some
p romise should be hobbled by being fo rced to move at the pace of all the
o t h e rs . The Balkans gove rnments still seem inclined to seek a quick fix or a short
cut to EU members h i p . The EU’s process demonstrates that no such option is
ava i l abl e . It also re i n fo rces other critical - but difficult - message s :
o Full-scale stru c t u ral economic re fo rm is - compellingly - in the interests of the
Balkans countries themselve s ; and 
o T h e re is no lasting half-way house ava i l able on the way to setting up a fre e
m a rket economy.
256 AFTER MILOSEVIC
Hard Realities
S i m p ly put, recognising the amount of wo rk invo l ved in securing EU
m e m b e rship for the Balkans countries will be painful for all invo l ve d .
From the EU side, the amount of funds re q u i red to ease the transition will
be substantial, if re l a t i ve ly limited by the small size of the Balkans
e c o n o m i e s . I n t e grating the Balkan economies will not be a task on the
m agnitude of embracing Russia, Poland or Tu rkey, but nonetheless, E U
assistance to the Balkans will be needed for decades to come. None of
these economies would be as hard to digest in terms of scale. The Balkan
economies are so decrepit that, if their ge o graphic position was more
distant or their security situation less pre s s i n g , the EU might well consider
an extension of Lomé-type arra n gements rather than extending EU
m e m b e rs h i p . The real pro blem is in wo rking out not the amount of
m o n ey the EU may need to spend in any gi ven ye a r, but the number of
ye a rs they would need to keep on spending. C e rt a i n ly addressing the
re gi o n ’s pro blems entails a major commitment - of funds, t e ch n i c a l
a s s i s t a n c e ,n e gotiating time and political will over time.
S u ch engagement also imposes opportunity costs, d raining the EU’s
re s o u rces to deal with other types of crises elsew h e re . If the Balkans
c o u n t ries we re not ge o gra p h i c a l ly in Euro p e , then some quite diffe re n t
fo rm of association - one more like the Cotonou A greement with AC P
d eveloping countries - might seem more appro p ri a t e . As one index of the
l evel of re gional deve l o p m e n t , t h e re are as yet few thorough estimates
even of the fi rst key economic thre s h o l d , the date when the Balkans
economies might expect to re t u rn to their 1991 production leve l s . S o m e
estimates have been made of the dimension of EU infra s t ru c t u re
assistance over the coming decade, but no compre h e n s i ve accounting has
been conducted of the cost of closer ties (including the costs to the
Common A gri c u l t u ral Policy (CAP), to re gional pro grams and to the
cohesion funds). F u rther possible adjustments to the CAP would be a
p re d i c t able cause of contention, but still an intense one, despite the fa c t
that the Balkans accounts for only 0.16 per cent of the EU’s agri c u l t u ra l
i m p o rt s . C ritics will look at the future capacity of the Vo j vodina gra i n
fi e l d s , not their curre n t ly depressed levels of output.
The test for the EU is a matter of whether the organisation can pers eve re
despite evident costs and ri s k , allocate sufficient re s o u rces to fo l l ow
t h rough on its commitments, and frame its policies boldly enough, a n d
implement them thoro u g h ly enough, to be effe c t i ve . Resisting the
i n t roduction of a two-tier or three-tier membership system may be
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d i fficult for the EU. E n s u ring compliance with the proposed ch a rter of
fundamental rights might also invo l ve regular interfe rence in what the
Balkans countries would perc e i ve as their own legi t i m a t e ly intern a l
a ffa i rs .
From the Balkans side, the promise of eventual EU membership is
i n d i s p e n s able to ge n e rating optimism about the economic future . The EU
link is seen as a way of consolidating, e n c o u raging and rewa rd i n g
economic re fo rm . While the economic benefits of accession have been
w i d e ly tru m p e t e d , the adjustment costs of the accession process - as
m e a s u red in lost jobs, cl o s u re of enterpri s e s , the expense of re t raining the
wo rk fo rc e ,i m p o rt penetra t i o n , diminished fl exibility in policy making and
p ro found stru c t u ral ch a n ge - have not sunk in with the people of the
re gi o n . E q u a l ly import a n t , for the Balkans economies, m ovement towa rd
the EU entails abandoning not only all the economic practices and
policies of the past. That process also means ch a l l e n ging powerful ve s t e d
i n t e rests in critical sectors of the economy, as well as the corru p t i o n ,
c ro nyism and criminality on which their power is based. Meeting the
conditions for joining the EU will be felt acutely in the cl o s e d ,
p ro t e c t i o n i s t , c ro ny - run and unpro d u c t i ve sectors of Balkans economies.
M a ny countries in the re gion have been sluggish in pursuing meaningful
economic re s t ru c t u ri n g , despite the fact that it is an essential step in
p re p a ring to sign on to the EU’s acquis commu n a u t a i re. I n d e e d , we have
seen far less commitment to economic re fo rm in the Balkans than has
been practised throughout mu ch of Central and Eastern Euro p e .
In theory, the EU sequence makes good sense. In pra c t i c e , B a l k a n s
gove rnments may come to think that the path set by the EU is too long,
its conditions too tough, the wait too fru s t ra t i n g , and the adjustment costs
too high. T h e re is a risk that the current stru c t u re and sequence will
ge n e rate expectations that cannot be fulfi l l e d , then disappointments that
cannot be contained. T h e re is cause for concern that, in assessing their
links with Euro p e , as some of the present candidates, the Balkans
c o u n t ries do not appear to have ack n ow l e d ged the economic costs and
political risks entailed in trying to tie their economies to the EU.
R a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , re s t ru c t u ri n g ,s t ru c t u ral ch a n ge and economic re fo rm will
all entail considerable economic and social dislocation in the Balkans.
T h e re is no altern a t i ve to giving up sectors of the Balkans economies that
a re now - and always will be - unpro d u c t i ve . The only issue is how slow ly
or quick ly those sectors are ab a n d o n e d , h ow drastic the ch a n ge is, w h a t
social and financial safety nets are put in place for the wo rke rs invo l ve d ,
and where the economy is then re fo c u s e d .
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The EU association process will need to care f u l ly gauge how best to
blunt some of the shock from this process in countries that have alre a dy
s u ffe red so mu ch upheaval by building in some early dividends that will
rewa rd Balkan gove rnments for a commitment to economic re fo rm and
d e m o n s t rate that such re fo rm can produce tangi ble benefi t s . T h e
S t abilisation and Association agreements have set out a va riety of
c o m m o n - s e n s e , p ractical ways for assisting conve rgence with the a c q u i s.
T h ey outline mechanisms fo r : t ra i n i n g ; m o d e rn i s a t i o n ; s u p e rv i s o ry
s y s t e m s ; re g u l a t i o n ; institution building; good practice and ex ch a n ges of
i n fo rm a t i o n . The agenda set in the SAAs also includes issues which wo rry
the EU but which do not dire c t ly affect economic manage m e n t . C rime is
o n e , justice another. R e fo rm of those sectors would consolidate
economic ch a n ge (by, for instance, e n s u ring a fair hearing in cases of
dispute settlement), but adds another layer to an alre a dy daunting
p ro c e s s .
T h rough the SAAs, the EU has focused on those areas of confo rmity with
the a c q u i s that are essential for effe c t i ve trade and economic intera c t i o n ,
rather than on a compre h e n s i ve overhaul of the Balkans economies.
Looking ahead, this is the appro a ch with the best prospects fo r
ge n e rating job creation and short - t e rm economic growth in the re gi o n .
What remains to be seen is if the EU can ensure that the momentum fo r
re fo rm needed to meet the more technical aspects of the a c q u i s i s
maintained over time.
In this contex t , e a r ly dividends will be at a pre m i u m . In terms of early
dividends from association with the EU (or stru c t u ral ch a n ge , m o re
ge n e ra l ly defi n e d ) , then the best place to start may be with pro p e rt y
ri g h t s . In the absence of clear title, e s t ablished ri g h t s , s e c u re tenu re and
f ree movement of capital and pro fi t s , i nve s t o rs will remain reluctant to
spend money in the Balkans. A t t racting some - short - t e rm ,o p p o rt u n i s t i c
- investment is not that diffi c u l t . A t t racting quality inve s t m e n t , the sort
that ge n e rates jobs, t ra n s fe rs tech n o l o gy, expands the local economy, a n d
facilitates re - s t ru c t u ring in other sectors , is a diffe rent matter.
O t h e r, e a r ly steps - each of which could be designed to produce early
dividends - could incl u d e :
o EU decisions to relax the rules on investment guarantees for new
investments into the Balkans economies,in order to spread the burden of
risk. If one EU country took a lead,since guarantees are administered on
a national basis,then others would follow;and
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o Organising standard rules on dispute settlement for foreign investors to
provide some rudimentary basis of stability, fairness and predictability in
the structure of economic rules through the Stability Pact.
The EU is extending the va l u able wo rk of the Customs and Fiscal A d v i s o ry
O ffice (CAFAO) from Bosnia elsew h e re in the re gi o n . The EU assistance
p ro gram for the post-Milosevic gove rnments in Serbia has been fi rm ly
based on a recognition of the need for a “ q u i ck start ” , for an early
d e m o n s t ration of the practical value of association with the EU. T h a t
p rinciple should be applied to other sectors as we l l . Without a “ q u i ck
s t a rt ” , t h e re is no guarantee that the Balkans countries (in contrast with,
s ay, Poland and Hungary) will stay the course of economic re fo rm .
U n re c i p rocated tari ff concessions comprised a go o d , fi rst offer from the
E U. What happens, t h o u g h , if no significant trade fl ow s , despite the
concessions? Ta ri ff concessions are based on the premise that the Balkans
c o u n t ries still retain some niche of compara t i ve adva n t age and
c o m p e t i t i ve effi c i e n c y. T h ey may not. Their economic future may depend
on dismantling mu ch of their current economic plant, as well as
demolishing all their current economic ort h o d ox i e s . Some local
businesses will continue to enjoy residual adva n t age s , those based on
l o c a t i o n , re l a t i ve ly low labour costs, or an established relationship with
local consumers . Those businesses, h oweve r, will face difficulties in
p roving competitive in a wider marke t . Few of the traditional sectors of
c o m p e t i t i ve efficiency in the Balkans (pharm a c e u t i c a l s , re s o u rc e s
p rocessing) can re a d i ly be re s u s c i t a t e d . None of the plans for future
growth (touri s m , i n fo rmation tech n o l o gy, financial services) can be
expected to deliver early re s u l t s . An interesting area for the EU to
consider assisting these countries may be in agri c u l t u re . These are
societies with a heavy agra rian element, and early EU assistance in this
a rea might help ge n e rate economic growth while addressing a sector that
is often sticky for potential members .
The EU has developed seve ral assistance pro grams to help the Balkans
c o u n t ries ach i eve re fo rm and re c o n s t ru c t i o n , and to soften the social
impact that re fo rm is liable to have . Some of the countries benefited fro m
the PHARE (Pologne Hongrie Assistance pour la re c o n s t ru c t i o n
économique) pro gra m , designed to help economies in tra n s i t i o n . T h e
ex p e rience gained in the Central and Eastern European accession
c o u n t ri e s ,i n cluding lessons learned from PHARE, and the effe c t i veness of
those pro grams and their applicability in the Balkans, helped shape the
O B N OVA pro gram (1996-2000), and its successor, the CARDS pro gra m .
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The element of regional conditionality built into the Stabilisation and
Association process reflects the specific history of this region. The South
Eastern European aspirants to European Union membership have to convince
Western European public opinion that they can achieve normal relations
among each other. Although some countries bridle at this element, it must
not be diluted. Such dilution is a risk, for, notwithstanding the regional
projects notionally agreed at Zagreb,the EU’s proposals are based on a series
of separate and distinct bilateral deals with individual Balkans economies. In
some sectors, such as telecommunications, the burden of adjustment might
be eased if it were coupled with moves to establish regional networks. The
arguments which underpinned the EU’s single market,freeing trade in goods,
services,capital and labour,also apply - on a smaller scale,but in the same way
- to the Balkans economies. More direct, hands-on assistance may also be
necessary if the Balkans countries are to manage their current economic
challenges effectively, particularly privatisation. The benefits of privatisation
may have been over-stated,but the process is fundamental to any thorough-
going renovation of the Balkans economies. The Europeans may need to do
more, perhaps by proposing that independent, outside panels be used to
evaluate tenders, or by calling on European experts to strike fair market
values for assets,or by recommending that the Balkans apply more widely the
approach used in Kosovo (offering a relatively free hand to investors to run
former state assets, for a defined period but without settling questions of final
ownership). The EU countries should not be perturbed about imposing
conditionality of this kind. In fact, they should do more of that. Successive
tranches of aid could and should be tied to progress made against agreed
benchmarks. Without clear guidance and assistance from the EU, the Balkans
governments may well sell many assets off at less than fair market value,
perhaps to cronies and slow more meaningful reform. This kind of approach
may be criticised as paternalistic. It would, however, work. The European
Commission effort at “twinning”- detailing officials from EU member states to
institutions in aspirant countries - could also be quite useful in this area.
All the Balkan entities covered in this report will need to understand that a
great deal of the onus for the economic and political transformation that will
make EU membership a reality rests on their shoulders. The essential points
that the Balkans countries have to understand are simple ones. Structural
economic reform is in their own best interest, and deserves support in its
own right - not simply as a precondition of EU membership. There is no
alternative to movement toward a free market and while movement toward
market economies and European standards will entail considerable social
dislocation,a failure to make hard reform choices will doom these countries
to remaining outside Europe’s mainstream.
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The Balkan governments have some resource assets,skills in their workforce,
natural linkages with Europe,and economic strengths. Over time,they may
become credible candidate countries. In the meantime, they need other,
more specific and more practical forms of assistance,to supplement the help
provided under the EU’s association schedule. There might also be a scope
for greater EU involvement in the implementation of public administration
reforms, designing management systems and training and equipping civil
servants in the Balkans. This help would impose some additional demands on
EU resources and funding in the short term,but with the substantial benefit
of alleviating the risk of longer-term economic problems.
Critics of the EU are keen to suggest that the Union should do more in the
Balkans - spend more, offer more, concede more and coordinate more.
However, the question now is less of the EU’s overall commitment to the
Balkans,and more of its ability to build momentum for future progress. The
idea behind the Stability Pact’s “Quick Start” projects and the European
Commission’s small and medium enterprises programs (SME) is the right one,
that more effort needs to be made to produce signs of initial progress,enough
to give hope and confidence to policy makers and their electorates.
A “quick kick”like that would lend momentum,and credibility, to economic
reform efforts,at a time when any reform will be bitterly opposed by strong
vested interests,and when the Balkans countries need to make progress on
many fronts at once. Organising a “quick kick” should be the EU’s top
economic priority. The speed with which assistance has flowed to Serbia
helps demonstrate the point, since the Euro p e a n s ’ fi rst post-election
assistance package there has helped give Serbs the wherewithal - through
reliable power supplies, heating oil and the provision of medicines - to get
through their first winter under democracy. Without that “quick kick”,other
programs - perhaps better choreographed and better synchronised,will never
get the chance to be effective.
Conclusions and recommendations on EU accession
o T h e re needs to be a clearer and more realistic acknowledgment on both sides
of the enormous difficulties involved for the Balkans countries in meeting
EU accession criteria.  
o E u ropean Union member states need to recognise and rise to the challenge of
institution building in South Eastern Europe.  “Twinning” pro g r a m s ,
placing civil servants from EU countries in Balkans ministries, should be
boosted.  
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o The EU should make clear that it will hold Serbia to the same level of
accountability it re q u i res of other countries in the region, to be eligible for
continuing assistance.  
o The EU, to maintain the momentum for re f o rm, should focus on eff o rts that
have the best prospects for generating job creation and short - t e rm economic
g rowth in the region including clarifying pro p e r ty rights, relaxing the ru l e s
on investment guarantees and organising standard rules on dispute
settlement.  
o The EU should bring in privatisation experts to determine the fair market
value of assets, use outsiders to evaluate tenders and set strict perf o rm a n c e
re q u i rements for the new owners of enterprises.  
C. Priorities
G i ven that so mu ch of the instability in the Balkans fl ows from on-go i n g
disputes over political status and constitutional arra n gements - in Montenegro ,
S e r b i a , Ko s ovo , Bosnia and Macedonia - it seems unavo i d able that peacefully
and democra t i c a l ly resolving these matters should be a high pri o rity fo r
E u ro p e . H oweve r, t h e re have been tro u bling signs that Europe is eager to avo i d
resolving matters of political status. On 22 Ja nu a ry 2001, the EU Fo re i g n
M i n i s t e rs made clear their pre fe rence for “maintaining an ove rall fe d e ra l
f ra m ewo rk ” in the FRY, and UN Balkans Envoy Carl Bildt told Reuters that the
EU statement,“ ve ry cl e a r ly ex p resses that the international community has no
i n t e rest in setting up new states in the re gi o n ” .2 3 2
The major European actors do not appear to be divided on these issues. T h e
commonality of views and pers p e c t i ves on the re gion is unu s u a l ly high, and in
m a ny re g a rds we l c o m e . H owever this conve rgence of opinion does not
n e c e s s a ri ly mean that Europe is taking the soundest appro a ch to resolving fi n a l
status issues, and the illusion of consensus could well be quite shallow. S i m p ly
p u t , the major European actors will have a difficult time being viewed as an
honest bro ker or facilitator for talks between Serbia and Montenegro ,or Serbia
and Ko s ovo , if they continue to insist that they favour retaining some rev i s e d
fo rm of the FRY over all other constitutional options. I n d e e d , this appro a ch is
not even viewed as entire ly realistic in Belgra d e ,and this stasis in policy ignore s
the wider impera t i ve . The Balkans will only embrace a lasting peace when it
has ach i eved political arra n gements through a peaceful, d e m o c ratic dialogue
that allows its citizens to feel they are secure and well serve d . If Europe simply
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dismisses such a ch a l l e n ge as too thorny, or lets itself be viewed in Po d go ri c a
and Pristina as favo u ring the retention of the FRY ab ove all else, it will pay the
costs for its lack of fo resight for ye a rs to come.2 3 3
Some may use the recent outbreaks of violence in Macedonia to argue ag a i n s t
resolving final status issues. The opposite would seem to hold tru e . The longe r
political status issues are left open,the more sway political ex t remists will think
that they might have over any final decision,and the more like ly they will be to
t a ke up arm s . B ri n ging cl a rity and finality to constitutional arra n gements and
b o rd e rs is a vital step in moving past resolving issues by means of violence.
One of the lessons learned during the last decade has been that the pro bl e m s
in the Balkans cannot be effe c t i ve ly addressed by any European country acting
a l o n e . Dealing on an equal basis with the United States wa s , and will be, b o t h
simpler and more effe c t i ve when Europe speaks with a ge n e ra l ly unified vo i c e .
S y n ch ronising diplomatic initiatives - especially on the terms of recognition or
settlements - was essential to avoid the appearance of internal division and
cl u m s i n e s s . A s s e m bling tro o p s , assessing accession cri t e ri a , a p p ra i s i n g
economic needs, all those jobs we re done better if done by the Euro p e a n s
t o ge t h e r. E u rope should lead the way in galvanising the intern a t i o n a l
c o m munity to tackle the most difficult issues facing the Balkans.
B eyond status issues, the situation in the Balkans will demand great pers i s t e n c e
over time. E ven if the flames of potential conflict are doused,E u rope will have
to address a re gion where slow economic grow t h , high unemployment and
l i n ge ring social tensions are the norm . D e m o c racy will remain fragile and
e ffo rts to move more fully to market economies will like ly be ve ry uneve n .
Discontent with the speed of expansion of the EU and NATO may also be
w i d e s p re a d .
In assessing their interests and exe rcising leve rage over the next few ye a rs ,
E u ropean countries will need to confront a ra n ge of complicated securi t y
p ro blems in the Balkans. In part i c u l a r :
o If there is not another major confl i c t ,E u rope will need to establish just how
mu ch it is pre p a red to do in the re gi o n , either by assuming a larger role in
the NATO operation or considering an operation that is not stri c t ly NATO -
l e d . Because the Bush A d m i n i s t ration continues to suggest that while it
would like to reduce its role in the Balkans, it would only do so by
agreement with its European NATO allies, t h e re should be no rush to
consider the non-NATO option.
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o Within the context of NATO,E u rope will need to establish how long its ow n
fo rces will remain in Bosnia and Ko s ovo .
o E u rope - again either within NATO or the EU - will have to consider if it
wishes to take a military role in supporting whatever outcome can be
s e c u red from final status discussions between Serbia, M o n t e n e gro and
Ko s ovo . R e g a rdless of their precise constitutional status, some Euro p e a n
m i l i t a ry invo l vement could be helpful in securing the para m e t e rs of an
agre e m e n t . A ny plausible deployment or retention of peaceke e p e rs or
b o rder monitors to underpin a final status agreement would have to be
based on an open-ended promise to use sufficient fo rce to respond to
t ra n s gre s s i o n s .
o The European members of NATO will have to emulate the U. S . in one
re s p e c t ,by starting to think about an exit stra t e gy for their ground troops and
h ow best to create the conditions that will allow the draw down of tro o p s
over time. S u ch planning should take place within the context of NATO and
recognise that the costs of peacekeeping can often be modest when
c o m p a red to the price of re n ewed confl i c t .
o The European members of NATO need to determine how best to use
p ro grams in which the Balkans countries are intere s t e d , s u ch as NATO ’s
M e m b e rship Action Plan and Pa rt n e rship for Peace as mechanisms for setting
a p p ro p riate troop levels throughout the re gi o n . NATO,the OSCE and the EU
need to wo rk collab o ra t i ve ly to help militaries in the re gion reduce tro o p
s t re n g t h ,i m p rove equipment,p ro fe s s i o n a l i s e ,m ove towa rd part n e rship with
We s t e rn military stru c t u res and ge n e ra l ly become modern military
institutions that are constru c t i ve part n e rs with a stake in re gional securi t y.
o Decommissioning militias and attempting to find and destroy illegal stock s
of weapons and deter smuggling should also be intensified within the
f ra m ewo rk of these pro gra m s . The EU, for its part , should ex p l o re how
similar military training and cooperation pro grams fit into their own view of
a more robust effo rt to define a Common Fo reign and Security Po l i c y. All of
these fa c t o rs suggest that Europe should appro a ch the final status questions
for Serbia, M o n t e n e gro and Ko s ovo with greater urge n c y, not less. U n l e s s
E u rope deals with the underlying sources of insecurity in the re gi o n , it will
find itself policing the Balkans for ye a rs to come.
Progress in democracy, human rights and economics will be fundamental to
this effort. A sense of the true value and meaning of democratic change
underpinned Croatian voters’decision to rid themselves of the long-standing
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HDZ government,the Serbian people’s insistence that Kostunica’s democratic
victory over Milosevic be honoured, and support for moderate parties in
Kosovo’s October 2000 local elections.
Those are heartening ex a m p l e s , e s p e c i a l ly for the Euro p e a n s , but the
c o m fo rt they gi ve should not obscure real ch a l l e n ges in ensuring that there
is no re gression to habits of authori t a ri a n i s m , ag gre s s i o n , u n b ri d l e d
nationalism and political corru p t i o n . The transition towa rd democra c y
p romises to continue to be ro cky in the Balkans. Commitment to democra t i c
p rinciples remains disturbingly shallow among many of the political elites in
the re gi o n , and the organs of civil society - independent media and dy n a m i c
n o n - gove rnmental organisations among them - remain underd eve l o p e d . As a
re s u l t ,E u rope will peri o d i c a l ly encounter pro blems with accepting some of
the ex p ressions of the popular will in the Balkans. For ex a m p l e , w h e n
e l e c t o rates vote for ex t reme nationalists or ex - C o m mu n i s t s ,E u rope will fi n d
itself torn between support for democracy and fe a rs of ex t re m i s m . In a
similar ve i n , E u rope will like ly suffer heart b u rn when the popular will in
places like Ko s ovo and Montenegro for independence runs counter to its
own pre fe rred policy options.
E u ropean effo rts to support justice system re fo rm , and the rule of law
ge n e ra l ly, a re also vital. These effo rts will provide the key underpinning fo r
lasting economic and democratic growth in the re gi o n , and their import a n c e
cannot be ove rs t a t e d . P ro found institutional ch a n ge is fundamental to
p e a c e . Two key sets of questions arise in Euro p e ’s appro a ch to human ri g h t s
in the re gi o n . The fi rst goes to the matter of the pursuit and trial of wa r
c ri m i n a l s . H ow ri go rous will Europeans be in demanding accountability fo r
all the crimes committed during the past decade? Clearly, in providing the
bulk of international financial assistance to the re gi o n , E u rope has unique
l eve rage to assert pre s s u re on the entities cove red in this re p o rt . E q u a l ly
cl e a r ly, E u rope will need to balance a va riety of its interests in determ i n i n g
the amount of pre s s u re it will bring to bear. A c c o u n t ability will be a key
factor in re s t o ring a sense of responsibility and normalcy in the re gi o n ,b u t
will often be low on the list for Balkans leaders more concerned with
p roviding tangi ble signs of economic and social pro gress to their citizens,
and eager to avoid stirring domestic political passions. E u rope should take
a position on this issue that is consistent across the re gion and demands that
justice is fulfi l l e d .
The second set of human rights issues centres around re f u gee re t u rn s . To
what extent should the Europeans insist on full rights of re t u rn for all
re f u ge e s , even in cases where that does not seem to be fe a s i ble? Obv i o u s ly,
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no re t u rns should take place unless re f u gees can be re a s o n ably assured of
their safety and securi t y. H oweve r,by any re a s o n able standard , if the entities
in this re p o rt are to fulfil the conditions tra d i t i o n a l ly set for EU members h i p ,
the Balkan states would have to substantially revise many of the legal and
a d m i n i s t ra t i ve practices that curre n t ly stand in the way of more fulsome
re t u rn s . Instead of simply re s o rting to compensation for re f u gees unable to
re t u rn , the EU should continue to stri ve to provide the underlying conditions
that would make these people again welcome in their own homes and
c o m mu n i t i e s .2 3 4
The OSCE, with its North A m e rican and Asian as well as Euro p e a n
m e m b e rs h i p , will continue to play an import role in human rights and the
p romotion of democratic norms in the re gi o n , among its other
re s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . As a re l a t i ve ly small org a n i s a t i o n , it has more fl exibility than
m a ny of its international counterpart s . H oweve r, with still limited
ex p e rience in field operations and implementation, the OSCE has often been
t h rust into taking an almost breathtaking array of tasks: the monitoring of
e l e c t i o n s , building confidence in a wide ra n ge of military affa i rs , h u m a n
rights monitori n g ,e a r ly wa rn i n g ,c risis manage m e n t , ove rseeing agre e m e n t s
and crisis preve n t i o n . The gulf between the OSCE’s incre a s i n g ly bro a d
m a n d a t e , and its limited re s o u rces and rather ad hoc bure a u c ratic style, i s
reason for some caution about its effe c t i ve n e s s . It is also not clear how its
l a rge ly consensus dri ven decision-making style will impact its opera t i o n a l
e ffe c t i veness as it takes on these new ro l e s . Because NATO, the UN and the
EU still loom as mu ch larger and more influential institutional stru c t u res on
the continent, the OSCE’s long-term effe c t i veness will pro b ably depend on
closer cl a ri fication of its role vis-à-vis these institutions.
N u d ging the Balkans countries away from a single-minded focus on the EU
and towa rd other “ E u ro-Atlantic stru c t u re s ” will also have some utility by
putting less pre s s u re on timetables and serving as an apprenticeship for the
demands of both EU and NATO members h i p . The Council of Europe is the
l o gical place to start . A l b a n i a , C ro a t i a , S l ovenia and Macedonia are alre a dy
m e m b e rs of the Council of Euro p e ; Bosnia has been accorded “special guest
s t a t u s ” at the Council’s Pa r l i a m e n t a ry A s s e m bly since 1994, and on 22
Ja nu a ry 2001 the Fe d e ral Republic of Yu go s l avia was also gi ven special guest
s t a t u s . The Council’s Statute fo re s h a d ows not only discussion, but also
common action among members “in economic, s o c i a l , c u l t u ra l , s c i e n t i fi c ,
legal and administra t i ve matters ” as well as in “maintenance and furt h e r
realisation of human rights and fundamental fre e d o m s ” . For the countries of
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the Balkans, the most useful “common action” would come in the fo rm of
p ractical assistance, c o m p a ra t i ve pers p e c t i ves on policy, m e n t o rs for a ra n ge
of pro gra m s , and a chance to inculcate the habit of coopera t i o n .
M o re ove r, the Council imposes its own re q u i rements and conditions,
including the threshold obligation on members to accept the principle of the
rule of law, and to guarantee human rights and fundamental freedoms to
everyone under their jurisdiction. Again, the Europeans are faced with a
difficult choice between retaining their existing standards, and therefore
excluding the Balkans countries from closer association, or encouraging
Balkans membership at the cost of diluting the conditions of participation
which embody the common principles underpinning membership.
The Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) may also serve as a
logical “waiting room” for countries wishing to join the EU. All CEFTA
members have previously signed association agreements with the EU, and
relations based on the principles of the progressive removal of trade barriers
in keeping with GATT regulations. Countries that are WTO members and
have signed the EU Association Agreement are eligible for membership,
subject to approval by existing CEFTA members.
Conclusions and recommendations on Euro p e ’s ro l e
o E u rope should adopt a less negative approach toward the holding of final
and future status discussions, and be more open-minded about possible
outcomes.  By continuing to insist upon the retention of the FRY in some
f o rm and to oppose the creation of any new states, the major Euro p e a n
actors are jeopardising their role as honest brokers in such discussions.
o If the U.S. seeks to continue to limit its military engagement in the re g i o n ,
E u rope will need to establish just how much it is pre p a red to do itself, either
by assuming a larger role in the NATO operation or considering an
operation that is not strictly NAT O - l e d .
o N ATO, the OSCE and the EU need to work collaboratively to help militaries
in the region reduce troop strength, improve equipment, pro f e s s i o n a l i s e ,
move toward partnership with We s t e rn military stru c t u res and become
p a rtners with a stake in regional security.  
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13.  THE US, RUSSIA 
AND OTHER MAJOR ACTORS
Lack of coordination among the myriad of external actors in the Balkans
continues to be a problem, notably on conditionality issues.  The UN, often
m a rginalized by its membership divisions, and haunted by successive near
death experiences, has improved its perf o rmance, but struggled to provide the
n e c e s s a ry overall leadership.  The U.S.  must stay engaged in the Balkans: its
leadership will be essential in shaping NAT O ’s necessary military role, and
helpful in the resolution of constitutional issues in Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo
and Bosnia.  Russia’s involvement has been a mixed blessing; its re s o u rces are
limited, but it can play a positive and enduring political role and should be
encouraged to do so.  
A.  A Crowded Arena
An incre d i ble dive rsity of international institutions and actors , a p a rt from the
E u ropean states and institutions alre a dy discussed, a re curre n t ly invo l ved in the
B a l k a n s . It is beyond the scope of this re p o rt to do justice to the dive rsity and
c o m p l exity of their contributions and intera c t i o n s . The UN, NATO,the Contact
G ro u p , the G-8,the Stability Pa c t , the W TO,the World Bank, the IMF,m a ny other
i n t e rgove rnmental org a n i s a t i o n s , nu m e rous state and pri vate donors ,s c o res of
i n t e rnational NGOs and a my riad of business interests all play a role of one kind
or another. This chapter focuses on just a handful of the key state and
i n t e rgove rnmental actors , the United States, R u s s i a , the United Nations, NATO
and the international financial institutions.
An important issue raised by the pro l i fe ration of ex t e rnal Balkans actors is that
of coord i n a t i o n . One of the greatest ch a l l e n ges for the intern a t i o n a l
c o m munity as a whole, the lack of coordination is usually felt most acutely in
e ffo rts to condition assistance. Because such a wide va riety of org a n i s a t i o n s
and institutions insist on a wide va riety of conditions, often including none at
a l l ,those demanding strict conditionality often find their positions underm i n e d .
G ove rnments in the re gion are often left with the leve rage to “ s h o p ”among the
va rious international donors for the most favo u rable arra n ge m e n t s .
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By setting benchmarks and deadlines for tangible progress by the Balkans
countries as a condition of provision of further assistance,the international
community can make clear that money will follow reform: those who
produce will be rewarded,and those who do not will be left behind. This will
help accustom the Balkans countries to the norms and procedures of the
international community and can be a useful tool in helping forge a public
consensus for the difficult choices that reform will often entail in these
societies.
Fortunately, the international community has learned from some of its
mistakes. The early stages of the operation in Bosnia offered a particularly
s t riking model of how not to coord i n a t e . The Office of the High
Representative (OHR) and the Implementation Force (IFOR) did not work
easily together, and the Dayton Agreement itself set up institutional structures
that made collaboration quite challenging. Subsequently in Kosovo, the
international community put a more logical system in place. KFOR and
UNMIK have enjoyed a good working relationship from the beginning of the
operation, and the UN was given a much clearer lead role in civilian affairs.
UNMIK effectively brought under its wings the EU, the OSCE,the UNHCR and
the other various elements of civil administration. Clearly this design is much
superior to that initially put in place in Bosnia. However, both operations in
Bosnia and Kosovo have made abundantly clear that without political will
from the key governmental players, even the most effective coordination on
the ground will not make for an effective operation.
B. The United States
The United States has been a periodically reluctant but often indispensable
force in the Balkans. More vigorous U.S. diplomatic and military leadership
proved essential in transforming the disastrous international community
policies of the early and mid-1990s into the more credible approaches of the
last several years. U.S. strategy toward the Balkans became far more effective
once the scope of U.S. interests in the region were seen with greater clarity.
First and foremost, the U.S. came to fully appreciate over time the security
threats posed by continuing regional instability to U.S. interests and allies.
The potential for a Balkans-wide war was genuine for much of the 1990s.
Because of the prominence of the Balkan wars,the U.S. correctly recognised
that direct military intervention was necessary to more widely deter
aggression,establish that the international community would not turn a blind
eye to crimes against humanity, and reaffirm the basic credibility of NATO in
dealing with regional security threats.
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In an even broader sense, Washington also came to appreciate that
c o n t i nuing instability in the Balkans threatened to fundamentally
u n d e rmine its vision of a large r, and more incl u s i ve , t ra n s a t l a n t i c
c o m mu n i t y. If the fo rmer Yu go s l avia and its off s p ring remained in ch a o s ,i t
would not only doom the hopes of these entities for joining the ranks of
m o d e rn Euro p e , but it could also undercut similar aspirations for any
number of other states across South Eastern and Central Europe and the
C a u c a s u s .
The U. S . also saw the climate of its ove rall relations with Russia deeply
impacted by developments in the re gi o n , and NATO ’s use of fo rce both in
Bosnia and Ko s ovo tri g ge red considerable outrage in Moscow. While Russia
has never been willing to sever its ties to Washington in protest over U. S .
m i l i t a ry activities in the Balkans, both Ko s ovo and Bosnia highlighted the
potential for the Balkans to ge n e rate friction in U.S.-Russian re l a t i o n s .
C o nve rs e ly, both conflicts also demonstrated that the U. S . and Russia could
wo rk jointly to help stem further confl i c t .
S eve ral points have become clear over the last seve ral ye a rs :
o C o n s t ru c t i ve and vigo rous U. S . e n g age m e n t , in part n e rship with
E u ropean allies, is critical if the re gion is to have any chance of lasting
political stability or economic grow t h .
o S u ch engagement must include a suffi c i e n t ly strong military component
to render cre d i ble A m e rican threats of fo rc e .
o The cost of putting in place “ s h o ck ab s o r b e rs ” , s u ch as deve l o p m e n t
a s s i s t a n c e ,c o n flict prevention effo rts and peacekeeping deployments is
minimal compared with the costs of another war like that over Ko s ovo .
o Success in the Balkans is vitally important to the cohesion and cre d i b i l i t y
of the United States’ major global security alliance.
The Current Appro a c h
The Bush A d m i n i s t ration has cl e a r ly ex p ressed an interest in eve n t u a l ly
d rawing down the U. S . p resence in the Balkans. This is a legitimate go a l ,
and well in keeping with U. S . i n t e re s t s , gi ven the global scope of U. S .
s e c u rity commitments ra n ging from the Ko rean peninsula to the Middle
E a s t . H oweve r, the key question then becomes how can the U. S . best go
about designing a ge n e ral “ exit stra t e gy ” while ensuring its goal of
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maintaining stability in the re gion is met, and when as the recent unrest in
s o u t h e rn Serbia and Macedonia has made cl e a r, the time to decl a re “ p e a c e ”
m ay not yet be at hand.
The Bush A d m i n i s t ration came into office promising mu ch greater cert a i n t y
and wisdom on when and how A m e rican power would be exe rc i s e d . T h e re
was an explicit commitment to avoid “nation building” and mini-wa rs in the
B a l k a n s . U. S . t roops would be pulled back from ex t raneous peaceke e p i n g
exe rcises where the energies could be better focused on major
i n t e rnational security thre a t s . The Bush A d m i n i s t ration has thus fa r
t ranslated these promises into a persistent stra t e gy of limiting U. S . a n d
NATO engagement in dealing with the situations in southern Serbia, Ko s ovo
and Macedonia,while drag ging its heels on any effo rt that would re s o l ve the
political status of either Ko s ovo or Montenegro .
Some of the campaign rhetoric used by Bush officials during 2000 may have
c reated high expectations within some U. S . d e fence circles that the curre n t
a d m i n i s t ration would quick ly disengage its fo rces from the Balkans. W h i l e
the Bush fo reign policy team has wo rked to re a s s u re its European allies that
it will not “cut and ru n ” f rom the Balkans, U. S . m i l i t a ry officials may be
s l ower to embrace this shift from rhetoric to policy. F u rt h e r, d i v i s i o n s
within the alliance about how to respond to the situation in the Pre s evo
va l l ey and Macedonia have also raised concerns in Europe that Wa s h i n g t o n
is eager to distance itself from the Balkans. C o n c e rns about fo rc e
p ro t e c t i o n , b u rden sharing and exit stra t e gies appear to be dominating
mu ch of the U. S . s e c u rity pers p e c t i ves towa rd the re gi o n . The speed with
w h i ch NATO was positioned to respond to security concerns in southern
Serbia and along the Ko s ovo-Macedonia border unders c o re the utility of a
robust peacekeeping presence in the re gi o n , and make clear that
p reventing conflict in the re gion often will invo l ve far fewer troops than
would be necessitated if such situations grow out of contro l .
Both NATO as an organisation and its European members seemed far more
willing to have NATO take robust military action to stop violence in the
P re s evo va l l ey and along the Macedonian bord e r. When NATO re q u e s t e d
p e rmission to ex p l o re moving KFOR into southern Serbia and sugge s t e d
boosting troop strength along the border with Macedonia, Wa s h i n g t o n
q u i ck ly made clear its antipathy towa rd both pro p o s a l s . While NATO has
w i s e ly ex p l o red ways to bring Serbia and the guerrillas in southern Serbia
to the negotiating tabl e , and provided reconnaissance and intellige n c e
i n fo rmation to the Macedonia gove rnment as it fought separatists along the
b o rd e r, Wa s h i n g t o n ’s actions send an incre a s i n g ly dange rous message to
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ex t re m i s t s : the U. S . m i l i t a ry will not get invo l ve d . If that message ge t s
t ransmitted loudly and fre q u e n t ly enough, it will only be a matter of time
b e fo re violence again escalates in the re gi o n .
Although U.S. forces make up a small proportion of the peacekeeping
contingents in either Kosovo or Bosnia, U.S. technology, advanced logistics
networks and military hardware have made NATO’s potential use of force
consistently credible. The 11,400 American troops in Bosnia and Kosovo
comprise just under one fifth of total troop deployments in those areas,and
U.S. commitment to making NATO effective in its post-Cold War role has led
to substantial U.S. involvement in the region. What the U.S. brings to the task
of peacekeeping - and for which there is no substitute - is the ability to
dominate any escalation in the conflict. But that requires real troops,visibly
on the ground:not just forces assigned to communications and headquarters
tasks.
The U.S. contribution of peacekeepers in KFOR and SFOR remains small as
a percentage of these overall troop deployments,and Washington will surely
consider its role in the Balkans within the context of larger debates within
the NATO alliance - including controversial issues such as National Missile
Defence and the Rapid Reaction Force. Efforts to forge a collective EU
defence and security policy, when coupled with the discussions of a Rapid
Reaction Force, have fuelled U.S. trepidation that Europe is taking its own
steps toward “decoupling” the Alliance. It would be truly unfortunate if
disputes over such broad stroke issues undercut the practical and effective
NATO contribution to peace already in place on the ground in the region.
Instead, U.S. interests in the Balkans,and in the transatlantic alliance,lead to
a question quite similar to that faced by the EU:what is the best way to create
the conditions that will move the region beyond chronic instability and allow
U.S. troops a graceful exit? 
Given that a great deal of the region’s instability stems from ongoing disputes
over political status and constitutional arrangements - in Montenegro,Serbia,
Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia - it seems unavoidable that peacefully and
democratically resolving these matters should be a high priority for the U.S.
However, the Bush Administration seems thus far disinclined to tackle the
difficult issues of political status. Secretary of State Colin Powell declined to
meet with Montenegrin President Djukanovic when he was in the State
Department in February 2001,and Administration officials made it clear that
the Secretary’s decision reflected a broader policy opposing Montenegrin
independence. The Administration also weighed in with its opposition to
specific provisions within Montenegro regarding voting procedures for a
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potential referendum on independence. Prejudging its preference for
Montenegro’s ultimate status does not seem to be a constructive way to help
initiate a dialogue at a time when even Belgrade seems to increasingly
recognise that discussions will have to move forward. The Administration’s
lack of desire to deal with the difficult issues of Kosovo’s final status have also
been made clear,particularly through its acceptance of a go-slow approach to
establishing the basic institutions of self-governance in the province.
The approach by the Bush Administration risks replicating some of the worst
mistakes of the 1990s - the problems of the Balkans will not be solved by
simply wishing they were not so or limiting Washington’s engagement. The
Balkans will only embrace a lasting peace when the region has achieved
political arrangements through a peaceful,democratic dialogue that allow its
citizens to feel they are well served.
The Challenge Ahead
Since Milosevic was so frequently identified in the U.S. as the ultimate source
of Balkan conflicts, his departure from the scene may have created an
unfortunate impression in parts of the U.S. that stability in the Balkans is now
something of a foregone conclusion. Certainly developments in Serbia are a
step forward, and should be credited both to the people of the region and
NATO’s resolve in ultimately confronting the former Yugoslav President.
However, the political and security situation on the ground remains quite
fluid and the potential for further upheaval will grow if the evolving situation
is not handled adroitly by the international community, as recent events have
only reinforced. All these factors suggest that the U.S. should approach the
issues of political status in Kosovo,Serbia,Montenegro and Bosnia with more
urgency, not less. Unless the U.S. helps unravel the underlying sources of
tension in the region,it may find that any exit for its soldiers is painfully short-
lived or comes at an unacceptably high cost. The U.S.,in conjunction with its
European partners,instead of discouraging dialogue,should facilitate talks on
these matters to ensure that they are conducted fairly, transparently and
without violence. If the U.S. simply dismisses such a challenge as too steep,
or pre-emptively walks away from its security commitments in the region,it
may well pay a high price in the final analysis.235
Given the vast size of its military, the continuing deployment of U.S.
peacekeepers in the Balkans is a wise investment. A more immediate
withdrawal would not seem warranted by the current situation on the
274 AFTER MILOSEVIC
ground in Bosnia, Kosovo,Serbia or Macedonia, and would substantially risk
exacerbating already rising tensions within the Alliance. Further,Washington
should not become so obsessed with avoiding “mission creep” that it
compromises the ability of its forces in the region to effectively prevent
renewed conflict. Indeed, as Bosnia illustrates, a more robust use of the
military mandate to round up war criminal early in peacekeeping efforts
would have reduced tensions and obstructionism over the long term and
lessened the need for a prolonged peacekeeping presence.
Any U.S. force reductions should occur only within the context of regular
NATO reviews,as has been the case with all previous force reductions. NATO
periodically assesses how many forces it needs in the Balkans and makes
adjustments as the environment allows. It also makes changes in the relative
distribution among national contributions. It is very possible that over time
the overall force levels will continue to come down, or be shifted, and that
the U.S. percentage within overall levels will drop as well. This likely is the
approach Washington will adopt in reducing the American contribution.
H oweve r, the U. S . should also recognise that its re l a t i ve ly modest
contributions in terms of peacekeeping forces in the Balkans send a far more
powerful message about its commitment to both regional stability and the
NATO alliance as a whole.
To its credit, the U.S. military has been quite active in working to
professionalise the military structures across Central and South Eastern
Europe, and continued progress in this direction is sorely needed in the
Balkans. The U.S. needs to join its allies in determining how best to use
programs in which the Balkans countries are interested, such as NATO’s
Membership Action Plan and Partnership for Peace as mechanisms for setting
appropriate troop levels throughout the region. The U.S. needs to encourage
NATO and the OSCE to work collaboratively to help militaries in the region
reduce troops strength, improve equipment, professionalise, move toward
partnership with western military structures and generally become modern
military institutions that are constructive partners with a stake in regional
security. Decommissioning militias and attempting to find and destroy illegal
stocks of weapons and deter smuggling should also be intensified within the
framework of these programs.
U.S. cooperation with militaries in the region may well be viewed by the
Russian Federation with a jaundiced eye,particularly if these efforts are seen
as grooming the entities cove red in this re p o rt for eventual NATO
membership. Countries in the region will be paying close attention to how
the next round of NATO expansion is handled,and the potential membership
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of Baltic states will be seen as a clear barometer of both Russia’s sway over
the process and NATO’s intent to continue its eastward push. Given the
highly responsible role played by NATO aspirants such as Bulgaria, Romania
and Macedonia during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, there is reason to believe
that continuing hope for NATO membership can help serve as a positive
influence on countries hoping to enter the mainstream of the transatlantic
community.
In the field of economics,the EU will have the greatest say over the shape of
economic reforms and restructuring in the region. That is only appropriate.
For future growth, encouraging private sector investment will be more
important than maintaining public sector funding. Encouraging private
sector engagement in the region is the real key to economic success, and
therefore the foundation to success in any other field for the Balkans
countries.
Like the Europeans,the U.S. will need to assess ways in which provision of
export credits might be facilitated, in order to generate the investments
needed for upgrading skills and technology, generating jobs and revitalising
former state assets. Washington may also wish to explore possible grant of
concessional market access to products from the Balkans,although (given its
greater immediate interest in pushing through free trade policies in the
Americas) it may be obliged to stop well short of the free trade deal now
being negotiated between the Balkans and the EU. Generating sufficient
political support for such measures could be an uphill climb. The U.S. will
also be likely to continue to explore the possible imposition of conditions
(specifically on Serbia) for access to IFI funding.
While the countries of the region will clearly reform their economies in
keeping with the guidelines spelled out for eventual EU membership, U.S.
technical assistance in the field of privatisation can also be tremendously
helpful. The U.S. has gained important insight into this difficult process
through its assistance programs throughout Central and Eastern Europe over
the last decade. Washington is also positioned to learn from its mistakes in
the field and help these countries avert a privatisation process that cements
the control of small elites over political and economic power in societies that
are already suffering from this condition. The U.S. should lead the effort to
encourage financial assistance,including that from the international financial
institutions,is rigorously conditioned upon social and economic benchmarks.
Such“tough love”will be instrumental in breaking the hold of political elites
in the region and the sway of U.S. leadership on other donors - from the UN
to the World Bank - is considerable.
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G i ven the scope of the Stability Pa c t , and the stri c t u res established by the EU in
t e rms of gove rnance for potential members ,E u rope will be like ly to continue to
t a ke a lead role in guiding assistance to re fo rm gove rnance in the Balkans. T h a t
s a i d , the U. S . can also play quite an influential ro l e . The U. S . gove rnment has
gained va l u able insight into carrying out assistance pro grams designed to
e n c o u rage civil society and help societies make the transition from commu n i s m
to democra c y, and its assistance to the re gion has been ge n e ro u s .
The U. S . has made the promotion of democracy a strong tenet of its fo re i g n
policy in the re gi o n , both through support for elections and broader measure s
of civil society, s u ch as the media. It may well find this policy tested if either or
both Ko s ovo and Montenegro ex p ress support for independence at the ballot
b ox . S i m i l a r ly, the slowness with which the U. S . has allowed the UN
A d m i n i s t rator for Ko s ovo to move fo r wa rd towa rd “substantial autonomy and
s e l f - gove rn m e n t ” in the province also questions whether the U. S . s u p p o rt fo r
d e m o c racy in the re gion stops where rhetoric meets policy pre fe re n c e s . I n s t e a d
of trying to fru s t rate popular will, the U. S . m ay find itself far better positioned if
it tries to deepen the democratic process in the re gion and establish bro a d e r
m e chanisms for democratic dialogue between the entities cove red in this
re p o rt .
The United States has been wise in not making the perfect the enemy of the go o d
in the re gi o n . It has not sought ideal gove rnance in the Balkans,just less corru p t ,
less bellige rent and less xenophobic leaders h i p . The U. S . w i s e ly tendere d
assistance to the DOS befo re the Serbian elections in September 2000 in a low -
key fa s h i o n ,e ffe c t i ve ly avoiding making the assistance itself a campaign issue.
P ro gress towa rd more modern democracies will continue in fits and start s .
R h e t o rical denunciations of corru p t i o n ,c ro nyism or criminality in the Balkans
m ay prove less effe c t i ve than modest, u n o b t ru s i ve financial and tech n i c a l
c o n t ributions to pro grams designed to we a ken the hold of Mafia-style political
fo rc e s ,b a cked by a commitment to direct money to those making pro gre s s . Fo r
some time to come, it will be vital for the U. S . to be judicious but fi rm in its
a p p ro a ch to Serbia, gi ven the ex t reme Serbian political sensitivities to U. S .
i nvo l vement with that country over the last decade. It will be equally import a n t
to other countries in the re gion that the U. S . not be seen as giving Serbia a “ f re e
p a s s ”with re g a rd to intern a t i o n a l ly accepted norms of behav i o u r.
U. S . and European effo rts to support justice system re fo rm , and the rule of law
ge n e ra l ly,a re also vital. These effo rts will provide the key underpinning for lasting
economic and democratic growth in the re gi o n , and their importance cannot be
ove rs t a t e d . P ro found institutional ch a n ge is fundamental to peace. U. S . i n t e re s t s
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and leve rage in the human rights field concern the re t u rn of re f u ge e s , an end to
discrimination and harassment directed at minorities, constitutional
e n t re n chment of provisions for human ri g h t s , and the punishment of wa r
c ri m i n a l s . As a rule of thumb, the U. S . has tra d i t i o n a l ly been slightly more
emphatic on human rights issues in the Balkans than some, but cert a i n ly not all,
of its European counterpart s . It is unclear if this trend will continue under a new
U. S . A d m i n i s t ra t i o n . C o n t i nued U. S . ex p ression of support for the importance of
justice and accountability issues would prove quite useful. If the U. S . looks like
it is walking away from the pursuit of war cri m i n a l s ,t h e re will be far less pre s s u re
within SFOR to pursue indictees still at large in Bosnia; Serbia will be less like ly
to take meaningful steps towa rd real accountability and countries such as Cro a t i a
that have cooperated with the ICTY will be alienated.
Conclusions and recommendations on the United States’ role 
o The current U.S.  approach to the Balkans - seemingly designed with
limiting diplomatic and military engagement in the region as a central goal
- risks both alienating allies and creating a more dangerous situation on the
g round.  Washington should not become so obsessed with avoiding “mission
c reep” that it compromises the ability of its forces in the region to eff e c t i v e l y
p revent renewed conflict.
o Given its interests in the region, and the scope of American military
capabilities, the continuing deployment of U.S.  forces in the Balkans is a
modest investment.  
o The U.S., through the G-8 or the OSCE, should help guide an orderly and
democratic process to resolve final and future status issue for Montenegro
and Kosovo as discussed in Chapter 6.
o The U.S.  should maintain pre s s u re on Belgrade to reject unacceptable
policies such as its support for extremist elements in Bosnia, and its lack of
cooperation with the ICTY.
C . R u s s i a
R u s s i a ’s engagement in the Balkans during the last decade has proved a decidedly
m i xed blessing for all parties invo l ve d ,often deeply complicated by Russia’s ow n
social and economic tra n s fo rm a t i o n . While Russia’s re s o u rces are more limited at
this time than those of the EU and the United States, it can still play an enduri n g
and positive role in the re gi o n .
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Moscow’s policy toward the Balkans has often been quite divisive within
Russian foreign policy and defence circles. Many of the splits in how to
address issues in the Balkans reflect a wider division within Russia between
relatively pro-Western reformers eager for integration and more conservative
forces that remain deeply suspicious of Western policies and what they view
as a U.S.-dominated agenda to isolate and weaken Russia. Putin has generally
t a cked between these two positions, e ager to modernise the Russian
economy while expanding Russia’s influence in regional diplomacy.
Moscow’s Record
Moscow should be credited for its constructive efforts in the trilateral
diplomacy that set the terms for ending the 1999 NATO bombing campaign
against the Milosevic regime. It should also be recognised that on many
occasions, while Russia has resorted to colourful rhetoric about the West’s
involvement in the Balkans, it has actually taken a far more measured
response. For example, although deeply opposed to the air attacks against
Yugoslavia in 1999, then President Yeltsin did not pull his peacekeepers out
of Bosnia at the time. Indeed,Russia’s contribution of troops on the ground
as peaceke e p e rs in Bosnia and Ko s ovo as part of SFOR and KFOR
respectively, offers an important sense of balance to both operations.236 The
fact that Russia has been willing to take such positive steps - despite intense
domestic concern about NATO’s military role in the region and close historic
and cultural ties to Belgrade - offer forceful demonstration that Russia
increasingly views itself as part of the European mainstream. It is hoped that
President Putin chooses to continue and deepen this trend.
As fo rmer Russian Fo reign Ministry official Oleg Levitin noted, “The Ko s ovo
c risis also proved that it is wo rth trying to have Russia on board as long as
p o s s i bl e ,and that Russian intra n s i gence can often be ove rcome through We s t e rn
p e rs i s t e n c e . What is usually assumed to be Russia’s principled opposition is
sometimes more the result of inertia and incompetence. Sometimes it might not
be so difficult to persuade Moscow - still basically opportunistic and lacking a
clear vision of its own interests - to behave more constru c t i ve ly ” .2 3 7
Other aspects of Russian involvement in the region have been less salutary.
Too often the relationship between Moscow and Belgrade during the
Milosevic era took on the tenor of a client state relationship, with Russia’s
leadership eager to look beyond even the worst abuses by Milosevic, his
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cronies and his forces in the field. As many Serbs have rightly pointed out,the
ultimate victims of Milosevic’s failed policies were often the Serbian people
themselves. Under Milosevic,Serbia was turned into an international pariah,
living standards plummeted and hundreds of thousands of Serbs across the
former Yugoslavia became refugees. Moscow was painfully slow to support
d e m o c ratic ch a n ge in the re gion and sometimes re s o rted to pure
obstructionism to defend its interests. As a result, Russia’s credibility with
actors throughout the region has been badly strained.
To better understand Russia’s actions in the Balkans - both positive and
negative - it is necessary to view them within the broader context of
Moscow’s legitimate strategic concerns. Russia remains:
o C o n c e rned about the Balkans as pre c e d e n t . The intern a t i o n a l
community’s use of force against a sovereign state as a means to resolve
an internal conflict concerns Moscow at a time when it not only is mired
in a bloody civil war in Chechnya but fears that it could soon face similar
c o n fl agrations elsew h e re along its southern fl a n k . H u m a n i t a ri a n
intervention remains a hotly debated topic around the world and Russia’s
concerns about the matter cannot be dismissed out of hand. Similarly,
fe a rs that the international community could decl a re terri t o ri e s
independent on a unilateral basis go to the heart of Russia’s fears that it
can hold together as a unitary state.
o Nervous about NATO expansion and the Alliance’s ultimate military
intentions. It remains difficult for much of Russia’s senior leadership to
view NATO in non-adversarial terms. Many in Moscow remain convinced
that NATO activities throughout Central, Eastern and South Eastern
Europe all are designed to ultimately weaken Russia’s strategic position.
o Troubled by the increasing marginalisation of the United Nations. The
fact that NATO launched military action against the FRY in 1999 without
a UN Security Council mandate raised Russian fears that the strategic
value of its seat on the Security Council was being severely diminished.
While many,certainly including the International Crisis Group,viewed the
military action as abundantly warranted by the severe human rights
abuses being directed by Belgrade, NATO’s actions challenged many
traditional concepts of international law.
o Fearful of Islamic extremism. Given the situation in Chechnya, and
nascent fundamentalist movements across much of Central Asia and the
South Caucasus, some Russian strategic thinkers feel the greatest single
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238  See Also Chapter 6, The Future of the FRY.
threat to Russia’s continued existence within its current borders is a
“green wave”of separatism and violence. While the merits of this view are
better discussed elsewhere, the perception goes a long way toward
explaining continued Russian hostility toward an independent Kosovo.
o Eager to join mainstream European and transatlantic institutions.
Under the leadership of Presidents Yeltsin and Putin, Russia has made a
strategic decision that it cannot prosper outside the global economic
system. Russia values being taken seriously as a partner in the G-8, the
Contact Group,the OSCE and other bodies.
When all of the above factors are considered in concert,and given the often-
t u multuous state of the Russian domestic political scene, M o s c ow ’s
sometimes seemingly contradictory behaviour in the Balkans, while not
exemplary, takes on certain logic. The democratic uprising in Serbia provides
Russia an opportunity to learn from its past missteps in Balkans policy and
build on its previous contributions. Russia can,and should,take an active role
in encouraging Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo to resolve their final status
issues the same way the Soviet Union largely did: peacefully, with the
protection for minority rights and a shared understanding by parties to a
settlement that the territorial integrity of new states must be respected.238 As
argued in Chapter 6, Russia should be given a seat at the table if the
international community steps in to help mediate the final status of both
Kosovo and Montenegro.
An Evolving Policy
The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation issued in June 2000
noted, “Russia will give an all-out assistance to the attainment of a just
settlement of the situation in the Balkans, one based on the coordinated
decisions of the world community. It is of fundamental importance to
preserve the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,and to
oppose the partition of this State,something that is fraught with the threat of
emergence of a pan-Balkan conflict with unpredictable consequences.”
Russia was slow to acknowledge Kostunica’s victory in the FRY, but has
worked to soothe ties with Belgrade since that time. Central to that effort has
been Moscow’s unwavering opposition to any form of independence for
Kosovo and calls for the international community to rein in Albanian
“terrorists”. After a Moscow meeting in October 2000, Russian President
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Vladimir Putin and his visiting Yu go s l av counterpart Vo j i s l av Ko s t u n i c a
issued a statement decl a ring a “ n ew part n e rs h i p ” b e t ween their two
c o u n t ri e s . The joint statement also emphasised, “Russia and Yu go s l av i a
re g a rd full normalisation and the establishment of neighbourly re l a t i o n s
b e t ween all the countries that emerged from the fo rmer Socialist Fe d e ra l
R e p u blic of Yu go s l avia as the main factor in stabilising the situation in the
B a l k a n s ” . The two countries also ex p ressed support for full implementation
of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 on Ko s ovo , the early start of
political talks and the signing of an agreement on Ko s ovo ’s final status.
Russian Fo reign Minister Iva n ov indicated in Ja nu a ry 2001 that Moscow is
pleased by the pro gress in bilateral relations since Ko s t u n i c a ’s re fo rm -
minded administration was swept to power and that “ Yu go s l av i a ’s stab i l i t y
and pro s p e rity is in Russia’s intere s t s . Yu go s l avia must be an import a n t
factor of stability in the Balkans”.
Russia would like ly oppose independence for either Montenegro or Ko s ovo
if Belgrade we re united against such a possibility. H oweve r, a l t e rn a t i ve ly,
t h e re may be no party better positioned than Moscow to help Belgra d e
accept certain political realities over time. For ex a m p l e , R u s s i a n
a ck n ow l e d gement that Milosevic should be handed over to The Hag u e ’s
ICTY (which Russia’s own vote in the UN Security Council helped
e s t ablish) would be tre m e n d o u s ly helpful, as would be recognition that
m o re militant elements within the Republika Srpska need to fulfil the
conditions established in the Dayton A gre e m e n t . If Russia does indeed wa n t
to be taken seri o u s ly as a re gional player in the Balkans, it will ultimately
h ave to deepen such a constru c t i ve ro l e . R u s s i a ’s political leve rage is all the
m o re important in light of its rather limited ability to offer fi n a n c i a l
assistance for relief and large-scale re c o n s t ruction in the re gi o n .
Russia can continue to play a key role in building a wider consensus on key
s e c u rity and stra t e gic issues in the Balkans, and should choose to do so.
R u s s i a , l i ke the We s t e rn commu n i t y, has also been eager to support the
Macedonian gove rnment as it has struggled to deal with recent separa t i s t
v i o l e n c e . H oweve r, M o s c ow should take great care to ensure that its
a s s i s t a n c e , w h a t ever fo rm it take s , does not inadve rt e n t ly ex a c e r b a t e
tensions between Macedonia’s Slav and Albanian commu n i t i e s . M a c e d o n i a
and its international support e rs need to continue to make clear that the
issue is about supporting equal rights within a unified Macedonia - not
about drawing dividing lines between commu n i t i e s . In that same ve i n ,
M o s c ow needs to do a better job of distinguishing between ge nu i n e ly
ex t remist elements within Ko s ovo , Macedonia and southern Serbia and
m a i n s t re a m ,m o d e rate populations that happen also to be Muslim. L ab e l l i n g
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all Muslim populations with bl a n ket denunciations as “ t e rro ri s t s ” will do
little to improve the situation or will President Putin’s compari s o n s
b e t ween Chech nya and Macedonia.
Speaking in Skopje on 21 March 2001, Russian Fo reign Minister Iva n ov
s u g gested that We s t e rn support for Ko s ovo Albanian rebels has helped fuel
the conflict in Macedonia. I va n ov called for concerted international action
in support of Macedonia and the disarming of the re b e l s , and proposed the
signing of an accord , under which each Balkan state would pledge non-
i n t e r fe rence in the affa i rs of all the others . P resident Putin also raised such
a proposal at the EU Summit on 23 March 2001, indicating that such an
a rra n gement would guarantee each country ’s intere s t s ,c u rrent bord e rs and
p rovide a sense of mutual re s p e c t . While details of this plan remain ske t chy,
it appears to be an effo rt to fo re close any prospect that Ko s ovo might
u l t i m a t e ly ach i eve independence.
Long term stability and pro s p e rity in the Balkans would prove
t re m e n d o u s ly beneficial both to Moscow and all of Euro p e . Russian effo rt s
to improve energy supplies and re s t ru c t u re the FRY ’s considerable - ove r
$400 million - energy debts will also be important in helping Serbia’s
e c o n o my re c over over the long term . U n fo rt u n a t e ly, because of Russia’s
own considerable economic diffi c u l t i e s , M o s c ow ’s largesse will be
s o m ewhat limited in that re g a rd . G i ven that President Putin has made a
ve ry active role to re a ch out to part n e rs within Euro p e , M o s c ow may fi n d
that it is better positioned to wo rk with the EU than the U. S . on some issues
in the re gi o n . R u s s i a ’s ex p e rience in tra n s fo rming its economy to marke t
s t ru c t u re s , while not ideal, does offer a ri ch source of insight fo r
p o l i c y m a ke rs throughout the re gion looking to shed the burden of state-
dominated economies. C o n t i nued Russian participation in peaceke e p i n g
e ffo rts in the re gion is we l c o m e , and Moscow should fulfil its pledge d
c o n t ributions to the Stability Pa c t .
Conclusions and recommendations on Russia’s ro l e
o Russia should take an active role in encouraging Montenegro, Serbia and
Kosovo to resolve their final and future status issues peacefully, with
p rotection for minority rights and a shared understanding by parties to a
settlement that the territorial integrity of new states must be re s p e c t e d .
o Russian eff o r ts to improve energy supplies and re s t ru c t u re the FRY ’s
considerable energy debts will also be important in helping Serbia’s
economy recover over the long term .
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o Russia should maintain its peacekeeping presence in the re g i o n .
o Moscow should take great care to ensure that its assistance to Macedonia,
whatever form it takes, does not inadvertently exacerbate tensions between
M a c e d o n i a ’s Slav and Albanian communities.
D. Major Intergovernmental Organisations
United Nations
The Balkans have been a difficult cru c i ble for the United Nations. I n
m a ny way s , the events over the last decade have cut to the ve ry core of
the role the international community wants the UN to play in the modern
wo r l d . While recognising that the UN is no more than a re flection of the
w i l l , or lack there o f, of its member states, the Balkans presented the UN
with seve ral near death ex p e riences - none more traumatic than its
fa i l u re to prevent the genocidal carn age of Sre b re n i c a .
D u ring the last decade, m a ny diffe rent organs within the UN have been
e n g aged in the Balkans, i n cluding the UN High Commissioner fo r
R e f u gees (UNHCR), the World Food Pro gram (WFP), the United Nations
C h i l d re n ’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN Development Pro gram (UNDP), t h e
O ffice of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and
o t h e rs . M a ny of the effo rts of UN personnel and agencies we re critical in
b ri n ging life saving assistance to hundreds of thousands of people in the
re gion under the most demanding of circ u m s t a n c e s . The UN Securi t y
Council also established the International Criminal Tribunal for the
fo rmer Yu go s l avia (ICTY) to bring perpetra t o rs of war crimes in the
re gion to justice, and its effo rts are key to lasting accountability in the
re gi o n .
H oweve r, no set of the UN’s activities have been more controve rsial or
c ritical than its peacekeeping opera t i o n s . A g a i n , this re p resents an array
of effo rt s : the UN Protection Fo rce (UNPROFOR) which was initially
e s t ablished in Croatia and later expanded to Bosnia and Macedonia, t h e
UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), the United Nations
P reve n t i ve Deployment Fo rce (UNPREDEP) that served as the successor
to UNPROFOR in Macedonia; the UN Mission in Croatia (UNCRO ) , t h e
small UN Mission of Observe rs in Prevlaka (UNMOP); the United Nations
Transitional A d m i n i s t ration for Eastern Slavo n i a , ( U N TAES) and the UN
Mission in Ko s ovo (UNMIK).
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The high casualties and ex t reme ineffe c t i veness of UNPRO F O R
p e a c e ke e p e rs during the darkest days of the war in Bosnia convinced most
We s t e rn officials that peace operations that we re not dominated by NATO
would simply not be up to the task in either Bosnia or Ko s ovo . The fa c t
that NATO took the lead in peacekeeping in SFOR, IFOR and KFOR did
indeed make all these operations far more effe c t i ve . For all those hoping
to see peace prevail in the Balkans, We s t e rn insistence that NATO
command and control take pri o rity over traditional UN arra n gements wa s
ab s o l u t e ly the right decision. H oweve r, the UN now must also accept that,
at least when it comes to peace enfo rcement operations - with a military
role going beyond the superv i s i n g , m o n i t o ring and ve rifying roles of
t raditional peacekeeping - the “ blue helmeted” model has few friends and
s u p p o rt e rs in We s t e rn capitals.
In a similar ve i n , the larger role of the UN in authorising the use of fo rc e
has been fundamentally ch a l l e n ged by events in the Balkans. The inab i l i t y
of the UN Security Council to agree to the use of fo rce against the FRY
d u ring the Ko s ovo crisis has marginalised the UN’s role to a certain ex t e n t .
Recognising that both Russia and China would be like ly to veto any ro b u s t
use of fo rce to bring Milosevic back to the negotiating table after the
Rambouillet talks bro ke dow n , NATO went ahead with its military action.
NATO member states argued that it would be unacceptable to stand by and
do nothing as a humanitarian trage dy unfo l d e d . While there are compelling
a rguments on both sides of this issue, the practical impact was to ag a i n
u n d e rs c o re the notion that the UN was incapable of effe c t i ve action at
times when it was needed most. The deployments of peaceke e p e rs in both
Bosnia and Ko s ovo we re authorised by the UN, but these authori s a t i o n s
came only after NATO had effe c t i ve ly been able to create facts on the
gro u n d . The preve n t i ve deployment of the UNPREDEP fo rce in Macedonia
was a ra re bright spot in the UN’s preve n t i ve effo rts during the decade, a s
was the UNTAES in Eastern Slavo n i a .
While the series of Balkans crises has pushed the UN to the side when
m a t t e rs concerning the issues of fo rce are at hand, it has tried diffe re n t
models for giving the UN a role in civil administration after the shooting
has stopped. In Bosnia, the international community created a special
b o dy - the Office of the High Repre s e n t a t i ve (OHR) - and an ancillary UN
O ffice of Civil A ffa i rs . The UN Office of Civil A ffa i rs has often been
m a rginalised under this stru c t u re , as has been the UN Mission in Bosnia
( U N M I B H ) , with responsibility effe c t i ve ly only for policing. Lines of
c o n t rol and coordination for the entire international stru c t u re in Bosnia
h ave often suffe red from the lack of a clear hiera rchy.
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In Ko s ovo , the UN appointed special re p re s e n t a t i ves have been gi ve n
re m a rk ably broad mandates and powe rs with a mu ch cl e a rer chain of
c o m m a n d . In many way s , the situation in Ko s ovo re p resents an important test
for the UN. If it proves ineffe c t i ve in carrying out its mission, despite a bro a d
mandate and clear lines of authori t y, the UN may see its role in civil
a d m i n i s t ration pushed to the side just as was the case for peaceke e p i n g . W h i l e
the effe c t i veness of the UN obv i o u s ly traces back to the political will of its
m e m b e rs , that will not enable it to escape the blame for failed opera t i o n s ,a s
was the case for UNPRO F O R .
In Bosnia, the High Repre s e n t a t i ve ,as detailed in Chapter 7,has taken a nu m b e r
of important steps in the right dire c t i o n . Recognising that the only way to
b reak the hold of ex t remist elements on the political process is by dire c t ly
ch a l l e n ging them and strengthening central institutions, the High
R e p re s e n t a t i ve has fi n a l ly begun using a mu ch wider ra n ge of his authorities as
granted under the Dayton A gre e m e n t . This appro a ch offe rs a we l c o m e
o p p o rtunity to break the continuing constitutional logjam in Bosnia and help
to begin moving that country beyond its ethnic divide. The UN should embra c e
the wisdom of such a stra t e gy in Ko s ovo . The UN special re p re s e n t a t i ve in
Ko s ovo , as detailed in Chapter 5, needs to take a far more ag gre s s i ve appro a ch
to moving fo r wa rd with province-wide elections to establish a parliament fo r
Ko s ovo . This step is both mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1244
and is a fundamental measure not only in establishing substantial self-
gove rn a n c e ,but in creating the basis for a final resolution of the political status
i s s u e .
The UN’s re l a t i ve effe c t i veness in carrying out its civil administra t i ve duties in
Ko s ovo , and its more limited role in Bosnia, will have a tremendous impact on
the future of these societies. While these tasks ra re ly draw the same
i n t e rnational attention as the use of military fo rc e , t h ey are eve ry bit as
i m p o rtant in establishing the underlying conditions for re gional stab i l i t y. T h e
UN still has a considerable way to go in developing effe c t i ve and stre a m l i n e d
methods for getting such important operations quick ly up to speed, a n d
d eveloping more important systems along these lines will be vital to the
success of future opera t i o n s .
The UN will also be like ly to face difficult questions concerning final and future
status issues in the re gion with re g a rd to both Ko s ovo and Montenegro . T h i s
re p o rt suggests that either the G-8 or the OSCE might be better equipped to
t a ke a lead role in assisting the parties to these talks. H oweve r, o bv i o u s ly
w h a t ever agreements can ultimately be re a ched will need to be ra t i fied by the
UN if they entail ch a n ges in bord e rs or international re c o g n i t i o n . The UN
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should openly encourage such organisations to help fo rge an agreement that
can be subsequently endorsed in New Yo rk . The G-8’s role in helping fo rge the
d raft UN resolution 1244 can be seen as a model in that re g a rd ,setting a healthy
p recedent for the UN around the globe: if intergove rnmental actors and
o rganisations can re a ch consensus on such important matters in a tra n s p a re n t
and democratic fa s h i o n , t h ey should be encouraged in that effo rt . S u ch an
a p p ro a ch would help set the UN up for success, not fa i l u re , as has often been
the case in the past.
N AT O
While NATO only entered the Balkans militari ly with re l u c t a n c e , since the wa r
in Bosnia it has become a corn e rstone for maintaining stability in the re gi o n .
NATO ’s military mu s cle made peace possible on the ground in Bosnia and
Ko s ovo , and has been essential in keeping Macedonia from descending into
wider confl i c t . One can also make the argument that the successful NATO
m i l i t a ry intervention in Ko s ovo during 1999 helped speed the demise of fo rm e r
Yu go s l av President Milosev i c , and put Serbia on a mu ch faster tra ck to
n o rm a l i s a t i o n .
NATO ’s willingness as an institution to counter military ag gression in the
Balkans has proved a wa t e rshed for both the re gion and the organisation itself.
While some of these actions have raised difficult questions surrounding the use
of fo rce and international law, it was ab u n d a n t ly clear that inaction in the fa c e
of such widespread provocations would have been both mora l ly and
s t ra t e gi c a l ly unacceptabl e . In fi n a l ly taking more robust action in the re gi o n ,
NATO as an organisation sent a welcome signal throughout Central and Eastern
E u rope that it would defend the values of its member states while encouragi n g
a more incl u s i ve transatlantic commu n i t y.
NATO ’s role also re p resents a rather pro found organisational shift over the last
d e c a d e , and many have gi ven NATO credit for moving more quick ly than the
EU or other international organisations to define a new role and a new stra t e gi c
concept for itself in the wa ke of the Cold Wa r. While collective defence still lies
at the heart of the A l l i a n c e ’s mission, it has also expanded that notion to incl u d e
c o l l e c t i ve security for its growing members h i p . This has been accompanied by
ag gre s s i ve effo rts to re a ch out to new part n e rs and groom potential aspira n t s
for membership through its Membership Action Plan,the Pa rt n e rship for Pe a c e
and the Euro-Atlantic Pa rt n e rship Council (EAPC). The cycle of crises in the
Balkans have both shaped and tested NATO ’s new appro a ch , as well as the
willingness of the Alliance to use military fo rce in out of area operations where
t h e re has not been a direct assault on one of its member states.
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Immediate Challenges. In many ways, NATO seems to be facing a
fundamental fork in the road with regard to its peace operations. On one
hand are the officers and member states who view a robust presence and
aggressive steps to counter violence in the region as the soundest strategy to
defend the alliance’s interests. On the other hand are those who wish to see
NATO increasingly limit and contain its active engagement in the region as
the best means to avoid mission creep and extricate the alliance from open-
ended troop commitment in the Balkans.
These sharply divergent philosophies are playing themselves out against the
situations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and southern Serbia. More activist
elements within NATO were eager to pursue a preventive deployment of
KFOR into southern Serbia, facilitate talks between Presevo valley rebels and
the Serbian government, crack down on guerrilla elements within Kosovo
(both Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanian), increase the number of NATO
forces on the Macedonian border and pursue war criminals in Bosnia.
The “disengagement” faction within NATO has, by contrast, been eager to
keep NATO troops out of the southern Serbia buffer zone and to have lightly
armed Serb forces return to deal with the insurgency. This same faction has
also made clear that it does not support increasing KFOR troop levels to deal
with the unrest along the Macedonian border and has taken a far more hands
off approach to stemming violence and the collection of weapons in Kosovo.
In Bosnia, large numbers of war criminals have not be pursued by NATO
forces even though their whereabouts are well known.
These are legitimate strategic and military debates about the scope of NATO’s
mandate and how best to improve the security situation on the ground.
However, as noted earlier in this chapter, there is increasing European
concern that the Bush Administration is eager to distance U.S. forces from the
Balkans, while expressing reluctance to see NATO robustly exercise its
respective mandates in the region, and any NATO force reductions in its
peacekeeping commitments should occur only within the context of regular
NATO reviews as has been the case with all previous force reductions. NATO
will continue to periodically assess how many forces it needs in the Balkans
and makes adjustments as the environment allows, including the relative
distribution of national contributions. Overall force levels will likely continue
to come down over time (hopefully as the situation warrants), and the U.S.
percentage within those overall levels may drop as well. However, the U.S.
should clearly understand that even relatively small deployments of its
peacekeepers send out a larger and more powerful message to actors in the
Balkans (and to NATO allies as well), regarding the U.S. commitment to
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regional stability and the ability to dominate any escalation in the conflict. It
would be unfortunate if the Bush Administration desire to minimise foreign
“entanglements”ultimately helps create the conditions that lead to a need for
greater U.S. military involvement on the ground to stem renewed conflict.
As NATO’s recent role in dealing with the situations in the Presevo valley of
Southern Serbia and along the Kosovo-Macedonia makes clear, prompt
forceful action by the alliance can be invaluable in stemming potential
conflict. The alliance should be applauded for its efforts to stem the tide of
violence in southern Serbia by encouraging a direct dialogue between
Belgrade and the rebels,and directly facilitating those talks. Such an approach
would have been unthinkable even five years ago. Indeed,if the alliance had
acted as decisively a decade earlier in similar situations, many of the worst
horrors of the last decade might have been avoided.
Operationally, it seems that the alliance has learned a more adroit approach
over the years. However, the real question remains: will NATO’s political
leadership allow it to effectively act where it has the capacity to do so? For
example,the continuing reluctance by some of the allies to vigorously pursue
indicted war criminals in Bosnia has made breaking the grip of nationalist
ex t remists on the political process ex t re m e ly diffi c u l t . S i m i l a r ly, t h e
reluctance with which KFOR has approached moving against the bridge
watchers in Mitrovica has assisted more extreme forces in Kosovo in ensuring
that the province remains deeply polarised along ethnic lines. NATO should
understand that preventive actions,including the selective use of force,have
tremendous utility. If the alliance unwittingly creates the impression that its
foremost goal is simply keeping itself out of harm’s way, other and far more
unsavoury elements will quickly fill the military vacuum. Only by taking
forceful action in the short-term - even though such actions may occasionally
be politically unpopular and even risk casualties - can NATO speed the
p rocess by which it creates a tru ly stable env i ronment where its
peacekeeping presence is no longer needed.
NATO seems to recognise that its more than 60,000 peaceke e p e rs curre n t ly on
the ground in the re gion still have vital wo rk to do. It is cert a i n ly hoped that the
alliance does not move to suddenly draw down its presence in way that wo u l d
p rove destabilising to the situation. I n d e e d , as the re gion faces such potentially
ex p l o s i ve issues as the final status of Montenegro and Ko s ovo ,e ffo rts to gi ve the
c e n t ral gove rnment in Bosnia meaningful authority and continued insecurity in
the Pre s evo va l l ey of Serbia and Macedonia, this military presence provides a
vital buffe r. Without NATO on the gro u n d , the battlefield could again become
the court of fi rst re s o rt for disputes in the re gi o n .
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Partnership and Membership. NATO ’s long term effo rt to partner with
m i l i t a ries in the re gion is also a vital part of re gional stab i l i t y. For ex a m p l e ,
NATO ’s wo rk in training and upgrading the military in Bosnia, in ke e p i n g
with international policy along those lines, has helped re p ro fe s s i o n a l i s e
these fo rces to the point where Bosnia could now contribute troops to other
i n t e rnational peacekeeping missions. As a whole, e ffo rts to help shape
s m a l l e r, m o re pro fessional and civilian controlled militaries thro u g h o u t
South Eastern Europe has been of tremendous utility, and the effo rts should
c o n t i nue and intensify effo rts to rid the re gion of the para m i l i t a ry fo rces that
h ave been a source of so mu ch destruction and violence over the last
d e c a d e .
M a ny of the countries in the Balkans have ex p ressed interest in eve n t u a l
a ffiliation with NATO, and cert a i n ly South Eastern Europe is well within the
o rg a n i s a t i o n ’s potential ambit for members h i p . L i ke other potential NATO
m e m b e rs , the countries of the re gion should be judged on their pro s p e c t i ve
m e rits and pro gress towa rd meeting the cri t e ria that NATO has done an
a d m i rably clear job of establ i s h i n g .
The Pa rt n e rship for Peace is augmented by the Membership Action Plan
( M A P ) , l a u n ched in 1999, an effo rt designed to gi ve potential, and specifi c ,
roadmaps for NATO members h i p , and both effo rts have become an
i m p o rtant part of the developing security arch i t e c t u re in the re gi o n . NATO
m e m b e rship for any of the countries cove red in this re p o rt will take a gre a t
deal of wo rk and would only happen ye a rs down the ro a d .
In the interim,almost all Balkans countries have signed up for MAP, including
Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia and Macedonia, with Croatia hoping to
have a MAP in place this spring. All of these countries are also members of
the Partnership for Peace. The obvious outsider is the FRY. However, attitudes
in Serbia toward NATO are surprisingly benign given that the alliance was
engaged in direct military strikes against the FRY in 1999. Indeed,surprising
numbers of citizens in Serbia have notionally embraced the concept of some
sort of eventual relationship with NATO. Obviously, this sentiment is far from
universal and many Serbians are still very angry with NATO. However, some
working relationship between Serbia and NATO, if the momentum for
democratic reform can be maintained, could be quite useful in restoring a
sense of professionalism to the Yugoslav army,bringing troop strengths down
to a reasonable level and disbanding paramilitary groups.
Inclusion in the MAP implies acceptance of quite strict conditionality.
Aspirant countries are expected to:
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o settle any intern a t i o n a l , ethnic or ex t e rnal terri t o rial disputes by
peaceful means;
o d e m o n s t rate a commitment to the rule of law and human ri g h t s ;
o e s t ablish democratic control over armed fo rc e s ; a n d ,
o p romote stability and well being through economic libert y, s o c i a l
justice and env i ronmental re s p o n s i b i l i t y.
NATO ex p l i c i t ly states that membership of the MAP does not guara n t e e
f u t u re admission to NATO. It is, h oweve r, a new, fast tra ck . The 2002
rev i ew will be like ly to conclude that the Balkans aspirants needed
l o n ger to meet the conditions included in the Plan, and could set an
i n d i c a t i ve deadline of some ye a rs later to consider again the question of
actual NATO members h i p . G i ven the number of countries eager to join
NATO throughout Euro p e , it is unlike ly that the alliance will lower the
bar on its conditions for membership simply to promote good will in the
B a l k a n s .
T h e re may be value in emphasising more heav i ly the civilian component
of the Pa rt n e rs h i p , in areas such as crisis manage m e n t , civil emerge n c y
p l a n n i n g , and air tra ffic manage m e n t . R e c o n fi g u ring some fo rces to serve
as peaceke e p e rs outside the re gion has been useful in Bosnia and might
be replicated elsew h e re . E ventual development of plans for phased fo rc e
re d u c t i o n s ,e s p e c i a l ly in the Serbian army, would be similarly pro d u c t i ve .
The value for local militaries of seeing NATO in action is immense.
A c ross the re gi o n , local military commanders have been able to see
m o d e rn , p ro fessional NATO fo rces at wo rk . From commu n i c a t i o n s , t o
civilian contro l , to planning, to inter-operab i l i t y, NATO fo rces have been
able to pass on the lesson that militaries need not be politicised or
divided along ethnic lines. O ver time, these contributions may prove
eve ry bit as important as NATO ’s use of fo rce to keep the peace.
That said, t h e re should also be a heavy element of realism injected into
discussions about the potential for NATO expansion to include countri e s
in the re gi o n . The Balkans countries discussed in of this re p o rt will fi n d
that NATO members h i p , l i ke EU members h i p , is more a long-term go a l
than an immediate like l i h o o d . NATO expansion continues to be a ve ry
c o n t rove rsial process within the alliance, and the Bush administration is
m o re like ly to take a “ go slow ” a p p ro a ch to expansion than its
p re d e c e s s o r. The argument is essentially between those who see NATO
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m e m b e rship  as  mainly  a  political  issue, and  those  who  continue  to
see it in pri m a ri ly military terms and wo rry about potential entra n t s ’
c a p ab i l i t y. In addition, e n l a rgement also remains a contentious issue with
R u s s i a .
T h e re is a dange rous divide in perception re g a rding the issue of
ex p a n s i o n . While NATO has care f u l ly hedged its appro a ch towa rd Russia
and aspirants by saying that NATO ’s “door remains open”, m a ny
c o u n t ries from the Baltics to the Balkans feel that with re a s o n abl e
p ro gress they should be guaranteed entry. NATO ’s decision on potential
n ew members at its 2002 summit will be ke e n ly wa t ched throughout the
re gi o n , and the alliance should not underestimate the positive inf l u e n c e
potential membership has in re fo rming militaries and maintaining
momentum for democratic ch a n ge throughout Euro p e . Of the countri e s
c ove red in this re p o rt , C roatia and Macedonia have made the most
p ro gress in meeting the re q u i rements for members h i p , although they
will find themselves competing with Slove n i a ,R o m a n i a ,B u l g a ri a ,A l b a n i a
- and perhaps even Serbia at some juncture - within the re gi o n .
Conclusions and recommendations on NAT O ’s ro l e
o N ATO should continue and intensify its partnerships in the region as a
means to professionalise militaries, ensure civilian control and reduce tro o p
s t rength.  
o In southern Serbia, NATO should more robustly enforce the Kosovo-Serbia
b o rd e r, and explore having KFOR serve as an extraction force for EU
monitors on the ground, and continue facilitating talks between the FRY
and the UCPMB guerr i l l a s .
o KFOR should continue to take more effective steps to protect Serb civilians
in Kosovo, especially convoys, including crackdowns on illegal Serb and
Kosovo Albanian paramilitary and intelligence forces.  KFOR and UNMIK
police should act, with legal force if necessary, against the “bridge watchers”
at Mitrovica.  
o As well as maximising its eff o rts in Kosovo to control the border with
Macedonia, NATO - while recognising the primacy of political over militar y
solutions to the country ’s security problems - should continue its existing
training and support programs in Macedonia, and be pre p a red to consider
an active role in support of the Macedonian security forces against furt h e r
rebel activity if the country ’s government so re q u e s t s .
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o SFOR must live up to its obligations to provide maximum protection to
re t u rnees and to apprehend war criminals in Bosnia.
International Financial Institutions 
The major international financial institutions,in particular the World Bank and
IMF, and in the Balkans context the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), have both the authority and capability to exercise
critical leverage over the Balkans economies. Their actions could determine
not only direct access to concessional finance, but also the Balkans’success
in mobilising supplementary financial resources, their ability to manage
economic re fo rm and their credibility in seeking to attract pri va t e
investment. While EU association remains a relatively long-term project,
building a constru c t i ve relationship with the international fi n a n c i a l
institutions will need to be an important short and medium term dimension
of the Balkans’international engagement and their attempts to stabilise their
economies. Without stabilisation,there will be no economic growth.
The World Bank has identified institutional weakness as one of the key
constraints facing economies in the region.239 The Bank notes,“The past
decade of transition and conflict has left the region with a legacy of mediocre
growth and declining living standards. The region has recovered only 75 per
cent of its pre-transition GNP. Living standards, as evidenced by higher
poverty,unemployment and inequality,have also deteriorated. The underlying
reason is that,while considerable progress has been made with liberalisation,
and in some countries with privatisation, progress in structural reforms has
been slow in South Eastern Europe. This includes the privatisation of large
key industries,as well as the imposition of financial discipline on enterprises
and banks. Most importantly, the region has made little progress in
establishing the legal and social institutions that underpin effective markets
and provide the predictability, fairness and transparency required for private
investment”.240
Interestingly, the Bank hinges much of its hopes for positive economic
progress in the region on the broader process of association and affiliation
with the EU,“Success hinges critically on a credible and predictable path to
integration with European and global structures, particularly the European
Union. Such a path will anchor expectations and provide both an incentive
for reform and intra-regional cooperation. The sustained commitments that
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 293
241  Ibid.
242  “Preventing Deadly Conflict:Does the World Bank Have a Role?”,John Stremlau and Francisco Sagasti,Carnegie Commission
on Preventing Deadly Conflict,1998,www.ccpdc.org/pubs/world/world.htm
such a path requires will facilitate political and social changes,and discipline
the fo rmulation and implementation of domestic re fo rms in the SEE
region”.241
While the Bank has accura t e ly identified the source of the continuing economic
d i fficulties in the re gi o n , and ri g h t ly asserts that association with the EU will
s e rve as an important engine for long term re fo rm in the re gi o n , it is less cl e a r
about its own important role in the short and medium term in fo s t e ri n g
economic ch a n ge . The current pro grams put in place by the World Bank and the
E u ropean Bank for Reconstruction and Development are ge n e ra l ly we l l
d i re c t e d ,but like many large scale financial projects aimed at promoting lasting
economic re fo rm , the real ch a l l e n ge for the international financial institutions
will be to deliver tangi ble re s u l t s ,at an acceptable cost,within a re a s o n able time-
f ra m e .
While the Bank has stressed good gove rnance and institutions as key fa c t o rs in
building economies in the re gi o n , the Bank as an organisation did not re c o g n i s e
the heavy role of tra n s p a rency and good gove rnance on economic perfo rm a n c e
until the mid- to late-1990s.2 4 2 The Bank’s ve n t u res into post-conflict wo rk are
even more re c e n t . While the Bank should be congratulated for moving in this
d i re c t i o n , it cl e a r ly still has a ways to go . The Bank needs to further deve l o p
m e chanisms that are fa s t , fl ex i ble and field dri ven in such settings, b e t t e r
c o o rdinate its effo rts with other donors and effe c t i ve ly use its considerabl e
l eve rage as a means to secure meaningful political and economic re fo rm s .
As noted, the Bank set out a re gional stra t e gy for the Balkans, in “The Road to
S t ability and Pro s p e rity in South Eastern Euro p e ” . That re p o rt provides a
p ractical agenda for economic policy make rs , e s p e c i a l ly on re n ovation of
i n f ra s t ru c t u re , re gional coopera t i o n , t rade integration with the EU, s o c i a l
i n cl u s i o n , and the establishment of tra n s p a rent and fair economic stru c t u re s . A
number of supplementary proposals would help to make the wo rk done by
i n t e rnational financial institutions more effe c t i ve . T h ey incl u d e :
o engaging in more self-criticism, especially by avoiding the temptation to
try to achieve results too quickly or to spread expertise too thin, over too
many disparate projects;
o insisting on ri go rous conditionality, in the fo rm of deadlines and
benchmarks for progress;
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o d eveloping a distinctly hands-on appro a ch to major re fo rm s , p a rt i c u l a r ly
p ri va t i s a t i o n ;
o setting a high bar for Serbia,not giving the new gove rnment a “ f ree pass”by
o ffe ring early access to IFI funding, but rather maintaining the same
ri go rous conditions applied to Serbia’s neighbours ;a n d
o s y n ch ronising funding with pro grams financed under the Stability Pa c t .
The Bank has begun to understand the scope of ch a l l e n ges invo l ved in wo rk i n g
in post conflict settings,and its effo rts have drawn considerable attention. Key to
s u ch effo rts will be developing a strong political consensus in the countri e s
c ove red in this re p o rt for what World Bank President James Wo l fe n s o h n
ch a ra c t e rises as “ h o m e - grow n ”economic re fo rm ,b a cked up by a “ b road buy-in”o n
the part of local interests gro u p s . A g a i n ,while the EU membership process will be
useful in encouraging such re fo rm s , association is such an extended process that
the Bank will have to supplement these effo rts in the immediate term .
While international financial institutions cannot impose consensus, and wish to
avoid running the risk of appearing patronising or domineeri n g , local political
s u p p o rt for the hard choices invo l ved in mu ch needed economic re fo rm is
e s s e n t i a l . Thus it is incumbent upon the international community as a whole to
m a ke clear that supporting re fo rm , while involving some dislocation, is in the
long term interests of the people of the re gi o n . When individuals understand that
eve rything from World Bank loans to EU membership potentially hinge on the
willingness to enact meaningful re fo rm ,t h ey are far less like ly to turn their ire on
politicians who are pursuing such a cours e . I n t e rnational financial institutions
also need to ensure that their assistance is wo rking to combat corruption and not
u n i n t e n t i o n a l ly re i n fo rcing existing systems of economic and political patro n age ,
as has sometimes been the case. Without this broader fra m ewo rk of
u n d e rs t a n d i n g , the countries in this re p o rt will never fully embrace the
c o m p re h e n s i ve economic overhaul necessary for long-term grow t h .
The international financial institutions can offer counsel, but only local leaders
can make the hard political choices about economic policy. The key issues
i n cl u d e :
o h ow to make substantial pro gress on the full ra n ge of new, d i fficult and
complicated economic issues simu l t a n e o u s ly ;
o c o n f ronting deeply entre n ched vested interests that re g a rd economic re fo rm
as a direct threat to their power and we a l t h ;
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o the dearth of relevant,current skills in the Balkans labour force;
o lack of management skills or experience with privatisation;
o maintaining an adequate social safety net;and,
o obtaining early dividends from economic reform to maintain momentum
for further institutional change.
All of these questions have been raised throughout this re p o rt . T h e re are no
easy answe rs . The projects supported by the international fi n a n c i a l
institutions unders c o re the scope of the ch a l l e n ge ahead. For ex a m p l e ,t h e
World Bank pro gram in Albania ra n ges from institution building for both
s h o rt - t e rm (judicial re fo rm , financial sector technical assistance) and long
t e rm needs (education re fo rm ) , to emergency repair wo rk (in re h ab i l i t a t i o n
of water supply and repair of ro a d s ) . E ffo rts in no one area will be
successful without concurrent pro gress in equally pressing areas of other
n e e d .
G i ven the size of these countri e s , and the toll that war and communism has
t a ken on their economies, a stra t e gy that shifts the Balkans away fro m
t raditional reliance on state-owned heavy industries to deve l o p i n g
e n t re p re n e u rial small to medium sized enterprises would seem to make the
most sense. In that contex t , the World Bank’s Local Initiatives Project in
Bosnia deserves ack n ow l e d gement for its re l a t i ve success in prov i d i n g
access and credit for low-income micro - e n t re p re n e u rs . The World Bank
claims that seven out of eve ry eight businesses helped with its 35,000 loans
h ave become “ o p e ra t i o n a l ly self-suffi c i e n t ” , and if those fi g u res are eve n
close to accura t e , the model is wo rth ex p a n d i n g . As a whole, the Bank will
l i ke ly come to realise over time that smaller, m o re targeted and fa s t e r
d i s b u rsing pro grams are more effe c t i ve in building the momentum fo r
peace and re fo rm in post conflict settings than large top-down pro gra m s
instituted through central gove rn m e n t s .
The Balkan economies might also take some comfo rt in looking at how fa r
a number of Eastern European Economies have come since the fall of the
S oviet empire . T h roughout most Eastern Euro p e , local economies are now
almost back to their 1989 output levels but with economic systems fa r
better positioned to nu rt u re lasting grow t h . Poland is attracting fifty times
the level of inwa rds investment it re c e i ved a decade ago .2 4 3
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Conclusions and recommendations on the role of the International Financial
Institutions 
o Funding should focus on institutional strengthening, particularly measure s
that will allow democratic governments in the region to become incre a s i n g l y
s e l f - s u p p o rting, with less control of revenues by political parties.  
o The World Bank needs to further develop mechanisms that are fast, flexible
and field driven in post conflict settings, better coordinate its eff o rts with
other donors and effectively use its considerable leverage as a means to
s e c u re meaningful political and economic re f o rm.  
o For the near term, small and medium sized businesses will be the engine for
g rowth in the region and the international community should actively
p romote small business through deregulation, micro-enterprise lending and
by using local firms to the maximum extent possible in re c o n s t ru c t i o n
e ff o rts.  Accord i n g l y, the Bank should explore smaller, more targeted and
faster disbursing programs as a means for building the momentum for peace
and re f o rm in post conflict settings.  
o Privatisation will also need to be a central focus, with particular care given
to ensuring that these eff o rts don’t become a “fire sale” to the politically well
connected, and international financial institutions will need to better
c o o rdinate their programs with bilateral donors and the Stability Pact to
establish firm deadlines and benchmarks for pro g re s s .
o I n t e rnational financial institutions should ensure that Serbia is held to the
same high standards that Croatia has been in terms of cooperation with the
ICTY and meaningful political and economic re f o rm - a key factor
considering Serbia’s large debt burd e n .
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PART V.
CONCLUSION
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14.  TOWARD A LASTING BALKANS PEACE
The Balkans are not doomed by history or character to suffer perpetual conflict.
Lasting peace is possible with practical steps, everyday actions and the will of
the people to achieve it.  But it will also re q u i re sustained attention by the
i n t e rnational community, particularly the We s t e rn capitals, to building on the
costly foundations that have been laid.  Few tasks are more important than
peacefully resolving outstanding final and future status issues in Kosovo,
M o n t e n e g ro and Bosnia, and ensuring that militar y conflict yields to political
dialogue in Macedonia.  
The  Balkans, a lways  viewed  as  one  of  the  wo r l d ’s  most  unique  and
often ex p l o s i ve cro s s ro a d s ,n ow itself stands at a fo rk in the ro a d . One way
lies the path towa rd greater European integra t i o n , re gional stab i l i t y,
economic growth and cultural tolera n c e . The other lies violent
i rre d e n t i s m ,v i rulent nationalism, p e rsistent economic decline and despair.
The path chosen by the people of the Balkans is up to them. No amount
of international coerc i o n , financial assistance or go o dwill can substitute fo r
commitment by the people of the re gi o n . The Balkans are not doomed by
h i s t o ry or ch a racter to suffer perpetual confl i c t . Lasting peace is possibl e
with  practical  steps, eve ry d ay  actions  and  the  will  of  the  people  to
a ch i eve it.
E x t reme nationalism, and politics defined through the narrow prism of
ethnicity and pure ly paro chial intere s t s , h ave brought only ruin to the
people of the Balkans. T h e re are some encouraging signs throughout the
re gion that that message is at last being understood and accepted. As of 1
Ap ril 2001 Slobodan Milosevic sits behind bars . T h roughout the re gi o n ,
most citizens are eager to leave war behind.
In Cro a t i a , S e r b i a , Ko s ovo , M a c e d o n i a , A l b a n i a , M o n t e n e gro and Bosnia,
ex t remists continue to suffer some important reve rs a l s . H oweve r, v i o l e n t
nationalists and a well-placed criminal class are still potent fo rces in these
societies and, seeing their interests dire c t ly thre a t e n e d , will become all the
m o re dange rous for being wo u n d e d . In the period ahead, it is these
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ex t remist fo rces that will use violence and other fo rms of intimidation to
a d vance their short-sighted agendas - even at the risk of casting the re gion ag a i n
into broader wa r.
The international community has a vital role to play in assisting the fo rces of
p e a c e . T h e re is a dange rous tendency in We s t e rn capitals to marginalise those
issues that do not dominate the headlines, and the international commu n i t y
must avoid the temptation to let its attention drift at a time when the
foundation for a more lasting peace is possible but far from completed.
Slobodan Milosevic was not the only source of instability in the re gi o n . E ffo rt s
to deal with the underlying sources of tension are key to keeping conflcit fro m
e rupting and spre a d i n g .
Few tasks are more central or pro found for the international community than
p e a c e f u l ly guiding the processes to address unre s o l ved final and future status
issues in Ko s ovo ,M o n t e n e gro and Bosnia. While policymake rs often wince at
the complexity and intra c t ability of these issues, s u ch fundamental stru c t u ra l
ch a l l e n ges are the great unfinished business that Yu go s l av i a ’s dissolution set in
m o t i o n .
To ignore these issues or to reason that they are better left for another day is to
risk pouring petrol on the linge ring fi res of nationalism in the re gi o n . F u rt h e r,
t h e re is simply no way for these societies to emerge from ch ronic instab i l i t y
until some order and rationality is brought to their underpinning legal and
institutional stru c t u re s . The time has come to peacefully, t ra n s p a re n t ly and
d e m o c ra t i c a l ly re s o l ve final and future status issues in keeping with the rule of
l aw and re l evant international mandates. If the international community shirk s
this admittedly difficult wo rk ,h i s t o ry will not be kind.
Key  to  the  effo rts  in  this  respect  in  Ko s ovo , M o n t e n e gro  and  Bosnia will
be seve ral broader notions that apply throughout this re p o rt . The intern a t i o n a l
c o m munity will have to appro a ch its wo rk in the re gion within a ge n e ra l
s t ra t e gy to break the economic and political power of ex t re m i s t s . B ro a d
economic re s t ru c t u ri n g ,designed to ge n e rate tangi ble economic benefits in the
near term , will be cru c i a l . E ffo rts to re s t o re the rule of law, b ring perpetra t o rs
of war crimes to justice,build better functioning public institutions and re t u rn
re f u gees to their homes will all be essential as we l l . All this calls for a level of
i n t e rnational engagement in the re gion that is built around fo re s i g h t ,
p revention and a willingness to ag gre s s i ve ly counter nationalist fo rc e s . I n d e e d ,
h aving alre a dy tried a far more re a c t i ve , cautious and timid appro a ch to the
Balkans throughout mu ch of the 1990s - with disastrous results - the
i n t e rnational community has clear incentive not to re s o rt to earlier hab i t s .
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This has a number of ra m i fications in practical term s . NATO should
maintain a cre d i ble presence in the re gi o n , s u p p o rted by all of the
a l l i a n c e ’s nineteen members , and should not shy from being pre p a red to
use its military mu s cle for preve n t i ve purposes. The intern a t i o n a l
c o m munity should encourage the UN re p re s e n t a t i ves in both Bosnia and
Ko s ovo to ag gre s s i ve ly exe rcise their mandates. The UN and its member
states should encourage a resolution of final status issues in keeping with
i n t e rnational norm s . The ge n e rous international assistance to the re gi o n
should continu e , but it should also be more cl e a r ly tied to meeting
s p e c i fic bench m a rks such as meaningful economic re fo rm , c o o p e ra t i o n
with the ICTY and full implementation of the Dayton A gre e m e n t . B o t h
the EU and the Stability Pact will need to more cl o s e ly focus their
activities on a more narrow ra n ge of issues where meaningful pro gre s s
can be made in ge n e rating jobs and economic growth within the contex t
of lasting re fo rm .
In terms of the entities pro filed in this re p o rt , t h e re are also a number of
clear tre n d s . S e r b i a , while to be applauded for its histori c
accomplishment in democra t i c a l ly re m oving Milosevic and putting him
under arre s t , still has many deeply nationalist elements. O n ly consistent
i n t e rnational pre s s u re and support will help Serbia come to terms with
the events of the last decade and begin to define its place within the
m a i n s t ream of Euro p e . The international community must insist that
Serbia meets the same standards that it has expected and demanded fro m
other successor states in the re gi o n .
M o n t e n e gro continues to be deeply preoccupied with its future status,
and there is significant support for independence in a political pro c e s s
that will be more like ly than not to gain momentum throughout 2001. T h e
i n t e rnational community needs to take a more realistic appro a ch to these
u n folding eve n t s , and realise that it will be better positioned if it plays a
c o n s t ru c t i ve role in facilitating talks, and ensuring that Montenegro
p u rsues its effo rts in a tra n s p a rent and principled way, instead of just
hoping that a fragile status quo can be pre s e rve d .
Ko s ovo is coming to be even more embroiled by tensions surrounding its
f u t u re . The slow pace with which the international community has
a p p ro a ched the establishment of institutions of substantial self-
gove rnment needs to be reve rs e d . It will be these institutions, fo rged with
the ove rsight of UNMIK, that will provide the basis for Ko s ovo to
u l t i m a t e ly re s o l ve its position within - or more like ly outside - the FRY.
E x c e s s i ve heel drag ging by the international community is only
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e n c o u raging  more  ex t reme  elements  within  Ko s ovo , both  ethnic
Albanian  and Serb, to  re s o rt  to  violence, and  giving  ever  more
momentum to ex t remists across the border in Macedonia and the Pre s evo
va l l ey.
Bosnia is again becoming a crucial test of the international commu n i t y ’s
re s o l ve . While the UN High Repre s e n t a t i ve has in recent times take n
i m p o rtant steps to more fo rc e f u l ly apply his mandate, even bolder steps
will be re q u i re d . The Bosnian constitutional court made a histori c
decision in ruling significant portions of the entity constitutions as
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , and now the High Repre s e n t a t i ve , b a cked by the will of
the international community and the mu s cle of SFOR, must help Bosnia
m a ke the transition from being a society dominated by ethnic rights and
p ri o rities within para-states to a unified country built around respect fo r
the rights of individuals. This process will re q u i re the ex p l o ration of
f u rther ways to meet the ex t remists head-on, s t rengthen the centra l
gove rnment and bypass the entities created by Day t o n , perhaps in favo u r
of more appro p ri a t e ly stru c t u red local bodies.
In many re g a rd s , C roatia has made the most pro gress of all the Balkan
a c t o rs cove red by this re p o rt . The hold of nationalist parties on electora l
politics has been large ly bro ke n , and the country ’s current leadership has
d i s avowed Bosnian Croat separatist elements hoping to carve out a “ t h i rd
e n t i t y ” in Bosnia or a Greater Cro a t i a . H oweve r, C roatia is still stru g g l i n g
to assemble a cre d i ble economic re fo rm age n d a .
Macedonia continues to weather with some resilience its many storm s ,
most re c e n t ly along the Ko s ovo-Macedonia border and in Te t ovo , but its
long term stability still remains tied to its capacity to fo rge - thro u g h
political dialogue, not war - a sound social contract between its A l b a n i a n
and Macedonian-speaking commu n i t i e s . The conduct of Macedonia’s
upcoming census will be vital in that re g a rd , as will be effo rts to ensure
all citizens are treated equally under the law.
Albania faces its greatest ch a l l e n ge in establishing an env i ronment where
the rule of law is re s p e c t e d , p rospects for economic growth are
m e a n i n g f u l , and civil society can operate in a more stable fa s h i o n . T h e
c o u n t ry was blighted by decades of ex t ra o rd i n a ry isolation and re p re s s i o n
under communist ru l e , and the upheavals of the last seve ral ye a rs have
been intensely further debilitating. C o n t i nued international assistance,
p a rt i c u l a r ly in combating the growing pro blem of organised crime and
s mu g g l i n g , will be essential.
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The people of the Balkans, with the continued help of the intern a t i o n a l
c o m mu n i t y, h ave the  opportunity now to fundamentally alter the future
of the re gi o n . From all the horro rs , m i s t a kes and missteps of the past
d e c a d e , t h e re has emerged a vision and commitment to allow peace to
t riumph over division and hatre d . The stakes invo l ved in this struggle are
i m m e n s e . T h e re is no altern a t i ve but to summon the collective political
will to tackle the outstanding issues while the chance to re s o l ve them is
re a l .
Too many have sacri ficed too mu ch to fa i l .
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
AAK Alliance for Future of Kosovo
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina
CAFAO Customs and Fiscal Advisory Office
CEDEM Centre for Democracy and Human Rights
CEFTA Central European Free Trade Area
CEPS Centre for European Policy Studies
CoE Council of Europe
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSBM Confidence and Security Building Measures (OSCE)
DA Democratic Alliance
DA Democratic Alternative
DB State Security (FRY)
DM Deutcsh Mark
DPA Dayton Peace Agreement
DPA Democratic Party of Albanians 
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPS Democratic Party of Socialists
DOS Democratic Opposition of Serbia
DS Democratic Party 
DZB For A Better Life Coalition
DSS Democratic Party of Serbia
EAR European Agency for Reconstruction
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit
ESI European Stability Initiative
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
G-8 Group of Eight
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HDZ Croat Democratic Union (Croatia)
HDZ Croat Democratic Union (Bosnia)
HNS Croatian People’s Party
HRT Croatian Radio Television
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HSLS Croatian Social Liberal Party
HSP Croatian Party of Rights
HSS Croat Peasant’s Party
HVO Croat Defence Council
ICG International Crisis Group
ICITAP I n t e rnational Criminal Inve s t i g a t i ve Training A s s i s t a n c e
Program
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IDS Istrian Democratic Council
IEBH Inter-ethnic Boundry Line
IFC International Finance Corporation
IFOR Implementation Force
IMF International Monetary Fund
INSIG Albanian Institute for Social Insurance
IPTF International Police Task Force
ISSP Institute for Strategic Studies and Prognoses
JNA Yugoslav People’s Army
JUL United Yugoslav Left
KFOR Kosovo Force
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army
KM Convertible Mark (Bosnian) 
KPC Kosovo Protection Corps
KPS Kosovo Police Force
LDK Democratic League of Kosovo
LKCK National Movement of the Liberation of Kosovo
LP Liberal Party
LPK People’s Movement of Kosovo
LS Liberal Party
LSCG Liberal Alliance for Montenegro
MAP Membership Action Plan (NATO)
MAPE Multinational Advisory Police Force
MRTV Macedonian Radio-Television
MUP Ministry of Interior Police (Yugoslavia)
NDP National Democratic Party
NHI New Croat Initiative
NLA National Liberation Army
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NS People’s Party 
NSS People’s Socialist Party
OAC Ownership Adjudication Commission
OECD Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
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OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OHR Office of the High Representative
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSCSP Office of the Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact
PBDNJ Union of Human Rights Party
PD Democratic Party
PDK National Democratic Party 
PDK Democratic Party of Kosovo
PDP Party of Democratic Progress (Bosnia)
PDP Party for Democratic Prosperity (Macedonia)
PHARE Pologne Hongrie Assistance pour la re c o n s t ru c t i o n
économique
PIC Peace Implementation Council
PKK Parliamentary Party of Kosovo
RS Republika Srpska
RTS Radio Television Serbia
SAA Stabilisation and Association Agreement (EU)
SBiH Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina
SDA Party of Democratic Action
SEDM European Defence Ministerial Group
SECI South East Europe Cooperation Initiative
SDP Social Democratic Party (Bosnia)
SDP Social Democratic Party (Croatia)
SDS Serbian Democratic Party
SDS Serb Democratic Party 
SDSM Social Democratic Alliance for Macedonia
SFOR Stabilisation Force
SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SLCM Special Local Security Measures
SME Small and Medium Size Enterprises
SNP Socialist People’s Party 
SNSD Party of Independent Social Democrats
SP Socialist Party
SPO Serbian Renewal Party 
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SPRS Socialist Party of Republika Srpska
SPS Socialist Party of Serbia
SRS Serbian Radical Party
SSJ Party of Serbian Unity
UK United Kingdom
US United States of America
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USAID United States Agency for International Development
UCPMB Liberation Army of Presevo-Medvedja-Buganovac
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNIKOMB Albanian Unification Party
UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNPREDEP United Nations Preventative Deployment Force
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSG United Nations Secretary-General
UNSRSG United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-
General
VJ Yugoslav Army
VMRO-DPMNE I n t e rnal Macedonian Revo l u t i o n a ry Organisation -
Democratic Party for Macedonian Unity
VRS Army of Republika Srpska
WEU Western European Union
WTO World Trade Organisation
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Executive Summary 
THE FUTURE OF THE BALKANS: Historically, the term “Balkans” is widely associated 
with fragmentation, violent conflict, backwardness and misery. Only very recently, the region 
started to generate a common vision: the perspective of future EU membership. The EU 
perspective is emerging as the Archimedean point of the entire process of stabilisation and 
development for the region, providing both the peoples in the Balkans and the international 
community with a real prospect for a breakthrough that would lead the region away from the 
divisions and the conflicts of the past and towards stability, co-operation and prosperity. The 
1999 Helsinki European Council gave the prospect for integration of the Western Balkans in 
EU structures a new geographic logic and strategic momentum, particularly as the existence 
of a Balkan enclave would refute the concept of a European territorial finalité. Moreover, 
basic preconditions for eventual EU membership, such as the Helsinki principles, the 
Copenhagen criteria and the adoption of the acquis communautaire, are more and more 
becoming the guiding principles and the role model for political and economic reform and 
institution building in the countries of the region. The EU countries have by now accepted 
that the entire region is already part of Europe, that its problems are European ones, and that 
any viable solution has to be a European solution. 
Today, the European perspective is basically represented institutionally in the region by the 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) as well as in some respects by the Stability Pact 
(SP). Although the EU’s bilateral agreements with the Balkan countries were originally 
modelled along the lines of those for non-accession states, the SP and the European promise 
triggered a redefinition along the lines of Eastern enlargement, resulting in the Stabilisation 
and Association Process. Yet, there is heterogeneity within the region defying the pattern of 
conditionality and regionality as practised in Eastern enlargement. Unlike the case of East 
Central Europe, considerations of stabilisation and scale require that regional co-operation in 
South East Europe operates prior to and parallel to the EU integration process instead of 
being treated as its natural consequence and a follow-up to integration.  
SP and SAP are not a perfect match and do not jointly provide a comprehensive framework 
for the European perspective in the region. Strategically, SP and SAP are based on 
contrasting contractual principles. The SP prioritises regional co-operation as a stabilising 
remedy for the structural deficits as well as recent conflicts in the region. The SAP prioritises 
the power of bilateral conditionality and consequently identifies regional co-operation as only 
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an auxiliary mechanism. The bilateral conditionality of the SAP or the pre-accession process 
causes a new fragmentation or divide within the region and competes with the SP’s logic by 
promoting integration via Schengen borders and an internal market. By its very logic, 
conditionality rewards those countries that have successfully mastered the quantifiable and 
urgent challenges of political and economic reform rather than the less tangible long-term 
objectives of regional co-operation. In sum, while the European integration constitutes the 
Archimedean point for the region, individual weaknesses and fundamental tensions between 
the two main instruments of the European perspective in the Balkans persist. The complexity 
and unpredictability of the Balkans’ road towards Europe calls for the re-thinking and re-
arrangement of some of the available instruments for crisis management, conflict prevention, 
reform assistance, regional co-operation and European integration in the direction of 
strengthening the European perspective in the region. 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES AHEAD: Many factors distinguish the 
development in the region from other regional transitions to pluralist democracy and market 
economy. It is even a bold hypothesis that the process of EU integration in the region would 
qualify automatically as a strategy for development, modernisation and transition, all in one. 
Unlike in East Central Europe, stabilisation predominated over reform assistance and pre-
accession support. In sum, there are three specifics in Southeastern Europe that merit deeper 
attention in the process of defining objectives and strategies in support of the European 
perspective.  
1 Modernisation and Transition: the weakness of the state, despite its strong pretences to 
sovereignty and ethnic statehood; the weakness of civil society with the excessive 
intertwining of economic and political power; and the deficits of economic 
modernisation, as the modernisation process has not yet reached its take-off phase in 
larger parts of the region. 
2 Managing Ethnic Conflicts and Security: the endemic crises of the weak states in the 
region; crisis management of internal conflicts; and the legacies of ten years of inter-
ethnic and inter-state conflict. The evident difference between the Balkans and East 
Central Europe is between ten years of steady transition in East Central Europe and ten 
volatile years of ethnic conflicts and instability in the major parts of South East Europe.  
3 Duration and Heterogeneity: The last two distinctive features of the region as far as 
strategies of regional co-operation and EU integration are concerned involve the 
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projected duration of the integration process and the structural heterogeneity of the 
region as such. 
Even in the best-case scenario, a set of strategies and institutions both qualitatively and 
quantitatively different from the ones employed in the enlargement process in East Central 
Europe are needed in the Balkans in order to cope with the specific requirements for stability 
in the region and in order to successfully complement the Stabilisation and Association 
Process towards EU integration. Overall, the integration process will be significantly more 
arduous, heterogeneous and asynchronous. A more realistic scenario for the Southeastern 
enlargement process after 2004 calls for a consistent and transparent overall strategy with 
more coherent sets of policies and instruments providing concrete “stepping stones” - distinct 
incremental incentives linked to tangible interim benefits. The paradigm for Southeastern 
Europe has irrevocably changed from stabilisation to enlargement. Thus, what is necessary 
today and will become an even more pressing need after Eastern enlargement is a 
comprehensive re-arrangement of existing institutions and policies in a single strategic 
framework: Europe and the region need now an Agenda for Southeastern Enlargement. 
ENHANCED STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITY: Complementary strategies partly 
precede (in a logical rather than temporal sense) the actual Stabilisation and Association 
Process (e.g. the start-up assistance), partly accompany the SAP in parallel (e.g. regional co-
operation) and partly proactively block interfering factors to the process (e.g. crisis 
management). In sum, bilateral conditionality and regional co-operation are separate strategic 
objectives promoting separate but equally important and complementary reforms and should 
not be allowed to emerge as competing agendas. The responsibility here lies both with the 
local political elites in demonstrating forward-looking leadership and with the EU in ensuring 
that regional co-operation is not construed (and thereby discredited) as a substitute to EU 
membership. For the issues this involves both a new quality of public policy in the region and 
a strategic prioritisation of functional forms of co-operation. 
ENHANCED INSTITUTIONAL CONGRUENCE: The logical next question is about the 
congruence of the institutions to shoulder the tasks for assisting in the development and the 
implementation of these complementary strategies. In this regard, a major question is whether 
the current proliferation of international and regional initiatives and, particularly the 
pluralism that characterises the institutional interface between the EU and the region, is 
appropriate and helpful. Yet, since the current situation is not the result of a comprehensive 
international approach to the realities in the Balkans but rather, as usual, the outcome of the 
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well-known complexity of the international community and the sui generis set-up of the EU, 
the question is rather how to do better out of the available instruments and mechanisms 
currently employed in the region and not to try to reinvent the wheel. The obvious 
consequence of the requirement for enhanced institutional congruence under the current 
circumstances is the need for a new deal for the current key initiatives in flexible 
arrangements under an informal common roof. 
AN AGENDA FOR SOUTHEASTERN ENLARGEMENT: Adopting an Agenda for 
Southeastern enlargement would therefore signify the progressive and balanced shift of the 
position of the international community and the local leadership: from stabilisation to 
enlargement; from international micro-management of the region to macro-management with 
greater local responsibilities; and from an international institutional proliferation to an 
integral institutional framework. The development of a flexible and informal common roof 
under which all current strategic objectives, actors and initiatives would be re-arranged to 
create dynamic synergies would be the acknowledgement of this paradigm shift. The above 
strategic complementarity and institutional congruence of the Southeastern enlargement 
process has to be consolidated in the next 2-3 years with the 2004/2005 Eastern enlargement 
as a deadline. 
In conclusion, what may have worked reasonably well in Eastern enlargement process 
requires additional endeavours in the case of Southeastern enlargement due to the 
qualitatively and quantitatively different challenges this region poses. A consistent Agenda 
for Southeastern Enlargement after 2004, including the establishment of an Informal 
Consultation Council to provide the much-needed strategic and institutional coherence and 
orientation under EU leadership as well as an enhanced Stabilisation and Association Process 
will be needed soon, in order to secure a credible Balkan trajectory to Europe. 
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Policy Recommendations 
For strategic complementarity and institutional congruence: 
? Informal Consultation Council: The ICC ought to be enhanced and upgraded to become 
the common roof for consultation among key strategic actors for the Agenda of 
Southeastern enlargement: the EU Council Secretariat, the European Commission, the 
SEECP, the SP and the EU Presidency, the USA, SEECP, SP, SECI, World Bank, NATO 
as well as (temporarily) the SRSG for Kosovo and the HR for Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
? SEECP: Regionalisation and true regional ownership require a SEECP with stronger 
capabilities – not necessarily institutionalised – including regular ministerial meetings in 
key areas of (potential) regional co-operation: security, economics and trade, energy, etc. 
? Stability Pact: The Pact ought to define its own agenda selectively and offensively based 
on actual and potential added value in complementarity to the SAP. Consequently, its 
table structure has to be reconsidered and certain other tasks regionalised, transferred to 
the EU or phased out in the medium term. Thus, the strategic capacity of the Office of the 
Special Co-ordinator will have to be strengthened.  
For Southeastern enlargement:  
? DG Southeastern Enlargement: SAP and EU candidate status should be upheld as 
separate (albeit sequential) trajectories for EU integration. Yet, the EU perspective for the 
Balkans, the logic of regionality and the concept of SAP Plus imply that as of 2004 DG 
Enlargement takes responsibility for both the remaining candidates of Eastern 
enlargement and for the SAP states of Southeastern enlargement.  
? Functional Co-operation: Without raising the spectre of virtual, partial or second-class 
membership, the EU might intensify co-operation in some policy areas (e.g. the fight 
against organised crime; environmental policies; and security issues). Functional co-
operation would be beneficial for the entire region and for the EU too.  
? Cross-Conditionality: Coherence of EU strategies for crisis-management, regional co-
operation and integration implies that “cross-conditionality” can be applied more 
vigorously and transparently: Non-compliance with international obligations (ICTY, Res. 
1244 or Dayton) could be linked to progress in the SAP.  
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? SAA Minus: In order to include all countries and entities of the region in the SAP and the 
SAA path, a special SAA minus has to be defined for those incapable of fulfilling the 
SAA admission criteria in the medium term, e.g. due to unresolved status issues. Once the 
constitutional constellation and the SAA procedure for Serbia and Montenegro has been 
arranged, Kosovo would be a prime candidate for a SAA minus with reduced 
conditionality and reduced but effective assistance and benefits.  
? SAA Plus: Conversely, the logic of conditionality requires that each country’s 
“graduation” from SAA to candidate status depends on the reform criteria of the SAA, 
not on the planned duration of the SAA. The separation and sequencing of SAA and 
candidate status, however, is not violated by selectively “mirroring” relevant pre-
accession instruments and offering them to the more advanced SAA states, e.g. screening 
for the adoption of the acquis, certain economic instruments and assistance for 
administrative capacity-building. Eventually, this SAA Plus approach might significantly 
shorten the actual phase of accession negotiations and strengthen the country’s 
“locomotive role” within regional co-operation.  
? European Reconstruction Agency: In line with the paradigm shift from stabilisation and 
reconstruction to integration, the agency will have to be renamed and take responsibility 
for CARDS assistance and evaluations either for all or none of the Western Balkan 
countries and entities. 
? Interim Incentives: The projected duration of the EU integration process for the Western 
Balkans requires stages within the SAP, marked by distinct reform conditions and interim 
incentives for individual SAA countries. Interim incentives might involve the lifting of 
visa regimes or specifics of the free movement of peoples, goods, services and capital.  
? Pan-European Benefits: In view of a projected European finality including the Western 
Balkans, some exclusive EU benefits can be turned into “pan-European” benefits to 
strengthen regional and European solidarity, without violating SAP conditionality. 
Citizens from the region could qualify EU educational programs and for staff positions at 
the EU. Information campaigns on the EU ought to include the region on equal footing 
and observer status for the states in the European Parliament or the next Inter-
Governmental Conference might be worth considering.  
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1 The Future of the Balkans: EU Integration is the Archimedean Point 
Historically, the term “Balkans” is widely associated with fragmentation, violent conflict, 
backwardness and misery. Developments in the 1990s, particularly the violent disintegration 
of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including the subsequent crises in 
Kosovo and Macedonia, as well as the collapse of the Albanian state in 1997, have only 
painted in brighter colours the imagery of the Balkans as the land of perpetual instability, 
ethnic divisions and state fragmentation. Indeed, antagonisms rather than co-operation have 
generally so far marked the relations among the Balkan peoples (with external Great Powers 
contributing their share to divisiveness and conflict). They have rarely perceived themselves 
as a region and they have seldom felt a sense of unity. Even the recent term “Western 
Balkans” (coined by the 1998 Vienna European Council) and the wider term “South East 
Europe” (that includes the EU accession states of Romania and Bulgaria) apparently 
correspond to external perceptions rather than to a local sense of belonging.  
Only very recently, the region started to generate a common vision: the perspective of future 
EU membership. Croatia and Albania, for example, may be miles apart in political and 
economic development, but both in Zagreb and in Tirana EU membership has become the 
political talk of the town. Kosovo Albanians and Serbs may disagree on almost every issue of 
political relevance, but neither of them seriously envisages a future outside the framework of 
EU integration. The EU promise for accelerating the process towards the European Union as 
a reward for compromise has been the catalyst in brokering the March 2002 Belgrade 
Agreement regarding the new state of Serbia and Montenegro which, arguably, has for the 
time being halted further disintegration and, possibly, further instability in the Balkans. Thus, 
the EU perspective is emerging as the Archimedean point of the entire process of stabilisation 
and development for the region, providing both the peoples in the Balkans and the 
international community with a real prospect for a breakthrough that would lead the region 
away from the divisions and the conflicts of the past and towards stability, co-operation and 
prosperity. 
The perspective of EU membership for the states in the region was first promised in the 
founding document of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe (SP) in Cologne on 10 June 
1999 - probably the most controversial clause in the entire declaration. After the Sarajevo 
Summit of November 1999, the promise was somehow toned down, but only temporarily. A 
month later, the Helsinki European Council decided to open accession negotiations with six 
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more candidates, including Romania and Bulgaria. This decision gave the prospect for 
integration of the Western Balkans in EU structures a new geographic logic and strategic 
momentum, particularly as the existence of a Balkan enclave would refute the concept of a 
European territorial finalité. The promise for an eventual European integration, as phrased in 
the Presidency Conclusions of the Feira European Council in June 2000, provided additional 
impetus. The EU countries have by now openly accepted that the entire region is already part 
of Europe, that its problems are European ones, and that any viable solution has to be a 
European solution. 
The credibility of the European perspective has also significantly increased during the past 2-
3 years in the Balkans. The EU and its member states, despite much criticism about slow 
bureaucratic procedures, have demonstrated a considerable readiness to pledge and commit 
substantial funds for the stabilisation of the Balkans, particularly at the SP funding 
conferences in Brussels (March 2000) and Bucharest (October 2001). In this respect, no other 
donor has even come close to the EU and its member states. Moreover, basic preconditions 
for eventual EU membership, such as the Helsinki principles, the Copenhagen criteria and the 
adoption of the acquis communautaire, are more and more becoming the guiding principles 
and the role model for political and economic reform and institution building in the countries 
of the region.  
Furthermore, the gradual strengthening of the CFSP and the shifting priorities of the US 
foreign policy after September 11th away from the Balkans have also brought Europe to the 
forefront of political involvement and crisis management in the region, thereby only further 
enhancing the European perspective. Europe’s continued central role in the peace-keeping 
forces of KFOR in Kosovo, SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Operation Fox in Macedonia 
are prominent examples of the presence and commitment of the EU in the region. The leading 
role of the EU in brokering the August 2001 Ohrid Agreement and the March 2002 Belgrade 
Agreement have only further strengthened the central role of the EU in conflict prevention 
and crisis management in the region. The prominence of the EU perspective in the Balkans 
over the last few years has been significantly enhanced by the efforts of some political, social 
and economic forces in the region to “re-dignify” the Balkans as a European region. The 
same applies to the growing recognition in the region that stability, development and the 
prospect for European integration rely on the Balkan peoples themselves becoming 
increasingly less part of the problems in the region and more part of the solutions. While the 
possibility of the region sliding back into open conflict cannot yet totally be ruled out, there is 
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a growing conviction both in Europe and in the region that the worst is over: Today the real 
challenge for the countries in the region is to catch up with the rest of Europe and eventually 
to become full members of the European Union. 
Today, the European perspective is basically represented institutionally in the region by the 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) as well as in some respects by the Stability Pact 
(SP). The concept of “association agreements” for the countries of the Western Balkans 
predated the SP and the more formal promise of a European perspective. Although these 
bilateral agreements were originally modelled along the lines of those for non-accession 
states, the SP and the European promise triggered a redefinition resulting in the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreements (SAA) in May 1999. By the time the first SAA was signed with 
Macedonia in April 2001, the EU had set up an SAP consisting of individual SAAs, a 
CARDS assistance program and a program of Autonomous Trade Measures (ATM). The 
model here clearly was the accession process for Eastern enlargement, with the SAAs 
resembling the Europe Agreements (EA) and with CARDS being the Southeast European 
version of PHARE. The main conditionality and reform stimulus in the SAP is located in the 
phase prior to the signing of the agreement. Typically, the individualised SAA phase would 
accelerate the subsequent phase of further reforms, acquis adoption and accession 
negotiations under the candidate status. Recently, the EU revisited its main instruments for 
the region in order to enhance strategic efficiency in respect to the ongoing process towards 
signing SAAs with all the countries of the region. First, it established an annual “progress 
report” for the countries of the Western Balkans along the lines of Eastern enlargement. 
Second, on the basis of the December 2000 CARD Regulation, five Country Strategy Papers 
and one Regional Strategy Paper, presented in early 2002, were conceived to provide a more 
comprehensive framework for EU assistance. 
Yet, there is heterogeneity within the region defying the pattern of conditionality and 
regionality as practised in Eastern enlargement. First, this heterogeneity in the region is 
already partly institutionalised within the EU structures. Assistance to one half of the region 
(i.e. Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia), which is troubled by unresolved status 
issues and still vulnerable to ethnic problems, is so far largely managed by the European 
Reconstruction Agency. The other half (i.e. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Croatia) is 
handled directly by the Directorate of Western Balkans of the DG External Relations of the 
European Commission. Second, while all states in the region experience similar structural 
developmental problems in varying degrees, some areas are still heavily affected by the 
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legacies of the past ten years of ethnic conflicts and unresolved status questions (Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro), and thus pose additional special 
challenges. Finally, considerations of stabilisation and scale require that regional co-operation 
in South East Europe - unlike in East Central Europe - operates prior to and parallel to the 
EU integration process instead of being treated as its natural consequence and a follow-up to 
integration. In short, the heterogeneity within the region poses special challenges and requires 
more than what the current EU assistance framework provides for the region.  
The SP was established in 1999 primarily to provide to the countries in the region an 
alternative vision on how to achieve lasting peace and security, stable democratic institutions 
as well as sustainable economic and social development. It has by now also emerged as an 
additional key instrument to assist these countries’ accession into the European Union. The 
SP is generally credited with success regarding the initiation of a political process towards 
regional integration, particularly in trade and security affairs. Conversely, from its very 
inception it has also suffered from a considerable lack of credibility, both among its local and 
among its international partners, particularly with respect to its role vis-à-vis the integration 
process of the countries of South Eastern Europe into the EU as well as into the Euro-Atlantic 
institutions in general. Even worse, often the SP and its regional approach have been 
perceived as a European delaying strategy or even as a placebo, compensating for perpetual 
non-integration in European structures. 
In addition to these individual weaknesses, in more than one respect, SP and SAP are not a 
perfect match and do not jointly provide a comprehensive framework for the European 
perspective in the region. The SAAs were originally conceived as a contract of non-
integration and were then remodelled as a long-term process towards integration along the 
lines of Eastern enlargement. The SP was conceived as a contract for stability and it has only 
in practice emerged as an instrument supporting the process towards European integration. 
The coexistence of SP and SAP is thus more or less a coincidence. Even more, until recently, 
the two strategies existed in parallel rather than in congruence. SP and SAP are also 
strategically based on contrasting contractual principles. The SP prioritises regional co-
operation as a stabilising remedy for the structural deficits as well as recent conflicts in the 
region. The initial conditions for an SP recipient country are limited to the Helsinki 
principles, ICTY co-operation and the Dayton Agreement. The SAP prioritises the power of 
bilateral conditionality and consequently identifies regional co-operation as only an auxiliary 
mechanism, as indeed readiness to engage in regional co-operation would be quite an 
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awkward clause in the conditionality of a bilateral agreement. The potential strategic tension 
between SP and SAP as well as between regionality and conditionality will most likely 
become more evident soon: The bilateral conditionality of the SAP or the pre-accession 
process causes a new fragmentation or divide within the region and competes with the SP’s 
logic by promoting integration via Schengen borders and an internal market. By its very 
logic, conditionality rewards those countries that have successfully mastered the quantifiable 
and urgent challenges of political and economic reform rather than the less tangible long-term 
objectives of regional co-operation.  
In sum, while the European integration constitutes the Archimedean point for the region, 
individual weaknesses and fundamental tensions between the two main instruments of the 
European perspective in the Balkans persist. It is likely that the tensions will come to a head 
soon with the forthcoming decision on the 2004 round of Eastern enlargement. Moreover, 
“exogenous” factors, like the US (exit) strategies in the Balkans with possible consequences 
for the EU’s policing and peace-keeping role in the region, the ongoing process of EU 
internal reforms and re-structuring with the possible outcome of the fusion of CFSP and 
External Relations as well as the yet unknown impact of Eastern enlargement on the Balkans 
and the general geopolitical malaise further add to the complexity and unpredictability of the 
Balkans’ road towards Europe. The only certainty is the need for the re-thinking and re-
arrangement of some of the available instruments for crisis management, conflict prevention, 
reform assistance, regional co-operation and European integration in the direction of 
strengthening the European perspective in the region is becoming ever stronger.  
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2 Challenges and Opportunities Ahead: The Road towards Europe 
There are a number of challenges and opportunities regarding the process of integration of the 
Balkans in the EU. Indeed many factors distinguish the development in the region from other 
regional transitions to pluralist democracy and market economy. Some of them are structural 
and some of them are apparently more circumstantial. In fact, it is even a bold hypothesis that 
the process of EU integration in the region would qualify automatically as a strategy for 
development, modernisation and transition, all in one. Yet, the optimism of transitology still 
permeates EU thinking, even though the process of enlargement has turned out to be a much 
longer undertaking than expected in East Central Europe, and though further East in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States the results of transition have been ambiguous at best. 
Optimistic scenarios in the definition of their objectives and strategies tend to focus on the 
recent past rather than on the long-term structural deficits. These scenarios are typified by the 
frequent use of the terms “reconstruction” and “reconciliation”. Evidently, the current 
situation is the outcome of centuries of complex interaction between regional developments, 
external power-projection and, more recently, assistance strategies. In these strategies, unlike 
in East Central Europe, stabilisation predominated over reform assistance and pre-accession 
support. In sum, there are three specifics in Southeastern Europe that merit deeper attention in 
the process of defining objectives and strategies in support of the European perspective.  
1. Modernisation and Transition: Some of the structural deficits in the region are not linked 
mainly to the communist past. In that sense, they distinguish larger parts of Southeastern 
Europe from East Central Europe, while in some respects they present similarities with 
the CIS region. Yugoslavia’s unique position in the Cold War has contributed to a process 
of economic modernisation and institution building that – despite a decade of 
disintegration and warfare – has some relevance for current reform potentials, albeit to 
widely varying degrees for the different successor states and entities.  
a. The first structural-historical deficit is the weakness of the state, despite its strong 
pretences to sovereignty and ethnic statehood. The lack of an efficient civil service, 
independent judiciary, accountable security and police forces and other modern state 
institutions predates the communist period. The process of modernisation of the 
state structures in Southeastern Europe is for the EU a considerably more 
demanding endeavour than the transition process in East Central Europe. 
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b. A related structural deficit concerns the weakness of civil society that also predates 
the communist period and is related to the consolidation of a nation state without a 
corresponding economic middle class and the excessive intertwining of economic 
and political power. Yet, neither the Europe Agreements in East Central Europe nor 
the SAAs for Southeastern Europe focus adequately on the development of civil 
society – NGOs, education, media, etc. Norm setting and guarantees for non-
intervention by the state are currently major preoccupations of the EU’s involvement 
in this area.  
c. Finally, the deficits of economic modernisation that occurred prior to communism 
and that even the communist ideology of forced, accelerated industrialisation and 
urbanisation largely failed to overcome is another distinct structural deficit in the 
region. In many respects, “economic reconstruction” is a typical misnomer for large 
parts of the region, as the modernisation process has not yet reached its take-off 
phase.  
2. Managing Ethnic Conflicts and Security: In addition to these structural deficits, the 
evident difference between the Balkans and East Central Europe is between ten years of 
steady transition in East Central Europe and ten volatile years of ethnic conflicts and 
instability in the major parts of South East Europe: conflict-prevention and post-conflict 
reconstruction versus transition policies and European integration. Still today the legacy 
of conflicts and the risks for renewed violence preoccupies considerably the political 
discourses in the region, albeit rather within and no longer between the states of the 
region. Hence, the distinctly complementary tasks of conflict prevention, crisis 
management and post-conflict reconstruction still remain high in the agenda of the 
relations between the EU and the countries in the region:  
a. There is a major auxiliary role for the EU in dealing with the endemic crises of the 
weak states in the region, as protracted crises typically encourage derailed or 
simulated reform and all forms of state capture.  
b. The EU and its High Representative for CFSP have come a long way to assume the 
leading role in crisis management of internal conflicts (e.g. Macedonia or Bosnia) 
and with regard to unresolved status questions (e.g. Montenegro or Kosovo). Yet, a 
more direct additional international presence and involvement continues to be 
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necessary as illustrated, for example, by the key political role of the High 
Representative in Bosnia and the UN Special Representative in Kosovo.  
c. Some of the legacies of ten years of inter-ethnic and inter-state conflict are not 
addressed adequately by the SAP in terms of comprehensive strategies and 
instruments. A key issue here is the return of refugees, which is currently a major 
obstacle for local and regional reconciliation and friendly relations between 
neighbouring states as well as for economic and social development.  
d. Last, but not least, the region, unlike East Central Europe, continues to require the 
presence of substantial numbers of international (and increasingly European) 
military and police forces to guarantee stability. While this aspect of the EU’s 
conflict-management involvement remains a basic precondition for stability in the 
region, inevitably it is also in some respects incompatible with an ongoing process 
towards regional ownership and the normalisation of the overall situation in the 
region. 
3. Duration and Heterogeneity: The last two distinctive features of the region as far as 
strategies of regional co-operation and EU integration are concerned involve the projected 
duration of the integration process and the structural heterogeneity of the region as such. 
a. Duration: Compared to the transition and accession process in East Central Europe, 
the integration process of the Southeastern Europe into the EU will in all likelihood 
be of a much longer duration, at least for some countries in the region. In that sense, 
the mere duration of the integration process increases the risks for societal and 
political fatigue and frustration and thus, the possibilities for setbacks, reversals and 
other destabilising effects. 
b. Heterogeneity: Some countries in the region have better potentials for political, 
administrative and economic reform than others. Some have a relatively 
straightforward and shorter road towards EU membership; some a correspondingly 
limited inclination towards regional co-operation and minor legacies of the recent 
past in terms of ethnic conflicts. Other countries and state-like entities have to cope 
with major modernisation deficits and weak state institutions; face a long and 
arduous road towards EU membership; need to depend more on regional co-
operation and face major burdens in terms of sovereignty status, inter-ethnic 
relations and state consolidation.  
16 The European Union and the Balkans: From Stabilisation Process to Southeastern Enlargement 
Even in the most optimistic scenario, both Europe and the region will have to prepare 
themselves for a linear but much longer process towards EU membership than the one 
experienced by the states in East Central Europe. The expected duration of this “association 
phase” poses new challenges to Europe and the region alike. The historical-structural deficits 
and the specifics of the first ten years of post-communist transition in the region will likely 
further complicate this process, obstructing it by “state capture” through corruption and 
organised crime; the re-emergence of nationalist and populist movements, inter-ethnic 
conflicts or predatory elites; as well as processes of “simulated change” by local elites 
subverting the actual process of EU stabilisation, association and integration. Last, but not 
least, the very combination of massive international support (in terms of financial and human 
resources) and weak states causes a whole array of specific unintended consequences, 
ranging from aid-addiction and a lack of regional ownership to democratic de-legitimisation. 
Even in the best-case scenario, a set of strategies and institutions both qualitatively and 
quantitatively different from the ones employed in the enlargement process in East Central 
Europe are needed in the Balkans in order to cope with the specific requirements for stability 
in the region and in order to successfully complement the Stabilisation and Association 
Process towards EU integration. Overall, the integration process will be significantly more 
arduous, heterogeneous and asynchronous. 
A more realistic scenario for the Southeastern enlargement process after 2004 includes 
enhanced tensions between European strategic instruments due to the divides within the 
region. In this case, both the process of managing ethnic conflicts and unresolved status 
issues and the challenge of modernisation and transition would solidify the dividing lines 
across the region, putting the inherently conflicting European approaches of regionality and 
conditionality under considerable additional strain in the medium term. A trajectory towards 
membership, that may be too slow for some, may be too ambitious for others. Thus, in order 
to avoid paralysis and destabilising setbacks, a more realistic approach would necessitate the 
adoption of a consistent and transparent overall strategy with more coherent sets of policies 
and instruments providing concrete “stepping stones” - distinct incremental incentives linked 
to tangible interim benefits in order to sustain the EU momentum. 
In conclusion, the paradigm for Southeastern Europe has irrevocably changed from 
stabilisation to enlargement. While resisting the temptation to treat the Southeastern 
European enlargement as a historical inevitability for all the states in the region, today 
without doubt the European perspective is the Archimedean point of reference for all 
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strategies and policies in the region. Thus, what is necessary today and will become an even 
more pressing need after Eastern enlargement is a comprehensive re-arrangement of existing 
institutions and policies in a single strategic framework. Only such a consistent framework 
would be capable of managing the long road of the region towards European integration 
while safeguarding peace and stability, and ensuring smooth and sustainable transitions. In 
short, Europe and the region need now an Agenda for Southeastern Enlargement.  
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3 An Agenda for Southeastern Enlargement: Enhanced Strategic 
Complementarity and Institutional Congruence 
A more coherent trajectory for the accession of the Balkans to the EU should have as its core 
strategy the SAP, since the SAP is today the most comprehensive partnership between the EU 
and the countries in the region in the process towards EU membership. In view of the SAP’s 
genesis since 1999 and the shifting paradigms, such as the perspective for the Balkans, 
reform policies and regime changes in the region as well as the upcoming Eastern 
enlargement 2004, the SAP will have to evolve accordingly. Not unlike the case of the 
Eastern enlargement process, EU instruments will have to adapted and modified during the 
process without forfeiting credibility and reliability. 
Other instruments and institutions may have to review their roles seeking complementarity to 
the SAP. Complementary tasks involving conflict-prevention and crisis-management should 
remain the primary responsibility of NATO and EU’s CFSP/ESDP diplomatic and military 
capabilities. Complementary tasks involving mainly, but not exclusively, regional co-
operation should remain a key role of the Stability Pact. The key objective should be the 
effort to articulate their respective roles in a more complementary manner in order to generate 
a truly comprehensive integration process. Thus, an Agenda for Southeastern Enlargement 
would require above all enhanced strategic complementarity and institutional congruence.  
Complementarity should mainly be understood to refer to the need to avoid duplications and 
overlapping among the multiple strategic objectives and initiatives in and for the region and, 
thus, to help creating a coherent working space of international and local synergies. 
Complementarity implies that none of the individual strategic objectives and actors or 
initiatives can achieve alone what is needed, given the enormity of the task of European 
integration for the South East. Thus, while enhanced strategic complementarity points to the 
need for a skilful balancing of the various strategic objectives that promote the European 
perspective in the Balkans, enhanced institutional congruence points to the necessity for a 
more rational division of labour among the relevant actors and existing initiatives. In other 
words, some considerable pulling and pushing - involving both strategies and institutions - is 
needed to strengthen the European perspective in the region, while avoiding 
counterproductive duplications, multiple interfaces and, above all, time-consuming and 
resource-wasting conflicting policies and objectives. 
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3.1 Enhanced Strategic Complementarity 
Complementary strategies partly precede (in a logical rather than temporal sense) the actual 
Stabilisation and Association Process (e.g. the start-up assistance), partly accompany the SAP 
in parallel (e.g. regional co-operation) and partly proactively block interfering factors to the 
process (e.g. crisis management). In sum, bilateral conditionality and regional co-operation 
are separate strategic objectives promoting separate but equally important and 
complementary reforms and should not be allowed to emerge as competing agendas. The 
responsibility here lies both with the local political elites in demonstrating forward-looking 
leadership and with the EU in ensuring that regional co-operation is not construed (and 
thereby discredited) as a substitute to EU membership. For the issues this involves both a new 
quality of public policy in the region and a strategic prioritisation of functional forms of co-
operation.  
Regionality and Conditionality: Strategic coherence today in the Balkans, first, requires 
squaring the need for a transparent differentiated process for each individual candidate 
towards EU membership (bilateral conditionality) with the prerequisite for enhanced regional 
co-operation among the various states and entities in the region (regional approach). Bilateral 
conditionality is necessary both as a stick and as a carrot. It is important, on the one hand, 
because it sets out clearly the benchmarks that the different local actors have to meet in order 
to fulfil the EU criteria for accession, thereby laying out the rules for the trajectory towards 
Europe. The strict but fair application and rigorous review of the various bilateral conditions 
can also ensure the credibility of the European model, for example, by discouraging 
simulated reforms and cheating. Moreover, a differentiated approach reflects the political, 
social and economic heterogeneity of the region and the necessity for tailor-made solutions to 
specific individual problems and challenges. Finally, it ensures that the region can move 
faster than the lowest common denominator.  
Regional co-operation is not merely a precondition for EU membership. It is above all a 
prerequisite for peace, stability and prosperity and, thereby, a strategic objective on its own 
merit. Functional forms of co-operation make sense from a purely regional perspective, 
regardless the process towards EU integration. For example, regional co-operation in 
enhancing free movement of peoples, goods, services and capital is a must for economic and 
social development, while regional political co-operation in addressing international 
organised crime, corruption as well as problems related to refugees and internally displaced 
persons are necessary for stabilisation, normalisation and reconciliation. Yet, pragmatic and 
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local-driven regional co-operation could only complement efforts towards EU integration. 
Eventually, within an EU-32 the only significant voice the Balkan states will have, will be a 
regional voice. In this respect, one might distinguish three levels of regional co-operation:  
1. basic forms of regional co-operation and co-existence as preconditions for normalisation 
and reform throughout the region, e.g. a regional political dialogue and confidence-
building measures; 
2. functional forms of co-operation building up on these preconditions are advantageous for 
all the regional partners, e.g. regional standardisation (visa regimes and free trade 
agreements) as well as improvement of regional transport and energy infrastructure; and  
3. instrumental forms of regional co-operation, directly linked to the objective of EU 
integration, e.g. idem – standardisation and infrastructure.  
The EU perspective in Southeastern Europe will remain a chimera if it is not backed up by 
sufficient basic regional co-operation as a precondition for reform and stability and by 
sufficient functional co-operation as a stimulus for state consolidation and economic 
development.  
The Stability Pact should be refocused strategically to become an auxiliary instrument to the 
SAP. This new paradigm for the SP implies prioritisation instead of comprehensiveness and 
offensive rather than defensive programming. The different complementary tasks should 
follow different timeframes and set-ups. Regional political co-operation and dialogue should 
gradually be transferred to regional ownership under the South East European Co-operation 
Process (SEECP) in the medium term, which would have to develop appropriate mechanisms 
and procedures. With the conclusion of major infrastructure projects and initiatives like the 
free trade agreements, the SP’s investment advisory should also be regionalised. The role of 
the SP in economic matters would be phased out. Justice and Home Affairs could be left to 
the relevant EU structures in the medium term, whereas security matters might have to be 
taken over by the regional dialogue under the SEECP. One long-term role of the SP would be 
to become the clearinghouse for civil-society initiatives and donors. Another important long-
term role with a critical regional dimension also could be the active involvement of the SP in 
the thorny issues of reconciliation and refugee return. Other SP initiatives would stand on 
their own feet as regional centres for specific tasks. This refocusing of the SP implies that the 
structure of working tables, task forces and sub-stables becomes a liability and requires 
change: Many of the core regional tasks are by definition cross-cutting issues, particularly in 
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economic-reform matters. Comprehensiveness could remain a major SP asset only in the area 
of the First Working Table’s civil-society initiatives. Here, the SP might increasingly become 
a valuable interface between the EU and bilateral donors and NGOs. As the very nature of 
donors, civil society and NGOs defies co-ordination, the SP would have to guide and 
prioritise by presenting consistent and convincing strategic visions. Thus, the strategic 
capacity of the Office of the Special Co-ordinator will have to be strengthened. The business 
advisory council, the specialised regional centres, regional dialogue, the co-ordination of 
regional initiatives and the free-trade agreements constitute inherent added values of the SP. 
In sum, the SP should partly be regionalised, partly be absorbed by the EU integration 
process, partly (in the medium term) phased-out, and partly continue as a long-term 
framework.  
Functioning States and Status Issues: Enhanced strategic complementarity simultaneously 
addresses capacity-building for functional states and political entities at all levels to 
strengthen the effectiveness and legitimacy of state institutions and develops creative 
approaches to the unresolved status issues without sliding back to zero-sum conflicts and 
destabilising unilateral demands for territorial revisionism. Building functioning states is a 
conditio sine qua non both for stability and for the prospect of EU integration. Regardless of 
final status arrangements, the progress of states and political entities and their chances to 
advance towards EU membership will be conditional to their performance in capacity-
building and reforms of state institutions such as the public administration, the financial 
regulatory framework, the judiciary and the police. The establishment of functioning state 
institutions is, perhaps, the single most important strategic objective for all actors in the 
region and must not be allowed to be taken hostage by unresolved status issues risking to 
delay reforms and betray expectations. Thus, the functionality of states and entities has to 
take precedence over questions of sovereignty. Even more, questions of unresolved status, 
such the question of Kosovo, will have a greater chance to be negotiated and resolved in a 
self-sustaining and constructive manner, if the actors concerned manage to build effective 
state structures and legitimate institutions capable to negotiate solutions. Conversely, a step-
by-step peaceful and democratic process of negotiating political status issues can only 
strengthen the legitimacy and thereby the effectiveness of state institutions. 
Sustaining this balancing act between building functional states and preparing final political 
arrangements is perhaps the most demanding challenge of our times in the Balkans. The two 
strategies are separate but mutually complementary and reinforcing. The starting point for 
creative politics in the region regarding unresolved status problems, particularly regarding the 
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local leadership, is the need to respect international obligations (e.g. Dayton Accords, UNSC 
1244, Ohrid Agreement, Belgrade Agreement). The burden, however, for showing creativity 
in addressing complex questions such as, for example, how to fully engage Kosovo in the 
Stabilisation and Association Process without compromising the fragile equilibrium of 
Resolution 1244 lies mainly with the EU and the international administration in Kosovo 
(UNMIK). Whatever the exact mechanics for a solution to such a problem, pending final-
status issues must not be allowed to delay the process of building functioning states in the 
region. Due to the conditionality principle, the EU cannot afford to accept the potential for 
(regional) destabilisation as an “asset” or a bargaining chip. Due to the regionality principle, 
the EU cannot afford to accept unresolved status issues as a reason for excluding the entity 
from the SAP. In sum, including all states and entities of the region in the SAP requires 
political will on the part of the national authorities to engage in political dialogue and to 
guarantee common markets within all states of the region. On the part of the EU, it requires a 
creative adaptation of the SAP to the deficits and capabilities of the laggards without 
forfeiting conditionality.  
Enhanced strategic complementarity also requires balancing creatively the demands for 
greater regional/local ownership in the process towards EU integration with the inevitable EU 
intrusiveness, comprehensive norm-setting and the Brussels-imposed conditionality for EU 
membership. Local interest-driven initiatives carry greater chances to respond to real and 
immediate needs in the region. In the end, they will also carry greater weight in sustaining 
local support. Yet, EU intrusiveness and conditionality is also indispensable both because the 
attraction of the EU membership carries a great leverage for generating necessary support for 
unpopular reforms and other initiatives and, because a strict EU review process of bilateral 
conditionality will be necessary to ensure that reforms towards EU integration are genuine 
and self-sustaining. Similarly, enhanced strategic complementarity has to square an open 
process without fixed timetables with a concrete approach with verifiable benchmarks to 
ensure the credibility of the process and sustain popular support for the rather protracted 
trajectory to Europe. To that end, the benchmarks have be to linked to well-defined stages in 
the SAP involving tangible interim benefits on the basis of bilateral conditionality.  
In conclusion, enhanced strategic complementarity recognises that addressing the complex 
and special challenges of the Balkans’ path towards the EU integration requires a process-
oriented approach. Seemingly incompatible strategies (bilateral conditionality versus regional 
co-operation; capacity-building of functional states versus unresolved status issues; regional 
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ownership versus international intrusiveness) have to tackled as mutually complementary 
processes that support rather than obstruct the road towards EU accession. 
3.2 Enhanced Institutional Congruence 
The logical next question is about the congruence of the institutions to shoulder the tasks for 
assisting in the development and the implementation of these complementary strategies. In 
this regard, a major question is whether the current proliferation of international and regional 
initiatives and, particularly the pluralism that characterises the institutional interface between 
the EU and the region, is appropriate and helpful. Yet, since the current situation is not the 
result of a comprehensive international approach to the realities in the Balkans but rather, as 
usual, the outcome of the well-known complexity of the international community and the sui 
generis set-up of the EU, the question is rather how to do better out of the available 
instruments and mechanisms currently employed in the region and not to try to reinvent the 
wheel. The obvious consequence of the requirement for enhanced institutional congruence 
under the current circumstances is the need for a new deal for the current key initiatives in 
flexible arrangements under an informal common roof. 
Institutional complementarity here implies that the various actors should try to determine 
their priorities and set their policies by measuring the comparative advantages and added 
value of their institutional capacity and instruments in relation to those of the other actors, 
committing themselves to a more regular and systematic consultation and some degree of 
joint policy planning. In the same direction, it is also very important that each initiative and 
institution develops policies and sets priorities with clearer focus. Flexibility implies that no 
question of single leadership is raised and no formal institutional re-arrangements are sought 
but rather more systematic consultation as well as informal agreements for a more rational 
division of labour. Thus, a common roof does not refer to the creation of any new institution 
either, but rather to the need to pull all main current initiatives into a more integrated strategic 
framework, that promotes the common goal of Southeastern enlargement. A number of issues 
concerning institutional congruence have not been adequately addressed so far, despite some 
initial efforts in the right direction, such as the establishment of the Informal Consultative 
Committee involving the EU Council Secretariat, the European Commission, the SEECP, the 
SP and the EU Presidency (November 2001). Three specific issues have to be resolved:  
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1. SP and SAP: The complementary tasks of the SP listed above (regional dialogue, 
regional co-operation, clearing house for civil-society initiatives and donors) require a 
more integrated co-ordination with the responsible offices in the European Commission. 
2. SAP and CFSP: Similarly, the short-term crisis management of CFSP ought to tally in a 
more systematic manner with the medium-term requirements of workable arrangements 
for the SAP.  
3. SEECP and SAP/CFSP/SP: The SEECP should progressively become the voice of the 
region and an equal partner in decision-making regarding the affairs of the region, in the 
context of CFSP as well as in SP and SAP. Given the necessary capabilities and political 
will, in a number of issues the lead role might even be transferred to the SEECP.  
Stability Pact and SAP: The future role of the SP and the prospect for an enhanced 
complementarity between SAP and SP are central issues here. A pivotal assumption behind 
the need for moving from stabilisation to integration and adjusting the EU involvement in the 
region to the new realities is that the SP should become institutionally, strategically and 
operationally synchronised with the overall EU framework for the region. As a new 
paradigm, such a tighter and clearer SP-EU nexus and enhanced complementarity between 
SP and SAP carry the potential to alleviate some of the Pact’s original problems, improve its 
effectiveness and help to cope with the new challenges in the region. This change of 
orientation also implies the need for the consolidation of the SP’s objectives, institutions, 
strategies and timeframes. The reorganisation of the SP aims to turn an initiative created 
primarily for regional stabilisation into a full-fledged instrument for European integration. 
Complementarity here should not be defined as the full set of existing institutional structures 
and possible policy areas minus those covered by the SAP. Other policy areas and 
institutional ties may also have to be identified.  
Crisis-Management and EU-Integration: Another issue here is the need for enhanced 
complementarity within the EU structures, for example, between the initiatives and the role 
of the EU High Representative for CFSP (EUHR) in the region and the role of the European 
Commission-led SAP process. The paramount consideration here is the need to ensure 
consistency of the EU involvement in the region. One major issue here is that the EU should 
ensure that it speaks with one voice and that it becomes fairly clear to local actors about who 
does what and who is responsible for what in the EU. For example, while the conflict 
prevention and management crisis role of the EUHR should be clearly distinguished by the 
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long-term enlargement role of the European Commission, the two should not be perceived as 
parallel (and thereby often competing) roles but rather as complementary ones. A recent 
illustration of the risks of undermining the credibility of the EU here is the turbulence, yet 
admittedly not a big one, caused in Montenegro in the summer of 2002 over the question of 
the status of the new constitutional set-up of Serbia-Montenegro. The European Commission 
presented a modified position that seemingly contradicted the initial position of the EUHR 
when he brokered the Belgrade Agreement in March 2002. The security role of the EU in the 
region, particularly as it is preparing itself to take over full responsibility for the international 
police presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is another important issue necessitating greater co-
ordination within the EU.  
SEECP and Regional Ownership: SEECP might become the voice of the region and an 
equal partner in decision-making regarding the affairs of the region, including true 
“regionalisation” in a number of issues. The capabilities to take on a lead role require not so 
much an institutionalisation of the SEECP, but rather a fair amount of political will and 
regular ministerial meetings in in key areas of (potential) regional co-operation: security, 
economics and trade, energy, etc. SEECP should be credited with the potential to become the 
voice of the region, but not be elevated to that position “by default”. 
3.3 An Agenda for Southeastern Enlargement after 2004 
Adopting an Agenda for Southeastern enlargement would therefore signify the progressive 
and balanced shift of the position of the international community and the local leadership: 
from stabilisation to enlargement; from international micro-management of the region to 
macro-management with greater local responsibilities; and from an international institutional 
proliferation to an integral institutional framework. The development of a flexible and 
informal common roof under which all current strategic objectives, actors and initiatives 
would be re-arranged to create dynamic synergies would be the acknowledgement of this 
paradigm shift. More specifically, sooner than later, and certainly soon after the finalisation 
of the Eastern enlargement process, assigning the leading role for the Southeastern 
enlargement process to the European Commission would most likely be a formality. DG 
Enlargement would combine experience from ten years of Eastern enlargement with 
responsibility both for the accession negotiations with Romanian and Bulgaria and for the 
Stabilisation and Association Process of the Western Balkans. The question then would be 
how to better redefine responsibilities within the various EU instruments as well as with other 
actors that operate outside the EU framework such the SP and the SEECP.  
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DG Southeastern Enlargement: A schematic re-arrangement of roles promoting enhanced 
strategic and institutional complementarity would be based on two rules. Each actor and 
initiative develops a clearer focus of action taking into account the need for enhanced 
strategic complementarity. And all actors and initiatives commit themselves to enhanced 
consultation and co-operation, taking into account the need for enhanced institutional 
congruence. As of the day of the actual Central East European accession, the European 
Commissioner for Enlargement should become the Commissioner for South East European 
Enlargement. Thus, the region – i.e. the Western Balkans and, likely Romania and Bulgaria, 
should no longer be in the responsibility of the Commissioner of External Relations. The 
remaining funds previously earmarked for Central East European enlargement should be 
made available for the candidates of South East European enlargement. Accordingly, the 
promotion of some of the “associated states” to the status of “candidate states” should 
increase CARDS resources for the remaining countries in the SAP. Moreover, with SAP and 
pre-accession in one DG, the mismatch between Phare, Interreg and Tacis (especially in their 
cross-border dimensions) during Eastern enlargement can be avoided. The SAP (the name 
itself might fade out under a DG Southeastern Enlargement) should increasingly resemble 
Eastern enlargement with annual Progress Reports for each country (both candidates and 
associated states) plus a regional report for all of them. Accordingly, the European 
Reconstruction Agency would either be responsible for all or none of the CARDS countries 
rather than half of them. A renaming of the agency would also be appropriate. Nevertheless, 
SAP and EU candidate status should be upheld as separate (albeit sequential) trajectories for 
EU integration.  
Informal Consultation Council: An Agenda for Southeastern Enlargement should not be 
seen as a new institution, but a forum of dynamic consultation and pragmatic co-operation for 
the relevant EU and non-EU institutions, an enhanced and enlarged Informal Consultation 
Council. The consultation ought to include CFSP, DG External Relations (Southeastern 
Enlargement as of 2004), SEECP, the USA, the SP, SECI, World Bank, NATO as well as 
(temporarily) the SRSG for Kosovo and the HR for Bosnia-Herzegovina. An Agenda for 
South East European enlargement as a flexible co-ordination mechanism would respond to 
two institutional problems: Firstly, the multiple interfaces and/or competing responsibilities 
of the Stability Pact with the SAP, SECI and even CFSP could be clarified and improved 
without major new institutional arrangements. Secondly, institutions that are non-EU or only 
partly EU could be integrated without excluding key partners like the US, SECI, NATO or 
the SP. This forum for consultation might also gradually replace the High Level Steering 
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Group/Task Force of EU and World Bank in strategic economic decisions. In sum, whereas 
representativeness is a key element in the SP’s Regional Table, the ICC banks on strategic 
synergies of key the actors. The EU could chair the Pact’s co-ordination sessions. Depending 
on the issues at hand, the HR for CFSP or the Commissioner for Enlargement, External 
Relations or Trade would represent the EU as chair, although decisions on these issues in any 
case will ultimately depend on the outcome of the internal restructuring of the EU in the years 
to come. Consequently, divergent messages to the region and strategic confusion or 
contradictions could be avoided to a much larger degree. Moreover, “cross-conditionality” 
could be applied more vigorously and transparently: Non-compliance with international 
obligations (ICTY, Res. 1244 or Dayton) could be linked to progress in the SAP. 
Timeframes and Stages: The above strategic complementarity and institutional congruence 
of the Southeastern enlargement process has to be consolidated in the next 2-3 years. The 
2004/2005 Eastern enlargement should be the deadline. The Agenda for Southeastern 
enlargement also implies the phasing out of certain tasks and corresponding institutions as 
well as the transfer of other tasks to institutions in regional ownership and/or to the “normal” 
process of EU integration which is currently represented by the SAP. Schematically, the 
completion of stabilisation and reconstruction process should be achieved first. Eventually, 
crisis management and conflict prevention should be to be phased-out or regionalised, while 
the SP’s role in regional infrastructure and co-operation should follow suit later. 
Regionality and Conditionality: Due to the internal divides and heterogeneity of the region, 
the Agenda for Southeastern enlargement will have to accept and cope with a region in which 
different states will be in different phases and contractual relations to the EU for a long 
period to come. The core challenge will be to uphold and implement regionality without 
sacrificing the conditionality drive of the regatta model. A major challenge here, particularly 
because of the heterogeneity of the region, is the need to clarify as soon as possible after the 
decision regarding Eastern enlargement the procedures and phases of the Southeastern 
enlargement process: flexible but consistent entry procedures and exit procedures for the 
SAP.  
Five suggestions for creative policies between regionality and conditionality - with respect to 
individual countries on both ends of the scale and to the heterogeneous region as a whole:  
1. SAA Minus: As only functioning sovereign states can become members of the EU, the 
trajectory of Southeastern enlargement also implies long-term exit strategies for 
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KFOR/UNMIK in Kosovo and OHR/SFOR in Bosnia. At a given point in time, the status 
issues will have to be resolved in a way that can ensure that all peoples in the region 
would be capable to join the EU. Yet, in the short and medium-run the participation of all 
peoples in the region in the SAP process should be ensured by creative solutions. 
Unresolved status issues must not be construed as obstacles to the participation of certain 
parts of the region in the SAP process, as it could undermine peace, stability and the very 
process towards European integration for the entire region. In order to include all 
countries and entities of the region in the SAP and the SAA path, a special SAA minus 
has to be defined for those incapable of fulfilling the SAA admission criteria in the 
medium term, e.g. due to unresolved status issues. Once the constitutional constellation 
and the SAA procedure for Serbia and Montenegro has been arranged, Kosovo would be 
a prime candidate for a SAA minus with reduced conditionality and reduced but effective 
assistance and benefits.  
2. SAA Plus: It would be unrealistic and contrary to the principle of bilateral conditionality 
to expect the more advanced “association states” to remain in their SAA until all states of 
the region have completed the SAP. Therefore, a mode for the “promotion” from SAA to 
the status of “negotiating candidate” should be defined, based on fulfilment of all SAA 
criteria rather than pre-set timetables. A system of “sluices” with increasing levels of 
conditionality and assistance does not invalidate the logic of a single regatta. Assuming a 
time gap of at least ten years between the accession of the first and the last South East 
European state as well as that the EU will heed its preference for grouped accessions, for 
procedural and pragmatic rather than principled reasons, Southeastern enlargement will in 
all likelihood be completed in two rounds. The separation and sequencing of SAA and 
candidate status, however, is not violated by selectively “mirroring” relevant pre-
accession instruments and offering them to the more advanced SAA states, e.g. screening 
for the adoption of the acquis, certain economic instruments and assistance for 
administrative capacity-building. Eventually, this SAA Plus approach might significantly 
shorten the actual phase of accession negotiations and strengthen the country’s 
“locomotive role” within regional co-operation.  
3. Interim Incentives: The projected duration of the EU integration process for the Western 
Balkans requires stages within the SAP, marked by distinct reform conditions and interim 
incentives for individual SAA countries. Such tangible stepping stones might be found in 
Justice and Home Affairs and Schengen policies (visa and border regimes), internal and 
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external security or economic and trade integration. The incentives might stimulate 
reforms beyond the criteria and benchmarks of the respective phase of the integration 
process. 
4. Functional Co-operation: Regional co-operation should be made obligatory and instigated 
with vigour only in forms that are beneficial for both advanced countries and laggards – 
via SP and SEECP: regional infrastructure, energy networks, free movement of goods, 
capital and persons within the region, etc. In many issues of civil-society development, 
regional co-operation can be of added value, but it should not be directly implicated in the 
European conditionality. Accordingly, functional regional co-operation should be 
constrained less by the EU-made borders between members, candidates, SAP countries 
and non-members. Without raising the spectre of virtual, partial or second-class 
membership, the EU might intensify co-operation in some policy areas (e.g. the fight 
against organised crime; environmental policies; and security issues). Functional co-
operation would be beneficial for the entire region and for the EU too. 
5. Pan-European Benefits: In view of a projected European finality including the Western 
Balkans, some exclusive EU benefits can be turned into “pan-European” benefits to 
strengthen regional and European solidarity, without violating SAP conditionality. EU 
member states and the European public opinion may be already familiar and used to the 
complexity of the EU architecture and working methods. Generally, this does not apply to 
the Balkan states and their populations and, certainly, it does not mean that sending 
multiple and often diverse EU messages to the Balkans and the lack of clarity about EU 
priorities in the region is a minor issue which merits only minor attention. Moreover, 
familiarisation with the EU work methods and internal politics would also enhance the 
capability of the countries of Southeastern Europe to improve their co-operation with the 
EU institutions. Citizens from the region could qualify EU educational programs and for 
staff positions at the EU. Information campaigns on the EU ought to include the region on 
equal footing and observer status for the states in the European Parliament or the next 
Inter-Governmental Conference might be worth considering.  
In conclusion, what may have worked reasonably well in Eastern enlargement process 
requires additional endeavours in the case of Southeastern enlargement due to the 
qualitatively and quantitatively different challenges this region poses. A consistent Agenda 
for Southeastern Enlargement after 2004, including the establishment of an Informal 
Consultation Council to provide the much-needed strategic and institutional coherence and 
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orientation under EU leadership as well as an enhanced Stabilisation and Association Process 
will be needed soon, in order to secure a credible Balkan trajectory to Europe.  
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In 1996, the Aspen Institute Berlin and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published Unfinished
Peace, the report of the International Commission on the Balkans which had been established at the initiative and
with the support of European and American foundations in 1995. In his foreword to the report, former Prime
Minister of Belgium Leo Tindemans, who served as Chairman of the Commission, stated that the objective of the
Commission Members was "peace, a durable one, to pave the way to democracy, prosperity, well-being and a
humane society". Dayton, which had been signed in November 1995, was only the point of departure as it "marked
the end of the war, but only the beginning of the peace". The task for the international community at that point
was to "help transform the proverbially chaotic, bloody and unpredictable Balkans of the past into a stable, peace-
ful and dependable Southeastern Europe of the future".
Two years before the establishment of the Commission, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace had
republished the results of its 1913 Inquiry into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 (The
Other Balkan Wars, 1993), the first International Commission on the Balkans presided over by the French Senator
Baron d'Estournelles de Constant. Reports of atrocities occurring in the Balkans had prompted Nicholas Murray
Butler, one of the Endowment's leaders and president of Columbia University to send a commission of six individu-
als for "an impartial and exhaustive examination" of the hostilities in the Balkans. It was much in the same spirit that
the second Commission was created under the impression of the violent break-up of former Yugoslavia and the
ferocity of the wars. 
During its visits to the Balkan states during the second half of 1995 and the first half of 1996, the Commission
was struck by the parallels between their impressions and the insights of the first Carnegie Commission of 1913/1914
as its haunting question was still pertinent: "Must we allow these Balkan wars to pass, without at least trying to
draw some lessons from them, without knowing whether they have been a benefit or an evil, if they should begin
again tomorrow and go on for ever extending?" The second Commission's report concludes "that turning a blind
eye on the Balkans is no less a recipe for disaster at the end of the twentieth century than it was at its outset."
In the difficult context of the mid-nineties and the muddle of international efforts directed at the Balkans,
Unfinished Peace was a remarkable document analyzing the causes of instability and conflict, assessing internation-
al responses and the lessons to be drawn, and suggesting a process and a framework for defusing and overcoming
the conflicts in a broader regional context. We commend Leo Tindemans, Lloyd Cutler, Bronislaw Geremek, Lord
Roper, Theo Sommer, Simone Veil and the late David Anderson for raising their voice in the cacophony of the time
and offering their far-sighted analysis when the international community was still approaching the Balkans with a
piecemeal approach. Unfortunately, the Commission's warnings were largely left unheard, and the international
community had to undergo another painful lesson with the war in Kosovo and a more successful short-term con-
flict resolution in Macedonia before a more stable peace could be established. 
Today, almost a century after the creation of the first International Commission on the Balkans, a third
Commission on the Balkans is publishing its report. Different from the first two, this report is the first that is able
to reach beyond war and peace. Almost ten years after the Dayton agreement, and almost five years after the fall
of the Milosevic regime, the Western Balkans are a relatively stable region, the danger of war is no longer immi-
nent, and the countries of the region have proven stable enough not to be thrown into chaos by political turmoil.
Moreover, the European Union committed itself to integrating the countries of the region at the Thessaloniki
Summit in June 2003. Why then, the reader might ask, do we need a third International Commission on the
Balkans? 
Despite the achievements to date, the stability of the region still rests on weak feet. Reform processes are hin-
dered by the legacy of the past: immense structural challenges, constitutional problems, open status issues, a dire
economic situation and political instability. Unprecedented amounts of reconstruction and development aid poured
into the region could not lead to the desired results because of the chronic political instability and doubts about
the future. How fragile even the peace is in some parts of the region was demonstrated by the violence which erupt-
ed in Kosovo in March 2004 - and the helpless response of the international community. Preserving the current sta-
tus quo will not suffice to achieve lasting peace and stability, economic prosperity and to pave the way for European
integration. Additional efforts and a shift in international and Brussels thinking in particular are required in order to
solve outstanding issues and accelerate the transition process. 
In order to induce these developments with new momentum, the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the King Baudouin
Foundation, the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation in a concerted
Foreword l Report of the International Commission on the Balkans4
transatlantic effort of private foundations decided to establish a new independent International Commission on the
Balkans. We thank them for their inspiration and continuous support of our endeavor. Our task was to present
results which will stir the debate on the future of the region and to ultimately develop a vision for the integration
of the countries of Southeast Europe into the European Union.
The composition of our Commission reflected the changed situation in the Western Balkans and the different qual-
ity of cooperation that should guide the relations between the so-called "international community" and the region. It
was a great pleasure and enrichment for me to work with 18 distinguished individuals both from the region and from
outside the region who assembled such an array of expertise in matters Balkan, European and Transatlantic. In trying to
understand the current situation in the countries of the Western Balkans, we relied on the analyses of experts who are
familiar with the changing nature of challenges facing the region. We are especially grateful to James O'Brien, Srdjan
Bogosavljevic, Jovan Teokarevic, Srdjan Darmanovic, Gerald Knaus, Stevo Pendarovski, Remzi Lani, Antonina Zheliazkova,
Damir Grubisa and Josip Kregar whose contributions helped shape our opinions. Our intellectual and practical journeys
through the region were prepared and guided by a conscientious and highly motivated staff.
Over the course of one year, we undertook four Study Tours to the countries of the Western Balkans which gave
us the opportunity to exchange views with many individuals whose time is gratefully acknowledged. Unlike our
predecessors, we did not have to face the immediate suffering and destruction caused by war. However, in many
parts of the Balkans, the smell of violence is still in the air, and the distrust and hopelessness of people in view of
the insecurity and dire economic and social situation is depressing. We left enclaves in Kosovo with the conviction
that they will stand out as shameful symbols of the failure of international policy if the international community will
not succeed in securing the basic rights of these people and establishing conditions for a better life.
During all of our visits, whether in Belgrade, Kosovska Mitrovica, Pristina, Sarajevo, Skopje, Tetovo, Tirana or
Zagreb, the most memorable encounters were those with the youth and students, impressive young individuals
who are trying to shape their future against bleak economic prospects in societies which have only begun to come
to terms with their past. All of them see the future of their countries within the European Union. Understandably,
most of them envisage their own immediate future abroad even though they are very attached to their homelands.
We regard our recommendations as reaching out to these generations of potential leaders who are the future of
the region and its hope for reconciliation. If the international community does not remedy the damage that some
of its policies have done, we will see these young people leaving their countries in search of a better life.
Many will argue that the governments and the citizens of the region are responsible for the future of their own
societies, and should bring their own houses in order. In view of the political and financial engagement since the
beginning of the nineties and the responsibility the international community has assumed, such arguments are
nothing short of cynical. 
We do not cherish any illusions about the current political will among the member states of the European Union
to make major new commitments. Enlargement fatigue hovers over the European capitals these days, the looming
referenda on the European constitution question the future of the European project. In the absence of headline-
grabbing violence, many European politicians and civil servants hold on to the hope that the status quo is working
just fine. However, if the reform and transition process fails, the Western Balkans will become even more of an iso-
lated ghetto, and loom as a threat to stability and peace. The international community and the European Union in
particular have been engaged in the Balkans to an extent which is unprecedented so far, and should see this
engagement to a successful end. It will take more than symbolic gestures and rhetoric to build the pro-European
constituencies in the Balkans who will translate their dreams into votes for political elites to carry forward the reform
processes. And it will take no less of an effort to communicate the Balkans as a future part of the European Union
and the sense of urgency to the public in European Union member states.
If the EU chooses success over failure in the Balkans, the next two years could see the beginning of a long-term
solution to the problems that would enable all parties to close the book on the Balkans' bloody twentieth century
and to win the peace which has been established at such high human and financial cost. It would also mean that
this was the last International Commission on the Balkans which had to be initiated.
Giuliano Amato
Chairman of the International Commission on the Balkans
April 2005
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1 Timothy Garton Ash, Bosnia in Europe's Future, New York Review of Books, December 21, 1995.
It was in Sarajevo in the summer of 1914 that Europe entered the century of madness and self-de-
struction. The founding fathers of the European Union, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, were
respectively 28 and 26 years old. But their dream of a united Europe, founded on shared values
and institutionalised interdependence, can easily be traced back to that summer day in Sarajevo.
Eighty years later, in the early days of the siege of Sarajevo in the mid-1990s, a photo of a
half-ruined post office with three items of graffiti written on its wall captured the imagination of
the world. The first graffito read "This is Serbia!"; the second stated "This is Bosnia". And someone
scrawled underneath, "No, you idiots, it's a post office!" But a European historian of the present
added a line of his own, "This is Europe"1. Because all of the destruction in the Yugoslav wars has
been done by Europeans to other Europeans in Europe. The line "This is Europe" embodies the
European Union's moral imperative when it comes to overcoming the legacies of war and destruc-
tion in the Balkans. There is also a security imperative. Political instability in the Balkans threatens
Europe with the prospects of never ending military conflicts, constant flows of immigrants, flour-
ishing of Balkan-based criminal networks and the erosion of the EU's credibility in the world. 
It is in Sarajevo in the summer of 2014 that Europe should demonstrate that a new European
century has arrived.
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INTRODUCTION
Almost a decade after the Dayton Agreement, and almost five years
after the fall of the Milosevic regime in Belgrade, the Western Balkans2
are a relatively stable region with no military conflicts, no ongoing eth-
nic cleansing, where elections are free, if not always fair. In Thessaloniki
in June 2003, the European Union committed itself to integrating the
countries from the region. But what does this commitment really mean?
The region is as close to failure as it is to success. For the moment, the
wars are over, but the smell of violence still hangs heavy in the air. The
region's profile is bleak - a mixture of weak states and international pro-
tectorates, where Europe has stationed almost half of its deployable
forces. Economic growth in these territories is low or non-existent;
unemployment is high; corruption is pervasive; and the public is pes-
simistic and distrustful towards its nascent democratic institutions. 
The international community has invested enormous sums of money,
goodwill and human resources here. It has put 25 times more money and
50 times more troops on a per capita basis in post-conflict Kosovo than in
2 Since it first came into use at the turn of the 19th century, the Balkans have always been a fluid concept with countries being excluded and included
regularly and not always for any discernible reason. The past fifteen years have seen the region go through more contortions of geographic definition.
For the Commission's report, we have reduced the Balkans to include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro.
Where we also wish to include Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria or any combination of the three, we have stated so explicitly. As we were working on this
report, we had good reason to believe that Croatia was preparing to open negotiations with the European Union on the conditions for its accession.
post-conflict Afghanistan. But despite the scale of the assistance effort
in the Balkans, the international community has failed to offer a con-
vincing political perspective to the societies in the region. The future of
Kosovo is undecided, the future of Macedonia is uncertain, and the
future of Serbia is unclear. We run the real risk of an explosion of
Kosovo, an implosion of Serbia and new fractures in the foundations of
Bosnia and Macedonia.
The Commission acknowledges that there are no quick and easy solutions
for the Balkans and that ultimately it is up to the people of the region to
win their own future. But we are convinced that the international com-
munity and the European Union in particular has a historical responsibili-
ty to face and a decisive role to play in winning the future for the region.
The starting point of the International Commission on the Balkans is
that the status quo has outlived its usefulness. There is an urgent need
to solve the outstanding status and constitutional issues in the Balkans
and to move the region as a whole from the stage of protectorates and
weak states to the stage of EU accession. This is the only way to pre-
vent the Western Balkans from turning into the black hole of Europe.
At the same time, we are also convinced that the EU possesses the
mechanisms and the requisite political skill to face up to the challenge
which the region will present over the next three years in particular.
There is no doubt that Kosovo and the resolution of its final status will
be at the core of the political process in the months to come. However,
it is essential to bear in mind when addressing this and other unre-
solved status issues that they must be placed within a broader context
of the EU's explicit commitment to include the entire region as defined
at the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003.
Getting Incentives Right 
The Balkans needs a new strategy if it is to translate Brussels' stated
political aim to integrate the region into reality. Despite the commit-
ment made at Thessaloniki, the dream of European integration has not
yet proved powerful enough as a force for transforming the societies of
the Balkans, especially if we agree that the basic indicator of success is
the progress of each country on the road to the EU. 
Of course, the EU itself faces a significant dilemma as it has the capacity
to absorb only reasonably functioning and legitimate states. But now that
Croatia appears on the verge of the full accession process, there are no
The starting point of the
International Commission
on the Balkans is that the
status quo has outlived its
usefulness. 
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more of these left in the region. The classical enlargement model that
worked for Central and Eastern Europe in 1990 simply does not fit the con-
ditions prevailing in the Balkans. If this region is to become part of the EU,
it needs to undergo significant changes. But success also requires a con-
comitant shift in policy thinking towards the region in Brussels.
As a matter of common sense, the international community must now
address the unresolved status issues with the greatest degree of urgency
and look for new constitutional solutions within the framework of
European accession.
The question today is no longer, "What should be done?" We should
clearly bring the region into the EU. Rather we need to establish the
sequence of policy steps to be undertaken and the structure of the
incentives that will make them work. We need policies so that the
region can get on, get in and catch up with the rest of Europe.
The question today is no
longer, "What should be
done?" We should clearly
bring the region into the
EU. We need policies so
that the region can get on,
get in and catch up with
the rest of Europe.
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I. THE DANGEROUS STATUS QUO AND THE EU'S
BALKAN DILEMMA
The absence of headline-grabbing violence in the Balkans has persuad-
ed many in the international community that the status quo is working
just fine. This illusion of stability governed international perceptions of
the Balkans until the spring of 2004. But the March events in Kosovo in
2004 brought home to some in the international community what has
been common knowledge in the Balkans for some time: that the status
quo is not only unsustainable, it also might drive the region towards a
new period of highly dangerous instability.
Whether one views it with trepidation or with enthusiasm, the process
of final status settlement in Kosovo has already begun. We have
entered a most delicate phase in the struggle for a peaceful and pros-
perous Balkans. There is a good possibility that the international com-
munity and local political actors will succeed in this difficult quest to
solve the status issues. Such an outcome would almost certainly break
the logjam that is blocking political progress in the region, representing
a major achievement of international diplomacy as well as conferring
immense credit on local political forces.
The status quo is not only
unsustainable, it also might
drive the region towards a
new period of highly dan-
gerous instability.
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But everyone should be aware that failure is also a very real prospect
and that the consequences of failure could be grave indeed. If the EU
does not devise a bold strategy for accession that could encompass all
Balkan countries as new members within the next decade, then it will
become mired instead as a neo-colonial power in places like Kosovo,
Bosnia, and even Macedonia.  Such an anachronism would be hard to
manage and would be in contradiction with the very nature of the
European Union. The real choice the EU is facing in the Balkans is:
Enlargement or Empire.
The signs of such a debilitating future are already visible in the quasi-
protectorates of Kosovo and Bosnia. With no real stake in these territo-
ries, international representatives insist on quick results to complex
problems; they dabble in social engineering but are not held account-
able when their policies go wrong. If Europe's neo-colonial rule
becomes further entrenched, it will encourage economic discontent; it
will become a political embarrassment for the European project; and,
above all, European electorates would see it as an immense and unnec-
essary financial and moral burden. 
There are three major reasons that make us believe that the status quo
is the problem and not part of the solution.
1. Expectations Gap
The status quo is a problem in part because the citizens of the region
perceive it as such. A survey commissioned by the International
Commission on the Balkans and conducted in November 2004 demon-
strates that people in the region are overwhelmingly negative about
the status quo and that there is an alarming distrust towards both gov-
ernment and the opposition (figure 1-3). The public rejects the status quo
but has yet to see any credible alternative being offered in its place
(figure 4).
When we compared our survey to a similar poll conducted in 20023, we
observed a growing trend of public pessimism and dissatisfaction with
the direction of political and economic developments. A loss of hope
and perspective is the political reality of Western Balkans. And it is a
dangerous one.
The real choice the EU is
facing in the Balkans is:
Enlargement or Empire.
3 International IDEA, South Eastern Europe Public Agenda Survey, 2002.
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2. The Development Gap
The status quo is also a problem because it has widened the gap
between the economic and social performance of the region on the
one hand and of the new EU members and Bulgaria and Romania on
the other. The years lost in wars and half-baked reforms have widened
the gap between the winners and losers in Balkan societies, making the
demand for fairness and development stronger than ever.
As others have noted, if the status quo were to prevail, a new European
ghetto would arise in the heart of an integrating continent. This ghet-
to would comprise most of the Balkans' peoples, herded behind a wall
of visa restrictions that blocks a desperate population from seeking
work elsewhere. There is a risk that, instead of catching up with the
rest of the continent, the Balkan countries will fall further behind. The
goal of integration which holds the key to regional stabilization will
become even more distant. (Table 1, 2)
3. The Integration Trap
The consensus uniting governments and people in the Balkans is that
the region cannot achieve prosperity and stability outside the process
of European integration. At the same time, it is quite clear that the dys-
functional states and protectorates that characterise the region active-
ly hinder the inclusion of the Balkans into the European mainstream. In
this sense, the status quo is a problem because it is blocking the road
to EU accession.
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II. KEY ELEMENTS OF THE NEW POLICY FRAMEWORK
In the past decade, the international community has regarded the
Balkans primarily as a post-conflict region. This has led to a raft of pro-
visional solutions to constitutional problems and to policies based on
what might be termed 'constructive ambiguity,' embodied in docu-
ments like the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 or the Constitutional
Charter of Serbia and Montenegro. At the same time the international
community has been working on the assumption that economic devel-
opment would reduce the pressing need to solve the open status
issues. Unfortunately, this assumption has turned out to be false.
Policies that focus only on outstanding economic and social issues while
ignoring the unresolved status issues have failed to deliver. Policies that
seek to resolve status questions to the exclusion of urgent economic
and social issues are also doomed to fail. The Balkans need both.
For the EU, one of the greatest policy challenges emerges as a conun-
drum: how might one reconcile the regional approach that is essential
for the stabilisation of the Balkans with the requirement of evaluating
countries on the basis of their individual performances, a concept which
lies at the heart of the EU accession process? The EU-initiated
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Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) tried to answer this by empha-
sising the central need for regional co-operation as part of the EU's ‘con-
tract’ with individual SAP countries. The past four years, however, have
demonstrated that this does not work. The answer to the riddle remains
elusive. Now, the losers in the accession game - Bosnia, Serbia,
Montenegro, and Kosovo - no longer perceive the SAP as a fast integra-
tion track. The programme lacks the requisite incentives to engage Serbia
in co-operating over the Kosovo issue. It is striking that Partnership for
Peace enjoys a higher public profile in Serbia than the Stabilisation and
Association Process. Only real incentives can bring real reforms.
The new regional approach that the Commission advocates seeks to
reintroduce the missing incentives. The interdependence of states is
much more vital for the future of the Balkans than was the case in any
other part of Europe. These are small and unattractive markets. Their
economic sustainability depends on the creation of a common econom-
ic area that will attract foreign investors. In this sense, the regional
approach is a necessary precondition for development.
In the Balkans, the accession strategy should be a mixture of classical
state-building policies with those aimed at transforming nation states
into member states. What we face in the Balkans is a need for a 'mem-
ber-state building' strategy. 
The Stabilisation and Association Process is simply not strong enough as
a framework for building member states. Neither does it reflect the
intensity and breadth of practical EU involvement with the region.
This strategy would provide for three steps. First, we propose that in the
autumn of 2006 the EU should sponsor a Summit that aims to present all
Balkan countries with their accession road maps. The Summit should
review the achievements of individual states in satisfying the Copenhagen
criteria and on the basis of this, the EU will decide whether to start direct
negotiations on membership or to sign a pre-accession Europe Agreement
on member-state building with those countries that do not yet qualify for
accession talks. In the view of the Commission it is realistic for these coun-
tries to start accession negotiations around 2009/2010, in the belief that
the Europe Agreements will contribute to meeting the Copenhagen crite-
ria. The objective of accession could be set towards 2014/2015.
The experience of Central and Eastern Europe illustrates best how the insti-
tutionalisation of the European perspective is the most efficient way to fos-
ter and accelerate the overall political, economic and administrative reforms
in aspirant countries. This does not mean that all Balkan countries should
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join the EU at the same time, but it does mean an end to the fears of some
Balkan societies that they might be left out of the process altogether.
NATO membership is the second important pillar of our integration strat-
egy. In our view, the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in June 2005
should send a positive signal to the Adriatic Charter countries, Albania,
Croatia and Macedonia. This gesture will improve the security of Balkan
countries still outside the EU and will support reform in the security sec-
tor. We would envision these three countries receiving invitations to join
at the NATO Summit in 2006, based, of course, on the progress of their
Membership Action Plans. NATO played the role of a fast integration
track for the Central and East European countries and it should do the
same for the Balkans. Paradoxically, membership in NATO is the only avail-
able instrument for demilitarising this most militarised part of Europe.
But in order for NATO enlargement to fulfil its regional role, the Alliance
should offer membership in the Partnership for Peace program to Serbia
and Montenegro and to Bosnia and Herzegovina as soon as possible.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUS ISSUES
1.1. The Current Constitutional Environment
After the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, constitutions were written for several
states and other entities in the region. But five years after the wars ended,
the governments created by those constitutions remain weak, unpopular,
and as yet unable to persuade either their people or the international com-
munity that they are ready to enter the European Union (figure 17, 18).
Between 1994 and 2002, international negotiators and local parties
designed constitutional frameworks for the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (1994), which was to become one of the entities within
Bosnia; a constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina itself, as part of the
Dayton Accord (1995); changes to the constitution of the Republika
Srpska (1996); a constitutional framework for Kosovo as requested by
the Special Representative of the Secretary General (2001); Macedonia's
new constitutional framework, known as the Ohrid Agreement (2001);
and the new State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, negotiated with
the intensive engagement of the European Union (2002).
These constitutional frameworks have several features in common.
First, they were shaped by elites associated with armed conflicts.  The
processes that led to the constitutions were not informed by popular
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mandates but by hard-nosed trade-offs to persuade the elites to stop
fighting or avoid other destabilising acts. Power-sharing, not the
enforcement of rights, was the main principle.
A second similarity among the Yugoslav constitutional frameworks is
that each allocates power by group affiliation.  The groups are defined
according to ethnicity, a tendency that reinforces claims that the soci-
eties themselves are riven by ethnic differences which help to under-
mine central state institutions.  In the Bosnian Constitution, in the
Ohrid Agreement, and in the Kosovo constitutional framework, mem-
bers of various ethnic groups are assured specified quotas.
The hard truth is that without these allocations of jobs and decision-
making powers, the peace agreements would have failed. The long-term
consequences have been more subtle.  Local elites attempted to exploit
this to secure the primacy of their particular ethnic group in the constitu-
tional outcome.  There is a major gap between the rhetoric of civil society
that is at the centre of international efforts to democratise the region on
the one hand, and the struggle to enshrine the rights of ethnic groups that
is at the heart of the adopted constitutional arrangements on the other.
Third, the constitutional frameworks created weak states.  Each state
must compete with strongly decentralised powers (especially in the case
of Bosnia and Serbia and Montenegro); with parallel structures that are
wholly unaccountable to the constitutional frameworks (particularly in
Kosovo); and with intrusive international structures that have near
monopolies of power which are nonetheless ill-defined in crucial state-
building areas (for example, security in Bosnia and Kosovo).  A conse-
quence of the patchwork regulatory environment is that state actors
became cumulatively weaker while powerful private actors, including
political parties, oligarchs and criminal syndicates spawned by the wars
of the 1990s, have remained influential and largely escaped scrutiny.
This means that non-state institutions provide many basic public services
which would normally be the responsibility of the state. Some individuals
receive pensions, health care and education from neighbouring states (the
best example being the Serbs of northern Mitrovica who are subsidised by
Belgrade). The emphasis on decentralisation in Kosovo may accelerate
the trend.
State weakness is perpetuated in those states where there are influ-
ential international actors on the scene.  
The posts of High Representative in Bosnia and the Special
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Representative of the Secretary General in Kosovo were established
during crises. Years later, both continue to exercise extraordinary
power, including the authority to override local decisions.  Neither the
reach of this power nor the occasions for its use are clearly defined or
well understood.  In both Bosnia and Kosovo, there is an often irre-
sistible temptation for both international representatives and local gov-
ernments to shift accountability onto one another. Citizens are left
without a clear idea of who is responsible for what.
1.2. The Perceptions Map
Western governments have frequently argued that postponing the resolu-
tion of key status issues is the lesser of two evils. While they concede that
the status quo is not ideal, they maintain that it is nonetheless essential to
maintain regional peace and stability. The results of the survey commis-
sioned by the International Commission on the Balkans and of the meet-
ings held throughout the region show a more complex reality. The key find-
ings show that Bosnia is no longer a highly contested state. Most Serbs in
Serbia and almost half of the Serbs in Bosnia view the separation of
Republika Srpska from Bosnia as both undesirable and unlikely.
Paradoxically, Albanians in Albania and Kosovo are the only ones that favor
such separation of Bosnia. The survey also indicated that there is no ethnic
group intent on threatening the existence of the Bosnian state (figure 5).
In our view, the nightmare of the international community that
Kosovo's independence would automatically provoke the disintegration
of Bosnia has no foundation in reality. That does not mean that
Kosovo's independence will be a simple or uncontested process. Indeed
if mismanaged, the process could have a most deleterious domino
effect on the region. But independence per se is not the issue - the
issue is how you get there.
According to the survey, the breakdown of Macedonia and the establish-
ment of a Greater Albania are two developments that could destabilise the
region. The results of the survey show a relatively high acceptance of the
idea of a "Greater Albania" among the Albanian populations of both Kosovo
and Albania. As a whole, they differ from other groups in the region in their
view that a future unification of Kosovo and Albania is both desirable and
possible (figure 6). This suggests that the process of nation-building among
Albanian communities in the Balkans is still in progress. If the international
community fails to offer a convincing European perspective to the region, it
might bolster support for a Greater Albania or a Greater Kosovo among
Albanians. The international community should send a clear message that
Greater Albania or Greater Kosovo is not an option.
But independence per se is
not the issue - the issue is
how you get there.
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In contrast when it comes to the territorial integrity of the Republic of
Macedonia, the survey shows that a great majority of Albanians in
Macedonia reject the idea of dividing the country (figure 7). 77.5% of eth-
nic Albanians (and 85% of ethnic Macedonians) support the territorial
integrity of the Macedonian state.
Both the survey results and our talks in the region suggest that a peace-
ful separation of Serbia and Montenegro does not have the potential
to destabilise the Balkans (figure 8). An interesting point to emerge from
the survey is that most Montenegrins oppose such a separation while
the Serbian public is becoming less keen on retaining the present non-
functional federation.
1.3. Facing the Status Issues
The unresolved status of Kosovo and the provisional constitutional
frameworks in place elsewhere are among the major obstacles for the
Europeanisation of the Balkans. While all states undoubtedly aspire to
EU membership, we still have no clear idea how many will actually
emerge from the current constitutional mess - in theory, Serbia and
Montenegro could apply as one (the State Union of the present day),
two (Serbia and Montenegro as separate states) or even three countries
(adding Kosovo). The integration of the Balkans into the EU is unimag-
inable in the current circumstances of constitutional uncertainty. 
The Commission advocates:
 A four stage transition in the evolution of Kosovo's sovereignty.
Kosovo's sovereignty should develop from the status quo as
defined by Resolution 1244 (stage one) to "independence without
full sovereignty" (stage two) (allowing for reserved powers for
the international community in the fields of human rights and
minority protection), to the "guided sovereignty" (stage three)
that Kosovo would enjoy while negotiating with the EU and final-
ly to "shared sovereignty" (stage four) inside the EU.
 In the case of Bosnia, after ten years since the Dayton Accords,
passing from the Office of High Representative to an EU
Negotiator. This implies jettisoning the Bonn Powers and shifting
responsibility to the Enlargement Commissioner in Brussels. 
 A decision on the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro made by
its citizens. The Commission judges the current State Union as
non-functional. In the view of the Commission, citizens of Serbia
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and Montenegro should choose between a functional federation
and functional separation by the autumn of 2006.
1.3.1. Kosovo's Final Status
Time is running out in Kosovo. The international community has clear-
ly failed in its attempts to bring security and development to the
province. A multi-ethnic Kosovo does not exist except in the bureaucra-
tic assessments of the international community. The events of March
2004 amounted to the strongest signal yet that the situation could
explode. Since then UNMIK has demonstrated neither the capacity nor
the courage to reverse this trend. Serbs in Kosovo are living imprisoned
in their enclaves with no freedom of movement, no jobs, and with nei-
ther hope nor opportunity for meaningful integration into Kosovo soci-
ety. The position of the Serbian minority in Kosovo is the greatest indict-
ment of Europe's willingness and ability to defend its proclaimed
values. Kosovo Albanians should receive a clear message that the use of
violence is the worst enemy of their dream for independence.
The lack of leadership in Belgrade has contributed to the plight of the
Kosovo Serbs, and the Serbian community in Kosovo has to a large
degree become hostage to the political struggles in the Serbian capital.
The Albanian leadership in Kosovo must also shoulder its part of the
blame for failing to show any real willingness to engage in a process of
reconciliation and the development of multi-ethnic institutions and struc-
tures. Our survey indicates that a majority of Kosovars is keen on living in
an "ethnically homogeneous Kosovo" (figure 22). Most Kosovo Albanian
politicians  have done nothing to oppose this public mood which flies in
the face of everything that Europe believes in. 
But a substantial share of the blame for the failure of the project of a
multiethnic society in Kosovo should be placed at the door of UNMIK
and the international community. Over the past few years UNMIK has
on several occasions been actively involved in a policy of reverse dis-
crimination in Kosovo. Under UNMIK's leadership the number of Serbs
employed in the Kosovo Electric Company has declined from more
than 4000 in 1999 to 29 now, out of total of over 8000 employees.
"The international community in Kosovo is today seen by Kosovo
Albanians as having gone from opening the way to now standing in
the way. It is seen by Kosovo Serbs as having gone from securing the
return of so many to being unable to ensure the return of so few."4
The failure of UNMIK can be explained but it should not be tolerated.
The social and economic situation in the protectorate is no less depress-
4 Kai Eide, The Situation in Kosovo. Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Brussels, 15 July, 2004.
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ing. Kosovo suffers endless disruption thanks to its regular power cuts.
Some villages in the provinces are without electricity for periods of
longer than a month.
The province never boasted a self-sustaining economy and there is no
chance that it will develop one now. Currently, the unemployment rate
is about 60 to 70% (almost 90% among minorities). The construction
boom of the immediate post-war period has come to an end. Kosovo
Albanians are frustrated with their unresolved status, with the econom-
ic situation, and with the problems of dealing with the past. The
demand for sovereignty has not diminished; on the contrary, it has
increased in the past year. UNMIK is perceived by the local public as cor-
rupt and indecisive.
The Commission shares the judgment of the UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan that Kosovo has made insufficient progress towards meeting
internationally agreed standards with regard to human rights, respect for
minorities, and law and order. At the same time the Commission wishes
to underscore the urgency of dealing with the final status of Kosovo.
We do not believe that Kosovo's independence will solve all the territo-
ry's problems, but we are concerned that postponing the status talks
will lead to a further deterioration in the situation in the province. 
In our view Kosovo's independence should not be imposed on Belgrade.
The ‘imposition’ of Kosovo's independence is not only undesirable, it is
also unlikely to happen, bearing in mind that some members of the UN
Security Council (Russia, China) are opposed to it. Moreover, if Belgrade
opposes the process, it will significantly increase the chances of trouble
breaking out elsewhere whether in Bosnia, Macedonia or Montenegro.
The Commission is also pessimistic about the possibility of direct talks
alone between Belgrade and Pristina when it comes to solving the sta-
tus issue. It is up to the international community to guide this process.
In our view, negotiations on the status of Kosovo should concentrate on
offering real incentives to Belgrade so that Serbia may find acceptable
the prospect of an independent Kosovo as a future member of the EU.
Persuading Belgrade to engage is difficult but not impossible. If any-
thing can, the EU accession process can provide such incentives. Within
this context, Kosovo's independence should be achieved in four stages. 
The first stage would see the de facto separation of Kosovo from
Serbia. In our view this stage is implicit in Resolution 1244, which trans-
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formed Kosovo into a UN protectorate. This is despite the fact that the
UNSCR 1244 deals with Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and not with
Serbia. It is a dangerous illusion that Kosovo can revert to rule from
Belgrade in any foreseeable future.
The second stage (independence without full sovereignty) should
recognise in 2005/2006 Kosovo as an independent entity but one
where the international community reserves its powers in the fields of
human rights and the protection of minorities.  Legally Kosovo will
remain a UN protectorate but the Commission advocates transferring
the UN's authority, as defined by Chapter 7, from UNMIK to the EU.
KFOR should preserve both its mandate and its size. 
Kosovo should be treated as independent but not as a sovereign state
at this stage, allowing it to develop a capacity for self-government. All
functions of a normal government that are currently performed by
UNMIK or KFOR should be transferred to the government of Kosovo. This
government will tax and police the population, regulate the economy
and provide public services. The international community should reserve
its power to intervene in those areas that are essential for meeting the
Copenhagen criteria, namely human rights and minority protection.
In order for this policy to work, we should move away from a ‘standards
before status’ policy and towards a ‘standards and status’ policy.
Decentralisation, the return of refugees, and the clarification of prop-
erty rights are the key questions to be addressed. At this stage the
Commission advocates a special arrangement for the area around
Mitrovica and a special legal status for the Serbian monasteries. A spe-
cial administrative arrangement for Mitrovica (a transitional interna-
tional administration along the lines of UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia)
should exclude the possibility of Kosovo's partition.
The Commission advocates an internationally-supervised census in
Kosovo, including of those who claim to hail from Kosovo, before we
can start designing a programme of decentralisation. The definition of
a ‘Kosovo citizen’ is of critical importance. The long-overdue census
should be complemented by clearing up the property claims in the
province. Disputed property rights are the major obstacle to economic
development in the region. This is true for both private property and
for the ‘social property’ from the Yugoslav period.
The returns policy introduced by the international community in Kosovo
should be modelled on the successful returns policy applied in Bosnia. In
our view, the implementation of the returns policy is of great impor-
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tance. But our conversations with both Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and in
Serbia convinced us that the chances for a large-scale return are minimal.
The international community should provide incentives for Kosovo Serbs
to return even if they prefer to live in the mostly Serb-populated parts of
the province and not in areas where they lived before the war. It should
also take care of those who decide not to go back. A ‘Palestinisation’ of
the refugees who decide not to return to Kosovo could be a major source
of vulnerability for Serbia's democracy. This is why the Commission sup-
ports the establishment of an ‘Inclusion Fund’ to assist the integration in
Serbian society of the Kosovo Serbs who have chosen to remain in Serbia.
This fund should be financed by the European Union.
The decentralisation of power in Kosovo and guarantees of a normal life
for Kosovo Serbs are a pre-condition for engaging Belgrade in a construc-
tive debate with respect to Kosovo's independence. In the view of the
Commission, some of the minority quotas provided for the Albanians in
Macedonia in the Ohrid Agreement should also be given to the Serbs of
Kosovo. Decentralisation should afford Serbian enclaves a real opportuni-
ty for self-government and development. It is essential to appreciate how
Serbs believe that the social and economic difficulties they have experi-
enced over the past five years amount to an intentional policy of discrim-
ination and ethnic cleansing, designed by Albanians and underwritten by
the international community. So, the European Union should develop spe-
cial incentives for companies that employ citizens from ethnic minorities.
The need for policies focused on the needs of minorities should not
obscure that the culture of civil society, and not the principle of ethnic
separation, is at the heart of the European project. The ‘ghettoisation’
of ethnic minorities could promote institutional weakness and dysfunc-
tionality in the future state.
The US's active engagement at this second stage is of critical impor-
tance for a successful outcome of the EU negotiating process. Kosovo
Albanians view the US as a guarantor of their independence and an
American disengagement or a split in the Euro-Atlantic community
could quickly lead to trouble. 
The third stage (guided sovereignty) would coincide with Kosovo's
recognition as a candidate for EU membership and the opening of
negotiations with Brussels. There is a real purpose to this stage as the
EU cannot negotiate with itself  (i.e. with a protectorate which it con-
trols). During this stage the EU would lose its reserved powers in the
fields of human rights and minority protection and would exercise influ-
ence through the negotiation process alone. 
The US's active engage-
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The fourth stage (full and shared sovereignty) will mark the absorp-
tion of Kosovo into the EU and its adoption of the shared sovereignty
to which all EU member states are subject.
These stages would be an integral part of the overall process of Europe
integration of the Balkans as suggested earlier.
The necessary precondition for both the Serbian government and the
Serbian public is a fast track accession of Serbia to the EU together with
international guarantees for the protection of the interests of Kosovo
Serbs. Croatia provides a precedent in terms of such a fast-track
approach. In our opinion, the fast track for Serbia is a sine qua non. The
EU accession process is the only framework that gives Serbia real incen-
tives if not to endorse then at least to consent to such a fundamental
change in the status of Kosovo as independence represents.
1.3.2. Bosnia: From Bonn to Brussels
Since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995,
the international mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina has achieved some
astonishing successes. It has disarmed roaming paramilitaries, reduced
the size and influence of armies organised along ethnic lines, and over-
seen the restoration of freedom of movement across the country. The
former military frontlines that divided the country into a patchwork of
hostile ethnic enclaves have become largely invisible. In addition,
Croatia and Serbia, ever more attracted by the prospect of European
integration, have as a consequence ceased their attempts to subvert
the domestic constitutional order over this period.
The effects of ethnic cleansing are being eroded through the restora-
tion of property rights of the displaced, and the gradual reintegration
of returnees has changed the environment across much of the country.
More than 200,000 property claims for the repossession of houses and
apartments of those who fled or were driven out during the conflict
have been processed successfully. At the same time, Bosnia and
Herzegovina is more internationally isolated today than it was five years
ago. Together with Serbia and Montenegro, it is one of the last coun-
tries in Europe excluded from NATO's Partnership for Peace program,
which, with members like Turkmenistan, Belarus and Tajikistan, does
not traditionally enjoy a reputation of being an especially exclusive
club. Bosnia and Herzegovina does not yet belong to the World Trade
Organization, whose 147 members include Moldova and Angola. Even
more depressingly, Bosnia has yet to open negotiations for a
Stabilisation and Association Agreement. The only important European
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organisation that Bosnia has been able to join is the Council of Europe.
Yet in August 2004, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe reviewed the quality of Bosnia's democracy and questioned "the
extent to which the current role of the [High Representative] is compat-
ible with membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Council of
Europe"5. 
The need for constitutional change is high on the political agenda. All
agree that there are serious problems with the present system of fed-
eralism in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  This is partly due to the absence of
a coherent structure of regional government.  It is also because of a
tendency to see the federal system as a problem to be overcome, rather
than as a promising model which allows ethnic communities to flourish
side by side and facilitates healthy policy competition. 
The present constitutional architecture is dysfunctional. What is impor-
tant is a constitutional debate that accepts the need to facilitate and
indeed drives forward a reform of the Bosnian constitutional system. 
Along with the need for constitutional change, the main problem that
Bosnia faces today is the transition from its current status as protec-
torate that is defined by the Bonn Powers to a sustainable self govern-
ment guided by the process of EU accession.
The coercive authority of the High Representative (Bonn Powers) was
originally developed in response to threats to the peace process. The
international mission in Bosnia was designed for an unstable environ-
ment in the wake of armed conflict. When its intrusive powers to
intervene in and overrule domestic institutions were developed in
mid-1997, these were intended to head off threats to public order and
attempts by the former warring parties to challenge the integrity of
the state.
However, as the agenda of Bosnian politics has shifted to the very dif-
ferent issues of democratic consolidation and development, the powers
and activities of the High Representative continue to dominate Bosnian
politics. This has blocked the development of self-government which is
a precondition to becoming an EU candidate state.
As long as the Bonn powers of the High Representative exist, they form
the core of post-war Bosnia's unwritten constitution, and all political
calculations are shaped by them.
5 Resolution 1384.
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The talks in Bosnia convinced us that the OHR has outlived its useful-
ness. What Bosnia needs is an EU accession framework that will drive
the constitutional debate in the country.
It does not need a new Dayton, but a framework that will permit gen-
uine constitutional debate. The EU negotiation process can be this
framework and the EU Negotiator can play the role of honest broker in
the constitutional negotiations. 
The Commission advocates the necessity of incremental change.
Assuming that there will be no fundamental constitutional changes
imposed by international decree, any process of constitutional develop-
ment must necessarily begin with what is there at present.  This means
starting from the present reality of Bosnia's federal system of govern-
ment.  It also means acknowledging that constitutional change must
take place in accordance with existing constitutional rules.  State-build-
ing in Bosnia cannot be an open-ended process of centralisation and
concentration of resources for basic constitutional and political reasons.
What is essential, however, is a process of systematically clarifying
responsibilities across all levels of government, and ensuring that
(financial) resources are matched to these responsibilities.
The EU accession process will provide the requisite incentives for the
strengthening of the state's federal structures and for the develop-
ment of policy-making capacity.
1.3.3. Serbia and Montenegro: Functional Federation or 
Functional Separation
The constitutional charter of Serbia and Montenegro adopted on
February 4, 2003 with the mediation of the EU reflects a painful com-
promise reached at a time of great uncertainty. The EU feared that inde-
pendence for Montenegro would encourage Kosovo to declare its inde-
pendence thus provoking a possible destabilisation of the whole region.
The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro is a loose one, with central func-
tions largely limited to foreign policy. The two member republics maintain
separate currencies, tax systems, and customs. In addition, according to the
Charter, after a three-year period, either republic has the right to call a ref-
erendum on withdrawal from the union thereby unilaterally dissolving it.
Since the adoption of the constitution, the dynamics of federalist and
anti-federalist sentiment in the two republics has been the subject of a
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permanent if sometimes unenlightening debate. The survey commis-
sioned by the International Commission on the Balkans demonstrates
that support for independence is declining in Montenegro and that the
Serbian elite is ever less inclined to pay the costs of this dysfunctional
federation. At present, the ruling coalition in Montenegro is happy with
the common state precisely because it is gridlocked while for the
Serbian government the construct would only make sense were it to
start functioning properly.
The EU's decision to adopt a dual-track approach with regard to the
SAP for Serbia and Montenegro illustrates just how dysfunctional this
federation has become. The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro is
treated as one country with two separate accession processes.
In the view of the Commission, next spring's referendum should be
used to identify each republic's preference: a functional federation or a
functional separation. The Montenegrin government's policy of block-
ing the normal functioning of the Federation as a way to cause its dis-
integration should not be tolerated. It is up to the citizens of Serbia and
Montenegro to decide on the future of their existing federation. 
1.3.4 The Secret of Macedonia's Success
By rights Macedonia should have fallen apart by now. The survey com-
missioned by the International Commission on the Balkans indicates that
in the eyes of its own citizens Macedonia is the most vulnerable place in
the Balkans. A great majority of Macedonia's citizens is convinced that
the crisis has not yet run its course (figure 9). A staggering 76% expect
new military conflicts there6. The social and economic situation is
depressing.
And yet, Macedonia has survived all manner of threats, doggedly pur-
suing its goal of European integration. In contrast to several other ter-
ritories, Macedonia was able to prevent a full-scale civil war through a
process of negotiation between the parties and with the assistance of
the EU and the United States. The former Albanian minority's insurgent
leader, Ali Ahmeti, now heads one of the parties in the governing coali-
tion while his Macedonian partner, Prime Minister Vlado Buckovski, was
four years ago, at the time of burgeoning conflict, his resolute oppo-
nent when Minister of Defence. In February this year, however,
Buckovski officially submitted to Brussels the answers to 4,000 ques-
tions that should help the European Commission form an opinion as to
whether the country is ready to start accession talks with the Union.
6 Naturally, this figure represents only a snapshot of the critical situation around the referendum in November 2004.
The Montenegrin govern-
ment's policy of blocking
the normal functioning of
the Federation as a way to
cause its disintegration
should not be tolerated. It
is up to the citizens of
Serbia and Montenegro to
decide on the future of
their existing federation. 
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So although in theory, Macedonia should not exist, it is actually a mod-
est but significant success story. The country illustrates our thesis that a
final and clear constitutional arrangement and the institutionalization
of European perspectives are the two instruments that can work appar-
ent miracles in the Balkans. The Ohrid Agreement was initially fiercely
opposed by radical nationalist circles in Macedonia but the failure of
the November 2004 referendum on the re-territorialisation of the coun-
try which was a de facto referendum on the Ohrid Agreement demon-
strated that the majority of ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians
have now made their peace with the Ohrid Agreement which offers the
best way of holding the country together.
The tragic death of President Trajkovski in February 2004 and the March
events in Kosovo that year were litmus tests for the durability of the
state and for the viability of the Ohrid process. Macedonian institutions
and Macedonian society emerged stronger and with a greater legitima-
cy having met these challenges.
Macedonia's achievement in overcoming its crisis and its determination
to apply for EU membership should have a powerful symbolic impact
elsewhere in the region: it demonstrates how the solving of constitu-
tional issues and a realistic, carefully-calibrated EU perspective has the
capacity to transform Balkan societies.
At the same time the international community should not neglect the
major problem facing Macedonia today. The country is in urgent need
of economic growth and new jobs. The combination of cuts in the pub-
lic administration and the appointment of ethnic Albanians to public
sector jobs in accordance with the quotas agreed at Ohrid may lead to
renewed tensions between the two communities if the unemployed
are not absorbed elsewhere.
Macedonia's name is still disputed by Greece (an EU member state),
along with the fact that the provisional authority in Kosovo refuses to
recognise the demarcation of its border with Macedonia, are sources of
instability in the republic. As elsewhere in the region, the state of polit-
ical parties also gives cause for alarm. Macedonian politics have been
subject to a process of criminalisation for many years and there is a
pressing need to reverse this.
But despite all the risks and misgivings, Macedonia's progress since 2001
demonstrates that if the constitutional questions are resolved and if a
tangible European perspective is on the table, then Balkan societies
But despite all the risks
and misgivings,
Macedonia's progress since
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the constitutional ques-
tions are resolved and if a
tangible European perspec-
tive is on the table, then
Balkan societies have the
potential to get out of the
cycle of instability and
uncertainty. 
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suggesting that integration
helps to stabilize a region.
But there is also evidence
indicating that a partial
integration has the oppo-
site effect - it can destabi-
lize an area. 
have the potential to get out of the cycle of instability and uncertainty.
It is not by accident that Macedonia is a success in Europe's drive to pro-
mote multi-ethnic solutions in the region.
2. THE INTEGRATION CHALLENGE
The EU's decision to open negotiations with Turkey and Croatia and the
accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 mean that the remaining
Balkan countries are the only missing pieces from those states that have
been assured membership of the European Union. In contrast to the
others, however, the Balkans contain the possibility of a genuine security
threat in the next few years. Therefore there is a real imperative now to
address the issue of integration for this region. Such a strategy would be
significant not just practically but symbolically as well: for so long dismissed
as Europe's powder keg, if the Balkans were successfully absorbed into the
EU, it would finally banish the possibility of a revival of the type of conflict
which so plagued the continent's 19th and 20th century history. Defusing
the powder keg would be a landmark achievement for Europe.
In security, economic and political terms the Balkans are faced with a
clear choice: to be part of the European Union or to be part of a mar-
ginalised ghetto.
The success of EU enlargement is one of the few unambiguously positive
achievements of the post-Cold War world, indeed nothing short of a
political miracle. In less than a decade, the prospect of EU membership
succeeded in consolidating democratic and market reforms throughout
Central and Eastern Europe. The accession process profoundly trans-
formed societies as diverse as the Polish and the Bulgarian, the Romanian
and the Slovenian. There is now a widespread consensus that it can do
the same for the Balkans. There is, however, one critical difference this
time round - the problem of weak states. The EU lacks experience in the
integration of weak states and territories like Kosovo. So this next round
of enlargement is clearly no longer just a matter of business as usual.
There is ample evidence suggesting that integration helps to stabilise a
region. But there is also evidence indicating that a partial integration
has the opposite effect - it can destabilise an area. As Bulgaria and
Romania (followed presumably by Croatia) move on, there is the real
danger that Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, Kosovo and Bosnia will clus-
ter together to create a black hole on Europe's periphery - in fact that
process is already underway. A visa regime that builds walls between
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the Western Balkans on the one hand and accession states such as
Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia on the other, acts as a strong disincen-
tive to cooperation, leading to a further deterioration in the social psy-
chology of an already depressed region.
2.1 Building Member States
In 1991 the people of the former Yugoslavia embarked on their march
to independence, employing such ancestral European state-building
practices as waging war and ethnic cleansing in the process. They could
reasonably argue that by tradition this was part and parcel of
Europeanisation - everyone else had their own nation states, so why
couldn't the peoples of the former Yugoslavia? But in the eyes of the
new EU-Europe these practices were, of course, abhorrent and the
embodiment of a very un-European Balkanisation. Politically, the
Yugoslav succession states and the EU were talking at cross-purposes
and this turned out to be a major challenge for nation building in the
Balkans. The Balkans are not simply populated by weak states and pro-
tectorates, they also suffer the legacy of failed nation-building projects.
Building functional member states while integrating them into the EU
is Brussels unique challenge in the Balkans. In our view, the EU should
adopt a member-state building strategy that rests on three pillars:
 Developing functioning state administrations using the instruments
of the accession process, also during the Europe Agreement stage;
 Creating a common economic space in the region; 
 Constituency-building through an improvement in the quality of
political representation and ‘smart visa’ policies.
2.1.1. Member-State Building as Institution Building
The member-state building strategy that is advocated here is quite dis-
tinct from the mechanisms deployed by the international community in
other parts of the world and from the EU accession process as typified
by the last wave of enlargement. The objective is not simply to build
stable, legitimate states whose own citizens will seek to strengthen and
not destroy them - rather it is the establishment of a state that the EU
can accept as a full member with absolute confidence.
At present the negotiations and membership talks with the EU focus on
the terms under which applicants will adopt, implement and enforce
the acquis (i.e. the detailed laws and rules adopted on the basis of the
EU's founding treaties), and, notably, the granting of possible transi-
tional arrangements which are limited in scope and duration. 
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The experience of the most recent round of enlargement has made it
clear that the biggest room for improvement lies in the process of
implementation of the rules that make up the acquis. At the heart of
the member state building strategy is the need to move on quickly from
the formal adoption of legislation to the development of the capacity
to implement it. The development of this policy capacity will be
absolutely critical for the prospects of weak Balkan states in their aspi-
ration to join the EU. The negotiating framework needs to be enhanced
so as to include capacity building as its principal and explicit objective.
This should take priority both during the pre-accession Europe
Agreement phase and during negotiations themselves.
The transformation of the EU accession process into one of member-
state building implies that the very negotiating process be fine-tuned
with a view to encouraging institution building in the applicant coun-
tries. EU accession involves the creation of new institutions and the
strengthening of existing ones on a large scale in each candidate coun-
try. To do this, the EU has developed a ‘screening’ mechanism,
effectively taking an X-ray of the state administration. This then results
in the publication of hard-hitting annual progress reports that use the
acquis as a benchmark, and National Development Plans which aim to
buttress public investment strategies. It also involves substantial pre-
accession assistance for rural development, and for the institution build-
ing needed to develop absorption capacity.
Of course, there is no single model EU member state and this presents
a serious obstacle. The EU boasts a variety of practices and constitution-
al arrangements in the fields of justice or tax administration. This makes
Brussels unwilling to recommend specific institutional solutions to EU
candidate countries and so the EU has become a reluctant nation-
builder. But in the case of the Balkans, the European Commission must
assume the responsibility for some of the institutional choices that the
applicants are forced to make. The introduction of the "benchmark"
concept in the negotiating framework for membership talks with
Croatia is undoubtedly a step in the right direction. 
The most recent round of enlargement made it clear that institutional
issues, administrative capacity issues and judiciary issues turned out to
be the most challenging, and yet they were left until last. Our
Commission suggests that instead of starting with the White Book on
the Single Market, the countries of the Western Balkans would be much
better served by a White Book on Freedom, Security and Justice Issues.
In practical terms it means that assisting the countries from the region
in the field of justice and home affairs will be the overriding priority for
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the accession process and that the state of the rule of law will be the
major criterion in evaluating the progress of Balkan countries on their
journey to the EU.
2.1.2. The Regional Market
The establishment of a common economic space on the territory of
the Western Balkans is the second pillar of our strategy. Before the
opening of accession negotiations, free trade in the region, leading to
a customs union with the EU, should be complete. This should be sup-
ported by the facilitating infrastructure. The common economic space
should compensate for the costs related to the emergence of new,
small and economically unviable states in the region. 
Talk of economic integration has been fashionable in the region for
some time but it has yet to develop beyond mere words. There are con-
crete fears and obvious short term costs that have blocked the idea ever
since it was first mooted. More honestly, the Balkan countries are only
likely to buy into the idea if they believe that it will accelerate their inte-
gration into the EU. If they suspect that regional integration is really a
substitute for EU membership, it will be a non-starter. 
The future EU members Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia can play a deci-
sive role in making regional economic integration more attractive to the
rest of the Balkans. 
Our hypothesis is that countries in the region will open to each other
only within a broader framework of opening towards the EU. So, there
are four levels of regional integration that are critical for improving the
growth potential of the region. 
 Completion of free trade area in the region, leading to customs
union with the EU (In the case of Turkey, customs union with the EU
has proven its potential as an instrument for the Europeanisation of
candidate countries.)
 Regional infrastructures, both physical and institutional, that facili-
tate trade and capital flows.
 Legal arrangements between countries that facilitate the handling
of private or public claims against parties in other countries. 
 Labour market and travel policies within the region that support
regional economic integration. Differential speeds of  EU accession
should not impede this process. 
Our hypothesis is that
countries in the region will
open to each other only
within a broader frame-
work of opening towards
the EU.  
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Having said all this, however, the research from recent years suggests
that while regional cooperation may be useful in promoting growth,
impediments to growth in most countries of the region remain fixed
firmly at the national level. 
2.2. Member-State Building as a Constituency Building
A functioning state is not only an administrative entity, it is also a social
phenomenon. The growing gap between the state and key social con-
stituencies is regarded by the Commission as a critical risk for the suc-
cess of the transformative politics of the EU. Reforms to public admin-
istration and signs of positive changes in the economy are not suffi-
cient of themselves to bridge this gap. Political mobilisation and revi-
talisation of the political process is essential here. What is needed is a
new generation of policies that focus on democratisation and on the
quality of political representation which can consolidate and strength-
en pro-reform and pro-European forces in the region. 
2.2.1. Minority Rights and the Culture of Civil Society
There is an apparent tension between the rhetoric of the international
community, which emphasises the desirability of multi-ethnicity, and its
practice, which tends to place the emphasis on accommodating various
group interests in the interests of security. In the past decade, the general
legal and political environment for the harmonious development of
interethnic relations has improved substantially in most parts of the
Balkans. However, the reality of interethnic relations and minority rights
varies greatly. War and ethnic cleansing have resulted in significant demo-
graphic shifts. While all countries of the Balkans still contain multiethnic
areas, most countries are now nation states with a majority amounting to
80 % or more of the population. Albania, Croatia, Serbia (without Kosovo)
and Kosovo (if considered a separate entity) have strong majorities where
most minorities live in a relatively compact part of the country and account
for 10 to 20% of the population. We can talk perhaps about multiethnic
regions but no longer so much about multiethnic countries. Only Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro are countries that are
multiethnic as a whole but with no or no strong dominance by one
community7.
The results of the survey done for the International Commission on the
Balkans powerfully confirm the thesis that interethnic relations are much
better on the municipal level than on the level of the country as a whole.
It is also important that with the exception of the Albanians in Kosovo and
7 Florian Bieber, Minority Rights in Practice in South Eastern Europe, Discussion Paper, King Baudouin Foundation, 30 September, 2004.
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Albania, no other community favours living in an ethnically pure state. 
At the same time, we have to recognise that the newly fashionable pol-
icy of decentralisation increases the process of ethnic separation in cer-
tain parts of the region. In Macedonia in particular we can observe the
trend towards a consolidation of ethnically homogeneous regions,
resulting largely from the 2001 conflict. The argument for decentralisa-
tion is clear: with more competences exercised on a local level, minori-
ties are able to govern themselves to a larger degree, which in turn
should increase their loyalty to the state. The reality of decentralisation
and local interethnic relations is, however, far from being that straight-
forward. In many cases across the region, from disruptions of the return
of refugees to discrimination against Roma, local governments are
often the most serious violators of human rights. They are less suscep-
tible to international pressure and their actions could become a source
of tension and even destabilisation.
The international community is in need of a policy that will reconcile local
self-governance with the principles of multi-ethnicity. At present, the mon-
itoring of minority rights is focused at national level and on national minori-
ties. This has to change. In the view of the Commission what is important
is that minorities should be recognised not only at national but also at
municipal levels. The international community, for example, must monitor
the situation of the Slav Macedonian minority in Tetovo and the Albanian
minority in North Mitrovica as strictly as the situation of the Albanian
minority in the Republic of Macedonia or the Serbian minority in Kosovo.
2.2.2. Smart Visas, Smart Borders
Among the most discouraging findings of the Commission is that the
European generation of the Balkans, young men and women under 30
who share the values of Europe most keenly and who vote for pro-
European parties most regularly, are those who experience the great-
est difficulties in visiting the EU. More than 70% of students in Serbia
have never travelled abroad. The Commission believes that this should
change as a matter of urgency. This is most urgent for the youth of the
countries which have been most isolated from Europe: Serbia and
Montenegro, Bosnia, Albania. 
Bulgaria and Romania have demonstrated that freedom of movement
within the EU is the strongest signal that the EU can send both to the pub-
lic and to governments in the Balkans. A smart visa policy of the EU that
In the view of the
Commission what is impor-
tant is that minorities
should be recognised not
only at national but also at
municipal levels.
The Balkans in Europe’s Future l Report of the International Commission on the Balkans34
opens its borders to Balkan youth and Balkan businesses while closing
them for criminals should be at the very centre of policies that will
mobilise popular support for building EU member states in the Balkans.
The Schengen wall is the last wall that separates the Balkans from Europe.
Knowing how sensitive this issue is for the EU member states, the
Commission advocates a two-track approach.
The Amsterdam Treaty integrated EU visa policy into the legal framework
of the Union. On the basis of this Treaty, the European Council adopted
in 2001 a Regulation (EEC/539/2001) that includes Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro in the list of third
countries whose nationals are subject to visa requirements. As long as
the four Western Balkan countries remain on this list, any alleviations of
the visa requirement system can be negotiated only on a bilateral basis. 
On the level of the EU, the Balkan Commission proposes a Europeanisation
of the visa issue. As a first step, the EU should announce that the four
Western Balkan countries will be exempt from visa requirements once they
have met specific conditions. This was promised to Romania back in 2001
and visas were effectively lifted at a later stage once the European
Commission was satisfied that its concerns had been addressed. Such a pol-
icy sets tangible targets for the governments to work towards and to
engage ordinary citizens in the reform process.
A smart visa policy suggests that member states should adopt preferen-
tial regimes for certain social groups from the Balkans. This policy was
developed as a disincentive when Milosevic's collaborators were put on
the EU black visa list. It is time to use the preferential treatment as a
positive incentive. 
In the spirit of supporting the European generation of the Balkans, our
Commission suggests that member states establish a Balkan Student
Visa Programme for 150,000 full-time students in Serbia and
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Albania by June
2005. Representatives of the Balkan business communities should simi-
larly benefit from a smart visa policy.
2.2.3. The Hague Dilemma
As we approach the 10th anniversary of Srebrenica, the questions of jus-
tice and reconciliation should be higher than ever on the Balkan agen-
da of Europe. It is the proper time to evaluate the impact of
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
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The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was
established by Security Council resolution 827. This resolution was passed
on 25 May 1993 against the background of grave violations of internation-
al humanitarian law that had been committed on the territory of the for-
mer Yugoslavia since 1991, and as a response to the threat to international
peace and security posed by these violations. There are four central tenets
to the ICTY's mission: to bring to justice persons allegedly responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law; to render justice to the
victims; to deter further crimes; and to contribute to the restoration of
peace by promoting reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia.
The compliance of governments in the region with the ICTY is central
to the development of good relations between the international com-
munity and the Balkans. The EU has defined compliance with ICTY as a
threshold conditionality when it comes to the process of integration.
The same holds for the Partnership for Peace and NATO. In addition,
the EU regards the success of the ICTY as critical in its struggle to con-
fer legitimacy on the International Criminal Court.
The Commission suggests full cooperation should remain mandatory
for the opening of accession negotiations to the EU and NATO. But the
existing levels of good cooperation with ICTY are satisfactory when it
comes to joining PfP and to signing Europe Agreements.
So far, the Tribunal has played the decisive role in bringing the war
criminals to justice, but it has failed to communicate its mission to the
people in the region. A number of surveys made in the last year demon-
strate that the Tribunal is distrusted by local people and that national-
ist politicians like the Radicals in Serbia have exploited this resentment
in order to fuel anti-European and anti-democratic sentiments.
In our view, the challenge facing the international community at pres-
ent is how to translate the post-war conditionality of the ICTY which is
charged with examining concrete crimes into one that looks forward
and concentrates on the strengthening of European values across
Balkan societies. ICTY threshold conditionality should move away from
its focus on specific individuals to concentrate instead on the willing-
ness of governments and societies to examine the causes and conse-
quences of their troubled past. The focus should be much more on the
ability of the domestic judicial system to deal with war-related crimes
and on the effectiveness of the educational system to promote toler-
ance and reconciliation, than on "delivering" certain individuals. 
What should be put on trial is the readiness of all social institutions
from governments to churches and the history curriculum to deal with
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the crimes of the past. The success of this policy can obviously only be
measured over an extended period of time. Coming to terms with the
past is a long term problem for any society. That it is why compliance
with ICTY should now be understood more broadly than simply the
need to bring certain individuals to justice. ICTY should concentrate on
its fourth major goal - to contribute to peace by promoting reconcilia-
tion on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The Commission is convinced that current status quo in the Balkans has
outlived its usefulness. There is an urgent need to solve the extant sta-
tus and constitutional issues in the Balkans and to move the region as
a whole from the stage of protectorates and weak states to the stage
of EU accession. 
The Commission advocates the convening of an EU-Balkans Summit in
the autumn of 2006. The Summit should present a ‘Balkan audit’ to
demonstrate how much money EU countries are spending on the
Balkans. It should put forward a consolidated ‘Balkan Budget’ that
should in the future become an integral part of the Financial
Perspectives of the Union. The EU would only convene the Summit after
a resolution of all the status and constitutional issues that are currently
open. At this Summit each Balkan country will receive its EU road map.
In the case of Kosovo, the Commission suggests a four-stage transition
in the evolution of Kosovo's sovereignty. This should evolve from the
status quo as set out in Resolution 1244 to "independence without full
sovereignty" with reserved powers for the international community in
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the fields of human rights and minority protection; onto "guided sover-
eignty" that Kosovo will enjoy while negotiating with EU; before finally
arriving at "shared sovereignty" inside the EU. In the view of the
Commission, the powers of UNMIK should be transferred to the EU.
In the case of Bosnia, after ten years since the Dayton Accords, the
Commission envisions passing from the Office of High Representative to
an EU Accession Negotiator. This implies moving Bosnia from "Bonn to
Brussels" whereby the EU Negotiator will replace the OHR. Bosnia should
join PfP as soon as possible.
In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, the Commission judges the cur-
rent Federation of Serbia and Montenegro to be non-functional. The
citizens of Serbia and Montenegro should decide by the autumn of the
year 2006 whether to opt for a functional federation or functional sep-
aration. In the view of the Commission, the democratic future of Serbia
is key to the progress in the region. The Commission therefore advo-
cates that Serbia and Montenegro be extended an invitation to PfP
immediately and that Serbia and Montenegro as one or as two coun-
tries should start negotiations or be offered a Europe Agreement at the
Balkan Summit in the autumn of 2006.
The Commission regards the success of the Ohrid process in Macedonia
as a model for other parts of the Balkans. Furthermore, it urges the
European Commission to use the suggested Balkan Summit of the EU
to start accession talks with Macedonia by the autumn of 2006 at the
latest. In the summer of 2006, Macedonia should receive an invitation
to join NATO. In the view of the International Commission on the
Balkans, the dispute over the name of the Republic of Macedonia and
the demarcation of the border with Kosovo are sources of potential
instability in the republic. The international community should concen-
trate on resolving these two issues.
The Commission regards the decision of the EU to start negotiations
with Croatia and the prospect of Croatian membership as central to the
integration of the region as a whole into the EU. The Commission also
envisions Croatia being invited to join NATO in the summer of 2006.
The Commission highly estimates Albania's contribution to the general
stability of the region and thinks that Albania should be invited to join
NATO in the summer of 2006 and be offered negotiations or a Europe
Agreement by the autumn of that year thereby triggering the process
of member-state building in the country.
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The Commission urges the US government to play a more active role in
the region. What the Balkans need most is Washington's political atten-
tion to the problems of the region. The Commission is convinced that
only co-ordinated EU-US policies can help the region to get on, get in
and catch up with the rest of Europe.
In the spirit of supporting the European generation of the Balkans, our
Commission suggests that member states establish a Balkan Student
Visa Programme for 150,000 full-time students in Serbia and
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Albania by June
2005.
After the success in drawing Romania, Bulgaria and possibly Croatia
into the European Union, the logic for a further enlargement is com-
pelling: without the Balkans in the EU, the process of unification will
remain incomplete. Alternatively, the EU runs a serious risk of allowing
a black hole to emerge on the European periphery that could inflict
considerable harm on the European project. 
2014 is the year and Sarajevo is the place where the European Union
can proudly announce the arrival of the European century.
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GDP per capita in EUR
Source: WIIW Balkan Observatory
Source: WIIW Balkan Observatory
table 1
Foreign Direct Investment
(Net FDI inflow, mln EUR)
table 2
ANNEX
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Bosnia 1234 1359 1475 1556 1611
Albania 953 1174 1484 1521 1709
Serbia-Mont 1950 3106 1581 1874 1949
Macedonia 1709 1921 1887 1981 2041
Bulgaria 1481 1674 1920 2101 2249
Romania 1491 1795 2002 2221 2316
Croatia 4102 4502 4998 5451 5747
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Macedonia 30,4 190,1 492,2 82,5 83,5
Albania 39,0 155,0 232,0 143,0 158,0
Bosnia 165,9 158,6 132,8 281,8 337,6
Serbia-Mont 105,0 55,0 186,0 502,0 1197,0
Bulgaria 758,7 1099,7 892,6 951,1 1573,0
Romania 965,0 1161,0 1312,0 1194,0 1587,0
Croatia 1333,0 1177,0 1567,0 627,0 1688,0
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Overall Evaluation
“How would you evaluate the situation in our country in general?“
Kosovo
Albania
Montenegro
Macedonia
Serbia
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Mean Score
4.6
4.8
3.2
3.1
2.7
2.5
9%
6%
5%
3%
1%
1%
28%
28%
59%
64%
71%
74%
8 The Survey was commissioned by the International Commission on the Balkans and was conducted in November-December 2004
in Macedonia, Albania, Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Macedonia the survey was conducted by FORUM –
Centre for Strategic Research and Documentation, in Albania and Kosovo by BBSS Gallup International, in Serbia and Montenegro
and Bosnia and Herzegovina by SMMRI Strategic Marketing Research. The complete data was analysed by BBSS Gallup International.
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fig. 1
KEY FINDINGS OF THE PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY8
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Excellent/very good", and 1 - "Bad"
fig. 2 Trust in Government
“How would you evaluate the Government in our country at present?“
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fig. 3 Trust in opposition
“How would you evaluate the opposition in our country at present?“
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Development Prospects (Optimism / Pesimism)
“In your opinion where is our country heading?“
0%     20%    40%    60%    80%   100%
Better
No progress / not
developing 
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fig. 4
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Republika Srpska Scenario
“How good or bad will be for our country if the Republika Srpska gets separated
from Bosnia and Herzegovina? How likely is this to happen?“
(citizens of respective country)
1    2       3        4       5        6       7       8        9      10
Kosovo
Albania
Montenegro
Serbia 
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Macedonia
fig. 5
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Excellent/very good", and 1 - "Bad"
**10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Very likely / inevitable", and 1 - "Unlikely"
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Albania and Kosovo Scenario
“Do you think it is good or bad for our country if Albania and Kosovo unite in one country?  
How likely is this to happen?“
(citizens of respective country)
1     2      3         4       5        6       7       8        9      10
Kosovo
Albania
Montenegro
Serbia 
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Macedonia
fig. 6
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Excellent/very good", and 1 - "Bad"
**10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Very likely / inevitable", and 1 - "Unlikely"
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Macedonia Scenario
“Would it be good or bad for our country if Macedonia is separated into 
Albanian and Slavic parts? How likely is this to happen, in your view? “
(citizens of respective country)
1    2       3        4       5        6       7       8        9      10
Kosovo
Albania
Montenegro
Serbia Bosnia & Herzegovina
Macedonia
fig. 7
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Excellent/very good", and 1 - "Bad"
**10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Very likely / inevitable", and 1 - "Unlikely"
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Scenario 1: Albania unit-
ed with Kosovo
Scenario 2: Serbia and
Montenegro split
Scenario 3: Republica
Srpska set apart from
Bosnia & Herzegovina 
Scenario 4: Macedonia
splits into two parts
Unlikely
Very positive
Very negative
Very likely
10
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All countries' evaluation of each hypothetical scenario
“How good or bad for your country will be … ? 
How likely do you think is for this to happen?“
1    2       3        4       5        6       7       8        9      10
Scenario 2
Scenario 1
Scenario 4
Scenario 3
fig. 8
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Excellent/very good", and 1 - "Bad"
**10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Very likely / inevitable", and 1 - "Unlikely"
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fig. 9 "There are still military conflicts to come in my country"
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Rather Agree               Rather Disagree
fig. 10 Status Quo
“Do you agree/disagree with the following statement: "There have been wars in the 
Balkans. It is best that everything stays as it is now and in the future. 
Otherwise it will just become worse“?“
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49%
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Changes of Borders
“Do you agree/disagree with the following statement: "Even if not desirable, 
changes of borders of the Balkan countries may be necessary"?“
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Bosnia & Herzegovina
Macedonia
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58%
58%
36%
36%
32%
24%
25%
31%
36%
45%
46%
39%
Rather Agree               Rather Disagree
fig. 12 Multinational Countries
“Do you agree/disagree with the following statement: "Nationalities in our country can 
live together in one state, only if each nationality is in a separate region"?“
Kosovo
Albania
Serbia
Bosnia & Herzegovina
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12%
56%
60%
62%
71%
75%
69%
Rather Agree               Rather Disagree
fig. 11
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89% 8%    2%
88% 8%   3%
65% 28%     7%
61% 25%     13%
51% 26% 21%
50% 30% 17%
Albania
Kosovo
Macedonia
Montenegro
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Serbia
Importance of the Nation
0%    20%    40%   60%   80%   100%
Nation is important
to me (8+9+10) 
Neither yes, nor not
(4+5+6+7)
Nation is not impor-
tant to me (1+2+3) 
Mean Score
9.3
9.3
7.8
7.6
6.8
7.0
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "The nation is very important to me" and 1,  "The nation not important to me at all."
fig. 13
fig. 14 "My country is being injured by other countries. 
We have to seek justice, if necessary, through power and the army"
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fig. 15 "The peoples of former Yugoslavia will never 
live in peace together again"
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Rather Agree               Rather Disagree
51% 34%        9%
50% 21% 22%
47% 33%       15%
47% 19%          28%
45% 31% 20%
fig. 16
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Albania
Montenegro
Kosovo
Serbia
EU Integration
“How good or bad for our country will it be if the EU takes steps 
towards / makes its objective the accession of ……. to the EU?“
0%    20%    40%   60%    80%   100%
Excellent / very good
(8+9+10)
Neutral (4+5+6+7)
Bad (1+2+3)
Mean Score
7.3
6.8
6.9
6.4
6.6
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Excellent/very good", and 1 - "Bad"
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fig. 17
EU Integration: Expectations
“How likely is that in the next 5 years the EU initiates a procedure for 
the accession of ... to the EU?“
Albania
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Montenegro
Kosovo
Serbia
25%
23%
21%
21%
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35%
29%
33%
44%
39%
Very likely / Inevitable (8+9+10)             
Unlikely (1+2+3)
Mean Score
5.1
5.2
5.0
4.4
4.7
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Very likely / inevitable", and 1 - "Unlikely"
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EU Integration: Evaluation
“How good or bad for our country will it be if the EU takes steps towards / makes its 
objective the accession of … to the EU?
“How likely is it in the next 5 years that the EU will initiate a procedure 
for the accession of … to the EU?“
1      2       3          4       5           6         7         8         9        10
Kosovo
Albania
Montenegro
Serbia 
Bosnia & Herzegovina
fig. 18
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Excellent/very good", and 1 - "Bad"
**10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Very likely / inevitable", and 1 - "Unlikely"
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Verry negative
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72% 8%   2%   18%
71% 10%   5%   14%
62% 15%       8%    15%
56% 11%      4%        29%
54% 15%       5%       26%
49% 16%      13%      22%
fig. 19 Attitudes to Europe
Definitions: Pro-European : Positive to the EU / come closer to the EUPragmatic: Come closer
to the EUAnti EU: Negative To the EU / stay distanced
Albania
Kosovo
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Macedonia
Montenegro
Serbia
Pro-European
Pragmatic
Anti-EU
Not sure
85% 6% 3% 6%
80% 4% 8% 8%
39% 0%        37%              24%
35% 19%           24%        22%
26% 25%         16%             33%
17% 27%             28%          28%
fig. 20 Attitudes to the US
Definitions: Pro-American : Positive to the US / come closer to the USAPragmatic: Come closer
to the USAnti American: Negative To the US / stay distanced
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fig. 21 "The peoples of former Yugoslavia will reunite again 
in the end – in the EU"?
Macedonia
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fig. 22 New Borders
"It will be best if, under the auspices of the International Community, 
new borders are drawn in the former Yugoslavia and each 
large nationality lives in a separate country/state"
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Serbia and Montenegro (July 2004)
Stojan Cerovic Journalist, Vreme
Goran Ciric Mayor of Nis
Nebojsa Covic Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia and
Montenegro
Radivoj Cveticanin Journalist, Danas
Miljenko Dereta Civic Initiatives
Milo Djukanovic Prime Minister of Montenegro
Nemanja Dragicevic Student Union of Serbia
Vuk Draskovic Foreign Minister of Serbia and
Montenegro
Vladimir Goati Social Science Institute
Bratislav Grubacic Journalist, V.I.P. newsletter
Tanja Jordovic Journalist, Pink
Jasa Jovicevic MINA Information Agency
Natasa Kandic Humanitarian Law Center
Dragomir J. Karic Founding President of International
University of Business and Management 
Djoko Kesic Journalist, Kurier
Jelena Kleut Student Union of Serbia
Vojislav Kostunica Prime Minister of Serbia and Montenegro
Bilijana Kovacevic Vuco YUCOM
Miroljub Labus Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia and
Montenegro
Milan Lajhner Patrimons trading company
Sonja Licht School of Modern Politics
Svetozar Marovic President of Serbia and Montenegro
Veran Matic Journalist, “B92“
Jelica Minic European Movement
Tomislav Nikolic President, Serbian Radical Party
Danijel Pantic European Movement
Dusan Pavlovic Political Expert
Lila Radonjic Journalist, Mreza
Zeljka Radulovic Vijesti
Dusan Spasojevic Student Union of Serbia
Stojanovic Political Expert
Milka Tadic Monitor Weekly
Srbijanka Turajlic Belgrade University
Ratko Vlajkovic Mayor of Kragujevac
Hoyt Brian Yee Principal Officer, US Consulate, Podgorica
Kosovo (July 2004)
Fisnik Abrashi Associated Press
General Allard Chief of Operations, KFOR
Snezana Arsic NGO Dona, Strpce
Zorica Barac Women Association, Leposavic
Besim Beqaj Kosovo Coordinator for the Stability Pact
Vesna Bojcic Voice of America, Pristina
Nicolas Booth Senior Advisor to the Head of Pillar I
(Police and Justice)
Charles Brayshaw Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary General, UNMIK
Miomir Cankovic Community Coordinator, Lipljan
Zoran Cirkovic Village of Staro Gradsko
Patrice Coeur-Bizot acting DSRSG, Deputy Head of Pillar II
(UNCA, Civil Administration)
Jugoslav Crvenkovic Village of Staro Gradsko
Melihate Dedushi Program Manager, NGO Flaka
Vlada Dimic Village of Staro Gradsko
Zlatko Dimitrov Director of Office of Political Affairs,
Pillar III (OSCE, Institution Building
and Elections)
Florina Duli Sefaj Republican Club 
Milorad Durlevic Director, Fabrika Radiatora
Nafiye Gas MP, Democratic Party of Turks in
Kosovo
Astrit  Gashi Koha Ditore
Bashkim  Gashi Council for the Defense of Human
Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF), Prizren
Pater Walter Happel Prizren
Ramush Haradinaj MP and President of Alliance for the
Future of Kosovo (AAK)
Ylber Hysa Kosova Action for Civil Initiative (KACI)
Sadik Idrizi Deputy chairperson and spokesperson
of parliamentary group "Other
Communities" 
Sladjan Ilic Mayor of Strpce
Oliver Ivanovic MP, Member of Democratic Alternative
(DA)
Rev. Sava Janjic 
(‘Father Sava’) Monastery of Decani
Vesna Jovanovic MP, Member of Democratic Alternative
(DA)
Zorica Jovanovic Village of Staro Gradsko
Ljubomir Kragovic MP, Federal Parliament of Serbia and
Montenegro 
Tina Kraja Associated Press
Jakup Krasniqi Minister of Public Services, Secretary
General of PDK
Branislav Krstic Correspondent for Reuters and
National News Agency Fonet 
Dragisa Krstovic MP, Member of Democratic Party (DS)
Dojcin Kukurekovic Vice President of the Serb Chamber of
Commerce in Kosovo, President of the
Association of Small Businesses
Majka Makarije Monastery Sokolica
Leon Malazogu Program Director, Kosovar Institute for
Policy Research and Development
(KIPRED)
Jill Muncy Acting Police Commissioner, UNMIK 
Muhamet Mustafa President, RIINVEST - Institute for
Development Research
Randjel Nojkic MP, Member of Serbian Renewal
Movement (SPO)
Xhevat Olluri President of the Municipal Assembly of
Lipljan
Dragan Petkovic Community Coordinator, Gnjilan
Nebi Quena Kosovo's Public Broadcaster (RTK)
Zivojin Rakocevic Glas Juga and KiM Radio
Bajram Rexhepi Prime Minister of Kosovo 
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Ibrahim Rugova President of Kosovo 
Ahmet  Shala Deputy Director, Kosovo Trust Agency
Blerim Shala Zeri
Bishop Marko Sopi Head of the Catholic Community
Nexhmedin Spahiu Radio Television Kosovo (RTV)
Nevenka Spilkovic NGO NADA, Gjilan
Boban Stankovic NGO Council for Protections of Human
Rights - CPHR
Bogoljub Stefanovic Village of Staro Gradsko
Danko Stolic Village of Staro Gradsko
Naim Ternava Head of the Islamic Community of Kosovo
Hashim Thaci MP and President of Kosovo
Democratic Party (PDK)
Milorad Todorovic Minister-Coordinator for Returns,
Provisional Kosovo Government 
Boban Vignjevic Deputy Mayor of Lipljan
Andreas Wittkowsky Head of the Political and Legal Office,
Pillar IV (EU, Reconstruction and
Economic Development)
Albania (July 2004)
Hans-Peter Annen Ambassador of Germany
Baba Reshat Bardhi Head of Bektashi Community
Sokol Berberi Executive Director, Center for
Parliamentary Studies 
Sali Berisha President of Democratic Party (DP)
Erinda Bllaca Association of Former Property Owners
Carlo Bollino Gazeta Shqiptare 
Luan Bregasi President, Chamber of Commerce
Ylli Cabiri Human Development Promotion Center 
Pantelis Carcabassis Ambassador of Greece 
Ilirian Celibashi Head of the Central Electoral Commission 
Robert Damo Mayor of Korca 
Namik Dokle Deputy Prime Minister
Admir Duraj Association of Former Property Owners 
Alex Finnen Deputy Head of OSCE Presence in
Albania 
Sabri Godo Member of the Steering Committee of
Albanian Republican Party (RP)
Argile Gorea Former Mayor of Durres 
Artan Haxhi Shkoder Mayor of Shkodra
Odeta Haxhia Student of Social Sciences 
Avni Hoxha Local TV owner 
Vasilika Hysi Director, Helsinki Committee for
Human Rights
Attilio Massimo Lannucci Ambassador of Italy 
Gent Ibrahimi Executive Director, Institute for Policy
and Legal Studies
Archbishop Janullatos Head of Orthodox Church 
Grigor Joti General Manager, Infosoft Group
Perparim Kalo Managing Partner, Kalo & Associates
Lefter Koka Mayor of Durres
Koco Kokedhima Publisher, Shekulli Daily News 
Vajdin Lamaj Businessman
Remzi Lani Executive Director, Albanian Media
Institute
Edmond Leka CEO, Western Union 
Arbi Masniku Deputy Executive Director, MJAFT
Movement 
Vjollca Mecaj Executive Director, Women Center
Fatmir Mediu MP, President of Albanian Republican
Party (RP)
Ermelinda Meksi Minister of European Integration
Isa Memia Mayor of Tropoja
Arian Mene General Manager, DEKA Company
Archbishop Rrok Mirdita Head of Catholic Church 
Pirro Misha Director, Book and Communication
House
Alfred Moisiu President of the Republic of Albania
Selim Mucho Head of Islamic Community 
Genc Pollo Chairman of New Democratic Party
(PDR)
Ylli Popa Chairman of the Academy of Sciences
Albert Rakipi Director, Albanian Institute for
International Studies
Edi Rama Mayor of Tirana
Lutz Salzmann Head of Delegation, European Commission 
Dr. Gjergji Sauli President of the Constitutional Court
Kresnik Spahiu Director, Citizens' Advocacy Office 
Igli Toska Minister of Public Order
Ardian Turku Mayor of Elbasan 
Vebi Velija President, VEVE Group 
Steven E. Zate Charge d'Affaires, Embassy of the
United States of America
Leka Zogu Honorary President, Movement of
Legality Party
Macedonia (September 2004)
Ali Ahmeti President, Democratic Union for
Integration 
Zoran Andonovski Vreme
Venko Andonovski University of Skopje 
Stojan Andov Liberal Party
Teuta Arifi Vice President, Democratic Union for
Integration
Siljan Avramovski Minister of Interior
Kristof Bender European Stability Initiative 
Gligor Bishev CEO, Stopanska Banka
Sandra Bloemenkamp Representative of the World Bank in
Macedonia
Lawrence Butler Ambassador of the USA
Romeo Dereban Mayor of Struga
Donato Chiarini Head of Delegation, Delegation of the
European Commission
Den Donchev VMRO - Narodna
Jovan Donev Euro-Balkan Institute
Tobias Flessenkemper Program Coordinator, EU Police
Mission in Macedonia (PROXIMA)
Lubomir Frckovski Former Minister of Interior and Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Macedonia
Branko Gerovski Dnevnik Daily
Zvetan Grozdanov President of Macedonian Academy of
Sciences
Nikola Gruevski VMRO-DPMNE
Riza Halimi Mayor of Presevo (Kosovo)
Lurzim Haziri ADI
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Lutfi Haziri Mayor of Gjilan/Gnjilane, Kosovo
Guner Ismail Forum Magazine
Murtezan Ismaili Mayor of Tetovo
Georgi Ivanov Social Democratic Institute
Zoran Jachev Transparency Macedonia 
Svetozar Janevski Pivara Skopja AD
Saso Klekovski Macedonian Center for International
Cooperation 
Hari Kostov Prime Minister of Macedonia 
Slobodan Kovacevski Mayor of Kumanovo
Vladimir Milchin Open Society Institute Macedonia
Ognyan Minchev Institute for Regional and International
Studies, Bulgaria
Sasho Ordanovski Forum Magazine
Vlado Popovski University of Skopje
Erol Rizaov Utrinski Vesnik Daily
Kevin Ross Representative of the International
Monetary Fund in Macedonia 
Iso Rusi Albanian language weekly Lobi
Michael Sahlin EU Special Representative in Macedonia
Behicudin Sehapi El Hilal 
Radmila Shekerinska Deputy Prime Minister of Macedonia 
Gordana Siljanovska University of Skopje
Archbishop Stefan Head of Orthodox Church
Veton Surroi Publisher, Koha Ditore, Kosovo
Attila Szendrei CEO, Makedonski Telekomunikacii
Sladjana Taseva former chair of Macedonia's Anti-
Corruption Commission, director of
the Police Academy
Biljana Vankovska University of Skopje
Arben Xhaferi President Democratic Party of Albanians
Richard Zink Director European Agency for
Reconstruction (Thessalonica)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (December 2004)
Nidzara Ahmetasevic Slobodna Bosna
Fatmir Alispahic Valten Newspaper
Edo Arsnalagic Bosnaljek Pharmaceutics Sarajevo
Paddy Ashdown High Representative, OHR
Ivan Barbalic President of the Alumni Association of
the Center for Interdisciplinary
Postgraduate Studies
Becirevic Mayor of Municipal Centre Sarajevo
Taida Begic Deputy Director of the Center for
Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies
Ivica Cavar Centers for Civil Initiatives, Mostar
Dragan Cavic President, Republika Srpska; Chairman, SDS
Mustafa Ceric Head of Islamic Community
Dragan Covic Presidency Member (Croat), National
Government, HDZ
Dragoljub Davidovic Mayor of Banja Luka
Saba D'Elia Ambassador of Italy
Boris Diviak Transparency International
Srdan Dizdarevic Helsinki Committee on Human Rights
Dino Djipa PRISMA
Petar Djokic Former President of Federal Assembly,
Socialist Party of Republika Srpska
Milorad Dodik Chairman, SNSD 
Sacir Filandra Professor of Political Science
Jakob Finci Head of Jewish Community
Emina Ganic Director, Sarajevo Film Festival
Dobrila Govedarica Executive Director, Soros Foundation
Nedzad Grabus Islamic Faculty, University of Sarajevo
Tomo Grizelj Chairman of Bosnian Business
Association
Nedzad Hadzimusic Ambassador, Multilateral Relations,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Michael Humphreys Delegation of the European
Commission
Jasmen Imamovic Mayor of Tuzla
Mladen Ivanic Minister of Foreign Affairs, National
Government, PDP 
Bakir Izetbegovic Deputy Chairman, SDA
Hamdija Jahic Mayor of Mostar
Zvone Jukic Dnevni List, Mostar
Eldin Karic Editor in Chief, START Magazine
Freiherr von Kittlitz 
und Ottendorf Ambassador of Germany
Zeljko Komsic Mayor of Novo Sarajevo, SDP
Boro Kontic Director, Media Centar
Zeljko Kopanja Nezavisne Novine Newspaper
Senka Kurtovic Oslobodenje Daily
Lejla Letic Student of the Postgraduate Course,
Human Rights and Democracy in
Southeastern Europe
Sefic Lojo
Ivan Lovrenovic Journalist, Dani
Markovic Former Mayor of Municipal Centre
Sarajevo, SDP
Douglas McElhaney Ambassador of USA
Dapo Mirsad Brcko District Government
Dino Mustafic Director, MESS Theatre Festival
Hilmo Neimarlija Head of IC Council
Zlatan Ohranovic Executive Director, Centers for Civil
Initiatives
Orucevic Former Deputy Mayor of Mostar
Zarko Papic Economy Expert, IBHI
Borislav Paravac Presidency Chairman (Serb), National
Government, SDS
Zeljko Paukovic Youth Communication Center
Senad Pecanin Dani
Zoran Puljic Executive Director, Mozaik -
Community Development Foundation
Fahrudin Radoncic Owner, Dnevni Avas 
Nikola Radovanovic Minister of Defence, National
Government, SDS
Brothers Sabanovic Bosmal
Vehid Sehic director of the Forum of Tuzla Citizens
Hilmo Selimovic Brewery Sarajevo
Fadil Sero Executive Manager, Civil Society
Promotion Center
Faruk Sirbegovic contruction businessmen
Zekerijah Smajic Sense agency
Adnan Terzic Chairman, Council of Ministers, National
Government; Deputy President of SDA 
Sulejman Tihic Presidency Member (Bosniak), National
Government; President of SDA
Neven Tomic Former Mayor of Mostar
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Osman Topcagic Director, EU Integration Department
at Council of Ministers 
Henry Zipper de Fabiani Ambassador of France
Kresmir Zubak New Croat Initative
Edin Zubvevic Director, Jazz Festival
Croatia (December 2004)
Tomo Aracic President, Association of Croatian
Settlers from BiH (ZUNH), Knin 
Damir Azenic GONG 
Zvjezdana Bajic-Zeljak Association Zvonimir Knin
Ivan Begovic County Prefect of Viroviticko-
Podravska County 
Nikolina Colovic Activist from Knin 
Mirela Despotovic Center for Civil Initiatives 
Milan Dukic Mayor of Donji Lapac, Member of
Serbian National Party (SNS)
Andrea Feldman President, Soros Foundation Croatia 
Boris Grigic Head of EU Department, Ministry for
Foreign Affairs
Nenad Ivankovic President of Party "Independence and
Progress" (SIN)
Ivan Jakovic County Prefect of Istarska County 
Suzi Jasic GONG 
Ljubo Jurcic MP, Professor at Faculty of Economics 
Bojana Kovacic Central State Administrative Office 
Josip Kregar Professor at the Faculty of Law,
University of Zagreb
Bruno Lopandic Vjesnik 
Zoran Maksic Director of Finance Agency (FINA)
Stjepan Mesic President of the Republic of Croatia
Sasa Milosevic Serbian Democratic Forum
Sladana Miocic former Assistant Minister, Ministry of
Environmental Protection 
Sevko Omerbasic Head of Islamic Community in Croatia
Miroslav Parac Businessman from Knin 
Petar Pasic Mayor of Evenik 
Nebojsa Paunovic UNHCR Office Knin 
Antun Petrovic President, Transparency International
Croatia 
Milorad Pupovac Vice-President of Independent
Democratic Serb Party (SDSS)
Vesna Pusic President of Croatian People's Party (HNS)
Ivica Racan President of Social Democratic Party (SDP)
Miroslav Rozic Vice President of Croatian Party of the
Right (HSP)
Nikola Safer County Prefect of Vukovarsko-
Srijemska County 
Ivo Sanader Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia
Zdenka Sintraga Association Hocu Kuci  
Olgica Spevec Agency for the Protection of Market
Competition 
Gordana Stojanovic Coalition for Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights
Vojislav Stanimirovic President of Independent Democratic
Serb Party (SDSS)
Mladen Vedris Economic analyst 
Damir Vidovic Komunalno Poduzece Knin 
Boris Vujcic Deputy Governor, 
Croatian National Bank
Kosovo (February 2005)
Goran Bogdanovic Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija
Ramush Haradinaj Prime Minister of Kosovo
Oliver Ivanovic Leader of Serbian List for Kosovo and
Metohija
Marko Jaksic Law student, Kosovska Mitrovica
Stojna Jevtic Director of elementary school 21.
Novembar" in Gojbulja
Vesna Jovanovic Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija;
Member of Democratic Alternative (DA)
Faruk Korenica Public prosecutor, Kosovska Mitrovica
Bratislav Kostic Teacher at elementary school 21.
Novembar", Gojbulja
Stojan Kovacevic Coordinator for the Serbian communi-
ty in the Office for Minorities
Nebojsa Maric Public servant, Kosovska Mitrovica 
Suncica Masic Director of the Center for Social Work,
Priluzje 
Snezana Milic Village of Vucitrn
Vuceta Milenkovic Teacher at elementary school 21.
Novembar", Gojbulja 
Adem Mripa Kosovska Mitrovica
Randjel Nojkic Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija,
Member of Serbian Renewal Movement
Misko Popovic Community Coordinator in Vucitrn 
Slavisa Petkovic Minister for Returns 
Ibrahim Rugova President of Kosovo
Zecir Rusiti Kosovska Mitrovica
Veton Surroi President of ORA (Time")
Dragisa Terentic Village of Priluzje 
Hashim Thaci MP and President of Kosovo
Democratic Party (PDK)
Macedonia (February 2005)
Silvana Boneva VMRO-DPMNE
Vlado Buckovski Prime Minister of Macedonia
Argon Buxhaku Vice President of the Democratic Union
of Integration 
Branko Crvenkovski President of the Republic of Macedonia
Nikola Gruevski President of VMRO-DPMNE
Gordana Jankuloska General Secretary, VMRO-DPMNE
Trajko Slaveski VMRO-DPMNE
Arben Xhaferi Leader of the Democratic Party of
Albanians 
Serbia (February 2005)
Srdjan Bogosavljevic Strategic Marketing
Nebojsa Covic President of the Joint Coordinating
Center for Kosovo and Metohija
Biljana Jovic Joint Coordinating Center for Kosovo
and Metohija
Vojislav Kostunica Prime Minister of Serbia and Montenegro
Jelica Minic European Movement in Serbia
Boris Tadic President of Serbia and Montenegro
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GIULIANO AMATO
Former Prime Minister
Italy
Mr. Amato was Prime Minister from 1992 to 1993 and from
2000 to 2001. Thereafter he served as Vice President of
the Convention.
Mr. Amato was a Member of Parliament from 1983 to
1994; Under Secretary to the Prime Minister's Office from
1983 to 1987; Minister for the Treasury from 1987 to 1989
and from 1999 to 2000; Minister for Constitutional
Reforms from 1998 to 1999; Deputy Prime Minister from
1987 to 1988. He also headed the Italian Antitrust
Authority from 1994 to 1997.
Full Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law at the
University of Rome, School of Political Science, from 1975
to 1997, he had been Full Professor at the Universities of
Modena, Perugia, Florence. Presently he is Global Law
Professor at the NYU Law School and part time Professor
at the EUI in Florence.
Mr. Amato has written books and articles on the economy
and public institutions, personal liberties, federalism and
comparative government. 
CARL BILDT
Former Prime Minister
Sweden
In Sweden, Mr. Bildt served as Member of Parliament
from 1979 to 2001, Chairman of the Moderate Party from
1986 to 1999 and Prime Minister from 1991 to 1994. 
Mr. Bildt served as European Union Special Representative
to the Former Yugoslavia as well as the first High
Representative in Bosnia between 1995 and 1997, and
then as Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations to the Balkans between 1999 and 2001.
In the United States, he is the only non-US member of the
Board of Trustees of the RAND Corporation and on the Board
of the Centre for European Reform as well as the Council of
the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. 
Apart from numerous other awards, Mr. Bildt has an hon-
orary degree from the University of St. Andrews in
Scotland, where he is a Fellow at its renowned Institute
for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence.
AVIS BOHLEN
Former Assistant Secretary of State 
United States
Until May 2002, Ms. Bohlen was Assistant Secretary of
State for Arms Control. A career Foreign Service officer,
she also served as US Ambassador to Bulgaria, Deputy
Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Paris, and Deputy
Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian affairs for
European security issues. She previously served as Director
of the Office of European Security and Political Affairs,
Executive Director of the US Delegation to the US-Soviet
Nuclear and Space Arms Talks in Geneva, Deputy Political
Counsellor at the US Embassy in Paris, and Chief of the
Strategic Affairs and Arms Control Section in the Office of
NATO Affairs. 
Currently member of the Board of Directors of the
International Research and Exchange Board IREX in
Washington, DC. In 2003 was a Public Policy Scholar at the
Woodrow Wilson International Centre. 
Ms. Bohlen received the President's Distinguished Service
Award in 1991. 
JEAN-LUC DEHAENE
Former Prime Minister
Belgium
Mr. Jean-Luc Dehaene gained his degrees in law and eco-
nomics at the Universities of Namur and Leuven. From 1971,
he held the position of advisor, then as Head of Cabinet for
several different Ministers. He first held a ministerial post in
1981. From 1988 to 1992, he then became Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Traffic and Transport and
Institutional Reform. Finally, as Prime Minister, he led two
governments, from 1992 to 1995, and subsequently from
1995 to July 1999. 
He is seen as the architect of state reform. He led Belgium into
the Euro economy and reorganised the government finances.
Mr. Jean Luc Dehaene was vice chairman of the European
Convention and is at present a Member of the European
Parliament.
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KEMAL DERVIS
Member of Parliament
Turkey
Mr. Dervis holds a Degree in Economics from the London
School of Economics and Political Science and a PhD in
Economics from Princeton University, USA.
Following his studies, Mr. Dervis lectured at the
Department of Economics of the Middle Eastern Technical
University. In 1973-1976, he served then Prime Minister
Bulent Ecevit as an advisor on issues relating to the econ-
omy and international relations. He then returned to
Princeton University teaching economics and international
relations. 
In 1978, he took office at the World Bank, where in 1991 he
became Head of the Central Europe Department, includ-
ing former Yugoslavia and Albania.  In 1996, he became a
Vice-President of the World Bank in charge of Middle East
and Africa Region. In May 2000, he was appointed Vice-
President responsible for Poverty Reduction and Economic
Management. In March 2001 he left the World bank to
become Minister for Economic Affairs of his country, called
back to deal with the financial crisis that erupted in
February 2001. After the crisis was overcome he resigned
from the government in August 2002 and was subsequent-
ly elected to Parliament in November of 2002. He also rep-
resented the Turkish parliament in the Convention for the
Future of Europe. 
Mr. Dervis has published numerous articles on economic
policy and development economics. He is co-author of
"General Equilibrium Models for Development Policy" and
recently published a new book entitled "A Better
Globalization".
MIRCEA DAN GEOANA
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Romania
An alumnus of the Polytechnic Institute and, respectively,
the Law School at the University of Bucharest, Mr. Mircea
Geoana graduated in 1992 the "Ecole Nationale
d'Administration" in Paris, France. He served as professor
at the National School for Political and Administration
Sciences and the "Nicolae Titulescu" University in
Bucharest. He graduated the 1999 World Bank Group
Executive Development Program at the Harvard Business
School.
In February 1996, was appointed Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Romania to the
United States of America. Prior to his appointment to
Washington, he was Director General at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Romania. From 1993 to 1995 he also
served as Spokesman for the Romanian Foreign Ministry.
Mr. Mircea Geoana was Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Romania in 2000-2004. In this capacity, he served as OSCE
Chairman-in-Office in 2001. In December 2004 he was
elected Member of the Romanian Senate.
KIRO GLIGOROV
President of the Republic of Macedonia (1991-1999)
Mr. Gligorov graduated from the Law Faculty in Belgrade
in 1939. At the outbreak of the Second World War, he took
part actively in the anti-fascist and people's liberation
movement in Macedonia. From 1945 to the beginning of
the 60s, he held specialised executive functions in the
spheres of economy and finance in Belgrade. From 1963 to
1969 he was Minister of Finance of the SFR of Yugoslavia.
One of the leading economists supporting the advance-
ment of market economy in Yugoslavia, he was elected a
member of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (1974-1978) and President of the Parliament
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Thereafter
he was forced to abstain from political activities.
At the onset of the crises in Yugoslavia (1989-1990) he
made a comeback in the political life of Macedonia, pro-
moting multi-party elections and the introduction of a
market economy. These activities resulted in his election as
President of the Republic of Macedonia, in the first free,
multi-party elections held in January 1991. 
While he was in office as President, the Republic of
Macedonia proclaimed its independence and became the
only Republic of the former SFR Yugoslavia to attain its
independence though a peaceful and legitimate manner. 
On the first general presidential elections in the Republic
of Macedonia held in October 1994, Mr. Kiro Gligorov was
re-elected President of the Republic of Macedonia with a
five year term, which he completed in 1999.
ISTVAN GYARMATI
Chairman, Centre for Euro Atlantic 
Integration and Democracy
Hungary
Mr. Gyarmati is currently Chairman of the Board of the
Centre for Euro Atlantic Integration and Democracy in
Budapest and Co-Chairman of the International Security
Advisory Board for Southeast Europe of the Geneva-based
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. 
He has been a Foreign Service officer since he graduated
from the Budapest University of Economics, Faculty of
Diplomacy, in 1974. His postings include member of the
Hungarian delegation to the MBFR and IAEA (1981-86,
Vienna), to the CSCE Follow-up Meeting (1987-89,
Vienna), Head of Delegation to the CFE, CSBM, Opens
Skies Negotiations (1990-92, Vienna), Head of Security
Policy Department, MFA (Budapest, 1992-96); Personal
Representative of the CSCE/OSCE Chairman-in-Office in
Georgia (1992-93), Chechnya (1995) and the Negotiations
on CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996), Chairman of
the OSCE Senior Council (1995), Executive Secretary of the
Budapest CSCE Summit (1994); Under-Secretary of
Defence (1996-99), Chairman of the Missile Technology
Control Regime (1998-99), Chief Adviser of the Foreign
Minister on Security Policy and Chairman of the OPCW
(1999-2000), Senior Vice President for Policy and Programs
of the East West Institute. 
Mr. Gyarmati holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and is a can-
didate of Strategic Studies. He is member of the IISS, of
numerous scientific projects, Associate Professor at the
Zrinyi Miklos National Defence University. He is author of
numerous publications on security policy, European secu-
rity, conflict management and Hungarian defence policy.
FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG
Director
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
France
Mr. Heisbourg began his career as a member of the
French foreign ministry's policy planning staff followed by
a position at the French Permanent Mission to the U.N.
(New-York). 
From 1981-84 he was the International security adviser to
the French Minister of Defence as well as a founder mem-
ber of the French-German Commission on Security and
Defence. He took over the Directorship of the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in
London. In the years 1992-98, he was Senior Vice-
President (Strategic development) at MATRA-Defense-
Espace and subsequently was made Director of the
Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique in Paris. He is
adviser to the French Foreign Ministry Planning Staff;
Board member of the Aspen Institute in Berlin and
Member of the Royal Society for the Encouragement of
Arts, Manufacture and Commerce; Chairman, Geneva
Centre for Security Policy.
Mr. Heisbourg has published numerous articles and inter-
views in the academic and general media in both English
and French among which 'Hyperterrorisme: la nouvelle
guerre', 2001, and 'La Fin de l'Occident? L'Amérique,
l'Europe et le Moyen Orient', 2005.
BRUCE P. JACKSON
President
Project on Transitional Democracies
United States
Mr. Bruce Jackson is the founder and President of the
Project on Transitional Democracies, a multi-year endeav-
our aimed at the integration of post-1989 democracies
into the institutions of the Euro-Atlantic. 
From 1986 to 1990, he served in the Office of the Secretary
of Defence in a variety of policy positions pertaining to
nuclear forces and arms control. In 1990, Mr. Jackson
joined Lehman Brothers, an investment bank in New York.
Between 1993 and 2002, Mr. Jackson was Vice President
for Strategy and Planning at Lockheed Martin Corporation.
From 1995 until 2003, he was the President of the US
Committee on NATO, a non-profit corporation formed in
1996 to promote the expansion of NATO and the strength-
ening of ties between the United States and Europe.
During the 2002-2003, he served as the Chairman of the
Committee for the Liberation of Iraq.
He continues to serve on the Board of Directors of the
Project for the New American Century, a non-profit corpo-
ration involved in educating American opinion on foreign
policy and national security.
ZLATKO LAGUMDZIJA
President, Social Democratic Party
Former Prime Minister 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Mr. Lagumdzija holds a Ph.D. in computer Science and
Electrical Engineering at University of Sarajevo. He is a pro-
fessor of Management Information System at the School
of Economics and at the Computer Science and Electrical
Engineering School, University of Sarajevo since 1989.
President of the Social Democratic Party of B&H (SDP)
since 1997. Member of Parliament of B&H, House of
Representatives since 1996.
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of B&H (Prime
Minister) 2001 - 2002. Minister of Foreign Affairs of B&H in
2001 - 2003. Acting Prime Minister 1993. Deputy Prime
Minister of B&H 1992 - 1993.
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Member of "Global Leaders for Tomorrow" of the World
Economic Forum, since 1998. Awarded with numerous
international and national awards for his professional and
expert results. 
Postdoctoral research at MIS Department and CCIT at
University of Arizona, Tucson 1988/89. Consultant to various
business and governmental organizations. Author over hun-
dred research and expert papers and four books in MIS
area. Author of numerous articles on Bosnian political and
economic issues and series of independent TV forums on
Bosnian future.
ILIR META
Former Prime Minister
Albania
Mr. Ilir Meta is Chairman of the Socialist Movement for
Integration, which began in September 2004 as a reform
movement within the Socialist Party. He has graduated
from the Faculty of Economy, Tirana University. He was
involved in political life at the beginning of the 1990s as a
member of the leadership of the Student Movement. A
member of the Socialist Party Leading Council since 1992,
Mr. Meta was SP vice chairman during 1993-1996. In the
period 1996-1997, Meta was deputy chairman of the
Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission. 
Mr. Meta was appointed Prime Minister of Albania in
1999, and was reconfirmed in this post after the June 2001
elections. Mr. Meta resigned in January 2002 to give way
to a solution of a government crisis.  
In August 2002 he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, from which he resigned in
June 2003, as result of the failure of the government to
pursue the reforms toward EU integration.
NEVEN MIMICA 
Former Minister for European Integration 
Croatia
Mr. Mimica received in 1976 a degree in Economics from
the University of Zagreb and in 1987 a Master's degree
from the Faculty of Economics. 
Between 1979-83 he was a Research Associate and Adviser
at the Republic Committee for International Relations, in
1983-87 he became Assistant to the President of the
Republic Committee for the International Relations in
Charge of Foreign Exchange System and Foreign Trade
System.
Between 1987 and 1997 he served at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia. 
In 1997 Mr. Mimica was appointed Assistant Minister for
International Economic Relations at the Croatian Ministry
of Economy. In 2000, he was appointed Chief Negotiator
for Stabilization and Association Agreement and Deputy
Minister of Economy of the Republic of Croatia. In 2001-
2003 he occupied the position of Minister for European
Integration. Since November 2003 he is member of the
Croatian Parliament.
DAME PAULINE NEVILLE-JONES
Former Governor of BBC
United Kingdom
Ms. Dame Pauline Neville-Jones is Chairman of QinetiQ
Group plc, a defence technology company with govern-
ment customers in the UK and USA and Chairman of the
Information Assurance Advisory Council (IAAC).  She is a
member of the UK governing Board of the International
Chambers of Commerce (ICC) and of the governing
Council of Oxford University.
From 1998-2004 she was the International Governor of the
BBC with responsibility, among other things, for external
broadcasting, notably the BBC World Service (radio and
online) and BBC World (television).  
Prior to that, she was a career member of the British
Diplomatic Service serving, among other places, in
Singapore, Washington DC, the European Commission in
Brussels and Bonn. She was a foreign affairs adviser to
Prime Minister John Major (1991-1994), chairman of the
Joint Intelligence Committee in Whitehall (1993-1994). As
Political Director in the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (1994-96), she was leader of the British delegation
to the Dayton peace conference on Bosnia.
She is a graduate of Oxford University and was a Harkness
Fellow of the Commonwealth Fund in the United States
(1961-1963).  She was made a Dame Commander of the
Order of St Michael and St George (DCMG) in 1995. She is
a Doctor of the Open and London Universities.
JANEZ POTOCNIK
Member of the European Commission
Slovenia
Mr. Janez Potocnik graduated with honours from the
Faculty of Economics at the University of Ljubljana, where
he did his Ph.D. degree in 1993. 
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For several years (1989-1993), he worked as a researcher at
the Institute of Economic Research in Ljubljana. In July
1994, he was appointed Director of the Institute of
Macroeconomic Analysis and Development of the
Republic of Slovenia. In 1998 he was appointed Head of
the Negotiating Team for Accession of the Republic of
Slovenia to the European Union. 
In 2002, the Government of the Republic of Slovenia
appointed Mr. Potocnik the Minister without portfolio
responsible for European Affairs.
Since 2004 he is Member of the European Commission
responsible for Science and Research.
ALEXANDROS GEORGE RONDOS
Former Ambassador at Large
Greece
Mr. Rondos, a Greek national, born in Dar-es-Salaam,
Tanzania, was educated in Kenya and the UK where com-
pleted BA (Hons) at Oxford University (Brasenose College). 
Career has included journalism at West Africa Magazine, fol-
lowed by twelve years work in relief and development work.
After two years at the World Bank, became an adviser to
the Foreign Minister of Greece, counselling him and imple-
menting changes in Greek strategy in the Balkans as well
as helping manage the Greek Presidency of the European
Union during the Iraq crisis. 
Throughout this period also served as a personal envoy of
the Foreign Minister on missions to Turkey, governments
in the Middle East, Europe and the USA. 
GORAN SVILANOVIC 
Chair, WT I, Stability Pact for SEE
Former Minister for Foreign Affairs
Serbia and Montenegro
Mr. Svilanovic graduated from Belgrade University's School
of Law in 1987, and received his M.A. degree in 1993. At
the end of 1998, Svilanovic, along with another six profes-
sors, was expelled from the Law School for his participa-
tion in a strike organized to protest against the new and
restrictive university Law. 
In 1993 Mr. Svilanovic organized a legal aid department "SOS
line for the victims of national, ethnic and religious policy
and trade union discrimination" in the Centre for Anti-War
Action, dealing with the protection of minorities in Serbia. 
In December 1995, Mr. Svilanovic was elected president of
the centre's Council for Human Rights in Belgrade, mem-
ber of FIDH.
President of the Civic Alliance, political party 1999-2004.
Member of Federal Parliament 2000-2003. Federal
Minister of foreign affaires of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, later Serbia and Montenegro, 2000-2004.
Since January 2004 Member of the Parliament of Serbia.
Since November 2004, Chair of the Working table I of the
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.
In 1996 the University of Belgrade published his book "Proposal
for Repetition of Legal Proceedings." Svilanovic wrote a large
number of articles in the sphere of law, most of them concen-
trating on the condition of human rights in Yugoslavia.
RICHARD VON WEIZSÄCKER
President of Germany (1984 - 1994)
Mr. Richard von Weizsäcker studied philosophy and histo-
ry in Oxford and Grenoble. In 1938 he joined the army and
participated in World War II. In 1945-1950, Mr. von
Weizsäcker continued his studies in Göttingen. 
Mr. von Weizsäcker was elected to the Bundestag in 1969.
He served as vice president of the Bundestag (1979-1981),
but he resigned the office to become the governing
mayor of West Berlin (1981 - 1984).
In 1984, Mr. von Weizsäcker as the CDU/CSU candidate
won the presidential election. On May 8, 1985 - the 40th
anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe - he
made a dramatic speech to the Bundestag that articulat-
ed the historic responsibility of Germany and Germans for
the crimes of Nazism. Running unopposed for the first
time in the history of presidential elections in Germany,
Weizsäcker was re-elected in 1989. His second term wit-
nessed the process of the unification of Germany and col-
lapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.
He was one of the "Three Wise Men" who were request-
ed by the President of the European Union, Romano
Prodi, to elaborate suggestions for institutional reform of
the European Union in preparation for the integration of
new member states (1999). 
IVAN KRASTEV
Chairman, Centre for Liberal Strategies
Bulgaria
Mr. Ivan Krastev is a political scientist and Chairman of the
Board of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, Bulgaria.
Biographies of Commission Members l Report of the International Commission on the Balkans62
In the last decade he has been visiting fellow at
St. Anthony College, Oxford; Woodrow Wilson Center for
International Scholars in Washington; Collegium Budapest,
Wissenschaftskolleg, Berlin; Institute of Federalism,
University of Fribourg, Switzerland; Institute for Human
Sciences, Vienna and Remarque Forum, New York. 
Since October 2003 he has been the research director of
the project "Politics of Anti-Americanism in the Beginning
of the 21st Century" coordinated by the Central European
University, Budapest. Since January 2004 Mr. Krastev is the
executive director of the International Commission on the
Balkans. 
Among his latest publications in English are: De-
Balkanizing the Balkans: The State of the Debate; The
Balkans: Democracy Without Choices; Corruption, Anti-
Corruption Sentiments, and the Rule of Law. His paper
"The Anti-American century?" appeared in the April 2004
issue of Journal of Democracy. His book "Shifting
Obsessions. Three Essays on Politics of Anti-corruption."
was published by CEU Press in 2004.
SENIOR STAFF
Sandra Breka 
Ms. Sandra Breka joined the Berlin Office of the Robert
Bosch Stiftung as Program Director in January 2001. Her
portfolio primarily includes international programs focus-
ing on Southeast Europe and transatlantic relations. Ms.
Breka furthermore runs the newly established Bellevue-
Fellowship-Program involving several EU member states.
Prior to joining the Robert Bosch Stiftung, she served as
Program Director for Southeast Europe, transatlantic rela-
tions and security issues at the Aspen Institute Berlin after
a previous assignment with the American Council on
Germany in New York City. Ms. Breka is affiliated with sev-
eral international institutions such as the TRANSFUSE
Association and Women in International Security (WIIS).
After studies in Germany, France and the United States, she
obtained her M.A. at Columbia University in New York. 
Vessela Tcherneva
Ms. Vessela Tcherneva is a Program Director at the Centre
for Liberal Strategies, a Bulgarian think-tank since
November 2003. She manages the Centre's programmes
related to the Balkans and the transatlantic relations, as
well as security-related projects. She is the Managing
Editor of Foreign Policy Bulgaria magazine. Ms. Tcherneva
is a career foreign service officer on sabbatical for the time
of existence of the International Commission on the
Balkans. Her last assignment was at the Bulgarian
Embassy in Washington, DC, where she was the political
officer responsible for political-military and security issues
including NATO enlargement; liaison to the US administra-
tion and NGOs; South Eastern Europe. Ms. Tcherneva
holds a M.A. in Political Science from the University in
Bonn, Germany.
LIST OF EXPERTS
Srdjan Bogosavljevic, Strategic Marketing and Media
Research Institute, Belgrade
Srdjan Darmanovic, CEDEM, Podgorica
Misha Glenny, editor
Damir Grubisa, Department for International Economic
and Political Relations, University of Zagreb
Fabrice de Kerchove, Project Manager, King Baudouin
Foundation
Gerald Knaus, Director, European Stability Initiative
Josip Kregar, School of Law, University of Zagreb
Remzi Lani, Executive Director, Albanian Media Institute
James O'Brien, analyst
Stevo Pendarovski, Head of the Macedonian Electoral
Commission
Jean-Louis Six, Honorary Vice-Chairman, King Baudouin
Foundation, Director, EBRD
Jovan Teokarevic, Faculty of Political Science, Belgrade
Walter Veirs, Program Officer, Charles Stewart Mott
Foundation
Ivan Vejvoda, Executive Director, Balkan Trust for
Democracy
Antonina Zheliazkova, Director, International Centre for
Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, Sofia
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ROBERT BOSCH STIFTUNG
The Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH (Robert Bosch Foundation), established in 1964, is one of the largest
German foundations associated with a private company. It embodies the philanthropic endeavors of
founder Robert Bosch (1861-1942) within the structure of the Bosch organization. The Foundation pur-
sues the following purposes: health care, international understanding, social welfare, education, the
arts, culture, the humanities, social and natural sciences. It represents the philanthropic and social
endeavors of founder Robert Bosch 1861-1942) and fulfils his legacy in a contemporary manner in the
flowing program areas:
 Science in Society, Research at Foundation Institutes;
 Health, Humanitarian Aid;
 International Relations;
 Youth, Education and Civil Society.
Its work is organised into five program areas of which two are dedicated to international understand-
ing. The Foundation operates three institutions in Stuttgart: The Robert Bosch Hospital, the Dr.
Margarete Fischer-Bosch Institute for Clinical Pharmacology and the Institute for the History of Medicine.
KING BAUDOUIN FOUNDATION
The King Baudouin Foundation is a public benefit foundation, based in Brussels. It was established in
1976 on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the reign of late King Baudouin with the aim of improv-
ing the living conditions of the population. Four main themes are currently central to its work: the 'Social
Justice' programme seeks out new forms of social inequality and supports initiatives to give greater
autonomy to vulnerable people. The 'Civil Society' programme aims to stimulate civic engagement and
strengthen the NGO sector. The 'Governance' programme seeks to involve citizens more closely in the
decision-making that determines how goods and services are produced and consumed, and in develop-
ments in the medical sciences. Through the 'Funds & Contemporary Philanthropy' programme, the
Foundation wishes to encourage modern forms of generosity. The Foundation is active at local, region-
al, federal, European and international level, with a special focus on Southeastern Europe since 1999.
GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a non-partisan American public policy and
grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between the
United States and Europe. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working on transat-
lantic issues, by convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes, and by examining
ways in which transatlantic cooperation can address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition,
GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from
Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on
both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has five offices in
Europe: Berlin, Paris, Bratislava, Brussels, Belgrade, and Ankara.
CHARLES STEWART MOTT FOUNDATION
The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation is an endowed, nonprofit, private grantmaking foundation based in
Flint, Michigan, U.S.A. Charles Stewart Mott, who was an automotive pioneer in the General Motors
Corporation, established the Foundation in 1926. Through its Civil Society program, the Foundation awards
grants to nonprofit, non-governmental organizations working in Eastern Europe, including South Eastern
Europe, and Russia.  The mission of the Civil Society program is to support efforts to assist in democratic
institution building, strengthen local communities, promote equitable access to resources, and ensure
respect of rights and diversity.  Through the Civil Society program and all of its programs, the Foundation
seeks to fulfill its mission of supporting efforts that promote a just, equitable, and sustainable society.
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BALKANS WAS INITIATED
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